THE USES AND ABUSES OF ANTI-COMMUNISM BY SOUTHERN SEGREGATIONISTS AS A WEAPON OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE, 1948 - 1965

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Table of Contents

Abstract

Within the United States, the southern strategy of Massive Resistance to federally mandated racial desegregation had its origins in 1948, a year which saw the confirmation of Cold War hostilities in Europe. As a result, the dialogue surrounding matters of race was infused with Cold War rhetoric. Between 1950 and 1954, Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy added to this milieu, reinvigorating anti-communism and red-baiting as political weapons. Allied to the traditional southern fear of "outsiders," many southern segregationists seized upon anti-communism as a weapon to undermine opponents promoting change to the region's racial status quo.

This thesis, however, challenges the notion that all segregationists used anti-communism against all integrationists at all times. Rather, anti-communism could be a subtle, flexible political tool which individuals and groups tailored to suit their own needs. At times, it was used to rebuff specific civil rights campaigns, activists and organisations. At others, it was used sparingly. One of the main tenets of this thesis is that, hitherto, segregationists have commonly been treated in rather one-dimensional terms by historians of the civil rights movement. By examining their diverse responses to anti-communism and wider Cold War anxieties, it is argued that they were not the homogeneous political group that many have suggested, but in many ways were as resourceful and pragmatic as those they opposed in the civil rights movement.

This thesis also examines some apparent anomalies in the uses of anti-communism and Cold War rhetoric. Opponents of segregation berated segregationists for undermining America's attempts to court newly independent, post-colonial states in the Caribbean, Asia and Africa. No predominately non-white country, they argued, would align with the US-dominated West rather than the Soviet East with such blatant racism endemic in the American South. Segregationists were accused of being more totalitarian than their Soviet counterparts, and of bringing Soviet-style one party rule to the region.

Finally, by looking in depth at two southern states, North Carolina and Virginia, this thesis will do more justice to the nuances and complexities of anti-communism than would be possible in a broader, regional study. Both states were at the legislative forefront of Massive Resistance, and both propounded a more sophisticated -- though no less determined -- brand of racism than most of their counterparts in the Deep South, largely as a consequence of their reliance on external investment.

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Like Senator McCarthy, I have a list of names; unlike Tail Gunner Joe, I have only gratitude for those in the following list. First, I must thank my supervisor, Brian Ward, for helping me in every stage of this project from its inception to its conclusion. I hope my being here was not what spurred him to accept a prestigious post in the United States. I would also like to thank those who have read versions of earlier drafts, or who have contributed in some other way to the completion of this study: especially Jenny Walker, Emily West, Caroline Brooke, Sylvia Ellis and Jenny Macleod. To those with whom I have shared office space over the last three and a bit years, I can only offer my apologies if they find that their hair is greyer or thinner, or that their finger nails are shorter: Steven Walsh, Jenny Hutchinson and Dave Foster have had to put up with much, but have been invaluable in offering either friendship or advice, and occasionally both.

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Introduction

From the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 onwards, the Soviet Union made no secret of its desire to spread communism around the globe, whether by means of persuasion or force. "First we will take eastern Europe, then the masses of Asia," thundered Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, who had helped orchestrate the Revolution. "Then we will surround America, the last citadel of capitalism. We shall not have to attack. She will fall into our lap like an overripe fruit."[1] After the Second World War, such declarations took on a new relevance as Josef Stalin extended Soviet influence into Eastern Europe. To the West, this was construed as a signal of his expansionist ambitions. By the turn of the decade, the crystallising Cold War had added a chilling realism to Lenin's earlier rhetoric.

Even before the onset of the Cold War, Lenin's theme had been developed by some of his Soviet cohorts. Dimitry Z. Manuilsky, for example, told the Lenin School of Political Warfare in 1931 that "war to the hilt between communism and capitalism is inevitable. Today, of course," he continued, "we are not strong enough to attack. Our time will come in 20 or 30 years. To win we shall need the element of surprise. The bourgeoisie will have to be put to sleep." It was Manuilsky's final remarks, however, that exacerbated fears within the United States for decades to come. "We shall begin by launching the most spectacular peace movement on record. There will be electrifying overtures and unheard of concessions. The capitalist countries, stupid and decadent, will rejoice to co-operate in their own destruction. They will leap at

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[1]Vladimir Ilyich Lenin quoted in The Virginian: Serving the 48 Sovereign States, Vol. IV, No 5 & 6, Kathryn H. Stone Papers, Box 1, Manuscript Division, Special Collections Department, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville.

another chance to be friends."[2] The West was faced with a dilemma: an aggressive Soviet Union would have to be countered in kind, but, as Manuilsky explained, a conciliatory, even comradely Russia was, potentially, at least as dangerous. "As soon as their guard is down," he maintained, "we shall smash them with our clenched fist."[3] The 20 or 30 year wait of which Manuilsky had spoken was due to come to an end in the 1950s and 1960s.

Within the United States, such revolutionary rhetoric emphasised the external threat posed by the ideology of communism, and helped to inform -- and misinform -- views about its nature. The majority of Americans understandably reacted to such thinly veiled threats by supporting various manifestations of anti-communism. What at first appeared to be a straight-forward expression of opposition to communism, however, soon evolved into a highly complex political weapon. At different times, often by very different means and for a variety of motives, a diverse array of American individuals and groups played upon residual anti-communist fears. They did so for personal gain, to undermine personal and ideological enemies, and to foment hatred and mistrust. In sum, anti-communism became a flexible and potent political weapon aimed at a wide variety of targets, not just communists, internal or external.

It is essential to define, and in some cases redefine, some of the terms associated with opposition to communism. Both among contemporaries in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, and within the historiography of anti-communism, there has been a

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[2] By 1949, Manuilsky had climbed the ranks to become the Presiding Officer of the United Nations Security Council. Dimitry Z. Manuilsky quoted on flyer, enclosed with B.M. Miller letter to Wesley Critz George, 29 August 1955, Wesley Critz George Papers, Box 5, Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
[3] ibid.

certain amount of confusion and imprecision surrounding such definitions. For the purposes of this thesis, several of the terms which contemporaries would have seen as synonyms will be used in rather specialised ways, in order to make clear distinctions between the various categories of opposition to communism in post-war America. Here, "anti-communism" is used as a macro-term to define opposition to the ideology of communism, whilst "anti-Communism" is used as a micro-term to denote the subtle, but often important, difference of being opposed to any structured and formalised communist political grouping, whether it be the CPUSA, the Comintern or the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. "Red-baiting," too, has often been used interchangeably with the term "anti-communism." Here, however, red-baiting is used more precisely to describe the cynical manipulation of existing anti-communist fears in an attempt to discredit an opponent or undermine a specific target. Of course, in reality these artificial, analytical boundaries were extremely blurred, and categories of anti-communism often overlapped. McCarthyism, for example, was but one form of red-baiting.[4] Anti-Communism and red-baiting both come under the more generic category of anti-communism. All three constituted attempts to root out, from all corners of United States society, that which was perceived to be un-American; by no means, however, did they confront all that was deemed to be un-American.[5]

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[4] Making light of contemporary confusion over McCarthyism and related terms, Senator Benton, Democrat for Connecticut, rhetorically asked McCarthy in a face-to-face interview, "Don't some people define McCarthyism as the use of the Senate floor to make attacks upon people who do not have a chance to defend themselves against those attacks?" "Interviews with Senator Benton of Connecticut (Democrat) and Senator McCarthy of Wisconsin (Republican) Reprinted from US News & World Report, Washington. Release to press / TV / radio 8 a.m. EDT Monday Sept 3, 1951," Francis Pickens Miller Papers, Box 81, Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

[5] Other groups who have, at various times in US history, come under the auspices of that which is "un-American" include anti-war demonstrators, homosexuals, hippies and other counter-culture exponents.

This thesis aims to analyse how anti-communism was manipulated by southern segregationists between 1948 and 1965, a period which incorporated the zenith of Massive Resistance to integration.[6] The starting and closing dates for this study have been chosen for a number of reasons. For the United States, 1948 was a year of deep significance, both domestically and internationally. The Dixiecrat walkout from the 1948 Democratic National Convention heralded the beginnings of systematic southern resistance against increased northern liberal and federal pressure for civil rights reform. That movement came to fruition eight years later with the signing of the Southern Manifesto and the origins of truly massive southern resistance. In Europe, 1948 saw the exacerbation of Cold War tensions that had been growing steadily since the end of the Second World War. In that year, for example, the Soviet Union orchestrated a purge in Czechoslovakia which left a Stalinist puppet regime in power. In the United States, Communist Party leaders were indicted under the Smith Act, and Alger Hiss first appeared before the House Un-American Activities Committee [HUAC]. In terms of Massive Resistance, 1965 offers a convenient cut off date. By then, the civil rights movement had successfully captured the sympathy of many white Americans, and there was less conviction behind the notion that it was communist-inspired. Indeed, in many ways the crusade for racial equality had been successfully presented to the public as a truly American campaign. The Johnson Administration pushed the Voting Rights Act through Congress, which, combined with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, created statutory equality and outlawed the most overt, legal expressions of southern racism. Although resistance did continue

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[6] The term "segregationist" is used in this study to refer to anyone who condoned the South's segregated racial systems. Thus, it applies to politicians as much as to their constituents, to leaders as much as to followers.

in some areas, notably through the gerrymandering of electoral districts, a severe blow had nonetheless been dealt to the white South's hopes of preserving segregation and disenfranchisement.

Conducting research on the deployment of anti-communism as a weapon of segregationists has involved the use of a wide variety of primary sources. The majority of these were the personal and political papers of southern segregationists. Such papers afford an intimate insight into segregationists' personal views on the subject, especially in letters to fellow white supremacists. Many of these collections, especially those of state governors, also house reams of letters from their constituents, and therefore reveal much about segregationist views at the grass-roots level. Some white supremacists, notably Ernest Sevier Cox and J.B. Matthews, hoarded the broadsides, pamphlets, articles and magazines issued by segregationist groups during Massive Resistance. These sources provided important information, not only concerning segregationist thought, but also about which of those thoughts were most vigorously and successfully disseminated to a wider audience. The papers of some of the individuals who dissented from the anti-communist line, including notable racial moderates and integrationists, were also consulted.

These collections do have some drawbacks: there is, for example, the possibility that they have been "cleansed" before being deposited, as attitudes towards overt racism have changed over time. It is also worth bearing in mind that the constituents who wrote to their political leaders, particularly in a region with lower than average literacy levels, were not necessarily representative of mass popular opinion. On the whole, however, they offer access to a fairly wide spectrum of contemporary thought and debate. The knowledge garnered from those collections has

been augmented by the use of a cross-section of newspapers, magazines, the Congressional Record, microfilmed files and oral history interviews. Most of the FBI files covering the period are now on microfilm, as are those of the Kennedy Administration's Justice Department.

The first two chapters of this thesis seek to analyse the uses of anti-communism as a tool of Massive Resistance on a South-wide basis. While they attempt to find common patterns in the weapon's use, and to identify groups or individuals who were commonly targeted, they also reveal that anti-communism was often deployed by individual segregationists in a highly idiosyncratic manner. The second chapter will focus specifically on the anomalous uses of anti-communism and red-baiting by those southerners not traditionally associated with the weapon, as well as on the various tactics employed to counteract red-baiting.

Chapters three and four will look in depth at Massive Resistance as it was played out in Virginia and North Carolina respectively, and will seek to analyse the ways in which resisters used anti-communism in the two states. Both states were central to the evolution of Massive Resistance in the South, but followed very different paths to defiance. Both formed part of the "Rim" or "Upper South", where attempts were made to conceal some of the most blatant forms of racism that were still being played out very publicly in the Deep South. This required a more complex and variable apparatus of oppression. As a consequence, the tools of that repression, such as anti-communism, were often -- but by no means always -- used in a more elaborate and sophisticated manner than elsewhere in the South, where overt terror and intimidation were commonplace.

More immediately, the aim of this introduction is to map out the main thematic concerns of this thesis; to position it within the existing historiography; to clarify the terminology and chronology; and to sketch out the tradition of anti-communism of which southern segregationists were both heirs and architects.

II

The historiography of Massive Resistance has tended to over-generalise and over-simplify where the use of anti-communism is concerned; similarly, the historiography of anti-communism has tended to overlook the intricacies and nuances of the phenomenon when it was employed in the cause of Massive Resistance.[7] This study aims to remedy some of those inadequacies. In general terms, it will show that segregationists are deserving of closer scrutiny and understanding, even if the cause for which they mobilised was, paradoxically, a betrayal of the democratic "American" ideals for which -- in expressing their fierce anti-communist sentiment -- they professed to stand. They are not easily dismissed or categorised: they did not form one coherent group united behind a single strategy or ideology, beyond their shared commitment to white supremacy. By looking at anti-communism in particular, this thesis will draw attention to their resourcefulness, and to the subtleties present in their varied responses to federally mandated desegregation and direct action civil rights activism.

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[7] Ellen Schrecker, Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), for example, dedicated under ten pages to anti-communism and the civil rights movement, much of which covered the same ground as John Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day: The Generation Before the Civil Rights Movement in the South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994). See especially Schrecker, Many Are The Crimes, pp. 389-395.

Over the past three decades there has been an explosion of scholarship on all aspects of the post-war African American freedom struggle, including biographies of civil rights leaders, monographs concentrating on the efforts of major organisational bodies, syntheses of the Movement as a whole, narrow, local, grass-roots studies, and interpretative or thematic accounts of the freedom struggle focusing on, for example, the importance of labour, gender, voting rights, white liberals and popular culture.[8] So compelling have those histories proved that, if there is a collective weakness in this work, it is that the intricate details of the African American freedom struggle have been chronicled at the expense of a similarly nuanced account of white -- and, especially, segregationist -- responses to black activism. Even those histories that have sought to chronicle white responses to the civil rights movement have at times been

[8] The existing literature on the civil rights movement is perhaps the strongest arm of southern historiography. The following represents but a sample of the full breadth of work. Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day gives a very fine analysis of civil rights activity leading up to the emergence of a coherent, South-wide movement in 1955. For biographies, see Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: Martin Luther King and the Civil Rights Movement, 1954-63 (London: Macmillan, 1988); and Eric Burner, And Gently He Shall Lead Them: Robert Parris Moses and Civil Rights in Mississippi (New York: New York University Press, 1994). For studies of specific civil rights organisations, see Adam Fairclough, To Redeem the Soul of America: the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and Martin Luther King, Jr (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1987); David Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (New York: W. Morrow, 1986); and Clayborne Carson, In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981). For local studies, see John Dittmer, Local People: The Struggle For Civil Rights in Mississippi [Blacks in the New World Series] (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994); William H. Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North Carolina, and the Black Struggle For Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980); and Adam Fairclough, Race and Democracy: the Civil Rights Struggle in Louisiana, 1915-1972 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1995). For studies concentrating on the Movement's desire to secure the vote for African Americans, see Steven F. Lawson, Black Ballots: Voting Rights in the South, 1944-1969 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976). For the Movement's relationship with popular culture, see Brian Ward, Just My Soul Responding: Rhythm and Blues, Black Consciousness and Race Relations (London: UCL Press, 1998). For the importance of labour to the development of the civil rights movement, see Michael K. Honey, Southern Labor and Black Civil Rights: Organizing Memphis Workers (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993); and Timothy J. Minchin, 'What Do We Need a Union For?' The TWUA in the South, 1945-1955 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997). For the role of white racial progressives, see Thomas A. Kreuger, And Promises to Keep: The Southern Conference For Human Welfare, 1938-1948 (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1967); and Linda Reed, Simple Decency and Common Sense: The Southern Conference Movement, 1938-1963 (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991). For accounts centring on gender, see Peter J. Ling and Sharon Monteith [eds], Gender in the Civil Rights Movement [Crosscurrents in African American History, Volume 8] (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1999).

unsympathetic not only to the goals of their white supremacist subjects, but also to the skill and determination with which they fought a desperate and sincere, if often unpalatable, rearguard action to preserve their way of life.

The existing literature on Massive Resistance is dominated by three excellent studies, Numan V. Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South During the 1950's, Neil A. McMillen, The Citizens' Councils: Organised Resistance to the Second Reconstruction, and Francis Wilhoit, The Politics of Massive Resistance.[9] What Bartley, Wilhoit and McMillen have failed to chronicle adequately, however, is the flexibility in the approach of segregationists towards resistance in general, and their manipulation of anti-communism in particular. In what is still the best over-arching account of the phenomenon in the South, Bartley viewed Massive Resistance as a movement both generated and led by southern "Neobourbon elites." He noted anti-communism as an intrinsic part of the canon of southern white rhetoric, but was vague about its effects. "Certainly," he ascertained, "it must have done something to harden white southern sentiment and may have won some converts outside the region."[10]

Wilhoit retrod much of the ground covered by Bartley, though differed significantly from him in certain areas. He believed not that Massive Resistance was actively spawned by southern elites, but rather that it was a "political counterrevolution" in response to increasing African American agitation for racial change. More sensitive than Bartley to some of the cultural co-ordinates of Massive

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[9] Numan Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South During the 1950's (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969); Neil McMillen, The White Citizens' Councils: Organized Resistance to the Second Reconstruction [2nd Edition] (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1994); Francis Wilhoit, The Politics of Massive Resistance (New York: George Braziller, 1973).
[10] Bartley, Rise of Massive Resistance, p. 189.

Resistance, he detailed the "iconography and demonology" of Massive Resistance, terms which are used to refer to the psychological as well as physical aspects of the South's resistance movement. These included, Wilhoit noted, "not only a pantheon of saints and martyrs and verbalized propositions...but also a vast panoply of symbols, icons, emblems, totems, taboos, scapegoats, and stylized rituals."[11]

Neil McMillen's concentration on the South's more "respectable" organised resistance groups, the White Citizens' Councils, naturally offered insights that the broad nature of Bartley's work could not afford. He correctly identified that Citizens' Councils in the 1950s used anti-communism "to attract the support of conservatives beyond Dixie's borders," but failed to appreciate both the complexities of segregationists' use of the weapon and the fact that it was not always guaranteed success.[12] Indeed, as this thesis will show, one of the Councils included in McMillen's book, the Patriots of North Carolina, Inc., refused to countenance red-baiting as a weapon from 1955 to 1958, during which time southern resistance hit full stride.[13]

In 1998, David Chappell made a laudable attempt to correct some of the flaws in the historiography of segregationists. His article on the religious ideas of southern white supremacists rightly pointed out that "historians have on the whole ignored the ideas of the segregationists of the 1950s and 1960s."[14] In partially redressing that balance, however, like McMillen he ignored both the times when segregationists chose not to use anti-communism at all, and the times when the weapon failed them

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[11] Quotation from Wilhoit, The Politics of Massive Resistance, p. 122. For a full discussion of the Massive Resistance demonology, see pp. 122-134.
[12] McMillen, Citizens' Councils, p. 192.
[13] ibid., p. 196. Thus, while McMillen's assertion that, "second only to the question of race differences itself, Communist subversion became a principal tenet in the Council's defense of segregation," is undoubtedly true of the majority of Councils, it by no means applied to all of them.
[14] David L. Chappell, "Religious Ideas of the Segregationists," Journal of American Studies, 32, 2 (1998), pp. 237-8.

altogether. Chappell noted rather dismissively, for example, that segregationists "used anti-communism to great effect. But that is neither surprising nor instructive: anti-communism was in the air in those years. Everybody used it..."[15]

A quarter of a century ago, Wayne Addison Clark's PhD thesis sought to explore the link between anti-communism and demagogic red-baiting, and provides a useful general account of the phenomenon. He was, however, heavily reliant on secondary sources and left many of the most bewitching questions on the subject unasked, let alone answered.[16] Without access to primary sources, Clark's study assumes the existence a South-wide consensus on anti-communism which, on closer inspection, was not always evident: he failed, for example, to take into account both the times when anti-communism was not chosen as a weapon by segregationists, and the mounting opposition to the phenomenon in the late 1950s. Furthermore, just as the early histories of the civil rights movement generally concentrated on the national figures, institutions, and organisations at the expense of local activists and grass-roots campaigns, so Clark concentrated on the 'leading lights' of red-baiters, notably James Eastland, Herman Talmadge and Strom Thurmond.[17]

Much of the ground that Clark covered has now been filled by researchers privy to primary sources, such as Irwin Klibaner who has written on the Southern

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[15] ibid., p. 255, ftn. 28.

[16] Wayne Addison Clark "An Analysis of the Relationship Between Anti-Communism and Segregationist Thought in the Deep South, 1948-1964," PhD Dissertation, UNC at Chapel Hill, 1976. Clark's study appears, from his bibliography, to have had to rely on the files of the Southern Regional Council [SRC] and newspaper reports as primary sources. Unfortunately for his study, he does not appear to have gained access to, or made use of , the personal files of red-baiters, anti-communists and demagogues, or indeed to the archives of SCEF and SCHW, even though he accords these two organisations significant space in his work.

[17]Many early histories of the civil rights movement concentrated solely on that movement's national figures, notably Martin Luther King, Jr. One example of this is Harvard Sitkoff, The Struggle For Black Equality, 1954-1980 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981), who sees the chronology of the Movement very much in line with King's involvement, running from the start of the Montgomery Bus Boycott on 5 December 1955 to his assassination in Memphis on 4 April 1968.

Conference Educational Fund [SCEF], and especially Sarah Hart Brown in her fine study of southern anti-communism at the Congressional level.[18] Brown examines the work of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee [SISS] and HUAC during their forays South between 1954 and 1958. Naturally limited to the machinations of those two committees, she has shown that Congress did not rein in die-hard, anti-radical congressmen after the censure of Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy. The southern hearings, she maintained, "echoed distinctively regional themes and finally ended where they began, in a determined attempt to bolster southern resistance and brand white integrationists as traitors."[19] Brown's article on organised, congressional red-baiting in the South, therefore, offers a useful context within which to examine the often extemporaneous anti-communism and red-baiting of individual segregationists.

Anti-communism as a Cold War phenomenon, rather than as a part of southern resistance, has been the focus of some excellent recent studies, notably Michael Heale's McCarthy's Americans: Red Scare Politics in State and Nation, 1935-1965. As is evident from the title, Heale's main concern is with both the national politics of "red scares" in the United States, and the ways in which individual states attempted to control communism. That control, he suggests, was primarily implemented via legislative committees, loyalty oaths and anti-communist legislation. His study looked outside the nation's capital to examine the local impetus behind national red scares. Choosing Georgia as his only southern case study, Heale focused most heavily -- in

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[18] Sarah Hart Brown, "Congressional Anti-Communism and the Segregationist South: From New Orleans to Atlanta, 1954-1958," Georgia Historical Quarterly, 80,4 (Winter 1996). Irwin Klibaner, "The Travail of Southern Radicals: the Southern Conference Educational Fund, 1946-1976," Journal of Southern History, 49, 2 (May 1983), later expanded upon in Irwin Klibaner, Conscience of a Troubled South: The Southern Conference Educational Fund, 1946-1966 [Martin Luther King and the Civil Rights Movement Series] (Brooklyn: Carlson, 1989).

[19] Brown, "Congressional Anti-Communism," p. 794.

the Massive Resistance era -- on the work of the Georgia Commission on Education. Interestingly, even at this rather formal, legislative level of anti-communism, he noted that "the South has often been neglected as a source of McCarthyite politics."[20]

Heale fully appreciated that "any analysis which seeks to identify the ingredients of a red scare risks oversimplifying the phenomenon."[21] It is precisely that complexity which necessitates a closer study of the uses of anti-communism by individual segregationists and non-state-controlled segregationist groups, to supplement his work on government controlled agencies. This thesis will argue that guardians of the white South reacted with distinctive, if related, recourses to anti-communism -- a diversity which Heale's focus tends to conceal.[22]

III

As a political weapon, anti-communism was not unique to the Massive Resistance era, but had a substantial pedigree. In order to understand the phenomenon in the period from 1948 to 1965, it is essential to look briefly at the evolution of anti-communist thought in the United States before the onset of the Cold War. To a great extent, post-war anti-communism was built upon an existing paranoia. Its success as a political weapon must be seen as a product of a much broader climate of distrust and suspicion. In general terms, Heale has shown that, despite the United States' own revolutionary origins, from the mid-nineteenth century onwards the country's

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[20] Michael J. Heale, McCarthy's Americans: Red Scare Politics in State and Nation, 1935-1965 [American History in Depth Series, eds A.J. Badger and Howell Harris] (London: MacMillan, 1998), p. 214.
[21] ibid., p. 298.
[22] Heale noted, for example, that "the guardians of the white South ...whether chieftains like the Talmadges or the rednecks of the Ku Klux Klan, embraced anticommunism as well as segregation" as a reaction to the threat of political and social change. ibid., p. 281.

republican tradition was ill at ease with any revolution directed at individualism, individual rights or property. Discourses of anti-communism, or certainly of anti-radicalism, were in many ways inevitable given the American culture of entrepreneurial capitalism and free-market economics.[23] The deployment of anti-communism also played upon two other distinct yet related traditions that were deeply ensconced in the American psyche: the first was that which Richard Hofstadter designated the "paranoid style" in American politics; the second involved the waves of extreme nativism and xenophobia that periodically seized America in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Less concerned with the apparatus of the American political system than with the rhetorical style and social milieu in which that system has traditionally operated, Hofstadter identified a common thread of embittered, embattled and suspicious minority politics. This "paranoid style" boasts "qualities of heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and conspiratorial fantasy."[24] In language of particular relevance to red-baiters, Hofstadter noted that one of the central preconceptions of the paranoid style was "the existence of a vast, insidious, preternaturally effective international conspiratorial network designed to perpetrate acts of the most fiendish character."[25]

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[23] Heale states that the American "respect for human and property rights qualified the American affirmation of the legitimacy of revolution. For much of the nineteenth century revolutionary movements abroad for the most part appeared to be directed at replacing monarchy with some kind of liberal democracy, and with these Americans could empathize. They were less enchanted by revolutions accompanied by widespread violence, the destruction of property, and the elevation of 'the mob.'" Michael J. Heale, American Anticommunism: Combating the Enemy Within, 1830-1970 [The American Moment] (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), p. 13.

[24] Richard Hofstadter, "The Paranoid Style in American Politics," in Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1952), p.3.

[25] ibid., p.14. As further evidence of the anti-communists' proximity to the paranoid style, Hofstadter noted that practitioners of paranoid politics find hostile conspiracies against "a nation, a culture, a way of life whose fate affects not himself alone but millions of others...his sense that his political passions are unselfish and patriotic, in fact, goes far to intensify his feeling of righteousness and his moral indignation." p. 4.

As examples of the style's proponents throughout American history, he lists those taking stands against the Illuminati, the Masons, Roman Catholics and, finally, "reds." He maintained, however, that much of the intensity of the paranoid style stemmed from its perpetrators' exclusion from mainstream politics. In the Massive Resistance-era South, that was not the case. White segregationists controlled the South's political processes, and could draw upon huge levels of support from their white southern constituents.

While the new-born Soviet Union was planning its global expansion at the expense of capitalist society, the United States was in the grip of a predominately white, Anglo-Saxon backlash against open immigration. It is an implicit irony in US history that this nation, founded and sustained by immigration, had, by the 1920s, become wracked by xenophobia. The changing sources of mass migration from the 1880s until the 1920s inspired hostile reaction, distrust and contempt from previous generations of settlers who were already successfully assimilated into American society. The majority of these new arrivals were not from Northern Europe, but from the Mediterranean periphery and Eastern Europe. Predominately Protestant migrants gave way to mainly Jewish and Catholic settlers. A tide of nativism characterised the reversal in the public's perception of these immigrants, which culminated in congressional approval of the Johnson-Reed Immigration Act, signed in May 1924.[26]

In short, those of Northern European Protestant stock feared that their own identity --

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[26] The Johnson-Reed Act imposed quotas on immigration of 2% of the number of foreign-born residents of each nationality, as based on the census of 1890. For more on nativism, see John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925 (New York: Atheneum, 1969), in which the author identifies the three strands of nativism as based on grounds of race, anti-Catholicism, and anti-radicalism. Alan Kraut has added a fourth strand, that of anti-Semitism. Alan M. Kraut, The Huddled Masses: The Immigrant in American Society, 1880-1921 (Arlington Heights, Illinois: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1982).

synonymous in their minds with a true American identity -- would inevitably be diluted, and that their influence in US social, political, economic and cultural life would be undermined by a further influx of foreign ideologies, cultures, ethnic groups and religions.

This tradition of nativism forms part of a broad tendency to define what is "American" in negative terms. Again, as a consequence of being an immigrant nation, and, theoretically, one embracing whatever cornucopia of cultures, creeds and colours arrived on her shores, America has always struggled to arrive at a precise, uncontested definition of what exactly defines "American-ness." Americans knew almost instinctively what they were *not*, but were often rather less forthcoming about what they actually *were*. By the 1920s, Lenin and his cohorts were making it all too clear that there was no greater example of an alien, un-American ideology than communism. Thus, as Joel Kovel has noted, "the chances are that if you asked any sojourner or wayfarer what it meant to be American, at some point the answer would include the property of not being 'communistic.'"[27] Just as communists were one example of the un-American, so by definition being anti-communist emerged as a clear way to assert one's all-American credentials.

The pervasive mood of anti-communism increased exponentially with the establishment of the Communist Party of America in September 1919, which, by 1923, had become the Communist Party of the United States of America [CPUSA].[28]

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[27] Joel Kovel, Red Hunting in the Promised Land: Anti-Communism and the Making of America (New York: Basic Books, 1994), p.4.

[28] In 1919, the American Socialist Party split, forming two smaller parties: the Communist Party of America, and John Reed's Communist Labor Party. They were largely reconciled by 1923, however, when the CPUSA was founded. There are many histories of the CPUSA and of communism more generally in the United States. See, for example, Theodore Draper, American Communism and Soviet Russia: the Formative Period (New York: Vintage, 1986); Robert V. Daniels, A Documentary History of Communism: Volume 2 Communism and the World (London: I.B. Tauris, 1985); Harvey Klehr,

Here, with a manifesto proclaiming that "capitalism is in collapse," was a political party within the United States whose primary professed goal was the overthrow of the American political, economic and social system.[29] In pre-Cold War times, the CPUSA dogmatically followed the ideological pronouncements of the Third Communist International [Comintern], which had been established by the Soviet Union in March 1919. Emerging damaged, but by no means broken, from the first national reaction to internal Communist Party activity -- the Red Scare of 1919-1920 -- the CPUSA followed the Comintern's "first phase" of underground activity and "revolutionary upsurge" until 1923.[30] For the next five years, the Comintern predicted a period of "capitalist stabilization," and the CPUSA laid low until the "Third Period," beginning in 1928, which prophesied the decay of capitalism and the triumph of world communism. To hasten communism's ascendancy, and as part of a wider European Communist movement, the CPUSA proclaimed a "Popular Front" approach in 1934, which aimed to appeal to a broader cross-section of the public, to establish coalitions with other political groups, and to maximise recruitment.

Beyond the obvious threat that the existence of a revolutionary political party engendered, there were three distinct aspects of the CPUSA that gave cause for concern among southern white elites: the composition and numbers of its supporters; its links to union activity; and its views on race relations. The predominance of

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The Heyday of American Communism: the Depression Decade (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1984). For first-hand accounts, see, for example, J. Edgar Hoover, A Study of Communism (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1962); William Z. Foster, Toward Soviet America (New York: International Publishers, 1932).

[29] "Manifesto of the Communist Party of America," quoted in Daniels, A Documentary History of Communism, Volume 2, p. 41.

[30] The Red Scare of 1919 was led by Attorney General A. Mitchell "The Fighting Quaker" Palmer and his special assistant, J. Edgar Hoover, who was to dominate federal law enforcement for the next half a century. Writing on the origins of communism, Hoover proclaimed its proponents to be "committed to the destruction of our way of life and dedicated to the establishment of a world communist society." Hoover, Study of Communism, p. 18.

foreign-born citizens immediately exacerbated fears about the nature of Party activity.[31] CPUSA officials also continually exaggerated the numbers participating in Party-backed events and demonstrations to boost the Party's image as a vibrant and expanding political force. That exaggeration rebounded on the Party, however, since it served to intensify popular concern about the extent of Communist activity and influence.[32]

Even when the CPUSA's own exaggerations were taken into account, it was difficult to ascertain the true strength of support for the Party. There were those in the United States, for example, who applauded the Bolshevik Revolution and Soviet system of government, but nonetheless were not members of the Communist Party. They were referred to as "fellow travellers," a term popularised by the German Communist leader, Willi Muenzenberg.[33] In the words of historian David Caute, "fellow-travelling involves commitment at a distance which is not only geographical but also emotional and intellectual. It is remote control radicalism..."[34] The majority of fellow travellers within the United States reached an ideological consensus. For the most part, they believed that revolutions were rare events to be savoured, especially if

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[31] By 1931, two-thirds of the Communist Party's membership were born abroad, and a substantial number were Jewish. Indeed, it was not until the Gastonia Textile Strike of 1929 that US-born workers dominated a Party demonstration of any kind.

[32] William Couch, director of the University of North Carolina Press, expressed those fears in a 1935 article in The Westminster Magazine. Writing in the midst of the Depression, Couch felt that, coupled with the triumph of communism in the Soviet Union, "it cannot be argued now that communism is impractical or the mere dream of a disordered mind. In fact," he concluded, "it appears extremely probable that either communism or fascism will prevail in this country in a few years." W.T. Couch, "Economic Planning in the South," The Westminster Magazine, 23, 4 (Jan-March 1935), p. 304.

[33] Muenzenberg was secretary of the International Socialist Youth League from 1914-1921, and then of the Young Communist International. He became an outstanding "behind-the-scenes" propagandist, especially for "front" coalitions. He fled the Party in 1937 after the Moscow trials, however, and was murdered by unknown assailants in France in 1940. See Alan Adler [ed.], Theses, Resolutions and Manifestos of the First Four Congresses of the Third International (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, Inc., 1980).

[34] David Caute, The Fellow-Travellers: Intellectual Friends of Communism [Revised Edition] (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), p.4.

enacted against the causes of poverty, tyranny and war. But that did not mean a revolution was encouraged in the United States: as perhaps the most famous pre-war American fellow traveller, Henry Wallace, once noted, "I wouldn't want communism over here, but it makes more sense in Russia."[35] In general, then, they were broadly sympathetic to the communist system where it worked in other countries.

Furthermore, they were not overtly opposed to implementing certain aspects of Soviet-style centralised planning where they thought that they might alleviate some of America's own social, economic and even racial problems. The majority were socialists, college students, or those afraid of a new war in the atomic age.[36] To many anti-communists in the United States, however, the loyalty of such figures could not be counted on in times of crisis. As the Cold War escalated in the wake of World War II, furthermore, there was little room for differentiating between the dwindling band of fellow travellers and die-hard revolutionaries and card carrying CPUSA members.

To its enemies, the actual numerical strength and negligible real power of the CPUSA was not of the greatest significance. More important was the fact that the influence of an internal Communist Party in the United States was believed to constitute a real and present danger. The internationally respected scientist, Albert Einstein, succinctly summed up the situation in 1954. In an open letter to the Socialist Party's Norman Thomas, Einstein wrote that "America is incomparably less endangered by its own Communists than by the hysterical hunt for the few

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[35] Henry A. Wallace quoted in ibid., p. 286.
[36] Individually, in the pre-war period Vito Marcantonio was the most notable fellow traveller in Congress, and J. Robert Oppenheimer in scientific circles.

Communists that are here."[37] As John Egerton has concluded, "there was, in sum, a minimum of action -- but a maximum of reaction."[38]

To add more uncertainty to any estimation of the extent of communist support, not all members of the Party were genuine communists. Given the paucity of alternative sources of grass-roots labour organisation, many industrial workers were often attracted to the Party's organisational skills and joined without being completely committed to communist ideology. Gerald Zahavi noted this phenomenon in his case study of the New York State town of Schenectady, dominated by the General Electric works plant. Zahavi quoted a former Party activist who explained that "Sid (Friedlander, a local organizer) was pretty good, and he was pretty militant ...Nobody listened to this stuff about Communism, but they liked him as a union leader."[39]

The fact that so much Communist Party activity between the wars had revolved around labour organisation cemented a link between communism and unionism in the minds of southern segregationists. The bloody battles of the North Carolina Gastonia Textile Strike of 1929 proved for the first time that the CPUSA could lead native- rather than foreign-born workers in industrial disputes; a CPUSA-led march in New York City's Union Square a year later showed that the Party could

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[37] Albert Einstein quoted in Manning Marable, Race, Reform, and Rebellion: the Second Reconstruction in Black America, 1945-1982 [The Contemporary United States Series] (London: Macmillan, 1984), p. 12.

[38] Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, p. 451. Expanding on that issue, Egerton stated that, "Looking back on those frenetic times, it is clear that disruptive or criminal acts by Communists inside this country were less frequent and less harmful than the paranoid and reactionary behavior of rabid anticommunists driven by fear or hatred or insecurity."

[39] Gerald Zahavi, "Passionate Commitments: Race, Sex, and Communism at Schenectady General Electric, 1932-1954," Journal of American History, 83, 2 (1996), pp. 520-521. Zahavi sets out his position early on in his article, arguing that "this article wants to shatter historical infatuations with overly abstract, ideologically driven, and institutionally focused treatments of communism and labor." p. 515.

muster upwards of 50,000 workers for demonstrations.[40] The establishment of the Congress of Industrial Organisations [CIO] in 1935 provided fertile ground for Communist Party involvement in a nation-wide labour movement. Although neither founded, run, nor dominated by the CPUSA, Party members were nevertheless a major force in many of its affiliated unions and its national office. As CPUSA leader Earl Browder reported to his Central Committee, "We Communists are a small, though important, part of this great mass movement. We are giving all our best forces and mobilizing all our organizations to assist the work of the CIO."[41]

In turn, unionism provided southern segregationists with one of the clearest links between communism and the drive for greater African American rights. Robin Kelley's study of Alabama Communists during the Great Depression, and Michael Honey's study of labour in Memphis, have both shown that black, communist, and sometimes even black communist participation in southern union politics during the 1930s and 1940s was extensive.[42] Moreover, Honey argues that "only recently have labor historians begun to connect black working-class activism and industrial unionism to the rise of the civil rights movement."[43] Whereas the early actions of the CIO had in one sense linked communism to union activity, it added race to the equation in April 1946 with the launch of "Operation Dixie," ostensibly an effort to organise labour unions at the local level throughout the South. The southern labour

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[40] The Union Square demonstration was to commemorate the death of Steve Katovis, a CPUSA member who had been killed in a fight with a policeman during a peaceful demonstration on 16 January 1930. See Klehr, Heyday of American Communism, pp. 28-33.
[41] Earl Browder quoted in ibid., p. 238.
[42] Robin D.G. Kelley, Hammer and Hoe: Alabama Communists During the Great Depression (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990); Michael K. Honey, Southern Labor and Black Civil Rights: Organizing Memphis Workers (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993). The Food, Tobacco, Agriculture, and Allied Workers' Union of America, and the United Auto Workers provide examples of unions that countenanced interracial organising. Others, such as the National Maritime Union, were not interracial *per se*, but nonetheless often supported black union activity.
[43] Honey, Southern Labor and Black Civil Rights, p. 7.

movement, commented Richard Korstad and Nelson Lichtenstein, "seemed on the verge of a major breakthrough."[44] Van A. Bittner, however, director of the CIO's southern drive, and other conservative CIO leaders attempted to accommodate southern unionism's largest potential constituency -- white workers. As a result, the drive concentrated more on building up union strength among whites within the South's segregated workforce than it did in breaking down racial barriers. Indeed, the CIO was sometimes complicit in perpetuating racial inequalities in job opportunities and pay because it was so desperate to recruit new members. To many segregationists, however, Operation Dixie confirmed the idea that blacks, union workers and communists were all bound together in their subversive intent. Moreover, as Honey and Kelley both suggest, many communist-linked unions did indeed pioneer interracial organisation in the South in the 1930s. To segregationists, they were all undesirable "outsiders."[45]

Communist interests in interracial union organising reinforced a link between the CPUSA and racial activism which is essential to the understanding of anti-communism's selection by southern segregationists as a weapon of Massive Resistance. The CPUSA's repeated attempts to embarrass the United States on its racial record had a similar effect. In 1924, only five years after its inception, the CPUSA had proclaimed that "the Negro workers of this country are exploited and

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[44] Robert Korstad and Nelson Lichtenstein, "Opportunities Found and Lost: Labor, Radicals, and the Early Civil Rights Movement," Journal of American History, 75, (December 1988), p. 800. The CIO's goal was to bring a further million workers of all colours into the fold of southern unionism, thus immediately threatening the power of southern business elites. As Egerton rightly points out, the 1946 drive, traditionally known as "Operation Dixie," was in fact the *second* Operation Dixie, the first unsuccessful drive coming in 1942. Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, p. 444.

[45] For more on Operation Dixie, see Patricia Sullivan, Days of Hope: Race and Democracy in the New Deal Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), pp. 207-210.

oppressed more ruthlessly than any other group."[46] At its Sixth Congress in 1928, the Comintern publicly recognised the South's African Americans as an oppressed group, and proclaimed that they had the right to secession within the United States.[47] The fact that those pronouncements were concurrent with the rise of the militant "New Negro" only exacerbated the threat of communist-inspired black insurgency in the minds of white southerners. Many African Americans, not just in the South but throughout the nation, had fought for their country in the First World War or had been drawn to wartime industries in the fast-expanding cities. As a result, they were bolder and more demanding than their predecessors. US Army Major R.M. Howell highlighted the perceived danger in 1932, writing in an intelligence report that "Communism has chosen the Southern Negro as the American group most likely to respond to its revolutionary appeal."[48]

The Party further aggravated segregationists by seeking to turn its rhetoric on racial injustice into action. Perhaps the most famous example of its intervention, and certainly one that earned the Party large amounts of valuable publicity, was the Scottsboro Trial in 1931. The pre-eminent black civil rights organisation, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People [NAACP], was not initially prepared to use its legal resources to defend the "Scottsboro boys," nine black youths who had been arrested for the alleged rape of two white women on a freight train near Scottsboro, Alabama. The NAACP's Chattanooga branch, which was closest to Scottsboro, had closed down in 1930, and the Association's national leadership had to

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[46] Klehr, Heyday of American Communism, p. 324.
[47] At the same time, the CPUSA formulated twelve demands for ending black oppression, including a demand for the "abolition of the whole system of race discrimination. Full racial, political and social equality for the Negro race." ibid., p. 324.
[48] Major R.M. Howell quoted in Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, pp. 455-6.

follow the early machinations of the case through the press. The Communist Party-influenced International Labor Defense [ILD], on the other hand, used local CPUSA networks to ensure prompt representation for the defendants.[49] Although initially unsuccessful, in that it failed to secure justice or a release, the ILD oversaw a successful national and international publicity campaign which highlighted racial injustice and the plight of southern blacks faced with a discriminatory legal system. Figures of world-wide renown, such as Albert Einstein and Thomas Mann, voiced their support for the boys. As a result, the American Civil Liberties Union [ACLU]'s Roger Baldwin told the ILD that they had "done a job that no agency could do or would do, not only in arousing world-wide opinion and protest but in the selection of counsel for skilful handling of the moves in court."[50]

The success of the Scottsboro project for Party publicity was repeated -- albeit with a slightly lower profile -- with the trial of CPUSA-member Angelo Herndon one year later. Herndon was arrested in 1931 for organising a biracial demonstration outside an Atlanta courthouse, and was convicted to serve a prison sentence of up to 20 years. In his autobiography, Herndon wrote that the most personally injurious charge against him had been the prosecutor's declaration that the Communist Party's position was one of "setting up a nigger Soviet Republic in the Black Belt."[51] He was, however, released after five years, when the Supreme Court struck down the constitutionality of the Georgia law under which he had been convicted. In the space

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[49] For more on the often complicated struggle between the ILD and the NAACP, see Dan T. Carter, Scottsboro: A Tragedy of the American South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969) esp. pp. 51-103.

[50] Roger Baldwin quoted in Klehr, Heyday of American Communism, p. 338. Ultimately the combined might of the NAACP and the ILD was successful, with the Supreme Court over-ruling the original decisions. The last of the nine was released from prison almost twenty years later, in 1950.

[51] Angelo Herndon quoted in ibid., p. 333.

of two years, the Scottsboro and Herndon cases had lent the CPUSA what John Egerton has described as "a degree of legitimacy it had been unable to achieve by any other means."[52]

On the whole, however, attempts to harness African American support failed in practical terms, as each CPUSA success was followed by a failure to plant solid organisational roots. The Party had some success in unions, notably in the interracial Southern Tenant Farmers' Union [STFU] and the Alabama-based Sharecroppers' Union [SCU], but those triumphs belied a wider failure.[53] At the start of the Depression, for example, the Party's Jack Stachel admitted that black membership of the CPUSA was only 200-strong. Communist-dominated groups such as the Southern Negro Youth Congress, the Alabama-based League of Young Southerners, the League of Struggle for Negro Rights and the Council of Young Southerners had little organisational success; the American Negro Labor Congress did not have a single representative in the entire South. [54]

As will be seen, this failure was again largely irrelevant to white supremacists' perceptions of the extent of the communist threat in the South. What was important was that those segregationists frequently chose to associate attacks on the racial structure of their society with communist activity. A good example of this apparent contradiction was provided by Texas Congressman Martin Dies. He admitted that

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[52] Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, p. 170.
[53] One of the most influential figures in the STFU was Howard "Buck" Kester. A socialist and activist, he was nonetheless militantly anti-communist. Arguments about communist infiltration hugely diminished the Union's effectiveness, and, after World War II, its work was largely confined to California and Louisiana. For more on the STFU and the SCU, see Anthony P. Dunbar, Against the Grain: Southern Radicals and Prophets, 1929-1959 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1981), Kelley, Hammer and Hoe; Nell Irvin Painter, The Narrative of Hosea Hudson. His Life as a Negro Communist in the South (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1979).
[54] Klehr, Heyday of American Communism.

communist infiltration of African American groups had been largely unsuccessful. That was, he claimed, "a tribute to the patriotism, loyalty and religion of the negro."[55] Nonetheless, as chairman of HUAC for seven years, he was responsible for the Committee's relentless hounding of interracial unions and organisations dedicated to racial change, on the grounds that they were communist sponsored.[56]

The CPUSA's stance on race presented southern elites with a dilemma. On the one hand, they recognised the potential threat posed to their political hegemony by Communist Party organising, however unsuccessful it proved to be in practical terms. On the other hand, many recognised the gilt-edged opportunity that the CPUSA had handed them: because the Party was well-known for its advocacy of black self-determination, and because it had placed so much emphasis on mobilising southern blacks, southern segregationists realised that they could potentially dismiss any agitation for greater black civil rights as communist-inspired.[57]

As this thesis will show, not all segregationists chose to make the link between racial agitation and the Communist Party or its supporters. The task of those who did, however, was facilitated by the vicious circle in which the Party inexorably found itself caught: the pervading anti-communist mood forced it to conduct much of its activity in secret, intensifying the sense of covert, sinister manoeuvrings and ensuring

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[55] Martin Dies quoted in Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, p. 456.

[56] In his autobiography for example, Dies wrote that, "Aside from the merits or demerits of any arguments, it is a known fact that the Communist Party has exerted strenuous efforts to increase the intensity of racial strife...there is no doubt, because the pattern has been so clear, that this factor is responsible for some of the racial strife today. It would greatly facilitate the ultimate solution if those who are sincerely sponsoring the interest of the Negroes would examine the various programs very carefully to make sure that they do not aid the purposes and desires of the Communist Party." Martin Dies, Martin Dies' Story (New York: Bookmailer, 1963), p. 98.

[57] The other notable organisation that advocated black self-determination was Marcus Garvey's United Negro Improvement Association [UNIA]. Having established UNIA in Jamaica in 1914, Garvey moved to New York in 1916. His Black Star Line, however, did not succeed in its attempts to return African Americans to Africa. Indeed, the enduring significance of the UNIA for African Americans was psychological rather than practical.

that public knowledge of the exact nature of CPUSA aims and activities remained extremely limited. Many segregationists took the opportunity to manipulate those fears and that ignorance for their own gain. It is, therefore, an irony of Party history that its genuine support for African American rights, coupled with its recognition of the considerable propaganda value to be made from American domestic racism, led it to focus on racial issues. Once it had done so, not only did it expose itself to race-baiting, but it was also forced to look on helplessly as red-baiting took its toll on many civil rights organisations.

IV

European events in the late 1930s, in particular the rise of fascism, served to harden anti-communist feeling.[58] Without doubt, the greatest blow to Communist Party sympathy in the United States was the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 23 August 1939. In a late attempt to convince his foes otherwise, and exemplifying the shock of the ideological break to come, Browder himself had claimed in July that there was "as much chance of Russo-German agreement as of Earl Browder being elected President of the Chamber of Commerce."[59] Stalin, however, did choose to ally himself with Hitler, and thus immediately alienated swathes of international communist support. Many fellow travellers severed links with the party, while there was marked change in the vocabulary of left-wing intellectuals: references to "Stalin" became references to

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[58] In the Spanish Civil War, for example, Franco's fascists overcame nascent Spanish communism with help from Hitler and a blind eye from Britain and France. The Nazi Party continued its aggressive anti-communist stance in 1937 by signing an anti-Comintern pact with the Japanese, later co-signed by the Italians.

[59] Klehr, Heyday of American Communism, p.387.

"the Stalinist dictatorship," and both the man himself and the political system he embodied were increasingly designated "totalitarian."

This change, as Judy Kutulas has noted, "was symbolic of the abandonment of a leftwing opposition to the Soviet Union and the subsequent creation of liberal anti-Communism."[60] A fundamental shift was triggered in liberal politics within the United States: the *non*-communist left began its transformation towards the *anti*-communist left. By the end of Henry Wallace's unsuccessful 1948 presidential bid, in which the former New Dealer had voiced opposition to Truman's Cold War policies, and had come out in support of federally enforced desegregation, the left was increasingly isolated.[61] The pre-eminent liberal group in Washington, the Union for Democratic Action [UDA], turned against Popular Front politics and, in January 1947, launched the Americans for Democratic Action [ADA], solidifying the switch to anti-communism in liberal circles. By 1948, in the words of Peter Kellog, liberals "believed themselves engaged in a desperate struggle to survive as an effective political force."[62] By joining the growing ranks of anti-communists, liberals ensured the almost total ostracisation of the CPUSA and its support.[63] Southern segregationist

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[60] Judy Kutulas, "'Totalitarianism' Transformed: the Mainstreaming of Anti-Communism, 1938-1941," Mid-America: An Historical Review, 77, 1 (Winter 1995), p. 72.

[61] For a comprehensive view of Wallace's campaign, especially across southern states, see Sullivan, Days of Hope, pp. 243-270.

[62] Peter J. Kellog, "The Americans For Democratic Action and Civil Rights in 1948: Conscience in Politics or Politics in Conscience?" Midwest Quarterly, 20 (Winter 1976), p. 56. For another solid discussion on the change from non-communism to anti-communism amongst the national liberal caucus, see James V. Compton, Anti-Communism in American Life Since the Second World War [Forums in History Series] (St Charles, Missouri: Forum Press, 1973). See also Steven M. Gillon, Politics and Vision: the ADA and American Liberalism, 1947-1985 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

[63] The Party's political and social exclusion was cemented indefinitely after the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, held in Moscow between the 14th and 25th February 1956, during which Nikita Khrushchev denounced Stalin and admitted that his predecessor had been the overseer of pogroms and further atrocities against his own people.

politicians, like their northern counterparts, were faced with a constituency that was increasingly united in its adherence to anti-communism.

The effect of the Cold War on the CPUSA, and on support for Popular Front politics of any kind, was naturally devastating: in a few short months in 1946, Churchill had made his "Iron Curtain" speech in Fulton, Missouri, and Stalin himself had continued the earlier rhetoric of Lenin and Manuilsky by declaring that conflict between communism and capitalism was inevitable.[64] This climate left precious little room for neutrals, let alone for sympathisers or apologists for communism. In simple terms, as the American public and government policy makers surveyed the complicated disorder of the post-war world, they saw only a neat delineation between those countries which were broadly capitalist or followed free market systems, and those which were communist or sympathetic to communism.

As Patricia Sullivan has noted, the avowed and actual expansionist ambitions of the USSR changed the context of internal politics in the United States.[65] Domestically, Truman's loyalty program established an internal policy that dovetailed neatly with the administration's foreign policy and the Truman Doctrine. The precise motivations for the president's adoption of a domestic loyalty programme remain mired in scholarly debate. According to one biographer of Truman, the president felt that too much was being made of the "Communist bugaboo."[66] Nevertheless, a number of key issues led him to enact Executive Order 9835 in May 1947, a loyalty oath designed to ensure the "American-ness" of all federal employees. In part, this

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[64] For the full text of Stalin's speech, see "Stalin, Pre-election Speech of February 9, 1946," in Daniels, A Documentary History of Communism, Volume 2, p. 137.
[65] Sullivan, Days of Hope, p. 225.
[66] Harry S. Truman quoted in David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), p. 550.

was an attempt to repair the damage of the Democrats' disastrous showing in the 1946 mid-term elections, which had been branded a choice between "Communism and Republicanism" by the Republican Party.[67] Truman placed a conservative Republican, Seth Richardson, in charge of the loyalty review board. Richard Freeland maintained that Richardson's appointment undermined the argument that Truman instituted his loyalty programme for purely political purposes. The establishment of the programme, he believed, would not have necessarily headed off Republican claims that the administration was soft on communism: it could equally, he argued, be seen as a vindication of right-wing claims that there were internal communists who needed to be investigated.[68] Equally, though, it is possible to argue that Truman was striving to make domestic anti-communism a bi-partisan political issue, uniting Democrats and Republicans alike. By so doing, he was attempting to regain political ground and end the powerful association in the public mind between support for vigorous domestic anti-communist policies and the Republican Party.

Regardless of the complicated motives behind the implementation of the loyalty programme, disloyalty simultaneously became a by-word for that which was "un-American," taking the vocabulary and terminology of anti-communism another step forward and widening the scope of behaviour that was perceived to be unpatriotic. The "Loyalty Program Press Release" of 22 March 1947, for example, defined disloyalty as "membership in, affiliation with or sympathetic association with any foreign or domestic association, movement, group or combination of persons,

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67 Richard Gid Powers, Not Without Honor: The History of American Anticommunism (New York: Free Press, 1995), p. 197.
68 Richard M Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security 1946-1948 (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1972). See esp. pp. 117-134.

designated by the Attorney General as totalitarian, fascist, communist or subversive," or one wishing to carry out an act of violence against any US citizen. Finally, in what was an oblique reference to the CPUSA, it was declared disloyal to seek "to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means."[69]

Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, anti-communism at the federal level also showed signs of cleaving that which was deemed "un-American" to support for racial integration. Some of the questions that formed part of Truman's loyalty programme, for example, had hinted at this link. They included grilling defendants over their stance on the Red Cross' policy of segregated blood banks, asking whether or not they had ever entertained negroes at their home, and, stretching the credibility of the exercise to an extreme, the question, "How do you explain the fact that you have an album of Paul Robeson records in your home?"[70] Furthermore, leading southern segregationists, most notably Mississippi Senator James O. "Jim" Eastland, had a major hand in the federal witch-hunts conducted by HUAC and SISS which, to a great extent, served to legitimise red-baiting. It was, therefore, unthinkable that they would not import such effective tactics to their home states, where they could be deployed even more enthusiastically in the service of white supremacy.

Over and above Truman's domestic programme, federal anti-communism in the early Cold War era blossomed in two distinct areas: the crusade of Joseph "Tail Gunner Joe" McCarthy, nominally under the auspices of the Permanent Subcommittee

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[69] Quoted from "Part V: Standards," in "Loyalty Program Press Release, 22 March 1947," Frank Porter Graham Papers, Box 31, Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Allied to the Loyalty Program, the Taft-Hartley Act of 23 June 1947 forced union leaders to repudiate communism or forfeit protection under the National Labor Relations Act. The Smith Act of 1940 was also resuscitated to arrest twelve Communist leaders on 29 June 1948. Seven of the defendants were imprisoned, five were driven underground. The Supreme Court, which originally upheld the convictions, did not begin to overturn them until 1956.

[70] Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, p. 454.

on Investigations of the Committee of Government Operations; and the zealous investigations conducted by HUAC and SISS. As a Republican, McCarthy personified the connection between the Grand Old Party and anti-communism, which, in national politics, had been forged in the 1946 mid-term elections. Indeed, it is with some justification that McCarthy's name became synonymous with the cynical manipulation of public fears of communism and Communist Party activity. Even though he was hardly the first US politician to exploit residual fears of communism in an election campaign, he took calculated anti-communism to a new extreme.[71] First elected in 1947, McCarthy was initially best known as "The Pepsi-Cola Kid" because of his alleged proclivity for accepting bribes from large multinational companies, and for attempting to end sugar rationing on behalf of the soft drinks giant. As a politician he was exceptional only in his ineptitude, to the extent that he picked up the Washington Press Corps' award for "Worst US Senator" before commencing his anti-communist campaign.[72] Desperate for re-election in 1952, McCarthy seized upon the communist issue as his own personal political panacea. On Lincoln Day 1950, McCarthy's infamous speech in Wheeling, West Virginia, thrust anti-communism even further to the forefront of the domestic political agenda. For four years, McCarthy rode anti-communism's demagogic roller-coaster, which carried him first to the very heights of national political prominence, before finally leaving him

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[71] The Fighting Quaker himself, Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, was the first to attempt to use what Charlotte Pomerantz has described as "the Nixon-McCarthy technique of red-baiting" in a campaign against the Populist Tom Watson for a Senate seat in Georgia. Palmer hoped to use victory as a springboard to a presidential campaign, but was unsuccessful in both. Charlotte Pomerantz [ed.], A Quarter Century of Un-Americana (New York: Marzani and Munsell, 1963), p. 10. Similarly, Father Charles Coughlin carved out a niche as a proselytising, anti-communist radio-broadcasting priest. For more on his crusade, centred in the 1930s, see Kovel, Red Hunting in the Promised Land. pp. 23-38.

[72] For more on McCarthy's early career see Compton, "Anti-Communism in American Life Since the Second World War," esp. pp. 9-11. For a fuller account, see David M. Oshinsky, A Conspiracy So Immense: The World of Joe McCarthy (New York: Free Press, 1983), and Paul H. Rovere, Senator Joe McCarthy (New York: Harper Row, 1959).

discredited, alcoholic and dead.[73] During his ascendancy, however, McCarthy had invigorated anti-communism and red-baiting in the US to such an extent that, even after his fall from grace, much of his legacy remained. In the South, segregationists borrowed many of his techniques and much of his anti-communist invective in their defence of white supremacy.

The entrenched anti-communist sensibilities of the majority of American citizens were repeatedly reinforced by a succession of Cold War events, both domestic and international. The continued existence of the CPUSA compounded those fears and created the added danger of organised, internal subversion; the post-war slide of other "western democracies," notably Great Britain, toward socialism, which was widely perceived as communism's under-developed younger sibling, increased that fear yet further; high-profile espionage cases, such as those of the Canadian spy ring, the Rosenbergs, Alger Hiss and Klaus Fuchs intensified anxieties about the possibility of communist-sympathisers in sensitive government positions; and events of a global significance, such as the overthrow of Chiang Kai-Shek and the emergence of Mao Tse-Tung's "Red China," provided concrete evidence of communist expansion.[74] In accordance with the Truman Doctrine and the policy of containment, the United States deployed troops in Korea and later Vietnam to hold back what were perceived to be not indigenous revolutionary movements, but examples of communist expansion and aggrandisement originating in Peking and Moscow.

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[73] In the late Spring of 1954, McCarthy had his last fling with an attack on alleged Communist infiltration of the Army. The Army-McCarthy hearings lasted for 35 days, from which 187 hours of television were broadcast to 20 million viewers. Compton, "Anti-Communism in American Life Since the Second World War," pp. 1-2.

[74] Chiang Kai-Shek's regime in China fell to Mao Tse-Tung's Communists in the Spring of 1949. The term "Red" China was coined to signify Mao's regime, which was not officially recognised as China's legitimate government by successive American administrations. The US maintained that Chiang Kai-Shek and his government, both in exile in Formosa, remained the rightful rulers of China.

Intellectual and social theorists compounded those fears by suggesting that the United States was becoming increasingly susceptible to totalitarianism, whether communist or fascist. Hannah Arendt's Origins of Totalitarianism, in particular, enjoyed a vogue in the post-war United States. Arendt argued that Nazi and Soviet totalitarian regimes had emerged in German and Russian societies respectively because of the breakdown of previous social values. In both societies, she claimed, an increasing authoritarianism and a lack of individuality had paved the way for totalitarianism. Thus, the emergence of a mass consumer culture in the United States in the 1950s awakened real fears that Americans were losing their traditional creativity, vigour and individualism. As works like David Riesman's Lonely Crowd, C. Wright Mills' The Power Elite, Herbert Marcuse's One Dimensional Man, and William Whyte's The Organisation Man pointed out, Americans were increasingly conformist, politically passive, and intellectually and emotionally repressed. As a result, they believed, Americans were increasingly vulnerable to totalitarianism.[75]

The willingness of both sides in the Cold War to create propaganda from any perceived weakness in their opponent inevitably led the Soviet Union to concentrate on the United States' racial situation. Segregationists, it will be argued, were well aware of the situation. As will be shown, some chose to curb their racial rhetoric accordingly; others carried on regardless. The global ramifications of the Cold War

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[75] For more on the contribution to Cold War debate by political theorists, and the wide-ranging effects of America's burgeoning consumer culture, see Stephen J. Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), pp. 69-76; John P. Diggins, The Proud Decades: America in War and Peace, 1941-1960 (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1989), pp. 221-231. See also Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism [Third Edition] (London: Allen and Unwin, 1967); David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing American Character (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950); William H. Whyte, The Organisation Man (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1956); C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956); Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (London: Sphere Books, 1964).

revitalised the existing links between race and communism that had been created in the 1930s and 1940s. Consequently, this thesis will argue that the Cold War had an immensely powerful effect on the language and themes not just of anti-communism, but of the entire Massive Resistance campaign of which anti-communism was an integral part.

When western powers began to grant independence to former colonies in the 1950s and 1960s, the majority of those fledgling nations were technically non-aligned. They were, therefore, courted by both sides in the Cold War, as Soviet and Western governments tried to exert economic and political influence. As President Truman neatly summarised in 1948, "at the present moment of world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life."[76] From the slow start of Sudanese independence, granted on 1 January 1956, and Ghanaian independence, on 6 March 1957, momentum took hold in the early 1960s. Between 1960 and 1964, nineteen African and Caribbean states gained independence, eleven of them in 1960 alone.[77] With a high percentage of those states' populations belonging to the African Diaspora, the imperfections of the United States' racial practices had a potentially huge impact on their choice of ideological allegiance.[78]

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[76] Truman quoted in Compton, "Anti-Communism in American Life Since the Second World War," p. 6. In the words of Richard Scher, "international events began to take the form of a gigantic morality play." Richard Scher, Politics in the New South: Republicanism, Race and Leadership in the Twentieth Century (New York: Paragon House, 1992), p. 225.

[77] In 1960, independence was granted to Zaire, Somali, Dahomey, Upper Volta, Ivory Coast, Chad, Congo Brazzaville, Gabon, Senegal, Mali and Nigeria. In 1961, Sierra Leone and Tanzania became independent, in 1962 Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uganda, in 1963 Kenya, and, in 1964, Malawi and Zambia.

[78] By the early 1960s, that drive was made all the more important by the attempts of many of those nations to create an independent, "non-aligned" coalition. Indeed, in September 1961, India's Jawaharlal Nehru, Marshal Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, Indonesia's Achmad Soekarno, and Abdel Nasser of Egypt met in Belgrade to formally establish the Non-alignment Movement [NAM]. Building on the Bandung Conference of 1955, twenty-five states became founder members of NAM, and sought independence from either the Western or Soviet sphere. The US, therefore, could no longer rely on discrediting the Soviet Union to gain the allegiance of a newly independent state automatically. For

This situation was clearly recognised in the final report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights in February 1947. "An American diplomat cannot argue for free elections in foreign lands," it stated, "without meeting the challenge that in sections of America qualified voters do not have free access to the polls."[79] Similarly, the US Justice Department's *amicus curiae* brief to the Court in the *Brown v. Board of Education, Topeka* decision was in some respects as much a direct product of Cold War realpolitik as of the long struggle waged by the NAACP and others to abolish Jim Crow in southern education. "The United States is trying to prove to the people of the world, of every nationality, race and color," it stipulated, "that a free democracy is the most civilized and most secure form of government yet devised by man."[80] Clearly, the three strands of anti-communism, race, and the demands of Cold War diplomacy were inextricably woven together.

V

Whereas, at the national level, anti-communism must be seen as an extension of contemporary xenophobia and residual nativism, for southern segregationists it must be seen within the context of the South's own peculiar history. The southern psyche had been permanently scarred by the indignities suffered at the hands of the Federal Government during the period of Reconstruction, as the North tried to reincorporate the South into the Union after the Civil War. Southern myths abounded

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more on the early politics of NAM, see A.W. Singham and Shirley Hune, Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments (London: Zed Books, 1986), esp. pp. 57-118.

[79] Quoted in Lawson, Black Ballots, p. 123. Lawson accurately contends that the "cold war with the Soviet Union focused attention on race relations inside the United States and spurred anticommunist [sic] reformers to remind the nation about living up to its egalitarian preachings." p. 122.

[80] Quoted in Mary L. Dudziak, "Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative," Stanford Law Review, 41, 1 (November 1988), p. 65.

of heavy-handed mistreatment by the federal government, northern carpetbaggers and their black allies. These legends were fuelled by the rise of African Americans to positions of unprecedented influence: in South Carolina, blacks held a 76 to 41 majority in the state convention; in Louisiana, there was an equal divide between the races. Mississippi was represented by two black congressmen, Hiram Revels and Blanche K. Bruce. So ingrained were those memories that fears of a Second Reconstruction, and, more importantly perhaps, working out ways in which to avoid such a calamity, were constantly at the forefront of southern political thought and rhetoric.[81]

Those fears resurfaced with Roosevelt's New Deal, and with a succession of federal reports into the South's economic conditions. The Fair Employment Practices Committee [FEPC], established in 1941 as a response to A. Philip Randolph's March on Washington Movement, had little enforcement power. It did, however, symbolically display a willingness by the administration to intercede on behalf of African Americans. Under pressure from the NAACP, the Supreme Court, too, threatened the South's racial autonomy and white political hegemony with a series of decisions that provoked real fears of a Second Reconstruction. In 1944, for example, the Court's *Smith v Allwright* decision proclaimed the all-white primary to be unconstitutional, removing one of the pillars of continued southern white political hegemony.[82] It was the Court's *Brown* decision of 17 May 1954, however, that

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[81] C. Vann Woodward was one who characterised the first *Brown* decision as the "New Reconstruction." See, for example, C. Vann Woodward, "The New Reconstruction in the South," Commentary, 21, 6 (June 1956); or Woodward, "From the First Reconstruction to the Second," Harper's Magazine, 230 (April 1965).

[82] *Smith v. Allwright* was decided on the basis of the Fifteenth Amendment; in 1947, in the *Morgan* case, the Supreme Court outlawed segregation in inter-state transport; and, in 1950, it decided in *Sweatt v. Painter* that Texas' black law school was separate but not equal to its white equivalent.

brought home the immediacy of the growing threat that the white South faced from federal forces intent on desegregating the region. Declaring separate-but-equal schooling to be inherently unconstitutional, the ruling struck at the heart of the South's socio-political fabric, and promised to unstitch the region's carefully crafted racial mores. The supremacist South, in the words of Neil McMillen, "could find a kind of perverse satisfaction in indulging its fantasies in lurid comparisons between the post-*Brown* and the postbellum periods."[83]

This thesis will suggest that, if *Brown* heralded the Second Reconstruction in the southern psyche, then civil rights activists -- and communists in particular -- were conveniently cast as that Reconstruction's carpetbaggers, with the federal government playing its traditional role of the interventionist destroyer of the South's racial status quo. A letter sent to a southern newspaper by J.J. Bower in 1957, tellingly entitled, "History Repeats Itself In the South Even Today," noted the links between the First and Second Reconstructions. "Directly after the Civil War, carpetbaggers from the North moved in on the South. They exploited the newly freed Negro slaves for the carpetbagger's gain ...All these conditions were agitated by the outsider." Bower explained that "similar conditions exist in the South today. While the whites and the Negroes have been living a fairly peaceful co-existence, outsiders have again taken up the cry for the Negro."[84] The South was traditionally wary of "outsiders," a term which southern resisters employed somewhat idiosyncratically to denote anyone unsympathetic to the region's racial practices. As outsiders, so it was argued, not only did racial agitators have no right to comment on the South's racial situation, but they

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[83] McMillen, White Citizens' Councils, p. 359.
[84] "History Repeats Itself In the South Even Today," 13 November 1957, Harry Flood Byrd, Jr, Papers, Box 241, Manuscript Division, Special Collections Department, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville.

could also not hope to grasp its subtleties. Communists fitted the southern perception of "outsiders" twice over: they were not only viewed as alien to the region, but were also excluded from any definition of "American-ness." Although confining his remarks to the Deep South, Michael Heale has commented that, "from the Russian Revolution onward[,] every labour organizer or civil libertarian...risked being labelled a red, an alien 'other' to whom the normal constitutional protections need not apply."[85]

At mid-century, however, it was not just outsiders who were felt to be threatening the white South. More difficult for segregationists to countenance was opposition to the region's racial practices from their fellow white southerners -- the scalawags of the Second Reconstruction. In many ways, segregationists felt that the values they were upholding embodied the purest forms of American idealism and White Anglo-Saxon Protestantism. That was a feeling bolstered by the white southern religious establishment, notably Baptists, Methodists and Presbyterians. Racial separation, it was believed, would maintain the divinely ordained purity of the white race, and hence ensure that the South remained a bastion of Protestant Americanism. As one constituent wrote to North Carolina Senator Sam Ervin, Jr, when southern values appeared threatened by the Kennedy Administration's 1963 proposals for a civil rights bill, "It was white, Christian people who founded America. And who have worked and struggled to make it what it is today."[86] Segregationists held those views religiously: southerners who questioned such accepted truths were regarded as

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[85] Heale, McCarthy's Americans, p. 214.

[86] Mrs Isaac Twiddy letter to Samuel Ervin, Jr, 26 July 1963, Sam Ervin Papers, Folder 2981, Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. During my research, the Papers were in the process of being re-catalogued: the folder numbers listed are those of the original cataloguing.

heretics. The will to stamp out that heresy underpinned the often ferocious red-baiting attacks on bi-racial organisations attended by racially progressive white southerners, notably the Southern Conference for Human Welfare [SCHW] and the Southern Conference Education Fund [SCEF].

At mid-century, white southern society was thus facing opposition on three separate fronts: an increasingly hostile federal administration, an increasingly organised civil rights movement, and the ever-present menace of communism, both internal and external. This three-pronged attack was appositely summed up by an aide to Martin Luther King. The aide revealed that "KKK no longer stands for the Ku Klux Klan. 'It now means,' he said, 'Khrushchev, Kennedy, and King.'"[87]

[87] Aide quoted in unknown newspaper clipping enclosed with W.C. Daniel letter to Harry Byrd, Sr., 26 April 1963, Byrd Papers, Box 266.

Chapter One

The South

On Monday 17 May 1954, the US Supreme Court pronounced school segregation to be inherently unequal and, therefore, unconstitutional. The decision, *Brown v Board of Education, Topeka*, overturned the legal basis for segregation, which had rested since 1896 upon the separate-but-equal doctrine expounded in *Plessy v Ferguson*. Although *Brown* itself applied only to segregation in schools, its seminal importance rested upon its dismantling of the "separate-but-equal" premise: the South was left with no constitutional basis from which to protect any form of social, political, or economic segregation.

For almost two years after "Black Monday," southern leaders failed to formulate a coherent response to the decision. Many expressed dismay at the outcome of the case, yet nevertheless appeared unwilling or unable to define clearly their proposed legislative and political rejoinders. That was not, however, because they had been surprised by the Court's action. The case had been in the legal system for a considerable length of time: by December 1952, for example, it was already on second appeal to the Supreme Court. As Guy Benton Johnson explained to a Washington, DC, audience a full eleven months before the decree, "the Supreme Court is about to make a momentous decision on the question of the constitutionality of compulsory segregation in the public schools. This decision," he predicted, "may precipitate a grave crisis in the relations of the races in the South."[1]

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[1] "Segregation Vs Integration and the Impending Supreme Court Decision: An Address Delivered to the Association of Former Interns and Residents of Freedman's Hospital, Washington, June 4, 1953," Guy Benton Johnson Papers, Box 106, Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

As historians such as Tony Badger have shown, it was not until the Spring of 1956 that anything like a homogeneous resistance movement to *Brown* emerged in the South.[2] No single leader wanted to take the first step in defining a long-term strategy of defiance for the region. Furthermore, any need for leaders to give immediate direction to the segregationist response to *Brown* was somewhat offset by a second, implementation decision one year later, which decided rather nebulously that school desegregation should take place with "all deliberate speed." Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black, himself a southerner, later rued the vague wording of *Brown II*.[3] His Supreme Court colleague, Justice Brennan, recalled that, "several times later at conference, [Black] said sadly, '...We made a mistake.'"[4] That mistake was twofold: it failed to impose a strict timetable on desegregation, and it placed responsibility for the implementation of the decision in the hands of local school boards, many of which were composed of the very whites who wanted to forestall desegregation.

Southern discomfort with an increasingly "hands on" federal approach to government had been growing slowly but surely since the days of the New Deal. By the time of the Dixiecrat revolt in 1948, that discomfort had begun to gel into a formidable wave of resistance. The Dixiecrat challenge stemmed from southern Democrats' growing disenchantment with the National Democratic Party's political

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[2] See Tony Badger, "Fatalism, Not Gradualism: The Crisis of Southern Liberalism, 1945-65," in Brian Ward and Tony Badger [eds], The Making of Martin Luther King and the Civil Rights Movement (London: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 67-95; and Brian Ward, "Racial Politics, Culture and the Cole Incident of 1956," in M. Stokes and R. Halpern [eds], Race and Class in the American South since 1980 (Oxford: Berg, 1994), pp. 181-208.

[3] Looking back on the wording of the decision fifteen years later, Black said that "that was language for lawyers and that had been a grievous mistake. The phrase had given the South its weapon. For fifteen years lawyers had seized upon it to defy the law of the land." Hugo Black quoted in Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong, The Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), p. 38.

[4] William Brennan quoted in Roger K. Newman, Hugo Black: A Biography (New York: Pantheon, 1994), p. 440.

platform. Truman himself campaigned openly for greater black rights, and, when the Democratic National Conference adopted a positive civil rights plank in July 1948, southern politicians felt a sense of betrayal: coupled to the Presidential administration's attempts to desegregate the armed forces and federal government departments, an alliance of southern Black-Belt politicians and anti-New Dealers split from the ranks of the National Democratic Party.[5] The Dixiecrats based their political challenge to the National Party on a strong States' Rights stance, a return to small town "laissez faire" economics and, of course, opposition to desegregation.[6] Most of their support came from local politicians who had no committee positions to protect in Congress, although certain senior southern leaders were active supporters, most notably Mississippi Senator Jim Eastland and South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond, the Dixiecrat presidential candidate. Although the Dixiecrats' insurgency would fail, it nevertheless laid many of the rhetorical and organisational foundations for the truly massive resistance campaign which followed the *Brown* decisions of 1954 and 1955, when once again federal forces appeared determined to dictate to the South on the region's social and racial affairs.[7]

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[5] Truman's desire to fight the 1948 election on a strong civil rights plank was in part motivated by the need to appeal to the fast-expanding African American vote in the North. It was also in part due to the sympathetic backlash from many white Americans to the violence that greeted so many returning African American veterans who had fought for freedom abroad in World War II, only to be denied it at home. Truman therefore set up the President's Committee on Civil Rights, which issued its report in 1947. Entitled To Secure These Rights, its proposals included a plan to desegregate the armed forces and the federal establishment. In February 1948, Truman delivered his civil rights recommendations, based on the committee's report, to Congress.

[6] As Sarah McCulloh Lemmon has written, the ideology of the States' Rights Democratic Party [or Dixiecrats] was based on "the retention of present southern customs, especially segregation, by obtaining control of Federal policy, or failing that, by strictly limiting the powers of the Federal government." Sarah McCulloh Lemmon, "The Ideology of the Dixiecrat Movement," Social Forces, Vol. 30, p. 171.

[7] In the 1948 presidential elections, the Dixiecrats were not a success. They carried only South Carolina, Mississippi, Alabama and Louisiana. As Goldfield has pointed out, those were the four states in which the Dixiecrats ran under the Democratic Party emblem, suggesting that the South as a whole was not ready for revolt. David Goldfield, Black, White and Southern: Race Relations and Southern Culture 1940 to the Present (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), p. 67.

Given this context of steadily mounting white opposition to federal intervention, it was nonetheless the region's African Americans who played the most crucial role in encouraging the white South's embrace of wholesale resistance to federally supported racial change. By early 1956, the Supreme Court's two *Brown* decisions had come and gone, and still southern blacks saw little improvement in their social, economic and political positions, vividly exposing the enduring gulf between *de jure* and *de facto* racial equality. Southern black impatience and frustration at the pace of change soon transformed itself into action, and a succession of civil disobedience campaigns swept the South.[8] Direct action protests such as the bus boycotts in Tallahassee and, most notably, in Montgomery, petitions to school boards, and legal challenges to all forms of continued segregation brought with them a tremendous white backlash. As it dawned upon southern segregationists that blacks would not be content with the sort of prevarication and tokenism that had followed *Brown I* and *II*, and as a succession of southern federal judges surprised their fellow white southerners by upholding the law of the land and supporting black desegregation suits, an escalation of organised white resistance became inevitable.[9]

The beginnings of what can be termed widespread, truly *massive* resistance, therefore, is perhaps best traced not to *Brown* itself, but to the formulation and signing of the Southern Manifesto, on 12 March 1956. The Manifesto declared as its primary purpose the use of "all lawful means" to overturn *Brown*, and was signed by all but a

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[8] There were a number of other contributing factors leading to this increase in black protest action, including: dissatisfaction among World War II veterans who, having fought a war against democracy in Europe, found they were denied democratic rights at home; urbanisation; and, for example, a number of court cases preceding Brown, such as 1941's *Smith v Allwright* decision which outlawed the all white primary.

[9] The actions of the southern federal judges who supported *Brown* are eloquently retold in Jack Bass, Unlikely Heroes (Tuscaloosa and London: University of Alabama Press, 1981).

handful of southern legislators.[10] The driving forces behind it were some of the South's most influential figures, including Strom Thurmond from South Carolina, Sam Ervin from North Carolina, Georgia's Richard Russell, John Stennis of Mississippi, and Harry Byrd of Virginia. The "lawful means" to which those signatories put their names soon encompassed a broad arsenal of resistance weapons, which came under the umbrella term of Massive Resistance. They included recourse to traditional southern values, such as an emphasis on the primacy of States' Rights and the need to maintain the "purity" of the white race, as well as specifically designed legislative acts, attempts to undermine the black freedom struggle by labelling it as subversive, the use of demagogic rhetoric and, where desegregation was concerned, prevarication, tokenism and occasional mob violence.

This chapter will examine the ways in which segregationists chose and utilised weapons from that resistance arsenal, concentrating especially on the deployment of anti-communism. It will also seek to identify recurring themes in anti-communist rhetoric, whilst retaining sensitivity to the particular -- often local -- ways in which anti-communism was deployed. There was certainly something of a "call and response" dimension to much of the rhetoric of Massive Resistance, and to anti-communism in particular: the more that white communities were actively threatened by concerted attempts to ameliorate the position of local African Americans, the greater the intensity of that rhetoric. More generally, the chapter reveals the powerful impact of the Cold War on many aspects of southern racial rhetoric and politics.

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[10] See Badger, "Fatalism, Not Gradualism," pp. 67-95.

II

Brown, mass black civil rights activism and Massive Resistance did not occur in isolation from the broader themes of the Cold War. The decision was as much a product of that conflict as it was a domestic response to increased African American agitation for racial reform. Internationally, the Soviets openly and continually pressed for explanations of America's treatment of its minorities, in an ongoing attempt to keep the South's racism in the world news. Internally, African Americans attempted to harness that growing external pressure to ameliorate their own position. Indeed, the decision to desegregate southern schools was ultimately used as a foreign policy weapon, which Mary Dudziak has described as providing a "Cold War imperative" for desegregation.[11] As she explained, African Americans attempted to focus international attention on American racism from the outset of the Cold War. In 1951, for example, William Patterson and Paul Robeson had published "An Appeal to the United Nations," under the auspices of the Civil Rights Congress [CRC]. Initially formulated by W.E.B. Du Bois three years earlier, the Appeal strove to highlight internal racial abuse through the global forum provided by the United Nations.[12] It was publicly unveiled on 12 November 1951, with copies deposited on the desks of such notaries as United Nations Secretary General Trygvie Lie and Eleanor Roosevelt. Neither

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[11] Mary L. Dudziak, "Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative," Stanford Law Review, Vol. 41, No.1 (November 1988).

[12] The Appeal highlighted cases of civil rights abuse within the United States which, the authors believed, ran contrary to the Geneva Accord's "Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide." Noting that the Convention defined genocide not as the complete and definitive destruction of a race or people, but as "any intent to destroy, *in whole or in part*, a national, racial, ethnic, or religious group," the authors maintained that "the oppressed Negro citizens of the United States, segregated, discriminated against and long the target of violence, suffer from genocide as the result of the consistent, conscious, unified policies of every branch of government." We Charge Genocide: The Historic Petition to The United Nations For Relief From a Crime of The United States Government Against the Negro People [New Edition] (New York: International Publishers, 1970), p. xiv. Emphasis in the original.

would read the document. The general public, however, were less hostile, and copies sold in abundance.[13]

Although it ultimately failed to do so, *Brown* was seen by many as an attempt to curtail such protests. It was hoped that the decision would put an end to what on the global stage was becoming an increasing embarrassment for the United States. That embarrassment had been intensified by the knowledge that critical articles on southern racism had been carried by foreign newspapers. The Presbyterian Outlook of February 1954, for example, included an article by Benjamin Mays in which he reported on a trip to India in 1953. Whilst in Lucknow, he began, "I held a press conference with nine newspaper men from different parts of India. It was," he wrote, "an interesting session. They literally cross-examined me for ninety minutes, all on the race problem in South Africa and in the United States."[14]

At home, both national and local newspapers carried front page reports of the Supreme Court's decision, stressing that it was a body blow to both continued legal and practical racism in the South. Many of those papers, including the New York Times, were at pains to make it clear that news of the decision had been flashed around the globe by the Voice of America as soon as the Court's judgement had been handed down. In the wake of the decision, an editorial in another nation-wide publication, Time, held that the best way to win against communism was to "overcome the unjustified stigma, which the Communists have succeeded in making

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[13] See Earl Ofari Hutchison, Blacks and Reds: Race and Class in Conflict 1919-1990 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1995), pp. 207-215. For more on Du Bois' role, see Gerald Horne, Black and Red: W.E.B. Du Bois and the Afro-American Response to the Cold War (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1986).

[14] The Presbyterian Outlook, 1 May 1954, p. 5. Copy in J.L. Blair Buck Papers, Box 2, Manuscripts Division, Special Collections Department, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville.

stick with that two thirds of the world's population who are colored, that our own color (in the main white) is a symbol of exploitation."[15]

A year after the 1954 decision, it appeared that *Brown* had not placated foreign critics of US racial practice any more than it had delivered equality to southern blacks. The same accusations of US racial malpractice surfaced at the Bandung Conference, at which delegates from 29 independent countries from Asia and Africa met to herald the emergence of an unaligned, under-developed "Third World" of nations. An article about the conference by C.L. Sulzberger appeared in the New York Times of 23 April 1955, drawing attention to the crucial role played by US race relations in global politics. Soviet propaganda, the article maintained, had convinced many Asians that the United States had dropped an atom bomb on Japan because it was a non-white country. "Hatred and suspicion of such an attitude are vigorously alive on both continents," Sulzberger continued. "Communism had taken advantage of this sensitive situation. Its propaganda seeks to describe a United States that has assumed the mantle of colonialism and encourages racial discrimination." Coupled to the white South's determination not to abide by *Brown* and to forestall desegregation for as long as possible, it is not surprising that Sulzberger was moved to conclude that "this kind of propaganda has considerable success."[16]

The UN, too, continued to be a target for the newly globalised racial dialogue. Once the high-profile target of Patterson and Robeson's "Appeal," the organisation was also at the heart of a propaganda offensive launched by the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, nearly six years after the desegregation decree. Khrushchev intended to

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[15] 1954 editorial quoted in Page d'Aulnay, "for the editors, Time," letter to J.R. Orgain, Jr, 6 May 1960, James Robert Orgain, Jr, Papers, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia.
[16] "Foreign Affairs: Bandung Draws Attention to A Problem," by C.L. Sulzberger, New York Times, 23 April 1955, p. 18.

capitalise on the racism endemic in the South. In September 1960, he "began a vigorous campaign for removal of the UN headquarters from New York to some other country," reported Judge H.L. Riddle, Jr, to the 1961 Southern Governors' Conference.[17] The Soviets made much of "certain embarrassing incidents" that had befallen non-white foreign-embassy personnel during their visits to the United States. Most of these involved personal experiences of being segregated on grounds of colour whilst travelling through the South, or of being excluded from southern hotels and restaurants altogether. According to Stetson Kennedy, the Florida-born radical journalist, "Even if you are a diplomatic representative of some foreign government, there is no diplomatic immunity from arrest and perhaps mob violence if you violate the segregation laws and customs. For this reason, the State Department maintains a special office in Miami, Florida, whose chief function it is to meet visiting Latin American dignitaries as they arrive at the International Airport, and whisk them away in private limousines to be entertained until such a time as they can be put aboard another plane to carry them north and out of the segregated territory."[18] As Judge Riddle concluded in his address to the southern governors, Khrushchev's success in moving the United Nations "would constitute a tremendously damaging blow to the prestige of the United States..."[19] It was increasingly apparent that the United States' Cold War foes would not willingly allow an organisation as prestigious as the United

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[17] "The State Advisory Committee to the Chief of Protocol: Remarks To The Southern Governors' Conference September 25, 1961 by Judge H.L. Riddle, Jr," Sanford Gubernatorial Papers, Box 112, State of North Carolina Department of Cultural Resources, Division of Archives and History, Raleigh, North Carolina.

[18] Stetson Kennedy, Jim Crow Guide: The Way It Was (Boca Raton: Florida Atlantic University Press, 1959), p.182.

[19] "The State Advisory Committee to the Chief of Protocol: Remarks To The Southern Governors' Conference September 25, 1961 by Judge H.L. Riddle, Jr," Sanford Gubernatorial Papers, Box 112.

Nations to remain headquartered in New York while institutionalised racism continued unabated in the South.

The symbolic importance of *Brown* in an international Cold War context was also exemplified by the response of both segregationists and desegregationists to the Supreme Court's pronouncement. Predictably, racial moderates applauded the decision and its wider ramifications; white supremacists, equally predictably, were aghast. Representative of the racially progressive viewpoint was the eminent liberal preacher-theologian Harry Emerson Fosdick, a member of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People [NAACP]'s "Committee of 100" and an influential supporter of the Association. Only four days after *Brown*, he wrote of the need to put into practice what he termed the "new vision of democracy" granted by the decree. "It would be ironic," he believed, "if discriminations were to persist long after the Voice of America proudly announced a bright new emancipation to the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America."[20] Arthur Shores, a lawyer for the NAACP, stated that *Brown* would "prove a great boost to democracy, not only in the matter of propaganda value against Communism, but also from a political standpoint."[21]

Ever sensitive to the leverage which Cold War anxieties could offer, later civil rights activists were not averse to maximising the discomfort of southern segregationists by drawing attention to this aspect of foreign policy. On Labor Day, 1957, for example, Martin Luther King, Jr, told an audience at Tennessee's

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[20] Harry Emerson Fosdick letter to Charles Williams, 21 May 1954, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 110, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 108, Archives and Research Services, Library of Virginia, Richmond.

[21] Arthur Shores quoted in J. Tyra Harris, "Alabama Reaction to the *Brown* Decision 1954-1956: A Case Study in Early Massive Resistance," DA dissertation, Middle Tennessee State University, 1978, p. 158.

Highlander Folk School that the South "reveals increasing sensitivity to the force of world opinion. Few indeed are the southerners," stated King, "who relish having their status lumped in the same category with the Union of South Africa as a final refuge of segregation. It is not pleasant, either," he continued, "to be shown how southern intransigence fortifies Communist appeals to Asian and African peoples."[22]

Unsurprisingly, segregationists widely condemned *Brown*. Many of them objected most strongly to the argument that the South ought to comply with the decision to appease a foreign enemy. As Dudziak has pointed out, southern demagogues such as Georgia's Herman "Humman" Talmadge were dismayed at the federal government's pragmatic use of the decision to counter Soviet claims of internal racial malfeasance. In his 1955 monograph, You And Segregation, Talmadge urged southerners to "stop and think for a moment. How many times have you read in your newspapers and magazines or heard over the airwaves this question: 'What will Russia say if our government does this?' How many times have you read or heard this, 'What will the Reds say if we don't do this?'" Talmadge balked at the fact that, in some instances, the United States had shaped its domestic policy "by trying to please the Communists." "These are the answers I gave when asked, 'What will the Communists say about the stand you Southerners take on the racial situation?' Who cares what the Communists say! Who cares what *Pravda* prints!"[23] Congressman Elijah Lewis Forrester, a fellow Georgian, had himself "become exceedingly weary of hearing people say that we have got to pass laws that we know are unsound, or we are

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[22] "'The Look To The Future' by Martin Luther King, Jr: An Address Delivered at the 25th Anniversary of the Highlander Folk School, Monteagle, Tennessee, Labor Day, September 2, 1957 (Transcribed from a tape recording.)" 8003-b Microfilm, Sarah Patton Boyle Papers, Manuscripts Division, Special Collections Department, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville.
[23] Herman Talmadge quoted in Dudziak, "Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative," p. 117.

going to offend Russia and her satellites. That kind of statement," he told the House, "does no credit to America. I have no desire whatever," he finished, "to satisfy Russia and her satellites unless they are willing to be satisfied with that which is right."[24]

Dudziak noted this trend at a leadership level, chronicling the response of policy makers, government officials and diplomats. It was not only segregationist leaders who felt as Talmadge and Forrester did, however, but also many of their southern constituents. Harold Dorn, of South Miami's Dorn Fruit and Vegetable Company, was forthright in his condemnation of *Brown*. Writing in June 1954, Dorn protested that "liberal" writers in America "have already said that this measure [*Brown*] should disarm the most strident critics of our race relations around the world. In other words," he wrote, "it is an act of appeasement, especially towards the Communists." Dorn, though, felt that "such interests cannot be appeased; they will continue barefaced lies in America, no matter what it does." Furthermore, he firmly believed, "this decision will be considered a sign of weakness, and the Communists will rejoice in this ready furnished means of division."[25] Dan Smoot, Dallas-based pamphleteer and eponymous leading light of the Dan Smoot Speaks newsletter, was equally sceptical. Acknowledging that the Supreme Court's decision had, in some quarters, been loudly applauded for "taking the teeth out of communist propaganda about race," Smoot had other ideas. "If we are going to shape our national politics to avoid all the dishonest charges of Communist propaganda," he proclaimed in the newspaper, "we will have to eliminate all of our institutions of freedom, throw away what is left of our Constitution, dismantle our republic, and convert America into a

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[24] Congressional Record, 16 July 1956, p. 12949, Roosevelt Study Center [RSC], Middelburg, The Netherlands. Forrester, who represented Georgia's Third Congressional District, served from January 1951 until his retirement in January 1965.

[25] Harold W. Dorn letter to Thomas Stanley, 8 June 1954, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 100.

satellite of the Soviet Union. That," he believed, "is the only way to avoid criticism from the Communists."[26]

In this prevailing climate, Massive Resisters increasingly began to use much of the vocabulary of the Cold War. That was perhaps most clearly in evidence as segregationists began to tailor their traditional calls for the primacy of States' Rights to suit the new situation. If the federal government and judiciary were going to try to pressurise the South into reforming their racial practices to appease Cold War propagandists, then those segregationists responded in kind, utilising the terminology of the Cold War in their defence of States' Rights. The South's experience of Reconstruction after the Civil War had hardened sentiment against federal incursions. Likewise, attitudes towards Roosevelt's New Deal and its threat to southern autonomy had been decidedly ambivalent across the region. There were perceived similarities between that style of "hands on" federal government and the state control of socialism: both systems relied upon extensive government involvement; both were anathema to the vast majority of southerners.

Strom Thurmond, firebrand Senator from South Carolina and Dixiecrat presidential candidate, was one of a number of southern legislators who continually drew attention to the erosion of the individual sovereignty of southern states. Referring to the largely toothless 1957 Civil Rights Act, Thurmond wrote that, "since 1957, the succession of civil rights proposals that tended to expand the power of the Federal Government provide the best examples of legislation that exceeds the bounds of the Constitution."[27] Exceeding the Constitution was un-American; thus, Thurmond

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[26] Dan Smoot Speaks, 19 August 1955, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 104.
[27] Strom Thurmond, The Faith We Have Not Kept (San Diego: Viewpoint Books, 1968), p. 161.

was tacitly suggesting, so was the legislation. Thurmond's long-standing colleague, Mississippi Senator Jim Eastland, suggested taking the doctrine of States' Rights to its logical conclusion of interposition, in a last ditch attempt to protect the sovereignty of individual southern states.[28] Interposition, he told an audience of 4,000 at the inaugural meeting of the South Carolina Association of Citizens' Councils in early 1956, was the only solution to protect the South from the desegregation decisions. Those decisions, he maintained, were caused by a propaganda barrage inspired by "a radical pro-Communist political movement."[29]

A two-page printed news sheet originating in Nashville, Tennessee, entitled Sensing the News, provides a good example of the increasingly vocal concern amongst southerners of a link between the erosion of States' Rights and growing subversive influences in the region. In July 1956, Thurmond Sensing, printer and financier of the news sheet, asked the question, "who wants these civil rights bills passed -- besides the politicians in both parties who back them purely as a matter of political expediency?"[30] To Sensing, the answer was simple: communists, and, more specifically, the Communist Party-sponsored Daily Worker. That was not, however, solely because the Daily Worker was interested in civil rights. Rather, the paper supported the measure "because it hates the South and those political leaders in the South who support the principles of individual freedom and local self-government to

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[28] Veteran Virginia political correspondent James Latimer defined interposition as "An early-19th century doctrine that held, in effect, that a sovereign state by the action of its legislature could interpose its sovereignty to protect its citizens from usurpations created by federal judicial power, and if enough of its sister states did likewise, the objectionable decision could be nullified." James Latimer, "The Rise and Fall of Massive Resistance", Times-Dispatch, 22 September 1996, p. A11.

[29] James O. Eastland quoted in Nadine Cohodas, Strom Thurmond and the Politics of Southern Change (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993), p. 282.

[30] Sensing the News, No. 52, 1 July 1956, William Munford Tuck Papers, Folder 3951, Manuscript and Rare Books Department, Earl Gregg Swem Library, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg.

which the South so closely adheres." Introducing his own, original slant to the politics of States' Rights, and further demonstrating the flexibility of segregationist rhetoric, Sensing believed that the Daily Worker also supported civil rights measures because "it means more centralised government as opposed to States' Rights, and the communists know it is much easier to subvert a central government than it is to subvert forty-eight state governments."[31]

As those such as Sensing have exemplified, the primacy of States' Rights had become a defence against communist advancement, as well as a weapon against federal incursion. Practitioners of States' Rights arguments in the Massive Resistance era were also placing themselves in a venerable tradition of southerners opposed to federal power. Figures such as John C. Calhoun, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison were lionised by many resisters, who drew selectively from their achievements: Calhoun was revered for formalising the doctrine of interposition whilst a South Carolina Senator; Jefferson and Madison for their devotion to States' Rights and their suggestions in the 1790s that interposition resolutions could be used to check federal power.[32] Deference to such figures helped resisters not only to legitimise their adherence to States' Rights, but also to make respectable what was in essence resistance to racial change.

Sensing was merely suggesting a link between communist subversion and the undermining of States' Rights and the freedoms that such rights were held to secure.

Others did not tread so lightly. Marvin Griffin, for example, triumphant in the Georgia

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31 ibid.

32 As Wilhoit has correctly noted, many of Jefferson and Madison's contributions to American history were overlooked by resisters. "One must conclude," he noted, "...that the white South venerated Jefferson and Madison for their eccentric deviations rather than for the main thrust of their political philosophy." Francis M. Wilhoit, The Politics of Massive Resistance (New York: George Braziller, 1973), p. 75.

Gubernatorial Primary of 1954, proclaimed that the "meddlers, demagogues, race-baiters and Communists are determined to destroy every vestige of states' rights."[33] By 1962, Philip Braubach of San Antonio, Texas, had sent telegrams to southern governors to beg support for Mississippi's Governor Ross Barnett, who had threatened to arrest any federal officers assisting James Meredith's efforts to enter the steadfastly segregated University of Mississippi. "Suggest you solicit support for Gov Barnett from all governors based on constitutional States' Rights," he wrote. "If present trend continues," he believed, "country will be controlled by socialistic dictator who has thrown Constitution out the window."[34]

As Braubach and others suggested, the white South's traditional fear that its sovereign rights were under threat was increasingly augmented by the fear that communism was spreading in the region. In the majority of cases, civil rights insurgency was seen as the vehicle for that communist advancement. Thus, when civil rights activists began to force successive federal administrations to intervene in episodes of racial unrest in the South, for example during the Little Rock school crisis and the Freedom Rides, presidential administrations began to be seen as willing accomplices of subversive "communistic" forces. Whether those links were made explicitly or implicitly, they nevertheless became a *leit-motif* of the ideology of Massive Resistance.

Alongside this belief that their sovereign rights were under threat, white southerners became equally convinced that their traditional social values were in peril. The region's social systems had been carefully constructed over time to maintain the

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[33] Marvin Griffin quoted in Numan Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South During the 1950's (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969), p.68.
[34] Philip Braubach letter to Terry Sanford, 29 September 1962, Box 232, Sanford Gubernatorial Papers.

"purity" of the white race, upon which doctrines of white supremacy were predicated. Patriarchal, nuclear families were sanctified. More than just a homemaker, the "Southern Belle" was a hallowed symbol of inviolable, "American" WASP values. To many white southerners, she was the guardian of moral and racial purity. By the 1950s and 1960s, however, a succession of cultural changes had threatened to undermine the myth of southern womanhood, the sanctity of the family unit and, perhaps most perniciously of all in white southern minds, the purity of the white race. Coupled to growing agitation for African American social equality and the increased fear of communist advancement in the South, the region's white supremacists felt increasingly besieged.

World War II and its aftermath provided a catalyst for change in the employment and domestic practices of many American women. In the South, those changes were possibly slower than in the more urban industrial North, and were by no means complete by the mid-1950s, but, nonetheless, many southern women found themselves combining their traditional status as homemakers with supplementary paid work. As the Cold War took hold, they, too, became engulfed in the accompanying propaganda war. Joanne Meyerowitz has shown that, on the one hand, women's traditional domestic roles of homemaker, mother and wife presented them as "buffers against the communist threat."[35] On the other hand, Meyerowitz demonstrated the ways in which popular culture -- especially literature -- encouraged a more conspicuous public role for post-war women through educational advancement, career development and political participation. This strongly contrasted the popular vision of

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[35] Joanne Meyerowitz, "Beyond the Feminine Mystique: A Reassessment of Postwar Mass Culture, 1946-1958," Journal of Southern History, Vol. 79, No. 4 (March 1993). See especially pp. 1458-1465, 1469.

Soviet women, who were continually represented as politically oppressed menial workers. In a southern culture which had always valued paternalistic protection of the "Southern Belle," the slow changes in female domestic status signalled an era of uncertainty, anxiety and defensiveness about gender roles and social responsibilities among both men and women.

The emergence of a distinctive youth culture in the 1950s only added to many southerners' belief that their society and its mores were under siege. That nascent culture centred around rock'n'roll music, comic books and seemingly dysfunctional screen icons such as James Dean and Marlon Brando. It threatened to shatter traditional patterns of deference to parental and institutional authority, substituting new secular moral codes for old church- and family-based ones. Many southerners began to believe not only that their core family values were being eroded, but also that their children were being gravely threatened by delinquency. As recent histories have noted, the emergence of a truly widespread southern resistance effort was concurrent with a substantial increase in the popularity of rock'n'roll music, a bi-racial musical genre which drew heavily from African American rhythm and blues and often traded on overt sexual imagery and suggestive lyrics.[36] In order to confront this vibrant youth culture, commissions were established across the country with the mandate of staving off juvenile delinquency and of upholding traditional, American family values. In the

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[36] Brian Ward, for example, has shown how Asa Carter attempted to use an attack on Nat King Cole in April 1956 to gain the initiative in Alabama's organised resistance campaign. Carter and his North Alabama Citizens' Council [NACC] hoped to outmanoeuvre Sam Englehardt's rival Alabama Association of Citizens' Councils [AACC] by playing on many of the residual white fears that Cole, playing to an all-white audience in the state, aroused. So knee-jerk was the reaction to rock'n'roll's success that even Cole, a non-rock'n'roll artist, was attacked. By focusing on rock'n'roll, "Carter located a powerful metaphor for the horrors of integration. He skilfully used rock and roll to tap into all manner of social, political and generational, as well as racial and sexual, anxieties afflicting adult white America at mid-century." Brian Ward, Just My Soul Responding: Rhythm and Blues, Black Consciousness and Race Relations (London: University College London Press, 1998), p. 100.

South, those efforts were played out within the context of deteriorating race relations. The spectres of racial conflict, rock'n'roll, miscegenation, juvenile delinquency and un-American family values became inextricably fused together.

Resistance forces, therefore, thought that juvenile delinquency and rock'n'roll were but precursors of imminent social collapse. Furthermore, it was commonly believed that destruction of the region's rigid social order could only facilitate communist success, as red forces made the most of the resultant turmoil. The CPUSA's long-standing commitment to inter-racial sex and marriage served only to heighten such tensions, with the result that segregationists began to place increasing emphasis on the link between calls for racial integration and the "racial mongrelization" that would "inevitably" follow.[37] Indeed, throughout its history, the CPUSA had been linked to the advocacy of inter-racial sex. In 1919, for example, as a reaction to the first Red Scare, the General Intelligence Division [GID] of the Justice Department produced a report on the threat of miscegenation.[38] In 1953, a report produced by its successor, the Domestic Intelligence Division, stated that it was "interesting to note that one of the [Communist Party's] 'concrete demands'...advocated the 'removal of all legal restrictives and social censorship of intermarriage in the Southern States.'"[39] By 1956, when LeRoy Collins fought the

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[37] As early as 1947, for example, Mississippi's Theodore "The Man" Bilbo wrote and self-published a book entitled, Take Your Choice: Separation or Mongrelization. Bilbo, summed up Egerton, "with the most serious intent, concluded that annihilation would be preferable to 'intermingling'; better to see civilisation 'blotted out with the atomic bomb,' he wrote, 'than to see it slowly but surely destroyed in the maelstrom of miscegenation, interbreeding, intermarriage, and mongrelization." See John Egerton, 'Speak Now Against the Day': The Generation Before the Civil Rights Movement in the South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), pp. 402-403.

[38] The GID was established by Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer on 1 August 1919 to collect information on radicals. In 1924, J. Edgar Hoover recast the GID as the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

[39] Domestic Intelligence Division Report quoted in Kenneth O'Reilly, 'Racial Matters': The FBI's Secret File on Black America, 1960-1972 (New York: Macmillan, 1989), p. 147.

wealthy businessman Sumter Lowry in the Florida Democratic Primary, he denounced "integration as part of a communist conspiracy to destroy the moral fibre of the nation by creating a 'mongrel' race incapable of preventing a red take-over."[40]

Mississippi Congressman John Rankin, who established his anti-communist credentials chairing HUAC from 1945 to 1946, was even more explicit than Collins. "The fellow travelers," he stated simply, "are out to mongrelize this nation." Rankin, though, thought the communist hordes to be more scheming and sinister than did Collins. "One of the most vicious movements that has yet to be instituted by the crackpots, the Communists and the parlor pinks of this country," Rankin told the Speaker of the House, "is trying to browbeat the American Red Cross into taking the labels off the blood bank they are building up for our boys in the service so that it will not show whether it is Negro blood or white blood. That seems to be," he concluded, "one of the schemes of these fellow travelers to try and mongrelize this nation."[41] Without labels, it was probable that whites would be given "black blood" in transfusions, and *vice versa*. That in turn played upon the residual notion that blood in some way denoted racial essence, and that the presence of as much as "one drop" of non-white blood in an individual's genealogy excluded any claim to white-ness. Although such definitions were determined rather arbitrarily over time and place, it was generally held that contamination of blood could only mean contamination of

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[40] LeRoy Collins quoted in Richard K. Scher, Politics in the New South: Republicanism, Race and Leadership in the Twentieth Century (New York: Paragon House, 1992), p. 243. Although initially a product of the South's paternalistic views on race, by 1960 Collins recognised the inadequacies of a tokenistic approach to racial desegregation. Under President Johnson, Collins was appointed to head the Community Relations Service in 1964. He took on a role of mediator in the Selma civil rights conflict in March 1965. Rather than being a convert to inter-racialism, however, Collins sought to avoid conflict in the interests of promoting a New South. See Tom Wagy, Governor LeRoy Collins of Florida: Spokesman of the New South ([n.p.]: University of Alabama Press, 1985), esp. pp. 177-191.

[41] John Rankin quoted in Charlotte Pomerantz [ed.], A Quarter Century of Un-Americana (New York: Marzani and Munsell, 1963), p. 31.

racial purity.[42] Georgia's Congressman Elijah Forrester, one of the South's more vocal anti-communists, followed this well-trodden path. "The Communist conspiracy," he stated, "was that the fight against us would be first waged on the grounds of equality, but denying that intermarriage and integration was sought or desired. That lasted only for a season," he noted, before coming to the crux of the present problem. "They are now demanding in unmistakable terms social equality and intermarriage."[43]

Away from the spotlight of national politics, many southerners echoed the sentiments propounded by the likes of Rankin, Collins and Forrester. George Constantine, from Chickasaw in Alabama, authored and disseminated a pamphlet entitled, "What Price Slavery: A Deep Look into the Melting Pot of Indiscriminate Breeding." "The purpose of this publication," he wrote, "is to reaffirm the basic fundamentals concerning breeding and segregation at a time when their importance is obscured in an indiscriminate fog."[44] Tennesseean Thomas D. Palton, on the other hand, not only believed that it was northerners and not his fellow southerners who were responsible for agitation in the South, but also that black communists in the North were squarely to blame. He contended that "race friction is caused by forcing

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[42] As Joel Williamson has written of the South, "in those parts, in the eyes of the dominant whites the merest hint of Negro blood automatically made a person all Negro." Joel Williamson, New People: Miscegenation and Mulattoes in the United States (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995), p. 1. See also pp. 73-75. As Richard Sherman has shown in his study of early twentieth century Virginia, there was considerable variation of levels of blood "purity" over time: an 1866 law, for example, classified as "colored" anyone with "one-forth or more Negro blood"; in 1910, as the interest in racial science and eugenics spearheaded a drive amongst Virginia segregationists to seek yet more protection for the "purity" of the white race, that level was raised to one sixteenth. See Richard B. Sherman, "'The Last Stand': The Fight for Racial Integrity in Virginia in the 1920s," Journal of Southern History, 54, 1 (February 1988), esp. pp. 69-72.

[43] Congressional Record, 23 February 1956, p. 3208, [RSC].

[44] "What Price Slavery: A Deep Look into the Melting Pot of Indiscriminate Breeding," by George Constantine, enclosed with George Constantine letter to Tom Stanley, Box 100, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers.

the unwilling races into close proximity," from which miscegenation would result. "Only communistic northern negroes spread propaganda for breaking the social taboo and intermarriage of whites and negroes. Southern negroes," Palton stated, "abhor race-mixing anyway."[45]

III

Segregationists clearly tailored the rhetoric of Massive Resistance to the Cold War situation in highly individual and flexible ways. There were, however, commonly accepted discursive frameworks within which segregationist groups and individuals placed both their broader Massive Resistance arguments and, more specifically, their anti-communist accusations. The most well-defined of those discourses centred on the evolution of *Brown* itself, which was held to be an attack on what southerners perceived to be their core social values. Indeed, so great a threat did it pose that a genuine belief emerged among southerners that the propagators of the decree had to have been in some way un-American. In this context, southerners saw themselves as the last upholders of the white Anglo-Saxon ideals that were notionally at the centre of Americanism; the South, therefore, became the last bastion of a quintessential Americanism which was constantly being eroded by northern federalists. "I submit for your judgement," thundered Alabama's George Wallace a decade after *Brown*, "the

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[45] Thomas D. Palton letter to John Battle, 1 October 1953, Battle Gubernatorial papers, Box 142, Archives and Research Services, Library of Virginia, Richmond. James M. Thomson, of Clarke County in Virginia, felt so strongly about the issue that he published a broadsheet entitled, "The Supreme Court Legislates," shortly after *Brown*. The decision was, he claimed, "social legislation." In promulgating the decree, Thomson doubted whether any of the Supreme Court Justices "would argue that such compulsion to attend school from childhood to college graduation, and meet on terms of perfect social equality with other young men and women will not lead to intermarriage." Such miscegenation, felt Thomson, would also lead to the break down of the "historic separation of the races which has been in effect since the dawn of history." Anticipating a popular response to his publication, Thomson printed on the top of the first page, "reprint permitted." "The Supreme Court Legislates," by James M. Thomson, 1954, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 101.

fact that every single decision of the Court in the past ten years...has been decided against freedom and in favor of tyranny."[46] Freedom, Wallace was suggesting, was inherently "American;" tyranny, therefore, was "un-American." It was a short step from un-American to communist, and, armed with this belief, the major players in Massive Resistance locked horns with the Supreme Court.

Segregationist ire was exacerbated by the belief that, in passing down their decision, the Supreme Court Justices had exceeded their constitutional remit to interpret the Constitution, and had instead created law. Strom Thurmond, for example, stated that "although the judicial revolution gained momentum over a long period of time, history will cite one date as the most conspicuous moment when the Court freed itself of its oath to uphold the Constitution." His language was loaded, and intentionally so: it was a judicial *revolution*.[47] Called before hearings of the Florida Legislature in 1958, J.B. Matthews declared that "communists or communist influence were directly involved in every major race incident of the past four years since the Supreme Court 'legislated' on the subject of integration."[48] It is a clear example of the hit and miss nature of anti-communism as a weapon of Massive Resistance, however, that Matthews was taken to task by Florida's Tampa Tribune. He was, the newspaper believed, merely rehashing old charges that had already been brought, and which furthermore had never been proven.[49]

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[46] George Wallace quoted in Dan T. Carter, The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the Origins of the New Conservatism, and the Transformation of American Politics (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), p. 217.
[47] Thurmond, The Faith We Have Not Kept, p. 14.
[48] J.B. Matthews quoted in James Graham Cook, The Segregationists (Appleton-Century-Crofts: New York, 1962), p. 300.
[49] ibid. To add to the surprising nature of the Tampa Tribune's remarks, it was a newspaper published by the conservative D. Tenant Bryan, who also published Virginia's Richmond Times-Dispatch and the Richmond News Leader.

Many of the South's white constituents made the same charges as their political leaders. The "Red River Post No. 118" of the American Legion, based in Coushatta, Louisiana, for example, passed a resolution calling for "the United States Supreme Court and the Congress of the United States [to] be censured for their role in promoting socialism, destroying basic constitutional principles, creating dis-unity [sic], strife and for lending help, aid and support to the case of Communism."[50] An Associated Press clipping of 3 June 1954 filed from Sheridan, Arkansas, reported that angry patrons of Sheridan School had voted to keep the school segregated in response to *Brown*. Moreover, they voted to have Senator Joe McCarthy probe the "Americanism" of the Supreme Court. "I am wondering if the Supreme Court justices are not Communist-infiltrated," wondered J.H. Duncan, a candidate for State Representative.[51]

"Why," asked Birmingham's C.C. McLean, "have Members of Congress made no effort to control Supreme Court and federal judges who have usurped their power?...Today," he continued, "the American people are governed largely by decisions rendered by politically appointed Supreme Court and federal judges who are using methods comparable to those of communistic nations."[52] Miss Mary Chalmers Hood from Florence, Alabama, tried to put the Supreme Court's alleged subversion into context. "Until after the Economic War (1861-65) the country was satisfied to abide by Constitutional Law," she wrote, "then it tried to substitute the 14th Amendment for the State Law of Segregation. Not succeeding then, on May 17th,

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50 "Resolution by American Legion, Red River Post No. 118, Coushatta, Louisiana," [n.d.], Sanford Gubernatorial papers, Box 112.
51 Press clipping, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 107.
52 C.C. McLean letter to [unknown] newspaper editor, copied to Aubrey Brown, Aubrey Brown papers, Box 1, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia.

1954," she concluded, "a small minority, (nine judges)...backed by a subtle Russian 5th column (in America) again is trying to force the illegal 14th Amendment on the United States, Sovereign States!"[53] The Supreme Court, like the federal government, was also held to be riding rough-shod over States' Rights. Kentucky's Albert S. Brown was more to the point. "They talk about the Kaiser of Germany [and] the zar [sic] of Russia being dictators or despotic rulers," he wrote. "Well, we have it all in the 9 old men at Washington DC."[54]

The Independent American [IA] organisation, based in New Orleans, took its accusations of communist-infiltration of the Supreme Court to extraordinary lengths. In anticipation of the reconvening of Congress in January 1959, it published a collection of baseball-style "Pro-Red Batting Averages of Members of the Supreme Court."[55] Based on the remarks placed into the Congressional Record by Jim Eastland on 10 July 1958, the IA calculated that Justices Black, Douglas, Warren and Brennan had all scored over 90%. The pamphlet noted that, as a result, Eastland warned that the Warren Court was "moving step by step, decision by decision, toward establishment of the Communist Conspiracy in the United States as a legal political entity...How many more of these decisions must we take before we admit the apparent fondness of the Court majority for the Communist cause?"[56]

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[53] Miss Mary Chalmers Hood letter to Tom Stanley, 31 January 1956, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 105. Hood also referred to the "lunatic fungus" pressurising the Court, most probably a slightly confused reference to a "lunatic fringe."
[54] Albert S. Brown letter to Luther Hodges, 13 April 1956, Hodges Gubernatorial papers, Box 118, State of North Carolina Department of Cultural Resources, Division of Archives and History, Raleigh, North Carolina.
[55] "On Whose Side Is the Supreme Court?" Box 14, Wesley Critz George Papers, Box 2, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
[56] "On Whose Side Is the Supreme Court?" Box 14, George Papers, Box 2.

TABLE 1
PRO-RED BATTING AVERAGES OF MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT

Name of Justice	Year Appointed by US Senate	Appointed by President	Total Decisions	Anti-Red Decisions	Pro-Red Decisions	Percentage in Favor of Reds
Hugo L. Black	1937	Roosevelt	71	0	71	100%
Felix Frankfurter	1939	Roosevelt	72	16	56	77%
William Douglas	1939	Roosevelt	69	3	66	95%
Harold H. Burton	1945	Truman	69	37	32	46%
Thomas C. Clark	1949	Truman	51	33	18	35%
Earl Warren	1953	Eisenhower	39	3	36	92%
John M. Harlan	1955	Eisenhower	34	14	20	58%
William J. Brennan	1956	Eisenhower	20	2	18	90%
Charles E. Whittaker	1957	Eisenhower	11	7	4	36%

Source: "On Whose Side Is the Supreme Court?" Box 14, George Papers, Box 2.

Subversive intent was similarly imputed to two other major influences on the *Brown* decision: the NAACP, who brought the original case; and Gunnar Myrdal and his assistants, whose *magnum opus*, An American Dilemma, was cited by the Court as an authority on the sociological aspects of racism. Accusations that, if not actually a bastion of red sympathisers, the Supreme Court was at least being manipulated by the "communist" NAACP pervaded all levels of US society, despite the Association's

very public post-war attempts to purge communists or fellow travellers from its ranks. As Wilson Record and Earl Ofari Hutchison have described in detail, the NAACP's earnest attempts to become a conspicuously anti-communist organisation began in 1948.[57] At the NAACP's 1950 Boston Convention, a resolution was adopted by 309 votes to 57 empowering the national office to expel any unit which, "in the judgement of the Board of Directors," was communist-infiltrated. "Viewed in the overall context," thought Record, "the actions of the 1950 NAACP convention must be adjudged a public gesture to protect the organization's good name, a warning to the Stalinists to keep hands off, and an educational device for its own members."[58]

The majority of segregationists simply ignored the NAACP's internal purges and anti-communist pronouncements, and continued with their attacks regardless. Most Massive Resisters held a deeply ingrained belief that the NAACP was "communistic," and remained unmoved by claims made by the Association that it had cleansed itself of communist influence. As Francis Wilhoit has recognised, Massive Resistance leaders attempted to create a pantheon of myths, demons and scapegoats from which to strengthen their cause and create an "orthodoxy" for southern resistance. That orthodoxy included the demonising of groups which threatened the South's way of life: a communist dominated NAACP formed an intrinsic part of that canon.[59] In Congress, for example, James C. Davis of Georgia stated that it "is much

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[57] See Hutchison, Blacks and Reds, and, more specifically, Wilson Record, Race and Radicalism: the NAACP and the Communist Party in Conflict (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1964).
[58] Record, Race and Radicalism, p. 164. As Record went on to say, "the amount of time and energy that the NAACP staff used in countering misgivings among prospective members and in defending individual members against specific charges was, as one NAACP officer said in an interview, 'a real drain on us personally and a big handicap in trying to recruit members.' That time and energy could have been used for other purposes." p. 193.
[59] That mythology, thought Wilhoit, reached a "quasi-religious" level. See Wilhoit, The Politics of Massive Resistance, esp. pp. 122-134.

more than a coincidence that the plan and program of the Communist Party and the plan and program of the [NAACP] ...regarding the question of segregation are so similar."[60] A resolution carried by the South Carolina House of Representatives, and replicated in Mississippi, was placed in the Congressional Record by the Vice-President, Richard Milhous Nixon. In response to the Association's role in the legal process of *Brown*, the resolution requested that the Attorney General of the United States "place the...[NAACP] on the subversive list."[61]

By far the most widely disseminated published criticism of the NAACP's links to communist agitation was produced by Georgia's Attorney General, Eugene Cook. Entitled "The Ugly Truth About the NAACP," Cook's work was enthusiastically quoted by many of his fellow segregationists.[62] Part of the reason for its appeal lay in Cook's determination to emphasise the respectability of his anti-communist charges, and, what is more, to do so in a highly organised and methodical way, a facet of his politics which places it firmly in the tradition of Hofstadter's "paranoid style."[63] The booklet originated as a speech to the 55th Annual Convention of the Peace Officers' Association of Georgia. It was because of the Peace Officers' reputation as the guardians of individual rights and liberties, said Cook, that he used the occasion "as the proper forum for revealing, for the first time, the authenticated details of the most ominous of these threats [to individual rights and liberties] to arise

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[60] Congressional Record, 16 April 1956, p. A3067, [RSC].
[61] Congressional Record, 12 March 1956, p. 4444, [RSC].
[62] "The Ugly Truth About the NAACP" was, for example, reprinted by the North Carolina Defenders of States' Rights Inc. Copy in George Papers, Box 115.
[63] "A final aspect of the paranoid style," wrote Hofstadter, was its "quality of pedantry." "One of the impressive things about paranoid literature," he continued, "is precisely the elaborate concern with demonstration it almost invariably shows...The very fantastic character of its conclusions leads to heroic strivings for 'evidence' to prove that the unbelievable is the only thing that can be believed." Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays (Cambridge, Massachusetts: University of Harvard Press, 1952), pp. 35-36.

during our lifetime." That threat was one of integration, as posed by NAACP-backed court cases. Cook reiterated that he was "prepared to prove everything I say." Then, seeking to pre-empt the Association's claims that it had put its house in order with regards to communist infiltrators, he went on to state that, "for the benefit of those who undoubtedly will attempt to smear me and discredit my findings and conclusions...I would welcome the opportunity to present the evidence I have in hand for determination before a trial jury in a court of law."[64]

The specific charges that Cook levelled at the NAACP were based around the files of HUAC, which speculated on innumerable communist links with members of the Association. Intriguingly, he also made much of the colour of the organisation's founding members. All but W.E.B. Du Bois were white, said Cook. As a result, he claimed that "none of the organizations which have exploited the race issue in this country has ever had the welfare of the negro people at heart." They had, in fact, merely "seized upon this issue as a convenient front for their more nefarious activities as one which they could dupe naive do-gooders, fuzzy-minded intellectuals, misguided clergymen and radical journalists to be their pawns."[65] So successful was Cook's work on the NAACP that it soon informed the language and arguments of others hoping to discredit the Association. Maryland's Brita Counselman, for example, berated Virginia's influential Senator and HUAC member, William Tuck. "Why do you and the Southern leaders permit the subversive NAACP to interfere with your State Rights?" Counselman inquired of him, especially since, "as the

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[64] ibid.
[65] ibid.

Attorney General of Georgia declared, 75% of the NAACP leaders are Communists."[66]

The persecution of the NAACP continued in state legislatures, where specially convened committees hounded the Association. In March 1957, television and radio audiences watched and listened to the "experts" of Louisiana's Rainach Committee denounce the NAACP as communist.[67] In September 1958, R.J. Strickland, the Chief Investigator of a Floridian Committee, wrote to all southern Governors for information about the NAACP. "Inasmuch as the Florida State Legislative Investigating Committee is, at this time, going into the racial situation that exists in the State of Florida," he wrote, "which is, more or less, predominately controlled by the NAACP, we would appreciate any copies of petitions which have been served on the various school boards in your state...We have been successful, to a point, so far," he reported, "in showing certain Communist affiliations with the school movement in the State of Florida, and have also been successful, to a point, of showing Communistic affiliations with the NAACP in the State of Florida."[68] In January 1959, an Arkansas Committee followed suit and found the Association "guilty" of communism.[69]

Nevertheless, there were southerners who felt that, such denunciations notwithstanding, the region's legislatures were still not doing enough to counter the

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[66] Brita Counselman letter to Sam Ervin, 18 March 1956, Ervin Papers, Folder 1124, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
[67] Bartley, Rise of Massive Resistance, p. 187. The "Joint Legislative Committee," as William Rainach's committee was officially known, held three days of hearings on "subversion in racial unrest." According to Adam Fairclough, "even by the kangaroo-standards of McCarthyism, it was a crude affair." See Adam Fairclough, Race and Democracy: the Civil Rights Struggle in Louisiana 1915-1972 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1995), pp. 223-4.
[68] R.J. Strickland letter to Luther Hodges, 16 September 1958, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 313.
[69] Bartley, Rise of Massive Resistance, p. 187.

NAACP. Joseph E. Lally, for example, from Wheeling, West Virginia, the site of McCarthy's original anti-communist speech, felt that southern politicians should increase their efforts to root out such red influences.[70] He reported that he had "been combating communism for many years, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People under the leadership of the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court."[71] O.R. Phillips, from Columbia in South Carolina, thought that there were "good grounds" for defying *Brown*, primarily because it had been "ramrodded [sic] through the Court by a movement with a Communist front. From what I can find out," proclaimed Phillips, "the NAACP is a movement with a Communist front and we should fight it to the bitter end."[72] Such sentiment also appeared in segregationist broadsheets. The regional director of the fiercely segregationist America First! magazine, George E. Deartherage, for example, wrote to the combined southern governors on 5 June 1954. "With regard to the forthcoming Governors' Conference on the segregation matter," he wrote, "we thought it important to call your attention to the fact that the [NAACP] is in reality a communist front."[73]

J.B. Matthews, however, was more conciliatory. Having spent much of his early years in popular fronts, communist-infiltrated organisations and, eventually, the CPUSA itself, Matthews grew disenchanted with the Left, and repudiated all his links with it, emerging as one of the South's most fervent anti-communists.[74] Newly

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[70] As Albert Fried has commented, there is no accurate report of the original speech given by McCarthy at Wheeling on 9 February 1950, but it is known that he cited 205 State Department employees as Communists. In an interview held the following day with a reporter, McCarthy lowered that number to 57. See Albert Fried, McCarthyism: the Great American Red Scare. A Documentary History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 78-79.

[71] Joseph E. Lally letter to Luther Hodges, 6 September 1957, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 228.

[72] O.R. Phillips letter to Tom Stanley, 31 May 1954, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 100.

[73] George E. Deartherage letter to Southern Governors, 5 June 1954, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 100.

[74] Matthews had, for example, been chairman of the United States Congress Against War, a post he retained when it became the League Against War and Fascism. This political shift was a common

converted to anti-communism, Matthews pursued it with zeal and fervour. He authored a 51-page book entitled Communists, Negroes, and Integration, which referred to the "interlocking apparatus" of liberal circles, the drive towards racial amalgamation, and the communist desire to cause racial turmoil within the United States.[75]

The NAACP, however, escaped Matthews' censure. Stating that the Association was deserving of a "special word," Matthews conceded that it "had been a prime objective of Communist penetration and, in numerous instances, prominent individuals connected with [it] have succumbed to the appeals of the Communist-front approach." However, according to Matthews, the Association "is not a Communist Front." He based this belief on the NAACP's own publication, "The Communist Party -- Enemy of Negro Equality," written by Herbert Hill, one of the Association's field secretaries. "This pamphlet," contended Matthews, "is a devastating indictment of Communist views and tactics on the Negro question."[76]

Less surprisingly, Alfred Baker Lewis, a member of the NAACP Board of Directors, responded to accusations of communist infiltration of the NAACP in general, and to Eugene Cook's infamous "The Ugly Truth About the NAACP" specifically. In an October 1959 edition of The Christian Century, he sought to explain that segregationists' use of anti-communism was primarily pragmatic. Building upon the NAACP's self-published booklet, "The Truth Versus the Ugly Lies About the NAACP," Lewis implied that the majority of Americans were now aware

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occurrence post-World War II. The left-wing novelist John Dos Passos, for example, later served on the Virginia Commission on Constitutional Government, the propaganda arm of the Old Dominion's State-backed Massive Resistance campaign.

[75] J.B. Matthews, Communists, Negroes, and Integration [n.d., n.p.], J.B. Matthews Papers, Box 714, Special Collections Library, Duke University. Quotations from p. 1 and p. 30.

[76] ibid., p. 51. Emphasis in the original.

of the Association's anti-communist stance although, he admitted, "North and South, *some* sober-minded people still believe that the Negro organization is 'subversive.'" Lewis' article was designed to set out "the facts" to change that minority's mind, and took on both the more extreme and the more measured segregationists.[77] He cited the NAACP's own comprehensive anti-communist programme to disarm the more measured approach; the more outlandish charges, thought Lewis, could "be discounted out of hand, because the people who make them are generally the same people who charge that the United States Supreme Court is under Communist influence."[78]

The third part of the communist-influenced trio that southern resisters believed responsible for *Brown* was Gunnar Myrdal, author of An American Dilemma.[79] Senator Jim Eastland from Sunflower County, Mississippi, was once again in the vanguard of those targeting Myrdal for alleged subversion. In 1954, he asked for a Senate Committee to probe the *Brown* decision, solely because, a newspaper reported, "Communist groups apparently had wielded influence on authorities cited by the court...Eastland's resolution," the newspaper continued, "quoted the court's opinion written by Chief Justice Warren as saying that 'this finding is amply supported by modern authority.'" Eastland went on to declare that a footnote to the opinion "lists six allegedly modern authorities and concludes with a sentence 'and see generally

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[77] Again, this approach conforms to Hofstadter's "paranoid style."
[78] Alfred Baker Lewis, "Is the NAACP Communist?" The Christian Century, 7 October 1959, Reprinted by the NAACP," Aubrey Brown Papers, Box 3.
[79] Virginia's influential segregationist writer, James Kilpatrick, wrote that "half a dozen studies of the Negro deserve mention as reference works. Primus, of course, the monumental (and monumentally unreadable) work of Gunnar Myrdal and his associates, An American Dilemma. There are said to be eleven persons in the United States, apart from the collaborators, who have read the whole two volumes; I am not among them." "A Bibliographical Note," in James J. Kilpatrick, The Southern Case For School Segregation ([no city], USA: Cromwell-Collier, 1962), p. 216.

Myrdal, An American Dilemma (1944).'"[80] By Christmas 1955, Eastland had become even more vehement. Myrdal "called himself a social engineer," he told the Senate. "He was a Socialist who had served the Communist cause. He admitted he had no knowledge of the Negro question in the United States. Myrdal stated that the Constitution...was 'impractical and unsuited to modern conditions' and its adoption was 'nearly a plot against common people.' This is purely Communist propaganda," Eastland concluded. "I have often wondered what was the source of the pro-Communist influence in the Supreme Court."[81]

Such assertions had little foundation, however. Myrdal's son, Jan, was a communist, and actively participated in Communist Party events, but Gunnar and his wife, Alva, openly and often quite forcefully opposed the ideology. Myrdal wrote to Walter Lippmann in 1953, exemplifying his distaste for his son's communist sympathies: they were, he believed, "a passing ailment," and he felt that Jan's communist links were "a psychological protest against his parents."[82] A Social Democrat and a proponent of social engineering, Myrdal held American values close to his heart. Indeed, when Nazi aggression threatened his native Sweden in 1940, Alva and Gunnar published Kontakt med Amerika, which argued against the growing Swedish mood for accommodating Nazism. Instead, the Myrdals argued for a creed

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[80] Clipping, "Eastland Asks Probe of Court Racial Decision; Says Red-Front Groups Influenced Authorities Cited," 25 May 1954, Sam Ervin Papers, Folder 1119.

[81] "'The Supreme Court's "Modern Scientific Authorities" in the Segregation Case' speech of Hon James O. Eastland of Mississippi in the Senate of the United States, Thursday May 26 1955," enclosed with Elmore D. Heins letter to Tom Stanley, 12 December 1955, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 103.

[82] Gunnar Myrdal quoted in Walter A. Jackson, Gunnar Myrdal and America's Conscience: Social Engineering and Racial Liberalism, 1938-1987 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), pp. 328-9.

similar to that of the United States, with an emphasis on democratic principles and civil liberties.[83]

Nevertheless, it was not only at the lofty senatorial level of Eastland that claims of Myrdal's affiliation to communism were made. The American States' Rights Association, Inc., sought to investigate the origins of Myrdal's role in the *Brown* decision. "The Carnegie Foundation financed programs to promote subversive propaganda in our colleges," it wrote to the Trustees of the University of Alabama in August 1955. "The Carnegie Foundation financed Dr Gunnar Myrdal to make a study on the negro issue in America. The result: a book, 'An American Dilemma,' quoted so many times by the Supreme Court in its decision on school segregation."[84] S. Carter Williams, a resident of Washington, DC, simply stated that "the Supreme Court now deems to base its decisions upon the work of a known Communist, one Gunnar Myrdal."[85] Major General Robert S. Travis journeyed from Savannah, Georgia, all the way to Washington, DC, in order to "investigate" the desegregation decision. He found that "the citations of authority included a number of references to documents by communists, men who belonged to the NAACP, and then stated as the chief authority: 'See generally Myrdal's 'American Dilemma.'"[86]

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[83] ibid., pp. xv-xvii.
[84] American States' Rights Association, Inc., letter to University of Alabama Trustees, copied to Wesley Critz George, 5 August 1955, George Papers, Box 2.
[85] S. Carter Williams letter to Tom Stanley, 16 November 1955, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 103.
[86] Major General Robert S. Travis letter to Luther Hodges, 11 January 1956, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 119.

IV

No southern institutions were red-baited by segregationists with as much fervour as those groups who came under the rather nebulous, umbrella-term of "racial moderates," often referred to by the even less precise "liberals."[87] More accurately defined as racially progressive, those organisations and their members were targeted as communist-tainted from at least as early as 1938, when the Southern Conference on Human Welfare [SCHW] first met in Birmingham, Alabama. A template was created, whereby any individual or organisation threatening to undermine continued white political, racial and social dominance in the South was publicly targeted, linked to communism and declared subversive. So fulsome were the attacks on racial progressives that, just as the 1930s saw interracial unionism become synonymous with communism, that decade also saw the cleaving -- in segregationist minds -- of racial progressivism to communism.[88] That link continued into the 1960s. As Sarah Patton Boyle neatly summarised in a 1957 letter to Jim Dombrowski, "We must, as you say, choose between being effective and being unattacked [sic]. We cannot be both in the present climate. And yet," she concluded, "I think that each inexperienced liberal must find this out for himself before he can believe it."[89]

As a result, organisations which worked for racial change in the South such as the SCHW, its spin-off educational arm, the Southern Conference Educational Fund

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[87] One of the most useful definitions of a "liberal" comes from the somewhat unlikely source of Phil Ochs: "In every American community, there are varying shades of political opinion. One of the shadiest of these are the liberals. An outspoken group on many subjects...ten degrees to the left of center in good times, ten degrees to the right of center if it affects them personally." Phil Ochs, spoken word introduction to "Love Me, I'm A Liberal," Phil Ochs in Concert, Elektra, ELK-7310, 1966.
[88] As Linda Reed has commented, "If the race issue divided liberals in the 1930s, Communist allegations divided them in the 1940s and 1950s." Linda Reed, Simple Decency and Common Sense: The Southern Conference Movement, 1938-1963 (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991), p. 56.
[89] Sarah Patton Boyle letter to Jim Dombrowski, 1 June 1957, Sarah Patton Boyle Papers, Box 7.

[SCEF], the SRC, the Fellowship of Southern Churchmen [FSC] and the Highlander Folk School in Monteagle, Tennessee, were all depicted as hotbeds of radicalism. The need to maintain a consensus among members meant that those organisations took up different stances on the desegregation question: some of the South's more militant progressives wanted integration; others recognised the inequalities of the region's separate-but-equal systems, but nonetheless found integration unpalatably radical. The SCHW, for example, did not initially endorse the maintenance of segregation, but nor did it specifically support integration. Hoping to avoid splits within its predominately middle-class white membership, delegates were still declining to tackle the divisive issue of segregation head-on at the Conference's 1942 convention in Nashville, Tennessee.[90] Similarly, the founding statement of the SRC in 1944 proclaimed only that the white South had a responsibility to administer segregation equitably; it took almost eight years of internal argument for the Council to come out in favour of desegregation.[91]

Attacks on the South's progressive organisations were not only attempts to undermine the racially egalitarian principles that they propounded, but more importantly, perhaps, formed part of a wider move to discredit dissenting voices in the South. Furthermore, because so much of their membership consisted of southerners, they could not simply be described as "outsiders." It is a common theme in the red-baiting of such organisations that those attacks did not take place until segregationists felt explicitly threatened by their work: Highlander Folk School, for example, had

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[90] As Egerton has commented, at the Nashville conference "delegates and their leaders leaned over backwards to avoid flashing a radical image to the public." Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, p. 300.

[91] That decision was made on 12 December 1951. See Patricia Sullivan, Days of Hope: Race and Democracy in the New Deal Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), pp. 164-7, and Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, pp. 564-8.

been founded in 1932, but it was not until it began to establish itself as a centre for developing potential civil rights leadership in the early 1950s that southern segregationists stepped up their attacks on the institution.[92] The SCHW's first conference, held in Birmingham in 1938, posed a similar threat. As Robin Kelley has shown, it resulted in so much conservative opposition that a "Little Red Scare" ensued.[93] Rumours that the First Lady, Eleanor Roosevelt, had moved her chair into the aisle between black and white sections of the auditorium to protest Birmingham's racial ordinances caused consternation in segregationist circles.[94] Indeed, the backlash provoked by the Southern Conference's lax attitude to local segregation ordinances caused a mass exodus from the organisation, especially among southern politicians who feared for their political futures.[95] To avoid a repeat of such damaging defections, the SCHW shied away from the emotive issue of desegregation, and concentrated instead on abolishing the poll tax.

There was, to some extent, a communist presence in SCHW that, it could be argued, justified anti-communist attacks. Joseph Gelders, Howard Lee, John B. Thompson, John P. Davis, Rob Hall and Donald Burke were singled out by SCHW executive secretary H.C. Nixon as possible Communist Party members linked to the organisation. Burke and Hall both freely acknowledged their Party associations, but

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92 Aimee Isgrig Horton, The Highlander Folk School: A History of Its Major Programs, 1932-1961 [Martin Luther King, Jr, and the Civil Rights Movement Series] (Brooklyn: Carlson, 1989), p. 213.
93 Robin Kelley, Hammer and Hoe: Alabama Communists During the Great Depression (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), p. 188.
94 Egerton notes that "Mrs Roosevelt's part in that afternoon episode would be talked about for years to come, and the story of her seating would be so embellished in the telling and retelling that the truth would slip away and myth would replace it. Most accounts would paint a stirring picture of a boldly rebellious First Lady -- some even had her defiantly placing her chair straddle a chalk line in the aisle between the white and black segments of the audience..." Egerton, Speak Now Against the Day, pp. 193-4.
95 Those that severed their links included Congressman Luther Patrick, Senators Lister Hill, Claude Pepper and John Bankhead, Governor Bibb Graves of Alabama, Brooks Hays from Arkansas and Burnet Maybank, the Governor-elect of South Carolina.

the case against the other four was far from watertight: Gelders, for example, had helped with the Scottsboro defence, and had an office in the same building as Hall and the Alabama Communist Party; Thompson, although "close" to the Party, had believed that Christianity and not communism provided the only path to man's fulfilment ever since he had studied under Reinhold Niebuhr.[96]

Nevertheless, the presence of those six had a twofold effect, causing splits within the Southern Conference Movement itself as well as increasing the ferocity and frequency of segregationist attacks. Francis Pickens Miller, for example, an anti-Byrd Democrat from Virginia with progressive political views, refused to serve the SCHW in any official capacity because of Burke's presence at the 1938 convention.[97] Three years later, Mark Ethridge and Barry Bingham resigned when Thompson failed to answer their questions about his political affiliations.[98] By 1946, even the talismanic Eleanor Roosevelt declined to attend the New Orleans convention, disillusioned, as Kreuger has pointed out, by the Southern Conference's "occasional connections with fellow travelers and known American Communists."[99]

As specific studies concentrating on those organisations have chronicled, segregationists continued in their attempts to brow-beat the organisations with accusations of communism throughout the 1950s and 1960s.[100] One of the enduring

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[96] For a fuller discussion of the actual communist presence in SCHW, see Thomas A. Kreuger, And Promises to Keep: The Southern Conference for Human Welfare, 1938-1948 (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1967), pp. 65-96.

[97] Kreuger, And Promises to Keep, p. 38 "Off the record," noted Kreuger, "he [Miller] acknowledged that he not only opposed association with Communists on principle but also that if his connection with Burke became known it would ruin his chances of winning elective public office."

[98] Thompson's slow response could, however, have been explained by his attempts to recover from a serious car crash at the time.

[99] ibid., p. 152.

[100] See Reed, Simple Decency and Common Sense; Kreuger, And Promises to Keep; John A. Salmond, "'The Great Southern Commie Hunt': Aubrey Williams, the Southern Conference Educational Fund, and the Internal Security Subcommittee," South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 77; Irwin Klibaner, "The Travail of Southern Radicals: the Southern Conference Educational Fund, 1946-1976,"

themes of their collective work is the notion that guilt by association underscored the success of such red-baiting. When HUAC investigated Joe Gelders, a mainstay of the Southern Conference movement, for example, it concluded that the New Deal had been "hand-in-glove" with the Communist Party. Because the SCHW had embraced much of Roosevelt's New Deal programme, therefore, HUAC concluded that it was a communist-backed organisation.[101] Klibaner, too, has shown how SCHW President Jim Dombrowski was aware of the "early animus against the [Southern] Conference," much of it stemming from perceptions of it as a subversive organisation.[102] For white southern supremacists, perception and association was all where communism was concerned.

As a result of this persecution, racially progressive organisations spent precious time and resources attempting to stress that they were not communist-infiltrated. William Mitch, President of the United Mine Workers, attended the controversial 1938 Birmingham meeting of SCHW. "It was always my belief," he wrote in a letter to Frank Porter Graham, looking back on the situation in 1955, "that communism in the South was and has been practically nil...there was never at any time, in my opinion," he concluded, "anything that resembled a situation that the Communists were a real factor in the Conference."[103] Thinking that this did not, perhaps, make his views clear enough, Mitch wrote to the Conference's former

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Journal of Southern History, Vol. XLIX, No. 2. (May 1983); Aimee Horton, Highlander Folk School; Anthony P. Dunbar, Against the Grain: Southern Radicals and Prophets, 1929-1959 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1981).

[101] Dunbar, Against the Grain, p. 57.

[102] Dombrowski quoted in Klibaner, Travail of Southern Radicals, note 17, p. 186.

[103] William Mitch letter to Frank Porter Graham, 19 April 1955, Frank Porter Graham Papers, Box 48. Graham was an immense figure in twentieth century North Carolina politics, as well as in progressive circles. Elected President of the University of North Carolina from 1930, he was committed to southern progressive causes, served as Chairman of the SCHW, and served in the Senate. For more on Graham, see chapter 4.

chairman again a week later. "Relative to an oversight in my recent letter to you," he noted, "first let me state that I am sure the Communists and their fellow travelers in the South at no time had influence to their benefit in the Southern Conference."[104] Mitch, it would appear, saw the need to go out of his way in order to make it as clear as possible that there was no real communist influence in the SCHW.

Nonetheless, the issue haunted the SCHW. At the Birmingham conference, delegates and executives joined forces in an attempt to exclude whatever pro-communist sentiment did exist. One such delegate, Yelverton Cowherd, stated that "only those who were trusted implicitly" were brought together on the conference floor via a previously devised series of floor signals. Through these organised groups, "unbelievably large votes were cast in opposition to any proposals made by the small communist group."[105] The communists who had attended the Conference were effectively marginalised, and their ability to stamp their mark on the organisation greatly diminished.

At the second conference, though, held in Chattanooga in April 1940, the situation worsened. W.T. Couch wanted the convention to ratify a resolution condemning communist aggression in Europe, in the same way that the 1938 delegates had castigated Nazi aggression. Again attempting to maintain SCHW's fragile political consensus, part of the executive committee decided not to discuss foreign policy at all.[106] After much commotion, Couch succeeded in introducing a

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[104] William Mitch letter to Frank Porter Graham, 25 April 1955, Frank Porter Graham Papers, Box 48.
[105] Yelverton Cowherd letter to Frank Porter Graham, 28 December 1955, Frank Porter Graham Papers, Box 48.
[106] Fellow travellers within the SCHW were firmly against a resolution condemning the Soviet Union; Pacifists, on the other hand, stood unanimously against a concurrent resolution in support of aid to the Allies. See Kreuger, And Promises to Keep, pp. 55-64.

proposal to condemn Soviet aggression in Finland. Although scuffles broke out on the floor after its introduction, it was passed overwhelmingly.

The Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth, who had led the indigenous civil rights protests in Birmingham, Alabama from the mid-1950s, denied any links with communists upon assuming the Presidency of SCEF, the educational off-shoot of the SCHW. Aware that the Fund had a past history of criticism by segregationist press and leaders alike, and that "most often the label is Communism or some other type of subversive activities," Shuttlesworth wrote to Bobby Kennedy in June 1963 to dispel such notions. "Since serving on this Board," he noted, "and being in attendance at most of its meetings, I have never observed anything but complete support for the US Constitution and the American Way of life in its policies and resolutions, and in the words, and acts of its members."[107]

By the 1950s and 1960s, segregationist attempts to discredit mainly white racially progressive organisations diminished, partly because the years of pressure began to take their toll: Highlander, for example, had finally succumbed in 1961, and the SCHW had been replaced by the SCEF in 1948. In the context of the Cold War and Massive Resistance, however, it is easy to over-emphasise the effect that red-baiting had on liberal institutions, and to blame the weapon for all the ills and difficulties that they experienced. As Linda Reed has pointed out, communist charges did cause SCEF to lose some financial support and to spend too much time having to defend itself. There was, though, a plus side to the red-baiting, for it kept the Southern Conference movement and its work in the public eye. There were, simply, other

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[107] Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth letter to Bobby Kennedy, 6 June 1963, Civil Rights During the Kennedy Administration, 1961-1963. Part 2: The Papers of Burke Marshall, Assistant Attorney General For Civil Rights, Reel 7, 0069, Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands.

factors that limited the efficacy of the South's racially progressive organisations more thoroughly than anti-communism. Their refusal to take direct action as protest increasingly moved to the streets via mass civil disobedience campaigns, for example, naturally limited their effectiveness. Other issues, such as the differences of opinion over race at the 1938 Birmingham SCHW Convention, the dilemma over whether or not to charge membership fees for SCEF, and the personal animosity between Jim Dombrowski and James Foreman, were equally if not more debilitating.[108]

Regardless of the real reasons for the Southern Conference movement's collapse, guilt by association extended to prominent individuals who had taken part in the movement's organisations, many of whom were hounded ceaselessly by segregationists. In 1954, for example, SCEF's Aubrey Williams was summoned before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee [SISS] in the aftermath of a radio debate on school desegregation that he had conducted with the fiercely segregationist governor of Georgia, Herman Talmadge. Although Williams had been the only person to enter into debate with Talmadge, other stalwarts of the Southern conference scene were targeted by SISS: Myles Horton, Jim Dombrowski and Clifford Durr were all subpoenaed alongside him. Furthermore, Jim Eastland, who chaired the SISS hearings, paid very little attention to the activities of SCHW and SCEF during the investigations, and concentrated instead on attempting to establish links between the four defendants and the Communist Party.[109]

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[108] See Reed, Simple Decency and Common Sense, pp. xxiii-xxvi, 46-64, 99-128, 186-187.

[109] Asked by Jim Dombrowski's lawyer, Benjamin E. Smith, to outline the rules of procedure for the hearing, "Eastland's reply that "I will announce them when I desire" indicated that witnesses could well expect to be grilled on almost anything, and that they would not necessarily be able to dispute any adverse testimony." Salmond, "The Great Southern Commie Hunt," p. 439.

Even though Francis Pickens Miller had refused to serve the SCHW officially after the 1938 Birmingham meeting, he and his whole family were stigmatised by his support for racially progressive organisations. In the winter of 1956, for example, Miller's son, Andrew, was refused promotion to first lieutenant in the infantry division in which he was serving because of his father's alleged political views. Promotion required a security clearance report, and, Andrew wrote to his father, "when the Army asked the FBI for a check on me apparently the latter came up with a fifty-page report. I understand practically all of this was on family background...I was questioned from nine until four," he continued. "I was finally asked to make a statement of my views on Communism as well as what I thought yours were."[110] Much of the questioning, Andrew told his father, was based on the FBI report, which noted that "F.P. Miller had addressed the Southern Conference of Human Welfare in Birmingham, true or not."[111]

Both Jim Dombrowski and Carl Braden faced more than just harsh questioning from the authorities. Their sustained work for progressive southern organisations led to protracted legal battles, both of which ended up in the Supreme Court. Braden was indicted for contempt by Congress in August 1958 for failing to answer questions in front of a HUAC committee in Atlanta, and Dombrowski brought a case against New Orleans police who had raided his house for incriminating evidence and SCEF membership lists in October 1963. In February 1961, the Supreme Court upheld Braden's contempt charge 5:4, drawing a stinging rebuke from one of the minority

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[110] Andrew Pickens Miller letter to Francis Pickens Miller, 21 December 1956, Francis Pickens Miller Papers, Box 103, Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
[111] FBI report quoted in ibid.

judges, Justice Hugo Black, on the methods of investigating committees.[112] In contrast, the Supreme Court found in Dombrowski's favour in April 1965. It was not, however, until 1969 that the Louisiana legislature made a full apology to Dombrowski and SCEF's officers. Tellingly, it declared that previous allegations of "Communist Front" activities had been misleading and entirely false.[113]

V

As segregationists shifted their focus towards those -- predominately black -- protest organisations that were advocating non-violent direct action, the tactics of smear and guilt by association remained true to the template of harassment forged to counter racially progressive groups. As part of a smear campaign designed to undermine the freedom struggle, southern politicians sought information from the FBI on the extent of communist involvement in the Movement. Indeed, such information was thought to be sufficiently important by southern governors for it to be discussed not just at their own regular regional conference, but at the National Governors' Conference in January 1951. The fact that it was a national conference serves to highlight another facet of the segregationists' anti-communist weapon: unlike so much of the rhetoric of Massive Resistance, the spectre of "red" subversion affected the whole nation; anti-communism, therefore, theoretically appealed to northerners as well as to southerners. Hoover realised the importance of holding such information,

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[112] "If the Un-American Committee is to have the power to interrogate everyone who is called a communist," wrote Black, "there is one thing certain beyond the peradventure of any doubt -- no legislative committee, state or federal, will have trouble finding cause to subpoena all persons anywhere who take a public stand for or against segregation." Hugo Black quoted in Sarah Hart Brown 'Congressional Anti-Communism and the Segregationist South: From New Orleans to Atlanta, 1954-1958,' Georgia Historical Quarterly, Vol. 80, No. 4 (Winter 1996), p. 812.

[113] Klibaner, "Travail of Southern Radicals," p. 195.

however, and was initially reluctant to share it.[114] A compromise was reached, with the FBI agreeing to disseminate information, but only on members of the Communist Party employed in war industries.

Just over three years after the exchanges between Hoover and the governors, the *Brown* decision reinforced the importance of holding information on communists and subversives. As has been noted, the formulation of a truly massive, South-wide resistance effort did not take place until African Americans made it clear that they had not been placated by *Brown*, and agitation for racial change increased. Similarly, J. Edgar Hoover and the FBI were content to monitor civil rights activity from a distance, and to leak snippets of information on alleged Movement communists, until the spectre of wholesale racial change altered from being a mere possibility to become a definite probability. As Kenneth O'Reilly has shown, the catalyst for the change in the FBI's outlook from passive containment to an active, aggressive programme against the civil rights movement in general and Martin Luther King, Jr, in particular, was the March on Washington of 28 August 1963. "The decision to destroy King," O'Reilly noted, "was not made until the March on Washington Movement demonstrated that the civil rights movement had finally muscled its way onto the nation's political agenda."[115]

The FBI singled out King not only because of the impetus and national attention he was bringing to the freedom struggle, but also because the agency's

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[114] On 3 February 1951, Hoover wrote to the Attorney General to inform him that "the problem was raised by some of the Governors as to the Federal Bureau of Investigation making information available to them relating to subversive activities in their respective states." J. Edgar Hoover letter to the Attorney General, 3 February 1951, The McCarthy Era Blacklisting of School Teachers, College Professors, and Other Public Employees, Microfilm, Reel 1, 0001 [RSC].

[115] O'Reilly, Racial Matters, p. 133. For a full discussion of the FBI's specific attempts to target King, see pp. 125-155.

director, J. Edgar Hoover, personally disliked him. Hoover had always seen the civil rights movement as a challenge to authority, and had never been progressive in his racial outlook. Indeed, as Richard Gid Powers has pointed out, there were only five blacks working in the FBI until the advent of the Kennedy administration, and all of those worked personally for Hoover. Part of the Director's reluctance to pursue civil rights cases in the South stemmed from experience; he knew that southern white juries would not convict southern whites of crimes against blacks. More dogmatically, however, Hoover remained convinced that communists played at least some part in organised civil rights activity.[116] He was equally convinced that King was a moral degenerate. As an example of that animus, Hoover rejected out of hand an FBI memo compiled by William Sullivan five days before the March on Washington that described Communist Party infiltration of the Movement as "infinitesimal" -- it was not, frankly, the answer that Hoover had wanted to hear.[117] In order to placate his superior, Sullivan and his agents resubmitted a penitent memo to Hoover, suggesting that the Director had, in fact, been correct all along and that there was indeed "substantial" Communist influence at work.[118] Such sycophancy aside, Hoover stepped up his battle against King, using the Red menace as "a commodity as well as a threat."[119]

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[116] For more on Hoover's stance on the civil rights movement, see Richard Gid Powers, Secrecy and Power: The Life of J. Edgar Hoover (New York: The Free Press, 1987), esp. pp. 323-332.
[117] Although it is convenient to view the March itself as a turning point in Hoover's attitude towards King and the Movement, as O'Reilly has done, the timing of Sullivan's rejected memo suggests that Hoover's change in emphasis came during the planning of the March rather than during the March itself.
[118] "The Director is correct," wrote Sullivan. "We were completely wrong...the Communist Party, USA, does wield substantial influence over Negroes which one day could become decisive." William Sullivan quoted in O'Reilly, Racial Matters, p. 130.
[119] ibid., p. 136.

Although segregationists often appeared paranoid with their assertions of communist infiltration, notably of the Supreme Court, beyond the power games of Hoover there was at some level a greater justification for labelling certain players in the civil rights movement communist. The small number of active communists did not vindicate the smearing of the entire Movement, but the presence of Bayard Rustin, Stanley Levison and Jack "Hunter Pitts" O'Dell strongly suggest that, in targeting the Movement, segregationists were employing a mix of both genuine anti-communism and cynical red-baiting.[120] The calculated cynicism evident in so many instances of anti-communism during Massive Resistance must, therefore, be qualified.

Rustin's case is deserving of special interest. He combined many of the characteristics anathema to the white, segregated South: he was an articulate African American who believed passionately in racial integration; he was gay; he had been arrested on sexual deviancy charges; and he had been a Communist in the 1930s. As his biographer, Jervis Anderson, has noted, Rustin was chiefly attracted to the Party because of its stance on racial equality.[121] Although, like so many American Communists and fellow travellers, Rustin broke from the Party during the Second World War, he remained tied to organisations that were deemed to be "un-American." He was, for example, a member of A.J. Muste's pacifist Fellowship of Reconciliation [FOR], and was jailed in 1944 for refusing induction into the armed forces.[122] During

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[120] The FBI believed that, alongside Rustin, Levison and O'Dell, the other communists manipulating King were Clarence Jones, Harry Wachtel, C.T. Vivian, Randolph Blackwell and Lawrence Reddick. ibid., p. 133.

[121] As a member of the Young Communist League, for example, the young Rustin was dispatched to City College, New York, to organise and agitate on behalf of the League under the guise of being a student. See Jervis Anderson, Bayard Rustin: Troubles I've Seen. A Biography (New York: Harper Collins, 1997), esp. pp. 51-56.

[122] For more on Rustin's turbulent life and career, see John D'Emilio, "Homophobia and the Trajectory of Postwar American Radicalism: The Career of Bayard Rustin," Radical History Review, 62 (Spring 1995).

the 1950s and 1960s, Rustin was hugely influential in the Movement. During the early days of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, he convinced King to purge guns from his home and to wholeheartedly embrace a Gandhian non-violent approach. It had been Rustin, attempting to consolidate upon the boycott's success, who had set up the Southern Christian Leadership Conference with Ella Baker and Stanley Levison. He remained very much in the shadows, however, mainly because, in the words of John D'Emilio, he "affected a pose -- his own version of the mask that gay men of the era wore."[123] To segregationists, that low profile was interpreted as part of the Machiavellian intrigue that surrounded the CPUSA.

When the Alabama Legislative Committee to Preserve the Peace [ALCPP] stated that King was "wrong and untruthful" to claim that the SCLC was "un-Communist," it was to Rustin that they were referring. "Rustin was a young Communist leader," wrote the ALCPP, "and, by his own admission in an interview published in the Saturday Evening Post...was a Communist Party organizer for twelve years."[124] Herein lies a valuable insight into Massive Resisters' anti-communist attacks: they were, on the whole, unconcerned with whether communist activity was current or in the past, or whether an individual had been a fellow traveller or a card-carrying CPUSA member. Any hint that a civil rights worker was -- or, indeed, had ever been -- engaged in either communist activity or Communist Party support was sufficient to give credence to broad, sweeping accusations that the entire Movement was communist inspired.

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123 ibid., p. 91.

124 "Communists in Civil Rights," Prepared by the Staff of the Alabama Legislative Committee to Preserve the Peace, 1965, Harry Flood Byrd, Sr, Papers, Box 3, Manuscripts Division, Special Collections Department, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville.

King was forced to distance himself from Rustin in 1960, after threats not from any southern segregationist, but from Harlem Congressman Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. In June, Powell took exception to Rustin's planned civil rights demonstration at the National Democratic Party convention in Los Angeles, either because of Rustin's alleged left-wing links, or because Powell, as a Democrat, thought that the protest would threaten Kennedy's accession to the White House. Regardless of his true motives, Powell threatened to state publicly that King and Rustin were having an affair. It was not until after Rustin's successful role as co-organiser of the March on Washington in 1963 that he resumed a close political alliance with King.[125]

O'Dell and Levison proved problematic for the SCLC once Hoover and the FBI had become convinced that they were Communists. Of the two, Levison was by far the closest to King, described by Taylor Branch as his "closest white friend and the most reliable colleague of his life."[126] Having trained as a lawyer, Levison spent much of his early career as a fund-raiser for liberal and radical causes; O'Dell was expelled from both the National Maritime Union and from an insurance job in Montgomery, Alabama, for his Communist connections. The FBI's concern with their respective roles was heightened when they were seen by field agents taking part in the eleven-man "Dorchester retreat" with King in January 1963. What proved most damaging, though, was the FBI's leaking of stories about Levison and O'Dell's Communist Party connections to the press.

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[125] Although some members of SCLC were wary of Rustin's return to King's close circle of advisors, he nonetheless accompanied King on his trip to Europe to collect the Nobel Peace Prize in December 1964. See Anderson, Bayard Rustin, pp. 223-32, and 273-7.

[126] Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: Martin Luther King and the Civil Rights Movement 1954-63 (New York: Macmillan, 1988), p. 208.

As O'Reilly and David Garrow have shown, the FBI's counterintelligence programme (COINTELPRO) furnished information on O'Dell to newspapers such as the Birmingham News, the Times-Picayune, and the Atlanta Constitution in October 1962, and in June and July 1963.[127] Once that information was in the public domain, it achieved two things: it furnished anti-communist segregationists with "evidence" of Communist infiltration of the Movement with which to substantiate their attacks; and it added to the distrust and misgivings that many white southerners at the grass roots level had about the actual aims of the Movement. Segregationists did not, however, confine their attacks to the likes of Rustin, O'Dell, Levison and, by extension, the SCLC, all of which had at least some links to communists. In 1964, for example, the ALCPP published a detailed study of the civil rights movement, taking stock of the flurry of civil rights demonstrations of the 1950s and early 1960s. "The pattern of the Communist racial program clearly emerges in the present Civil Rights struggle and its violent by-products," it concluded. "The facts establish beyond any peradventure of doubt that the major role of the Communist in America in 1964, is being played out within the framework of civil rights." [128]

The close relationships King held with Rustin, O'Dell and, in particular, Levison, had a tremendous effect on the rhetoric employed to attack him. Historians such as O'Reilly, Garrow, Michael Friedly and David Gallen have chronicled King's harassment, concentrating on Hoover's personal vendetta against King, and on the FBI's efforts to smear him and the Movement as a whole.[129] Adam Fairclough, too, in

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[127]David J. Garrow, The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr. (New York: Penguin, 1983), pp. 53-54, 61-62, 66-67.

[128] "Communists in Civil Rights," Prepared by the Staff of the Alabama Legislative Committee to Preserve the Peace, 1965, Byrd Papers, Box 3.

[129] See Garrow, The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr., and Michael Friedly and David Gallen, Martin Luther King, Jr.: The FBI File (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, Inc., 1993).

his history of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference [SCLC], detailed the FBI's leaking of information alleging the Communist associations of the SCLC's O'Dell and Levinson.[130]

There are, however, two central aspects of segregationists' use of anti-communism against King which have not been fully explored: the ways in which the hounding of him was played out at the grass roots level; and the subtle yet pivotal significance of O'Dell and Levison in determining both the tenor and the focus of anti-communism at that local level. Local white supremacist groups from across the South targeted King extensively in their literature. The South Carolina-based Grass Roots League, Inc., for example, disseminated its information and misinformation on King's communist involvement on a huge scale. In August 1962, the League's grandly titled "Research Department" released a "Fact Finding Memo," selling at $2.50 per 100 copies. The document was headed, "America's Betrayal: Martin King, Red Tool," and contained sub-sections entitled, "Government Officials Support Anti-American Drive," "The 'Red-ucation' of Martin L. King," and "King's Communist Associates." It drew from a range of articles published in the New York Post. Some of them alleged Communist Party affiliation on the part of King's "mentor," Benjamin Mays. Others quoted Fulton Lewis, Jr, reporting in Human Events that King was a member of CORE, officials of which "have long histories of association with Communist causes." Still others quoted The Daily Worker, which noted King's

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[130] Adam Fairclough, To Redeem the Soul of America: the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and Martin Luther King, Jr. (Athens and London: University of Georgia Press, 1987). See esp. pp. 69, 95-99.

participation in the March on Washington, at which "three bus-loads of Communists from New York" arrived. [131]

In the main, however, the smearing of King at the state level rested almost entirely on his attendance at Highlander's Labor Day seminar in 1957, and relied upon the well established segregationist staples of smear and innuendo. Reports of the meeting as a subversives' summit were widely disseminated. Huge posters of King sitting in the front row of the seminar along with Abner W. Berry, Aubrey Williams and Myles Horton were posted on billboards across the South, and the photograph was reprinted by all manner of resistance organisations.[132] According to J.B. Matthews, "it is of great significance that King is in close touch with such Communists and pro-Communists" as were assembled at the school. But then, in a tacit admission that King himself was not yet a Communist, Matthews contended that "the Communists would like nothing better than to take him under their wing."[133] For all the rhetoric, Matthews believed that King was merely an attractive *possible* target for subversives. "The Party looks upon Martin Luther King's work and movement as a new opportunity to incite racial animosity, and upon King's attendance at the Highlander Folk School seminar as a most desirable contact," thought Matthews.[134]

Ironically, Hoover made light of the allegations, fearful of the vagaries of any debate played out in the public domain. He merely forwarded all official queries and

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[131] Research Department, Grass Roots League, Inc., Box 551, Charleston, S.C., "Fact Finding Memo 'F'" August 1962, James. J Kilpatrick Papers, Box 4, Manuscripts Division, Special Collections Department, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville. The March on Washington referred to here is most probably the Prayer Pilgrimage, organised at the Lincoln Memorial in 1957.

[132] Berry had been given a leadership role in the CPUSA by James Ford in early 1934, and took over the League of Struggle for Negro Rights in the same year. Williams and Horton were mainstays of the Southern Conference movement.

[133] J.B. Matthews, Communists, Negroes, and Integration [n.d., n.p.], J.B. Matthews Papers, Box 714. Quotations from p. 25.

[134] ibid., p. 26

correspondence on the matter to the Kennedys.[135] Among all the allegations, furthermore, categorical statements that King was a CPUSA member or a communist were rare indeed. Like Matthews, the ALCPP felt that King was not a communist, but merely "has been closely aligned with known Communist Party members for many years."[136] Earl Lively, Jr, again peddled the line that "King's associations with Communists, fronters, and fellow-travelers are legion," without clearly describing King as a communist.[137] Manning Johnson, a Communist Party member turned HUAC "friendly witness," made it clear that he was "not saying that Rev. King is a Communist, but I am saying that Rev. King is doing the Negroes considerable harm."[138] The Rockwell Report, official publication of the American Nazi Party [ANP], appeared forthright when it titled an edition, "Is Martin Luther King a Communist? The Shocking Record!" Even then, there was no explicit charge. "We think you are well qualified to judge for yourself whether this black agitator is a genuine 'Christian' Reverend or whether he is a conscious part of the despicable and deadly Communist conspiracy to destroy our Christian Constitutional Republic and our White Race," thundered that edition's author, Karl R. Allen. There followed twelve pages of press clippings and articles from which readers were invited to make up their own minds.[139]

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[135] O'Reilly, Racial Matters, p.151.
[136] "Communists in Civil Rights," Prepared by the Staff of the Alabama Legislative Committee to Preserve the Peace, 1965, Byrd Papers, Box 3.
[137] Earl Lively, Jr, "The Invasion of Mississippi," American Opinion Reprint Series [n.d.], Harry Flood Byrd, Sr, Papers, Box 5.
[138] Johnson quoted in Earl Lively, Jr, "The Invasion of Mississippi," American Opinion Reprint Series [n.d.], Harry Flood Byrd, Sr, Papers, Box 5.
[139] The Rockwell Report, Vol. 2, No. 20 (1 August 1963), copy in Ernest Sevier Cox Papers, Box 26, Special Collections Library, Duke University.

There are a number of reasons why segregationists shied away from directly labelling King a communist. First, once Hoover began to leak information to newspapers, the link between King and known communists such as O'Dell and Rustin was both verifiable and, crucially, sufficient to smear him without the need of further fabrications. Second, it is possible that the hesitancy in naming King as a communist stemmed from segregationists' collective desire not to associate the Communist Party with a leader of King's rising stature and success. If they had done so, they would be tacitly admitting that the Communist Party had much to offer African Americans in their drive for greater freedom.[140]

On the other hand, the South's resisters were aware of King's growing popularity with racial progressives in the North and, indeed, with a global audience. By the early 1960s, segregationists increasingly recognised that popular support and opinion was swinging towards King and the Movement. In the first few months of 1965, for example, Hoover's leaking of material concerning King's extra-marital affairs had been widely ignored and glossed over as irrelevant by a generally sympathetic press.[141] Segregationists, therefore, had to perform a balancing act. They needed to discredit King subtly: innuendo and guilt by association would do that more effectively than all-out attack, especially when there was no hard evidence to back up accusations of any actual communist involvement.

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[140] As Highlander Folk School's Myles Horton commented in the wake of a grilling by Eastland's SISS, "The hysteria spread by your committee and the McCarthy committee has made substantial contribution to the fiction that the only dynamic force in the world is Communism..." Myles Horton quoted in Horton, Highlander Folk School, p. 213.

[141] As David Garrow has noted about the FBI's material on King's extra-marital sex life, "By early 1965 the Bureau's leadership was extremely disappointed and surprised that no one had made available to the public any of the material believed damaging to King. This realization became especially pronounced in the wake of the December and January efforts to interest a substantial number of newsmen in the material..." Garrow, The FBI and Martin Luther King, Jr., p. 170. For a broad discussion of the motives behind the FBI's focus on that aspect of King's life, see pp. 151-172.

It is the style of The Rockwell Report's special edition on King, however, that gives the clearest indication of the reason behind this refusal to name him explicitly as a communist.[142] To do so would be libellous, and could be directly challenged by King in the courts.[143] To list accusatory articles and statements that had emanated elsewhere, however, as the ANP had done, was not. King could not, for example, successfully argue in a court of law that none of those present at Highlander were or had been Communist Party members: Abner Berry, for one, was well known as a reporter for the CPUSA's Daily Worker. The exact status of Rustin, O'Dell and Levison would also have caused him great discomfort, and would have almost certainly damaged King if held up to public scrutiny. In such circumstances, it was safer and just as effective to note King's "close association" with such known radicals.

VI

King was not, however, the only part of the freedom struggle to be red-baited. One of the underlying trends of segregationist anti-communism was to suggest that the burgeoning civil rights movement was infiltrated, directed, administered and staffed by communists. For many southerners, claims of communist involvement explained African American unrest in a region that had always held the paternalistic view that blacks were content with their lot. The cry that communists, who, after all, were "outsiders," were whipping up racial foment also satiated the southern desire to discredit agitation as the work of non-southerners, and therefore of those who did not

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[142] The Rockwell Report, Vol. 2, No. 20 (1 August 1963), copy in Cox Papers, Box 26.
[143] One of the reasons for the ongoing success of red-baiting committees such as HUAC and SISS was that witnesses hauled up in front of them had no right of reply. Had King met any of his protagonists in the courts, the senatorial privilege which protected those committee men would not have applied.

understand the South's peculiar racial practices. Claims that communists had infiltrated the Movement and concern that subversive outsiders were coming to the South specifically to cause racial chaos remained constant throughout the Massive Resistance period, among both political leaders and white southerners in general. Within that consensus, though, individuals varied their arguments and their language in subtle ways.

Mississippi Congressman Frank E. Smith, for example, believed that the Communist Party aimed to link up with southern civil rights agitators in order, quoting the words of the CPUSA's Claude Lightfoot, to "dramatize the plight of the Negro people in the South." Smith read into the Congressional Record a New York Times article which substantiated his own views. "The Communist Party," the Times article reported, "...plans to inject itself into the civil rights struggle in the South."[144]

The Citizens' Council newspaper, the influential organ of organised white supremacy in the South, agreed with Smith. In April 1956, it proclaimed on its front page that "the racial revolution seeking to wreck America's entire social system is the offshoot of a diabolical plot first hatched in Soviet Russia by Communists nearly three decades ago."[145] While sharing the same broad belief that agitators were involved, Georgia's Congressman Forrester, on the other hand, did not believe that the agitators were "outsiders" *per se*. As he explained to the House in February 1956, he maintained that "communist organizations would bring Negroes from the South up to the large cities

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[144] Congressional Record, 23 February 1956, p. A1729, [RSC].
[145] The Citizens' Council quoted in Neil R. McMillen, The Citizens' Council: Organized Resistance to the Second Reconstruction, 1954-64 [2nd Edition] (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), p. 198.

in the North, indoctrinate them with communism, and send them back South to sow the seeds of discontent. I personally know this to be true."[146]

Again throughout the Massive Resistance period, the majority of white southerners demonstrated that they shared the views of their political leaders. H.P. Moore, from Hyattsville, Maryland, made his own thoughts clear in the Summer of 1956. He compiled a manuscript entitled "The Black Tide," the second chapter of which was entitled "Communism's Pawn." Exemplifying the complacency in so much segregationist argument, Moore wrote in the book that "the Negro group is shown as being Communism's Pawn, the instrument which they have and are utilizing in order to reach their objectives. Some detail is given to why the Negro group was selected and the great advances which have been gained by their utility." The surprise about Moore's work, which serves to highlight inconsistencies not only in the application but also in the success of anti-communism and red-baiting, was that it remained unpublished. Moore complained that "the large publishing houses do not wish to publish" any book dealing with anti-communism and "pro-segregation."[147]

By 1959, Winton M. Blount of Montgomery's Blount Brothers Construction Company wrote that the "closing of the schools is a terrible and serious step but certainly it should not be only the white children who are sacrificed in this vicious struggle." Blount was adamant that it was a struggle "which surely must be led and

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[146]Congressional Record, 23 February 1956, p. 3207, [RSC]. Forrester's knowledge came from his role in the Ingram case. "Before coming to Congress," he stated, "I tried the cases known as the Ingram cases." A black woman and her three sons were accused of the brutal murder of a 65-year-old white man. When their case was heard, it was rumoured that large amounts of their defence fund was financed by communist donations. "Millions of dollars were raised over this country [by communists]," maintained Forrester, "ostensibly for the defense of the Ingrams..."

[147] "The Black Tide" manuscript enclosed with H.P. Moore letter to Tom Stanley, 29 July 1956, Box 108, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers. Most of the large publishing houses were based in the North, especially in the North Eastern cities of New York and Boston, adding to the difficulties of getting a "pro-segregation" tract published.

abetted by the Communist forces in this country."[148] As late as 1965, Tom Kennamer, writing from the Office of the Minority Door Keeper in the House of Representatives, reported to Virginia's Congressman Bill Tuck on the levels of anti-communism he had encountered on a recent visit to Selma, Alabama. During his trip, he happened to be "in conversation with Circuit Judge James Hare and Sheriff Jim Clark, both expressing a desire to testify before the House Un-American Committee [sic] in regards to this 'Civil Rights' movement." The Judge, Kennamer continued, "has quite a file, well documented, on this movement, which he allowed me to read."[149]

It would not be correct, however, to suggest that all segregationists used anti-communism against all civil rights agitators at all times. The Cold War climate ensured that, as a weapon, anti-communism was available for use whenever it was needed. On certain occasions, it was indeed used indiscriminately; on others, however, it was used economically and with precision. The basic premise that the Movement was infiltrated by communists was at times narrowed down to respond to specific civil rights confrontations, and other factors necessarily contributed to the vehemence of segregationist anti-communism: the Little Rock crisis, for example, was concurrent with the Soviet Union's launching of Sputnik, a satellite roughly the same size as an inter-continental nuclear missile. As much as segregationist leaders responded to such individual events and specific civil rights campaigns with -- albeit highly varied -- expositions of anti-communism, so their constituents were equally likely to do so.

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[148] Winton M. Blount letter to J. Lindsay Almond, Jr, 13 January 1959, Almond Gubernatorial Papers, Box 135, Archives and Research Services, Library of Virginia, Richmond.
[149] Tom Kennamer letter to William Munford Tuck, 7 December 1965, Folder 4343, Tuck Papers.

It is worth looking in detail, here, at the Little Rock crisis, as it provides perhaps the best example of the ways in which the international climate affected the language and tenor of Massive Resistance in general, and the use of anti-communism in particular. It was a crisis precipitated by the NAACP-backed move to desegregate Central High School, Little Rock, in the late Summer of 1957, in the face of pragmatic segregationist opposition orchestrated by Governor Orval Faubus.[150] Faubus was searching for an issue in 1957 that would ensure him an unprecedented third term as governor. He settled upon the race issue, and contrived a campaign of defiance that once again thrust the American racial question onto the front pages of the world's press. The Little Rock school crisis provided a vehicle for his ongoing political success.[151]

Akin to other southern states, Arkansas had devolved decisions on school desegregation to local school boards, in the knowledge that such a move would result in only measured, tokenistic desegregation. Faubus maintained that segregation was "a local problem which can best be solved on the local level."[152] In Little Rock, however, the local school board and segregationist organisations were insistent that Faubus should decide on the fate of the city's Central High School. When Faubus sounded out the Eisenhower administration's willingness to deploy federal forces to implement *Brown* in areas that were reluctant to comply, the Justice Department's

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[150] Faubus had always been an opportunistic political operator. As John Kirk has astutely noted, in the 1954 gubernatorial campaign against Francis Cherry, although Faubus "was generally inclined to take a moderate stance on the question of school desegregation," he was nonetheless hampered by "the need to court votes in eastern Arkansas [which] prevented Faubus from expressing unequivocal support for compliance with the *Brown* decision." John A. Kirk, "Black Activism in Arkansas, 1940-1970," PhD Dissertation, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, 1997, p. 131.

[151] As Richard Scher has noted, Faubus was "searching for an issue that could improve his chances for a third two-year term, something which no Arkansas governor had achieved in more than fifty years." Scher, Politics in the New South, p. 247.

[152] Orval Faubus quoted in Bartley, Rise of Massive Resistance, p. 262.

Arthur B. Caldwell was instructed to tell the governor that the federal government had no plans for taking on such a responsibility.

As court-ordered desegregation approached for Central High, segregationists and concerned parents' groups sought an injunction from the chancery court prohibiting such a move. Armed with the knowledge that Eisenhower was not poised to usurp Arkansas' sovereign rights with federal force, Faubus agreed to give evidence at the hearings. Reportedly on the grounds of his testimony, which stressed the possibility of violence if desegregation was to go ahead, an injunction against desegregation was granted on 29 August. The very next day, however, it was overturned by a federal court.[153] Faubus ordered in the National Guard.

Whereas Faubus was willing to use Arkansas National Guardsmen to keep black students out of Central High, Eisenhower continued to prevaricate over the use of federal troops to uphold the law of the land, reluctant to force any kind of stand-off between state and federal forces. According to his attorney general, Herbert Brownell, Eisenhower wanted to arbitrate between two sides, not take sides.[154] Although the school year began on 4 September, it was not until 24 September that Eisenhower went on national television to explain the deployment of the 101st Airborne Division in an attempt to ensure peaceful desegregation in Little Rock.

What made the episode especially significant in terms of anti-communism and red-baiting was that, on 4 October 1957, the Soviet Union hurled their Sputnik satellite into orbit, invigorating the space race and once again intensifying Cold War

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153 ibid., p. 264.

154 Brownell reported that "President Eisenhower's position was that he was president of all the people. He felt that his role was to stay in a position where, when the showdown came for enforcement, he would be able to talk to both sides and persuade them." Herbert Brownell quoted in Juan Williams, Eyes on the Prize: America's Civil Rights Years, 1954-1965 (New York: Viking, 1987), p. 103.

tensions. There was something menacing about the controlled launching of a bomb-sized satellite that was not lost on Americans, and that menace was maximised by the Soviets. "Those damn Russians," bemoaned West Virginia's Fred Haislip, "they had to call it a Sputnik, which was worth more to them than five zillion dollars worth of hydrogen. If," he believed, "they had called it a Geophysical Astraglobulus, like we would do if we could ever get one up there, it wouldn't have been worth a dime to anyone."[155]

Harry Ashmore, editor of the Arkansas Gazette, wrote in Harper's Magazine in June 1958 that the whole Little Rock affair "was about as handy a package as the Russians have had handed them since they set out to woo the colored peoples of the earth."[156] Not only did Little Rock prove conclusively that the *Brown* decision had not been the required panacea for internal racial strife in the United States, but it did so at a time when world interest was focusing once again on the battle between East and West. Indeed, Arkansas Senator Sid McMath remembered talking to Faubus in an attempt to dissuade him from playing the race card over the schools issue and keeping blacks out of Central High for precisely that reason. "The most important point that I made or attempted to make," remembered McMath, "was that I thought that at that particular time, the United States would be injured around the world by this kind of publicity, and that the Communists would take it and use it to advantage against us, beat us over the head with it around the world. And," he concluded, "they did."[157]

Others, such as Mississippi Judge Tom Brady, chose to draw parallels with other Cold War flash points when berating Eisenhower for his -- albeit delayed --

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[155] Fred Haislip letter to James Kilpatrick, 16 January 1958, Kilpatrick Papers, Box 3.
[156] Harry S. Ashmore, "The Easy Chair: the Untold Story Behind Little Rock," Harper's Magazine, June 1958. Copy in Francis Pickens Miller Papers, Box 80.
[157] Sid McMath, Columbia Oral History, p.11, Roosevelt Study Center, Middelburg, The Netherlands.

deployment of the US Army. "The most recent and most shameful abuse and usurpation of power by the executive transpired not in Korea," Brady stated, where US forces had been desegregated in combat for the first time, "but in Little Rock, Arkansas. The shame and blot of this tyrannical act will remain on the scroll of the executive branch of this government," he concluded, before adding with a degree of southern optimism, "so long as we have any government."[158]

For Massive Resisters, the deployment of the National Guard to enforce federally mandated desegregation over the substantial protests of the State Government was in every sense a gross violation of States' Rights. Even more alarmingly, the impetus for that desegregation had, they strongly believed, come from outsiders, subversives and communists. The Arkansas Legislative Council [ALC], having held hearings on Little Rock at the State Capitol in December 1958, found "that the incident which occurred at Little Rock...was not something that just happened overnight. It was planned, schemed, calculated, and had as its motivating factor the international Communist conspiracy of world domination squarely behind the entire shocking episode."[159] State Representative Dale Alford, who read the ALC's findings into the Congressional Record, told the House that he would "prove that racial agitation is a major weapon of the Communist party -- and that many of the racial incidents of the past 25 or 30 years can be traced directly to Communist leadership and direction." Alford's accusations centred on the role of a white woman shown by newsreels to be "befriending and comforting" one of the African Americans

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[158] "THE RED DEATH: A Complete Address in Sacramento, California by Judge Tom P. Brady of Mississippi in 1957," Tuck Papers, Folder 4028. Truman was held to have usurped power by failing to allow Congress the opportunity to debate US entry into the Korean War.

[159] Hearings of the Arkansas Legislative Council quoted by Representative Alford, Congressional Record, 17 February 1959, p. 2545.

chosen by the NAACP to integrate Central High. "Of course, the reporters and photographers had no way of knowing that scene was a staged affair," he continued. "However, an inquiry would have revealed that the white woman was the notorious Grace Lorch, ...a Communist functionary, whose record is in the files of the FBI," HUAC and, he claimed, SISS.[160]

It was not only Arkansas' leaders who supported Faubus during the Little Rock crisis. Georgia's Senator Richard Russell anticipated much of Alford's rhetoric, when, in August 1958, he urged that articles from the New Bedford Standard-Times be placed in the Appendix of the Congressional Record. He wanted to record the views of the paper's editors, as well as the content of articles entitled, "Forced Integration Fails to Promote Harmony," and, significantly, "Communists' Basic Goal: To Incite Racial Strife."[161] "No domestic problem is more important to the people of this country," claimed the Standard-Times editorial, "than relations between white and Negro Americans. An issue in which the extremist views are so widely separated is a natural for exploitation by the Communist Party. In this series of articles," it continued, "the Standard-Times documents and reviews the Communist campaign to promote racial unrest in the South and the influence of that campaign in the origin of, and the aftermath to, the impasse at Little Rock..."[162]

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[160] ibid. Dale Alford, an eye specialist with strong segregationist views, surprisingly defeated the eight-term incumbent Brooks Hays in the November 1958 congressional race. A member of the Little Rock school board, he was, notes Tony Freyer, voted in on a platform "insisting on the value of segregation and the threat of communism." Tony Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis: A Constitutional Interpretation (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984), pp. 157-158.

[161] Congressional Record, 12 August 1958, pp. A7213-A7215.

[162] Editorial and Articles sent to Basil Lee Whitener, Basil Lee Whitener Papers, Box 82, Special Collections Library, Duke University. The articles, all written by Edward B. Simmons, included "Senate Group Says South [is] Red's Target"; "Reds Goad NAACP to End Moderation"; and "Daily Worker Led the Cry For Federal Intervention."

Claude Hill, Jr, from Williamsburg, Virginia, was so incensed by the events of Little Rock that he copied a letter to politicians across the South, from Harry Byrd and Lindsay Almond in Virginia, to Richard Russell and Marvin Griffin in Georgia, Orval Faubus in Arkansas, LeRoy Collins in Florida and, finally, to "the Hypocrite Earl Warren" in the Supreme Court. His argument was a subtle variation on those of Alford and Russell. Hill did not suggest that communist agents were deliberately inciting racial strife at Little Rock, but rather argued that, because racial unrest so preoccupied the activities of the federal government, communists were benefiting more generally. Hill listed what he referred to as "the fundamental errors and crimes committed by Eisenhower in the name of legality," which read as if it were a blueprint for southern resistance. He was angered by Eisenhower's disregard for States' Rights, noting that the President had "forced his way into states' rights without exhausting legal processes and without an act of Congress," and "disregarded the constitutional responsibilities of Governor Faubus to keep order in Little Rock." Uniquely, Hill argued that Eisenhower had allowed the Soviets to launch a satellite before the United States was capable of so doing because of his absorption with federalising the South. "Preoccupation with these fundamental errors [of overstepping States' Rights] has caused the United States to lag behind Russia in scientific advancement and armaments. The security of our nation," he concluded, "has been put in jeopardy, therefore, by diverting all federal Executive functions toward the thought-control of the citizenry and agitation of the racial issue. You should be warned," he finished, using language reminiscent of that used to describe totalitarian dictators, "that you are not dealing with the sensible man Eisenhower but with a ruthless tyrant."[163]

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[163] Claude M. Hill, Jr, letter to Harry Byrd, Sr, Lindsay Almond, Richard Russell, Marvin Griffin,

Each period of sustained civil rights activity posed its own distinct problems and called for subtly different forms of anti-communist charges. One such conflict was sparked by the Freedom Rides in the Spring of 1961. The Congress of Racial Equality [CORE] initiated the rides in response to the Supreme Court's December 1960 ruling, in the *Boynton* case, that segregation in inter-state bus terminals was unconstitutional. Following on from the FOR's 1947 Journey of Reconciliation, in which an integrated bus travelled South to test the Supreme Court's *Morgan* ruling outlawing segregation on inter-state transport, thirteen volunteers headed South from Washington, DC, in May 1961.

Travelling through the Carolinas and Georgia, the two buses -- one Trailways and one Greyhound -- initially found little resistance. That changed, however, when John Lewis was assaulted by two whites in Rock Hill, South Carolina. Then, on 14 May, the two buses set out from Atlanta, Georgia, on their way to Birmingham, Alabama. The first was set upon by an angry mob as it made a scheduled stop in Anniston, Alabama. Over two hundred whites threw stones at the bus and slashed its tyres. When it pulled over six miles outside Anniston to repair some of the damage, a mob attacked again, and a firebomb forced the Freedom Riders out of the bus.[164] When the second bus arrived in Birmingham, enraged whites attacked unhindered by local police. The Commissioner for Public Safety, Theophilus Eugene "Bull" Connor, later recounted that his force had not afforded the riders protection because most of

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Orval Faubus, LeRoy Collins, and "the Hypocrite Earl Warren," 7 November 1957, Harry Flood Byrd, Sr, Papers, Box 241.

[164] For eyewitness accounts of the Freedom Rides, see Howell Raines, My Soul Is Rested: The Story of the Civil Rights Movement in the Deep South (New York: Penguin, 1983), pp. 109-131; and Catherine A. Barnes, Journey From Jim Crow: The Desegregation of Southern Transit [Contemporary American History Series] (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 157-75. See also Williams, Eyes on the Prize.

his officers were at home for Mother's Day. It was later revealed that an informant had told the FBI in advance that the Freedom Riders would be attacked in Birmingham.[165]

The violent attacks on the Freedom Riders put pressure on the federal government, not just because it was the first time that the Kennedys had been faced with such serious racial violence. With a summit looming with Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, press coverage of mob attacks on the riders was potentially hugely damaging to US international prestige. The Kennedy administration appeared to have weathered the storm when the original Freedom Riders, unable to find company drivers willing to take them onwards by bus, flew from Birmingham to New Orleans to complete their journey. Within days, however, ten more students -- eight black and two white -- arrived in Birmingham to complete the original planned route.[166]

Alabama Governor John Patterson refused to speak to Kennedy throughout the escalating crisis. Patterson was finally forced to talk to the Justice Department's representative in Alabama, the Tennessean John Siegenthaler, however, when the Kennedys threatened to escort the Riders with federal troops. Exemplifying his distrust of "outside" northern interference, Patterson greeted Siegenthaler by stating that he was "Glad to see you -- you're a southerner." Patterson released a public statement to ward off the impending arrival of federal forces, claiming that state police would allow anyone passing through Alabama safe passage. The statement

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[165] Williams, Eyes on the Prize, p. 148.

[166] The decision to fly to New Orleans was taken after two days of fruitless negotiations with bus companies to find willing drivers to go on with the journey. The second wave of riders had experience of non-violent direct action protest, having taken part in sit-ins in Nashville, Tennessee. They were arrested in Birmingham on 17 May, the anniversary of *Brown*.

ended, however, with Patterson ominously announcing that "we don't tolerate rabble-rousers and outside agitators."[167]

The Freedom Riders were faced with more violence in Montgomery, and, when Martin Luther King, Jr, flew there to speak at Ralph Abernathy's First Baptist Church, an estimated 2,000 whites surrounded the building. After much prevarication, and much to the chagrin of southern segregationists, the Kennedys were forced to dispatch federal marshals. King and his congregation were eventually escorted from the building by federal troops.

Anxious to defray accusations of lax policing and even complicity in the violence in Anniston, Birmingham and Montgomery, authorities strove to portray the Freedom Riders as communists. "Surely," Governor Patterson wrote to Bobby Kennedy in the Justice Department, "you have ample evidence by now that these *invaders* are nothing more than rabble rousers and law violators whose aim is to create riots and breaches of the peace in Southern States. Surely," he continued, "you know by now that many of them are Communist and Subversives and that their movement is backed and supported by the Communist Party with the intent of dividing our country and creating domestic disturbances at a time of international crisis."[168] MacDonald Gallion, Alabama's Attorney General, aimed one higher in the federal hierarchy, writing not to Bobby but to John F. Kennedy. In his official capacity as head of Alabama's judiciary, Gallion sought to link communist involvement to the Freedom Riders' apparent disrespect for States' Rights. "Since federal intervention was brought about in Alabama," he wrote, referring to the coterie of federal marshals deployed to

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[167] Williams, Eyes on the Prize, p. 152 and p. 153.
[168] Governor John Patterson to Robert F. Kennedy, copied to Terry Sanford, Sanford Gubernatorial Papers, Box 374. Emphasis my own.

shadow the Riders, "through the planned actions of a group of so-called 'Freedom Riders' led by one James Douglas Peck, an official of the Congress of Racial Equality...I wish to enquire officially of you," Gallion continued, "whether you were or are aware of the record of the said...Peck as a communist associate and a demonstrated enemy of America?"[169] Exemplifying the cleaving together of the dual threats of an interventionist federal government and subversives that had come to underpin so much Massive Resistance rhetoric, Gallion stated that he made his enquiry "particularly in view of the fact that statements from high administration officials, including Attorney General Robert Kennedy, indicate clearly that CORE was encouraged in its trip to Alabama, and offered safe conduct by the federal government."[170]

Outcry at the actions of the Freedom Riders, and the belief that they were communist inspired, spread from Alabama throughout the South. David Humphrey, for example, from Savannah, Georgia, believed in the wake of the Freedom Rides that, if "we southerners stick together we can win this battle for state rights [sic] and against Communism." Humphrey broadened his attack to encompass the loathed federal government. "President Kennedy uses our money to fight Communism abroad," he continued. "Why doesn't he take that money and fight it here in the US?" On a more basic level, he asked "what has happen [sic] to our God-fearing country?"[171] Politicians from outside Alabama also contributed to the red-tainted

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[169] Peck was the only Freedom Rider who was a veteran of the Journey of Reconciliation, and was the white editor of CORE's newsletter. When the Trailways bus, on which he was a passenger, pulled into Birmingham, Peck was dragged into an alleyway and beaten with iron pipes. He needed 53 stitches in head wounds. See Barnes, Journey From Jim Crow, pp. 158-60.

[170] MacDonald Gallion letter to John F. Kennedy, 23 May 1961, Sam Ervin Papers, Folder 2512.

[171] David Humphrey letter to Terry Sanford, 3 September 1961, Sanford Gubernatorial Papers, Box 111.

attacks. "Though it was unwilling to intervene effectively in Communist Cuba," stated South Carolina's Strom Thurmond, quoting a News and Courier editorial, "the US Government moved armed men into Alabama despite the protest of the Governor of that state." The Freedom Riders were, he believed, not actually communists *per se*. Rather, Thurmond pursued his own line of argument, accusing them of merely being "red pawns and publicity seekers" who were "playing directly into the hands of the communists in agitating racial disturbances in the South."[172]

Beyond the South, others also expressed doubts about the Riders' intentions and provenance, again suggesting the potency of anti-communism throughout the nation, and the wisdom of Massive Resisters in using it to garner broader support for their cause. "The Southern states and its people must stand together alongside Governor John Patterson of Alabama," wrote New York City's Walter Farrar in May 1961, "if they are to help stop the Radical elements in their vicious conspiracy to overthrow the Southern states."[173] From the West Coast, California's Chester Gilles had "been interested in the 'Freedom Rides' case ever since it began, for the reason that I believe these demonstrations to be...obviously Communist-inspired." Gilles continued that the "obvious suggestion is that the Communists are about to try and create friction between ourselves and our Allies by trying [sic] the so-called integration program into an international controversy of major proportions."[174] Harry S. Truman, retired from the Presidency, was quoted as saying that "Northerners who go South as Freedom Riders are meddlesome intruders [who] should stay at home and attend to their own business."[175]

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[172] Strom Thurmond quoted in Cohodas, Strom Thurmond, p. 324.
[173] Walter Farrar letter to Terry Sanford, 25 May 1961, Sanford Gubernatorial Papers, Box 111.
[174] Chester Gilles letter to Terry Sanford, 29 August 1961, Sanford Gubernatorial Papers, Box 111.
[175] Harry S. Truman quoted in Barnes, Journey From Jim Crow, p. 168.

Accusations of communist-backing were also levelled at James Meredith. The native Mississippian applied for entry to the segregated University of Mississippi the day after President Kennedy's inaugural address in 1961. His enrolment was strongly opposed by the State Government, and by a very vocal contingent of local segregationists. Amidst much acrimony, and after three failed attempts by the Justice Department to force Governor Ross Barnett to allow Meredith entry to the University, Bobby Kennedy and Barnett stage-managed a solution. As Taylor Branch has commented, Kennedy wished to appear accommodating; Barnett's political reputation as a staunch defender of segregation required that, if he was to submit to desegregation, it would only be by the forceful deployment of federal troops. Meredith's eventual arrival was greeted by a night of rioting which left 160 marshals injured, a French journalist killed, and a local juke-box repairman dead from a gunshot wound to the head. Much against the will of the Kennedy administration, Barnett's adherence to the primacy of States' Rights was only weakened by the intervention of the US Army. As John Dittmer has commented, "for the New Frontiersmen of the Kennedy administration, it should have been apparent that the doctrine of Federalism had not played well in Oxford."[176]

The extent of federal involvement needed to enforce Meredith's induction clearly influenced angry condemnations by segregationists from across the South, but so too did the ever-present Cold War context. Mrs Isaac Hardeman, of Louisville, Kentucky, wrote to the Jackson Daily News after hearing of the events surrounding

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[176] John Dittmer, Local People: The Struggle For Civil Rights in Mississippi [Blacks in the New World Series] (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), p. 141. For more on the crisis at Ole Miss, see pp. 138-142. For details of the negotiations between Barnett and the Federal Government, see Branch, Parting the Waters, pp. 647-672. See also Walter Lord, The Past that Would Not Die (New York: Harper & Row, 1965).

Meredith at Ole Miss. "There can be no controversy or difference of opinion as to the evil consummated by the ones in the back of all this," she wrote, "the ones who planned it; the ones who paid Meredith and his lawyers and his claque [sic] to invade Old [sic] Miss and bring rioting and danger to a state which has always had ideal race relations."[177] Somewhat unusually, though, Hardeman did not point the finger directly at the Communist Party, but at the "Bulletin For the Fund For the Republic." It was they, she believed, who bankrolled the NAACP, thus indirectly financing Meredith. Moreover, she wanted that seasoned red-baiter, Mississippi's Jim Eastland, to lead an investigation of the Ole Miss affair. "Ask him to tell you which tax-free foundations furnished Meredith and the NAACP the money to pay for the invasion of Mississippi," she continued. "Then take the roof off of hell until you force Congress to rescind the tax-free status of these privileged foundations."[178]

Hardeman's emotive description of the "invasion" of Mississippi by federal troops at Ole Miss was a popular term, preying on the spectre of the federal government's abuse of Mississippi's States' Rights and memories of the Civil War and Reconstruction. "The Invasion of Mississippi" was, for example, the title of a much-copied contemporary pamphlet written by Earl Lively, Jr. A reprint in the "American Opinion" series that sold for only one dollar, copies were dispatched with a sticker on the front referring to the proximity of Communists in Cuba. "Wake Up America!" it exclaimed, next to a hammer and sickle. "They're just 90 miles away!"

Lively's intent in writing the pamphlet was clear from his first sentence. "Oxford,

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[177] Mrs Isaac Hardeman letter to Jackson Daily News, 7 October 1962, enclosed with letter to James Kilpatrick, 22 October 1962, Kilpatrick Papers, Box 3.
[178] ibid.

Mississippi, was the setting, September 30, 1962, the time," he wrote, "but the script and the performance were better suited to Havana, Budapest or Peking."[179]

Having steeped the events of Mississippi in the prevailing language of the Cold War struggle, Lively attempted to immerse Meredith's actions in the rhetoric of Massive Resistance. He placed the battle at Ole Miss firmly in the context of the struggle between the "sovereign" South and the "federal" North. "The Communists and their supporters," he wrote, "planned an all-out campaign against the heartland of the South...the invasion of this heartland came at Oxford, Mississippi, when federal troops and marshals occupied the town and University of Mississippi." Lively was, therefore, substantiating his military metaphor of the "invasion" of Mississippi with terms such as "heartland," "campaign," and "occupied." This was a battleground on which the noble South was pitted against communists, northern federalists and their black pawns.

To States' Righters like Thurmond, federal invasions were clearly anathema. As he had shown with his criticisms of the government's handling of the incursions of the Freedom Riders, Thurmond clearly believed that the resources used to help Meredith's enrolment would be far better deployed internationally. "If the administration would demonstrate as much determination about decontaminating Cuba of communism as it has in forcing...Mississippi to bow to federal usurpation of power over education," he thundered, "the American people could rest much easier about the forward momentum communism has attained around the world."[180] Asking "why is this administration soft on Communism?" the Texan G.C. Inge wrote that

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[179] Earl Lively, Jr, "The Invasion of Mississippi," American Opinion Reprint Series [n.d.], Byrd Papers, Box 5.
[180] Strom Thurmond quoted in Cohodas, Strom Thurmond, p. 332.

"the use of troops in Mississippi have cost the federal government 4 1/4 million dollars to keep Meredith there. Using negro soldiers on the campus. Why," he concluded, "doesn't Bobby [Kennedy] use soldiers to put Communists in jail..."[181]

Such sentiments did not die out with Meredith's eventual matriculation. In August 1963, A. Philip Randolph, veteran organiser of the 1941 March on Washington, joined forces with Bayard Rustin to organise another march on the capital. They intended to maximise pressure on the Federal Government to improve the ongoing paucity of job opportunities for African Americans -- the main goal of Randolph's 1941 effort.[182] Randolph and Rustin, however, soon bowed to pressure from civil rights organisations to include demands for the passing of civil rights legislation as part of the March on Washington's agenda. Southern white supremacists reacted predictably. "The great majority of American votes of all 50 states," wrote Tallahassee's Carl Liddle a fortnight before the demonstration, "consider the District of Columbia belongs to them, and not an an [sic] insignificant number of Communist-incited trouble-makers."[183] Pausing to make a rare southern appeal to the federal judiciary for succour, albeit sufficiently far from his native Florida for safety, Liddle felt that a "federal law should be passed prohibiting or restricting massive demonstrations and questionable marches in the District of Columbia, before some million hell bent for the devil rascals try to take over several years hence."[184]

The proposed legislation that leaders such as Randolph and Rustin called for manifested itself initially in a weak civil rights bill in 1963. Before his assassination,

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[181] G.C. Inge letter to Terry Sanford, 21 January 1963, Terry Sanford Gubernatorial Papers, Box 374.
[182] The 1941 March on Washington never took place, mainly as a result of Executive Order 8802 which introduced FEPC legislation.
[183] Carl Liddle letter to Terry Sanford, 15 August 1963, Sanford Gubernatorial Papers, Box 374.
[184] ibid.

however, President Kennedy had strengthened the bill, and his successor Lyndon Johnson was able to use his political acumen to ensure the bill's safe passage in 1964. Like most white southerners, and all segregationists, Strom Thurmond was incensed by the Johnson administration's more forceful bill. "This legislation," he declared, choosing his terminology very carefully, "will make a Czar of the President of the United States and a Rasputin of the Attorney General."[185] Again, segregationists from across the country reacted very specifically to the proposed Civil Rights bill, rising to meet its particular challenge. In 1965, the staff of the ALCPP published a booklet entitled "Communists in Civil Rights," which carried a summary of the Committee's other segregationist propaganda works. In other studies which, as the pamphlet pointed out, were all available by mail order, "we have documented in depth the fact that the 1964 civil rights bill was copied from the Communist Party platform of 1928."[186] Such ideas were eagerly taken up by segregationists at a grass roots level. "I have read much on Communism that does exist in this country," wrote Eleanor M. Skinner, a southerner who had emigrated to Hawthorne, California. "This Bill has very similar things to what the Communists have been telling us they had planned for us," she continued. "Many years ago the Reds knew that if they agitated the Races it would be easier for Communism to advance, and," she concluded, "they seem to be accomplishing what they started out to do."[187]

Birmingham, Alabama, provides probably the best example of a city whose prior reputation as a hotbed of communist and unionist agitation had an unmistakable

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185 Strom Thurmond quoted in Cohodas, Strom Thurmond, p. 351.
186 "Communists in Civil Rights," Prepared by the Staff of the Alabama Legislative Committee to Preserve the Peace, 1965, Byrd Papers, Box 3.
187 Eleanor M Skinner letter to William Munford Tuck, 25 March 1964, Tuck Gubernatorial Papers, Folder 4258.

effect on the tone of red-baiting and anti-communism in the Massive Resistance era. As Michael Honey's work has shown, the Communist Party in Birmingham, along with its counterpart in Atlanta, sparked "unprecedented interracial working-class activity" in the 1920s and 1930s.[188] This was caused, he rightly points out, by the Party's willingness to go beyond mere posture into direct action. It was in response to this activity, thought Honey, that authorities in the area "made a fetish of 'common-ism.'"[189] By the 1890s, Birmingham had emerged as a major industrial centre; when the Depression hit in the mid-1930s, anti-communism formed part of what Robert Ingalls has shown to be a wider pattern of violence against radicals.[190] A leaflet produced in that decade warning African Americans away from Communist activity, for example, was circulated by the Number 1 Klavern of the Robert E. Lee Ku Klux Klan. "Negroes beware," it stated. "Do not attend Communist meetings...The Ku Klux Klan is watching you. Take heed. Tell the Communist leaders to leave."[191] A leader of one of Birmingham's most heavily subscribed unions, the United Mine Workers [UMW], attempted to explain the reason for this early red-baiting. "Most of this scare talk about Communism is started by industrialists who are using mythical red armies as bait against organized labor. Some capitalists," he believed, "who say they are fighting Communism actually are fighting labor union recognition."[192]

Segregationists in Birmingham in the Massive Resistance era, therefore, had a rich tradition of red-baiting and anti-communism from which to draw. The main

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[188] Michael K. Honey, Southern Labor and Black Civil Rights: Organizing Memphis Workers (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993), p. 54. On the subject of Birmingham's Communists, see also Kelley, Hammer and Hoe.
[189] ibid.
[190] Robert P. Ingalls, "Antiradical violence in Birmingham During the 1930s," Journal of Southern History, Vol. XLVII, No. 4 (November 1981), pp. 521-544.
[191] ibid., p. 524.
[192] UMW leader quoted in Ingalls, "Antiradical Violence in Birmingham," p. 523.

targets of the post-*Brown* attacks were not, however, traditional labour groups, but civil rights agitators. That shift in focus was not instant, though: the direction of red-baiting attacks had been slowly changing since the end of the Second World War. Bull Connor, Birmingham's then police chief and later Commissioner for Public Safety, was in the vanguard of that change. In the Spring of 1948, for example, the Negro Citizens' Defense Committee was established to improve African American living conditions in the city. It quickly petitioned for better law enforcement for blacks. To Connor, that could mean only one thing. The petition, he stated, followed the "straight Communist party line."[193] Two years later, Connor wrote an article in the Alabama Local Government Journal entitled, "Birmingham Wars on Communism," which provided further evidence of the change in focus to a stress on communist manipulation of local blacks. "In its electioneering, in its above-ground political activity," he wrote, "the Communist Party spreads only propaganda intended to deceive and agitate the people, for the purpose of creating class and racial hatred and to undermine our government."[194]

By 1958, Connor was openly harassing the Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth, leader of the Alabama Christian Movement for Human Rights [ACMHR] and Birmingham's indigenous black protest movement. In October of that year, Connor arrested three black ministers from Montgomery who were visiting Shuttlesworth. "We don't need, and we're not going to stand for any out-of-towners coming to Birmingham and agitating our people," fumed Connor.[195] Glenn Smiley, who arrived

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[193] Eugene "Bull" Connor quoted in R.G. Corley, "The Quest For Racial Harmony: Race Relations in Birmingham, Alabama," PhD Dissertation, University of Virginia, 1979, pp. 48-49.
[194] Eugene "Bull" Connor, "Birmingham Wars on Communism," Alabama Local Government Journal, August 1950, p. 7.
[195] Eugene "Bull" Connor quoted in Corley, "Race Relations in Birmingham," p. 163.

in Alabama to aid Shuttlesworth in December 1958, was directly linked by Connor to the broad communist goal of disturbing southern race relations. Smiley's Fellowship of Reconciliation, noted Connor, was surely a communist-front, if only because its name fitted "perfectly with 'co-existence,' 'human welfare' and other Communist terminology."[196]

Alabama Governor George Wallace claimed during the non-violent 1963 demonstrations in Birmingham, which were marshalled by Shuttlesworth and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference [SCLC], and which were met with vicious police repression, that most residents of both races were "fed-up" with the unrest. The Governor blamed the turmoil on "left-wing groups." In order to protect what he called the white "race of honor," Wallace vowed to fight "agitators, meddlers, and enemies of constitutional government." Referring to the leadership of the SCLC and to Shuttlesworth in particular, Wallace believed that "so-called clergymen and their communist, left-wing-inspired followers have set out to destroy the freedom and liberty of Americans everywhere. It's tragic to me," he continued, "that in Washington, we have weaklings who are afraid to expose the reds wherever they may be."[197] Just as Faubus had been in Little Rock, so Wallace's red-baiting was primarily pragmatic. It was designed not only to undermine his opponents in the way that Birmingham's white elites had attempted to undermine union activity in the 1920s and 1930s, but also as a pragmatic appeal to the insecurities of his white constituents. As John Kohn, a Wallace advisor in the 1960s explained, "if George had parachuted into the Albanian countryside in the Spring of 1962 he would have been head of a

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196 ibid., p. 164.
197 George Wallace quoted in Stephen Lesher, George Wallace: American Populist (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1994), p. 188.

collective farm by harvest time, a member of the Communist Party by midwinter, on his way to the district party meeting as a delegate by the following year, and a member of the Comintern in two or three years."[198]

One year after the SCLC's campaign, the Right Reverend Henry Lee Doll reacted against George Wallace's overt use of red-baiting. He accused the governor of sharing similarities with Adolf Hitler. In response, one Alabamian woman wrote to Doll that Wallace was "only interested in preserving the rights of the States and in preserving the purity of the races....The negro in Alabama has made great progress," she proclaimed, "and is treated with consideration and encouragement. Will you explain," she demanded, "why after a hundred years of neglect of the negroes by the North, there appears this sudden surge of interest in the North for the negro, particularly from the preachers and politicians and a probable prod from the Communists?"[199]

VII

"Crank," wrote Frank Porter Graham in pencil over a letter received from H.G. Willingham of Columbia, South Carolina, on 4 October 1946. Categorising Graham with Mary McLeod Bethune, Paul Robeson, Jonathan Daniels and "any other Communists you want to bring," Willingham asked, "why don't you go to Russie and quit being a traitor[.] I refer you if you deny me this fact to J Edgar Hoover[,] patriot and gentlemen [sic] head of the Federal Bureau [of] Investigation Washington DC[.]

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[198] John Kohn quoted in Dan T. Carter, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich: Race in the Conservative Counterrevolution, 1963-1994 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1996), p. 9.

[199] Gaylord Lee Clark letter to Harry Flood Byrd, Sr, enclosing letter from his niece's Alabamian grandmother to the Right Reverend Harry Lee Doll, 22 July 1964, Byrd Papers, Box 266.

Ready [sic] Kraychenokos book as well as the 2/3 Rrosky [sic] wrote before Stalin ordered him killed in Mexico."[200] A study of the full range of segregationists' uses of anti-communism would not be complete without a brief survey of some of these more eccentric claims of communist involvement in the black freedom struggle. Although it could not be said that these were widespread, neither were such claims rare. There is no great consistency in the language used or in thematic content, although syntax and spelling is generally of a low quality, suggesting poor education. The biblical imagery common to the majority of such claims was informed by a fundamentalist religious bent.

William Nevins, of Lexington, Kentucky, sent a copy of his book, Segregation Versus Integration, to politicians across the South in late 1948. Admitting that it was not a commercial venture, Nevins stated that "those who have read it say it is the best thing on the subject they have seen." It was, he believed, "a holy crusade to save our children and grandchildren from this horrible Moloch of integration that threatens us."[201] The themes that Nevins' book touched upon included miscegenation, whether or not segregation could be reconciled with Christianity, and whether or not the South needed a new States' Rights political party.

"The best way to blow the lid off the Pope's US Supreme Court decision to mix the races," Louisville's Haskell K. Meacham wrote to all southern governors one month after *Brown*, "is to throw the Pope's Papal Hierarchy[,] from the Priests to the Archbishops[,] into our State Penitentiaries and throw the keys away...We have spent nearly 300 billion dollars and look at the American Boys who have been murdered on

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[200] H.G. Willingham letter to Frank Porter Graham, 4 October 1946, Frank Porter Graham Papers, Box 31.

[201] William Nevins letter to Virginius Dabney, 20 November 1958, Virginius Dabney Papers, Box 9, Manuscripts Division, Special Collections Department, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville.

foreign battlefields fighting ex-Catholic Communists. All Catholic nations," he declared, "are going to go Communist as told in Revelation 18:4..."[202] The Biblical passage to which Meacham referred described the Whore of Babylon, a figure often used by religious fundamentalists to both symbolise and denigrate the Catholic Church. In the Cold War era, the Whore was also used by some as a metaphor for communism. This interpretation rested on the notion that the Whore "sits on many waters," which suggested an international menace. To Meacham and others, that menace could only be the global communist conspiracy.

Not all such correspondents tied their anti-communist concerns explicitly to the civil rights movement, however. Norman Williams, for example, produced a shorter body of work than Nevins. Printed in pamphlet form, it was titled, "Excerpts from the First Book of Norman; The Printer That's Dedicated to God. The Most Amazing Book of Revelation Since the First Holy Bible by Norman Lee Williams." The second page of the First Book of Norman dealt solely with the communist menace. "Communism is a lot of 'Hooey,'" he proclaimed, "along with Witchcraft and Voodooism and other such Quacks, for after all Communism is only a term for Good or Bad Men, Godly or Evil, and surely Russia and other Communists have no more, no less bad Communists than my Country."[203]

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[202] Haskell K. Meacham letter to "The Governors of Southern States," 1 September 1954, William B. Umstead Gubernatorial Papers, Box 58.2, State of North Carolina Department of Cultural Resources, Division of Archives and History, Raleigh, North Carolina. The text of Revelation 18:4 in the King James Bible is as follows: "And I heard another voice from Heaven, saying, 'Come out of her, my people, that ye be not partakers of her sins, and that ye receive not of her plagues."

[203] "Excerpts from the First Book of Norman; The Printer That's Dedicated to God. The Most Amazing Book of Revelation Since the First Holy Bible by Norman Lee Williams, Richmond 19, Virginia, USA," enclosed with 17 August 1955 letter to Tom Stanley, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 90.

It would appear that such offerings, although adding to the rich tapestry of red-baiting and anti-communism, nevertheless had a negligible effect on the thinking of those receiving them; there are certainly no records of any replies. A year after Williams had first written to Virginia Governor Thomas Stanley, for example, he wrote again, noting that, "after hearing from my first letter in December 1954, I have written and mailed you several or more pieces, in which, for some reason of your own, you failed to respond..." [204] However eccentric they may seem, their authors nonetheless all exhibited some degree of literacy. They could, therefore, cast their votes in support of candidates who shared their general fears of communism. Here, then, was another constituency which would react positively to southern politicians' red-baiting.

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[204] ibid.

Chapter Two

Opposition, Anomalies and Deviation

"It was and is an offence against sanity to try to stop all dissenting views by calling them 'communistic,'" wrote one-time University of North Carolina Press chairman William Couch in March 1955.[1] Although far from being representative of popular opinion, Couch's remarks do serve to illustrate a lack of truly consistent, homogeneous support for red-baiting: it was simply not always guaranteed a receptive audience, either in the North or in the South, when deployed as a weapon of Massive Resistance.[2] This lack of uniformity and efficacy has only rarely been hinted at by historians of Massive Resistance and of southern politics in the 1950s and 1960s. Neil McMillen, for example, quoted the PR Director of the Citizens' Councils, Dick Morphew, as stating that the Councils should not be overtly concerned with what he termed the "side issue" of communism.[3] According to Robert Sherrill, when Southern Regional Council [SRC] staff writer Pat Watters heard Jim Eastland at a fund-raising dinner for the Georgia Citizens' Council, he found that the Senator was "a disappointment, a sing-song speaker who often lost the tune, a stringer-outer of sentence structure, a constructor of swimming syllogisms, a citer of confused communist-front charges, and in this performance anyhow, a bore."[4] But these are exceptions: the historiography has rarely sought to qualify the success of anti-

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[1] William Terry Couch letter to Frank Porter Graham, 9 March 1955, William Terry Couch Papers, Box 13, Southern Historical Collection, Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
[2] Northern opposition to red-baiting was particularly galling for segregationists. As has been noted, anti-communism was one of the few weapons of Massive Resistance that, theoretically, could appeal as much to northerners as southerners.
[3] Dick Morphew quoted in Neil McMillen, The Citizens' Councils: Organized Resistance to the Second Reconstruction, 1954-64 [2nd Edition] (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), p. 199.
[4] Pat Watters quoted in Robert Sherrill, Gothic Politics in the Deep South: Stars of the New Confederacy (New York: Ballantine Books, 1969), p. 205.

communism as an instrument of Massive Resistance, or to explore the multifaceted opposition to the phenomenon that emerged on both sides of the Mason-Dixon line.

The ignominious fall of "Tail Gunner Joe" McCarthy in December 1954 had increased public wariness of red-baiting. For over a decade prior to the Senator's disgrace, however, and before the onset of a truly *massive* resistance movement, more enlightened southerners had begun to differentiate between genuine anti-communism and gratuitous -- if politically effective -- red-baiting. In 1942, for example, labour organiser Lucy Randolph Mason wrote to the First Lady, Eleanor Roosevelt, accusing Frank Daniel of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union of spreading "false rumours" about the communist backing of Highlander Folk School. "Mr Daniel began to accuse the School of Communism," wrote Mason, who was closely associated with the institution, "though he has privately admitted to members of its staff that he knows there is no connection between the Communist Party and the school[,] but that this is a good weapon for attack."[5] A decade later, in the Winter of 1952, William Couch wrote to Edward C. Kennelly of the Committee to Investigate Foundations. "I do not believe that the influences in this country that have been building up the power of Communism can be identified by the methods that are being used," he argued. "The procedure followed so far has been about as sensible as if we had looked for people wearing false beards and carrying bombs and had assumed that on jailing these people we stop the Communist influence."[6]

As has been noted in the previous chapter, southerners tended to resort to red-baiting when rising to the challenges of specific civil rights activities in their own

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[5] Lucy Randolph Mason letter to Eleanor Roosevelt, 13 January 1942, Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, Microfilm Reel 13, 762, Roosevelt Study Center [RSC], Middelburg, The Netherlands.
[6] William Couch letter to Edward C. Kennelly, 7 November 1952, Couch Papers, Box 3.

localities. They appeared more reluctant to level general charges of communist links at individual civil rights organisations such as the Fellowship of Reconciliation [FOR], Congress of Racial Equality [CORE], the Southern Christian Leadership Conference [SCLC] and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee [SNCC] when there was an absence of such activity. That stemmed partly from the "call and response" nature of so much of Massive Resistance, when challenges to the racial status quo by either the Movement or the federal government elicited specific responses. It also emanated from the growing awareness, both within the white South and in the North, that such attacks on the Movement represented cynical red-baiting and not genuine anti-communism. Thus, whereas in one sense anti-communism had offered resisters the opportunity to present themselves nationally as defenders of democracy, red-baiting also threatened to discredit the southern segregationist movement. The "Marginal Notes" section of the February 1957 edition of Fellowship in World Focus exemplifies this point well. "Lady in Pittsburgh wrote she wanted to use FOR Christmas cards but was afraid to because a columnist had said FOR was communist," the anonymous writer reported. "Looked up column. Columnist didn't say FOR communist, simply gave such a distorted account of Carnegie Hall meeting last May, and motives behind it, as to make any other inference impossible." With a resigned air suggesting that this was not the first time that this had happened, the writer continued: "Wrote columnist. No reply. No surprise."[7]

Aubrey Brown, a member of the National Student Christian Federation and various SRC affiliates, was a little more cautious in his attempts to publicise the

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[7] "Marginal Notes," Fellowship in World Focus, Vol. 23, No. 12 (February 1957), p.2. Copy in Sarah Patton Boyle Papers, 8003-b microfilm, Manuscripts Division, Special Collections Department, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville.

cynicism of red-baiting, but was perceptive nonetheless. In an address to the North America Area Council of the World Presbyterian Alliance in the Spring of 1957, he noted that, in some cases, churchmen had acceded to the will of the Klan and White Citizens' Councils by promoting continued segregation. Brown stated that they "have accused their brethren of supporting atheism, socialism, communism and mongrelization of the [white] race." But Brown explained to his audience that those accusations merely formed a manipulative weapon which allowed white supremacist churchmen to "drive a preacher from their midst if he antagonized the supporters of segregation."[8] Even Arkansas Congressman Dale Alford admitted that "there is an impression among some of our citizens outside the South that leaders of our Section, who are dedicated to resistance to forced integration, have sought to raise the issue of Communist influences in race agitation as a smoke screen to hamper the integration movement." Alford, one of the South's more vocal anti-communists, unsurprisingly moved quickly to dispel the idea.[9]

An article by Wilma Dykeman and James Stokely that appeared in The Nation on 5 January 1957 sought to explain more of the motivations for segregationists' use of red-baiting. "The conduct and accomplishments of the Negroes during the last year have obviously shaken some of the firmest convictions held by the whites," they wrote. At the beginning of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, they revealed, "it was often said that Negroes, 'can't organize anything but a crap game.'...Then, of course, the white people began to admit the Negroes were organized, but 'outsiders' had done it:

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[8] "'The Church in Southern United States' by Aubrey Brown, May 13 1957, to North American Area Council of the World Presbyterian Alliance, Ritz-Carlton Hotel, Atlantic City," Aubrey Brown Papers, Box 3, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia.

[9] Congressional Record, 17 February 1959, p. 2547, Roosevelt Study Center [RSC], Middelburg, The Netherlands.

Communists, 'NAACPs,' 'some of [Attorney General] Brownell's gang,' 'troublemakers' in general."[10] Paralleling the reasons behind the rise of a consistent Massive Resistance strategy, Dykeman and Stokely were insinuating that it was only once black protest was successful, and, therefore, threatening, that accusations of communism and subversion were necessary to undermine their efforts.

Most of the opposition that red-baiters faced did not centre on the accuracy of reports of communist infiltration of black organisations; rather, as Dykeman and Stokely suggested, it focused on the realisation that red-baiting was a well-chosen, manufactured weapon designed to stifle nonconformity and undermine opposition. The SRC, for example, moved swiftly and publicly to expose the red-baiting implicit in Eugene Cook's infamous pamphlet on the NAACP. Responding to Cook's baiting of the SRC and its affiliate, the Georgia Committee on Interracial Co-operation, the Council produced a pamphlet entitled "The Attack On Free Opinion." In it, Cook's attack on the two "constructive organisations" was depicted as a "side attack" intended to "frighten off thousands of religious, civic, labor, and business leaders who have joined together to work most positively" on the South's racial problem. Furthermore, the SRC believed, "every intelligent person will recognize this cynical attack for what it is," a last resort to "smear and innuendo in the public forum. Those who seek, for political or other reasons, to fan the fires of racial prejudice have set out to brand interracial progress as 'communist-inspired.' By this," it was concluded,

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[10] Wilma Dykeman and James Stokely, "Montgomery Morning," The Nation, 5 January 1957. Copy in Sarah Patton Boyle Papers, 8003-b microfilm.

"they hope to confuse the public and discredit the growing number of individuals and organizations who believe in equal citizenship for all."[11]

The SRC also seized upon the language and ideological context of the Cold War to question the efficacy of red-baiting. "No informed person believes that the communists want to see Negroes accorded equal rights and dignity or that they want to see our racial problems solved through the orderly processes of the law and constructive community action," the Council stated. "The communists," however, "want to see us hopelessly bogged down in our prejudices and our fears. They want to see us defying the law of the land, whipping up racial hatred for political purposes." For its final indictment of Cook and his manipulative brand of anti-communism, the Council concluded that "in this respect, they [the Soviet Union] have a common purpose with Attorney General Cook and his kind."[12]

Succeeding to the Presidency of SCEF in 1961, Aubrey Williams had a vested interest in deconstructing the vicious red-baiting attacks that were hurled at the Fund. In June of that year, he did so with some aplomb. In the wake of charges made by a Floridian Legislative Committee that all organisations working for integration in the State, including SCEF, were communist controlled, Williams wrote a form letter to the "Friends of SCEF." He claimed that the Legislative Committee's report was "one of the thinnest and flimsiest of its kind I have ever come across. It is little more than a series of assertions that the SCEF and those other organisations associated with it are Communist and the proof is that they are against segregation and working for

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[11] "The Attack On Free Opinion," Southern Regional Council Publication, p.1 and p. 6., Virginia Conference on Human Relations Papers, Box 1, Manuscripts Division, Special Collections Department, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville.
[12] ibid., p. 7.

integration."[13] Williams was "sure you recognize this attack on SCEF for what it is, a blind, angry sputtering of frustrated men." Nonetheless, he importantly pointed out that such denials of communist control, and such disassembling of the segregationists' red-baiting ploys, were useless unless the public could be convinced of what was happening. "Each of us must fight this," Williams concluded, "...each of us has a personal responsibility for this sort of thing."[14]

The unabashedly progressive news magazine, The Nation, made its stance on red-baiting very clear. In an article titled "Summer in Mississippi: Freedom Moves in to Stay," it stated that "representatives of the National Council of Churches, CORE and the NAACP's legal branch are reported to have refused to work with the [National Lawyers] Guild in Mississippi because of its left-wing reputation. Peace was eventually established and everyone calmed down except the Red-Baiting Mississippi Press, which," the article continued rather mischievously, "tends to call all civil rights workers Communist anyway."[15] The New York Times reporter C.L. Sulzberger, filing an article from London where he was covering anti-nuclear protests aimed at the visiting Greek monarchs, wrote that it "is of course slanderous to even hint that the American integration campaign is in any way led or financed by Communists, and," he continued, "such attempts to smear a genuine necessary drive have been properly denounced."[16]

One of the ways in which the meretricious red-baiting of civil rights activists could be exposed was by demonstrating how little headway communists had actually

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[13] Aubrey Williams letter to "Dear Friend," 27 June 1961, J.B. Matthews Papers, Box 500.
[14] ibid.
[15] "Summer in Mississippi: Freedom Moves in to Stay," The Nation, Vol. 199, No. 6, pp. 104-11. Quote from page 107.
[16] Clipping of C.L. Sulzberger article [n.d], Virginius Dabney Papers, Box 2, Manuscripts Division, Special Collections Department, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville.

made either in the South in general, or in the African American freedom struggle in particular. If groups could successfully refute the alleged evidence of a significant communist presence in the freedom struggle, accusations that the Soviet Union was running the Movement could then be attacked as cynical red-baiting, not genuine anti-communism. Perhaps the most surprising suggestion that the extent of communist infiltration of civil rights organisations was overstated came from J. Edgar Hoover himself. He was not, however, making any broad, sweeping statements about the Movement as a whole, but specifically about the NAACP. A newspaper advertisement run by the Charlottesville, Virginia, branch of the NAACP, titled "Is the NAACP a Communist Front?" opened with the statement that "J. Edgar Hoover replies: 'The NAACP's national leadership has vigorously denounced communist attempts at infiltration.'"[17] The FBI director had also congratulated the Norfolk, Virginia, NAACP on "one of the most effective anti-communist measures I have heard of..." A meeting of the Association opened with the chairman, a clergyman, asking "the simple statement that if any members of the Communist Party were present they would be excused." This was followed by the questioning of each individual present. When the minister got to the back of the room, to where the "state organizer of the Communist Party" was sitting, he said simply, "you are excused." The advertisement concluded by stating that "earlier, in a letter to the NAACP's national office, Mr Hoover stated: 'Equality, freedom, and tolerance are essential in democratic government. The NAACP has done much to preserve these principles and to perpetuate the desires of our founding fathers.'" The NAACP realised the potential

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[17] "(paid advertisement) by the Charlottesville Branch of the NAACP," The Daily Progress, 21 September 1960, VCHR Papers, Box 2.

importance of those words in allaying at least some of the fears that white southerners had about the Movement, especially given Hoover's reputation for hostility towards civil rights activities and his eagerness to root out all subversion. To make the most of their coup, the Charlottesville branch reminded readers in large bold capitals that "these statements reprinted with the permission of J. Edgar Hoover."[18]

Less surprisingly, perhaps, Nicholas Katzenbach, Assistant Attorney General to the Kennedy Administration, soundly dismissed notions of communist involvement in the black freedom struggle. Katzenbach had been involved in the stand-off between federal and state forces at Meredith's attempted enrolment at Ole Miss, and with George Wallace's Schoolhouse Door stand against the desegregation of the University of Alabama in 1963. Like Hoover, he was a federal employee; unlike Hoover, he was firmly behind the dismantling of segregation. In an interview with the Associated Press' Joseph E. Mohbat, published in The Washington Post of 4 April 1965, Katzenbach was asked what he made of George Wallace's contention that "the Communist Party of the United States has some influence or control over the civil rights movement and some of its leaders." Katzenbach replied that he did not "think it is true at all in terms of any of the organized civil rights groups or their leaders." The only qualification that he offered was that "of course there are efforts by Communists and left-wing people to involve themselves, inject their ideologies and beliefs into the

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[18] ibid. Hoover reiterated this position nearly four years later. In the progressive national magazine, New Republic, Alexander Bickel wrote an article titled, "After a Civil Rights Act." In it he sought to describe the state of the civil rights movement -- North and South -- and its leadership in the wake of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. "The aggressive, scattered, self-starting new leadership that has been causing all the brouhaha in the North in recent weeks is young. Often," he continued, "...it is composed of very recent arrivals from the Deep South. It would be expected that the eagle eye of J. Edgar Hoover would detect -- where has it not done so? -- that some of them are subject to Communist influence. But," concluded Bickel, "Mr Hoover offered no evidence to the House subcommittee to which he revealed his vision, and there does not seem to be any..." New Republic, Vol. 50, No. 19 (May 1964) pp. 11-15. Quote from p. 14.

civil rights movement. I think they have been remarkably unsuccessful in actually influencing any decisions," he concluded, "and certainly have not captured any of the leadership."[19]

Katzenbach, though, was an integrationist. Judge Tom P. Brady of the 14th Circuit Court District in Brookhaven, Mississippi, was not. Brady's most notable contribution to the South's resistance efforts was a pamphlet entitled Black Monday.[20] In a speech which summed up that booklet, entitled "A Review of Black Monday," Brady roundly and unceremoniously attacked the Supreme Court's *Brown* decision.[21] Although proclaiming elsewhere that both the Truman administration and *Brown* were "socialistic," and giving support to a proposed youth indoctrination programme to teach "the truth about communism," the speech that McMillen has termed the "inspiration and first handbook of the Council movement" propounded a surprising line on communist involvement in African American affairs.[22] Brady noted in passing that the "assault that is being made on the American mind is terrific. We know that the Communist organizations, and we know that Russia itself dreamed at one time of setting up a 'Black Empire,' of disfranchising the white man. And," he continued, "we know that they worked along those lines for a long time, until finally they were told to quit, and they quit either because of the economic superiority of the white man, or the loyalty of the negro, or a combination of both."[23] Quite clearly, Brady believed that

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[19] "Associated Press interview between AP's Joseph E. Mohbat and Attorney General Katzenbach, Washington Post, Sunday 4 April 1965 p. A5," J.B. Matthews Papers, Box 128, Special Collections Library, Duke University.
[20] Tom Brady, Black Monday (Winona: Association of Citizens' Councils of Mississippi, 1955).
[21] "A Review of Black Monday" by Judge Tom P. Brady, 14th Circuit Court District, Brookhaven, Mississippi; An Address Made to the Indianola Citizens' Council," enclosed with Robert Patterson letter to Wesley Critz George, 28 October 1954, Wesley Critz George Papers, Box 2, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The speech was first addressed to the Greenwood Chapter of the Sons of the American Revolution, in Brady's home state.
[22] McMillen, The Citizens' Councils, p. 17.
[23] Judge Tom P. Brady, "A Review of Black Monday."

blacks had at one stage had the chance of communist assistance in their struggle for equality, but, whether because of the strength of America's capitalist economy, or because blacks were not interested in the ideology of communism, that chance had passed.

Gunnar Myrdal, whose socialist background and citation as the sociological authority in *Brown* gave rise to a rich vein of segregationist anti-communism, was of the same opinion. In the twentieth-anniversary edition of American Dilemma, he acknowledged that the majority of African Americans were in economic distress, and that they were feeling increasingly excluded from mainstream US society. "It is further true," he wrote, "that the Communists have seen their chance and have been devoting much zealous work to cultivating the Negroes." Like Brady and Katzenbach before him, however, Myrdal insisted that "*the Communists have not succeeded in getting any appreciable following among Negroes in America.*"[24] Such denials, however, could be expected from individuals such as Myrdal who were themselves perceived to be part of the communist conspiracy behind *Brown* and the civil rights movement. The CPUSA was known to move in Machiavellian, conspiratorial ways, and such rebuttals by integrationists were expected. What had more of an impact, though, were the denials of communist involvement by the likes of Brady and -- in the specific case of the NAACP -- Hoover. Both men were held in high esteem by southern segregationists, and both were motivating forces behind white resistance.

Much has been written on the formalised red-baiting carried out by government sponsored anti-communist committees such as the House Un-American

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[24] Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: the Negro Problem in Modern Democracy [20th Anniversary Edition] (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 508. Italics in original.

Activities Committee [HUAC] and the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee [SISS]. What has not been chronicled adequately, however, is the extent of the opposition to the red-baiting of such committees. North and South, an increasing number of Americans saw through the sham of those various committees and their cynical manipulation of residual fears of communism, and were increasingly moved to public protest.[25] The discrediting of federally sponsored anti-communist witch-hunting brought with it at least the potential to undermine the use of such tactics against the civil rights movement.

In June 1952, HUAC held hearings outside the South, in Los Angeles, California. The growing strength of feeling against the Committee, however, cut across regional boundaries. A petition opposing the Committee's work was signed by 98 people, including some notable southerners, such as Jim Dombrowski from New Orleans, the Reverends Alva Taylor and Claude Williams from Tennessee and Alabama respectively, and Dr H. W. Kloepfer, a Professor of Zoology in Clarksville, Arkansas.[26] By 1959, that discontent manifested itself in an editorial by the Washington Post and Times Herald of 7 January. The editorial, signed by individuals including Bishop Edgar Love, pacifist A.J. Muste, Reinhold Niebuhr, Eleanor Roosevelt and Aubrey Williams, petitioned for the elimination of HUAC as a standing

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[25] A notable exception here is John Salmond's work on Aubrey Williams. During Williams' trial before SISS, the Montgomery Advertiser polled journalists who were covering the trial, asking which of the people that they had heard constituted the greatest threat to American ideals. "Half the journalists thought Eastland was," noted Salmond. "Of the remainder most went for [SISS prosecutor Paul] Crouch. No one voted for Williams..." John A. Salmond, "'The Great Southern Commie Hunt': Aubrey Williams, the Southern Conference Educational Fund, and the Internal Security Subcommittee," South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 77, p. 445.

[26] FBI memo, "Statement circulated in medical circles in California," 16 June 1952, FBI File on HUAC, Reel 3, 954-5, Roosevelt Study Center [RSC], Middelburg, The Netherlands.

committee.[27] "We believe," the petitioners stated, "that the US Supreme Court has, in the *United States vs. Watkins*, made it clear that the Committee has habitually misused its mandate in unconstitutional ways for political purposes; that it has become an agency for repression," they continued, and "that it has usurped the functions of the executive and judicial branches of our government."[28] Martin Luther King, Jr, joined the growing anti-HUAC throng. He believed that the Committee "should not be used to thwart integration. We see the rise of McCarthyism in the South again because all other weapons of the segregationists have failed."[29]

The reaction to the editorial by red-baiters was, as could be expected, aggressive in its rejection of such claims. The FBI's J.P. Mohr reported the remarks of Pennsylvania Congressman Francis Walter to the Bureau's Director, J. Edgar Hoover. Walter, according to Mohr, "pointed out that the editorial stated [that] the committee had succeeded in persuading a great many who are gullible that any organization which seeks social justice or racial equality or freedom of expression or restraints on police authority has been infiltrated by Communists. He advised," concluded Mohr, "[that] 'this is the line the communists have been putting out for years and is completely false...'"[30] Walter's defence of HUAC was totally in character. He was appointed to the chair of HUAC in 1955, and had co-drafted the Walter-McCarren Immigration Act. Once reported to have replied to criticism by Edward Corsi, head of

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[27] Although signed by only 35 individuals compared to the earlier petition's 98, the appearance of the 1959 petition in the Washington Post and Times Herald was higher profile and received more publicity.

[28] Editorial, Washington Post and Times Herald, Wednesday 7 January 1959, p. A8, FBI File on HUAC, Reel 6, 784, [RSC]. The Supreme Court decided, in *US vs Watkins*, that committees could not ask witnesses questions unless the answers were "demonstrably relevant to legislation that such committees were actively considering for submission to Congress." See Stephen J. Whitefield, The Culture of the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), pp. 123-124.

[29] Martin Luther King, Jr, quoted in Charlotte Pomerantz [ed.], A Quarter Century of Un-Americana (New York: Marzani and Munsell, 1963), p. 82.

[30] Memo from J.P. Mohr to The Director, 19 February 1960, FBI File on HUAC, Reel 7, 110, [RSC].

the State Department's Refugee Service, with the words "I'm not afraid of dagoes," Walter had stated on national television that neither the Ku Klux Klan nor the American Nazi Party "constitute a threat to the liberties of Americans."[31]

So compelling had the opposition to HUAC become that, in the Summer of 1958, Committee members felt the need to defend themselves publicly by means of a pamphlet entitled "The House Committee on Un-American Activities -- What It Is -- What It Does." "It is apparent that the document was issued with the hope of improving the HCUA [sic] in the public eye," an un-named agent wrote in a memorandum to the FBI's A.H. Belmont in July 1958. It was, he felt, designed to counteract "the charges and attacks which have been levelled recently against the HCUA [sic]." The agent made his own views on the Committee abundantly clear to Belmont. "The document correctly emphasises," he concluded, "that the communist menace is more serious than ever before."[32]

Perhaps the least documented use of anti-communism occurred when it was deployed against segregationists. At times, a large number of seemingly unconnected individuals turned the traditional use of red-baiting on its head, and accused die-hard southern segregationists of the kind of totalitarianism usually associated with communist regimes, or of actually being in the service of the Soviet Union. Fred J. Cassibry, a member of the New Orleans City Council, exemplified this point in an address delivered in the Winter of 1960 about the need for racially progressive organisations to take the lead in the South. "There is yet time," he began. "No lasting damage has been done. No charge of communism or integrator should deter those

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31 Francis Walter quoted in Pomerantz, A Quarter Century of un-Americana, pp. 73-5.
32 Memo to A.H. Belmont, 11 July 1958, FBI File on HUAC, Reel 6, 381-2, [RSC].

political, business, civic and labor heads from leading us through the trying crisis [of desegregation]. Demagogues," he continued, "have been the spokesmen of our people." In a direct attack on the misuse of anti-communism by those demagogues, Cassibry concluded that it "is high time their destructive and irresponsible mouthings are replaced by voices of responsibility and decency."[33]

Daniel Powell, Director of one of the CIO's Political Action Committees, told the CIO's Arkansas Convention that the United States needed responsible conservatives "just as we need responsible liberals because the American people need to hear both sides of any issue" in order to come to an intelligent decision. "The responsible conservative," he maintained, "deals in fact and logic, but," in a veiled reference to the red-baiter, he concluded that "the radical right winger resorts to distortions, lies, fear and smear."[34] Mrs Maybelle Nixon, from High Point, North Carolina, was more explicit in linking the ways in which segregationist leaders had dealt with the race question to "un-American" totalitarianism. "Don't you think our country is playing right into the enemy's hand when they read about all this commotion among us?" she wrote to North Carolina Governor Luther Hodges. "When in war against them we are all Americans," she continued, "and now since the Surpreme Courts [sic] have issued the proclamation [*Brown*] to treat us all as Americans, how America is kicking up about it is just playing into their hands."[35]

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[33] Address of Councilman Fred J. Cassibry quoted in "Southern Regional Council Report L-24 February 16, 1961," page 2, Aubrey Brown Papers, Box 2.
[34] "Address by Mr Daniel A. Powell COPE Director, Area 5," Daniel Augustus Powell Papers, Box 19, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
[35] Mrs Maybelle Nixon letter to Luther Hodges, 20 February 1956, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 228, State of North Carolina Department of Cultural Resources, Division of Archives and History, Raleigh, North Carolina.

Such sentiment was directed South by northerners, too. Henry Harman, of Dayton, Ohio, was one who "hoped and prayed" that southerners would abide by the Supreme Court's *Brown* decision. "'Segregation' is not 'Democracy', but is 'Fascism,'" he wrote. "'Segregation' is as Dangerous to 'Democracy' as 'Communism' itself..."[36] Garnett E. Phibbs took a somewhat more eccentric stance than Harman. Minister of the Killingworth Congregational Church in Connecticut, he sent a three page letter to Virginia's Tom Stanley, imploring Virginia's acceptance of *Brown*. "The next time you meet a rabid segregationalist [sic] speaker, just ask him if he ever heard the official solution to America's race problem offered by the Communist Party in 1933," he wrote, before describing in some detail the Party's proposals for a separate African American state. "Isn't it ironical [sic]," he continued, "that the very Communists who purportedly love equality and classless brotherhood offer as a solution even more segregation? So you see," he concluded with a flourish, "one might even argue that segregation is the Communist solution to our problem..."[37]

The Cold War obviously heightened discussions of the relative merits of "totalitarianism" and "democracy," and that language permeated through the vocabulary of all Americans. As a native of Memphis, Tennessee, wrote in 1963, "when Senator Eastland raves about oncoming totalitarianism here in the South, he

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[36] Henry Harman letter to Luther Hodges, 20 January 1957, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 228. Such sentiment existed before *Brown*, too. In 1950, a councillor representing the City of Miami Beach, Florida, wrote to Senator Frank Porter Graham to congratulate him on his vote against the "iniquitous" McCarran-Mundt "Communist Control" Bill. "It took a tremendous amount of intestinal fortitude and a deep sense of understanding of fundamental American principles to have, in the face of national hysteria, voted as you did," wrote Burnett Roth. Realising that Graham's opposition to such a bill was made even more difficult by the onset of war in Korea and "present world conditions," Roth concluded that it "is indeed unfortunate that those of us who have the deepest feelings against Communism must go to the extreme of Fascism and destroy all human rights in order to prove our Anti-communism." Burnett Roth letter to Frank Porter Graham, 27 September 1950, Frank Porter Graham Papers, Box 39, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

[37] Garnett E. Phibbs letter to Tom Stanley, 30 August 1954, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 110 Archives and Research Services, Library of Virginia, Richmond.

must surely know that we already have it to a great extent when you consider how we have taken the law into our own hands so often in dealing with the negro."[38]

II

In the previous chapter, the ways in which various southern racially progressive individuals and organisations were red-baited both before and after *Brown* were examined. On many occasions, however, red-baiting simply did not have the desired effect of either destroying or discrediting such racial progressivism; on others, it was either ignored or openly exposed as a pragmatic and cynical weapon of segregationists; at yet others, it was turned on its head and used against the very white supremacists who sought to undermine those who supported agitation for racial reform.[39]

One of the ways in which racially progressive organisations in the South sought to rebuff such attacks was through highly skilled deconstructions of the different methods of red-baiting that southern segregationists had at their disposal. One of the clearest examples of these counter-attacks was delivered by Rabbi Arthur Gilbert to a conference of ecclesiastical racial progressives in Lexington, Kentucky, in the Summer of 1960. In a paper entitled "Problems of the South," Gilbert noted that "it will be sadly ironic if the ardent segregationist, in order to protect his Southland

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[38] [unreadable] of Memphis, Tennessee letter to Terry Sanford, 18 July 1963, Sanford Gubernatorial Papers, Box 347, State of North Carolina Department of Cultural Resources, Division of Archives and History, Raleigh, North Carolina.

[39] There are the odd -- very brief -- exceptions: Anthony Dunbar, for example, quotes SCHW treasurer Alva Taylor in a letter to the editor of the Nashville Tennesseean, in which he wrote that "we have never paid any attention to those who mouth the red-phobia, moronic yawp of 'Communist'; their Peglerian poison is falsehood beneath the contempt of progressives." Quoted in Anthony P. Dunbar, Against the Grain: Southern Radicals and Prophets 1929-1959 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), pp. 226-7.

from a 'communist-inspired' attack on racial purity, in effect replaces our democratic system with a police-state of totalitarian stripe."[40]

Gilbert broke segregationist red-baiting down into five distinct parts, all of which were legitimised by so-called "emergency laws" passed by southern state legislatures. "They clearly have as their purpose," he felt, "the harassment, the deterring, the muzzling of individuals or organizations who would speak out for desegregation."[41] The first such law called for the disclosure of membership lists of, and contributors to, organisations which worked for desegregation in an attempt to "intimidate the members"; the second, which Gilbert thought "particularly effective," simply forbade public employees from belonging to such organisations; the third established "investigatory committees to ferret out the influence of communism and subversive activity in the state"; the fourth were laws against barratry, designed to prohibit anyone from assisting a court case challenging segregation; and, finally, looking specifically to the states of Florida, Georgia and South Carolina, Gilbert identified the passing of "emergency powers" for governors to crack down on dissenting voices.

Not only did Gilbert show the depth of understanding that many southern racial progressives had of the deliberate misapplication of anti-communism by segregationists, but he also identified another deep flaw in their constant cries of subversion. "It seems to me a dangerous course," he said, "to give communism credit for every impulse that challenges the pattern of segregation. This falsely exaggerates

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40 "'Problems of the South - Acts of Violence and Intimidation,' by Rabbi Arthur Gilbert; A Paper Read at the Interracial Consultation on 'Southern Churches and Race Relations'; The College of the Bible, Lexington, Kentucky, July 20, 1960," Aubrey Brown Papers, Box 5.
41 ibid.

the importance of communism and harms the cause of American democracy."[42] Logically, he concluded, if every organisation with a sensitivity to minority group interest and social justice was accused of being communist, those minorities would come to believe that such sentiments "can derive only from the secularist political tradition of communism rather than the Judaeo-Christian religious tradition of the American democratic heritage." Once again it was argued that segregationists were in great danger of being hoisted by their own petards: to label all dissent to the segregationist line "Communist," white supremacists were naturally imbuing the Communist Party with more significance than its extremely limited action deserved.

A statement from Highlander Folk School's Myles Horton, directly rebuffing charges made by the Georgia Commission on Education [GCE] that Highlander was nothing more than a "Communist Training School," exemplified the dark humour with which southern racial progressives faced up to a continual barrage of red-baiting. The GCE printed quarter of a million copies of its four-page attack, which was directed not only at Highlander, but also at Martin Luther King, Jr, for his attendance at the School. In his statement, Horton referred to "a letter from the Deep South," which, he believed, illustrated the red-baiters' attempts to "drive a wedge between the white and Negro integration leaders in the South." He went on to quote that letter at length: "'Being a white professor in a Negro school I am used to being classed as a Communist,'" the anonymous author had written. "'All believers in integration are so classed. The reason for my writing is that I should like to know more about

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[42] ibid.

Highlander Folk School. You must be doing a good job,'" he concluded, "'or the Georgia commission would not take notice of you.'"[43]

Not all moderates greeted the GCE's attack with such good humour. So incensed were some supporters of the South's racially progressive groups that, in direct response to the GCE's attack, Reinhold Niebuhr, Lloyd K. Garrison, Monsignor John O'Grady and Eleanor Roosevelt herself all signed their names to a document headed "National Leaders Answer Griffin's Attack on Highlander."[44] The attempts of Griffin and the GEC, the statement declared, "to draw from the serious and fruitful deliberations of this gathering sustenance for the efforts of the Southern racists to equate desegregation with communism evokes our strong condemnation. This kind of irresponsible demagoguery is obviously designed to intensify the difficulties confronting decent Southerners who might otherwise give leadership in the adjustment necessary for the desegregation which is inevitable."[45] The material, they believed, was slanderous, and such attacks on institutions like Highlander were morally indefensible. Indeed, in January 1958, Horton challenged Cook to label him unequivocally a communist so that Horton could take him to court and sue for slander. True to form, and true to the reliance of red-baiting on smear and innuendo rather than hard evidence, when a reporter telephoned Cook to see whether or not he would call

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[43] "For Immediate Release October 5, 1957 Statement From: Myles Horton, Director, Highlander Folk School, Monteagle, Tennessee," Sarah Patton Boyle Papers, Box 3.
[44] "'National Leaders Answer Griffin's Attack on Highlander,' Highlander Folk School, Monteagle, Tennessee, December 18, 1957. Signed by Reinhold Niebuhr, Lloyd K. Garrison, Monsignor John O'Grady, & Eleanor Roosevelt," Sarah Patton Boyle Papers, Box 3.
[45] ibid.

Horton a communist, Cook would only reply, "'People who live with dogs are bound to have fleas.'"[46]

Marion A. Wright carried the themes espoused by Rabbi Gilbert to Highlander Folk School two years later, in the Spring of 1959. Wright was unimpressed by segregationists' accusations of un-American behaviour amongst southern racial progressives and radicals. "If there is any group in this country which has given aid and comfort to the Communist cause," he said, "it is the segregationists. Their activities have been grist to the Communist mill." The Soviet's powerful media machinery, including *Tass* and *Pravda*, reported Wright, had "emblazoned" the words of segregationists across their pages. Furthermore, such propagandists targeted segregationists whether "suave and oily, as some of them are, or harsh and raucous, as others are." The South's segregationists were the greatest allies to the Communist cause, he concluded, and had the "unspeakable effrontery to accuse those who dare disagree with them of [being] subversive!"[47]

Beyond their attempts to expose the rationale behind the more cynical instances of segregationist anti-communism, there was a shared feeling amongst racial moderates that the red-baiting of their organisations was in many ways ridiculous. As early as 1940, Eleanor Roosevelt, an active supporter of the SCHW, had written to Joe Cadden that she was "sorry for the name-calling and everlasting red-smearing, which," she felt, "seems stupid."[48] Virginia Durr, also a stalwart of the SCHW,

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[46] "Memo For: Executive Council From: Myles Horton Re: Possible Suit Against Governor Griffin, Highlander Folk School, Monteagle, Tennessee, January 18-19, 1958," Sarah Patton Boyle Papers, Box 3.

[47] "Who Is A Subversive? An Address by Marion A. Wright Before Highlander Folk School, Monteagle, Tennessee, May 23, 1959," VCHR Papers, Box 7.

[48] Eleanor Roosevelt to Joe Cadden, 15 May 1940, Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, Reel 3, 911, [RSC]. Cadden was accused of being a Communist by the Dies Committee because of his links to the American Youth Congress [AYC], but always denied any membership ties.

revealed that many of her contemporaries throughout the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s thought red-baiting to be preposterous. "You see, the thing you've got to realize from our point of view," she said, looking back at the Conference's heyday, "was, in the first place, none of us were communists, and we thought the whole thing was absolutely insane...the whole communist fear was insane."[49] The SRC's George Mitchell put it more simply. Exemplifying the effort made by southern racial progressives to align the civil rights cause with patriotism, decency and obedience to the law, Mitchell declared that he thought it was "the height of Americanism to support the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States!"[50]

III

The attempts of various African American separatist groups to use anti-communism as a weapon for their own gain naturally complicates a study of the uses of anti-communism in the Massive Resistance era. Post-war black separatists saw theirs as the only solution to the South's racial problems. They drew from a long tradition which included the teachings of Henry Highland Garnet, Martin Delany, Bishop Henry McNeal Turner and Benjamin Singleton.[51] Perhaps the greatest exponent of the black separatist tradition was Marcus Garvey, whose Universal Negro Improvement Association [UNIA] ultimately offered blacks psychological, if not

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[49] Virginia Foster Durr, Southern Oral History Program, A-337, p. 30, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
[50] George S. Mitchell letter to Mrs Morris Brown, 17 September 1956, VCHR Papers, Box 1.
[51] Garnet, for example, was the first African American theorist to claim publicly that God was black. Along with Turner, they both advocated a separate black nation outside the United States. Singleton, on the other hand, wanted to set up a separate black nation in either Oklahoma or Kansas. See William Van Deburg, New Day in Babylon: the Black Power Movement and American Culture, 1965-1975 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), especially pp. 31-62. See also E. U. Essien-Udom, Black Nationalism: A Search For Identity in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); John T. McCartney, Black Power Ideologies: An Essay in African-American Political Thought (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992).

actual, empowerment.[52] In the 1950s and especially the 1960s, a renewed interest in separatism emerged among many African Americans, centred around Malcolm X and the Nation of Islam. Although Malcolm found his most willing constituency in the North, he nonetheless also attracted the support of some southern blacks.[53]

Although in many ways polar opposites, in other respects there was much common ground between black separatists and their white segregationist counterparts. Their motives and their means may have been different, but their ends were very much the same. Both wanted the enforced, long-term separation of the races. For white segregationists, this was because they believed blacks to be a denigrating influence on their culture, society and economy. For their African American equivalents, it was an attempt to separate themselves from the persistent, institutionalised racism of the white world. Black separatists never constituted anything more than a minority of African Americans, but, nevertheless, their presence adds considerable complication to an understanding of the South's racial patterns. They had, moreover, one further similarity with their white counterparts: they, too, used anti-communism and red-baiting.

Headquartered outside the South in Sausalito, California, the Joint Council for Repatriation [JCR] nonetheless appealed strongly to southern white supremacists. The correspondence entered into between the JCR and the Richmond-based property

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[52] Garvey's aim to transport blacks to Liberia failed in physical terms, but psychologically he had a galvanising effect on black consciousness. He instilled in African Americans a belief that they could indeed control their own institutions, and raised them from what he termed the "slumber of accommodation." For more on Garvey, see Amy Jacques Garvey [ed.], Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey or Africa for the Africans [Second Edition] (London: Frank Cass & Co, [n.d.]), especially "An Introduction to the Second Edition" by E.U. Essien-Udom, pp. vii-xxvii.

[53] Malcolm admitted that his views were extreme. In an interview with Alex Haley, for example, he admitted that, "Yes, I'm an extremist...You show me a black man who isn't an extremist and I'll show you one who needs psychiatric attention." Malcolm X interview with Alex Haley, quoted in Robert Weisbrot, Freedom Bound: A History of America's Civil Rights Movement (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1990), p. 175.

developer and eugenicist Earnest Sevier Cox exemplifies the similarities both in the aims of black separatists and white segregationists, and in the language that they used. Cox, for example, was solicited by the JCR's Willis Carto to become Honorary Chairman of the Temporary Council.[54] The letterhead of the JCR proclaimed it "A Bi-Racial Coalition United for Justice for Persons of African Descent." "It is a tragedy," stated the Council's explanatory literature, "that the legitimate aspirations of the Negro have been pushed to the background by the demands of professional troublemakers who mask their real intentions with the canard that they represent the Negro and his real desires."[55] In case the true identity of those "professional troublemakers" was in any way in doubt, the document went on to accuse the NAACP of being a Communist Front, and of being at the "very forefront of the subversive movement to pit race against race." This vitriol was not, however, reserved exclusively for the NAACP. One of four JCR goals was "to seek to destroy the evil influence of radical, trouble-making, race-mixing, Communist-front organizations which masquerade as being for the benefit of the Negro, but which actually deliberately cause strife."

Perhaps the starkest example of a red-baiting black segregationist organisation is provided by a group from Memphis, Tennessee, called "The Mutual Association of Colored People, South," [MACPS] whose letterhead included the words, "Bulwark Against Communism." Their President, M.L. Young, proclaimed that "we feel we can progress and advance much faster by remaining in separate schools. We shall continue our strong stand against the ideals and principles of radicalism, communism and

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[54] Willis Carto letter to Earnest Sevier Cox, 21 January 1955, Earnest Sevier Cox Papers, Box 10, Special Collections Library, Duke University.
[55] "What is the Joint Council For Repatriation," enclosed with Willis Carto letter to Earnest Sevier Cox, 21 January 1955, Cox Papers, Box 10.

integration." The MACPS's literature set out its position in no uncertain terms. The Association claimed that it had "begun a more vigorous and serious movement to fight the policy of Negroes and White in the same school. It is regrettable," it continued, "that Communist and filtrated [sic] minded people seek to destroy the society of the White man and Negro in the South." The most striking statement made by the MACPS in the context of anti-communism was that "integration is one of the sentiments used by the Communist and radicals seeking to bring about trouble, disloyalty and distrust..."[56]

One of the highest profile black separatist individuals in the South in the 1950s was Zora Neale Hurston. Her outlook was a complicated one. Born in the all-black town of Eatonville, Florida, and having studied under Franz Boas at Barnard College, Hurston strove to prove that her home town was capable of functioning within a segregated society. As she articulated in much of her written work, she did not see either the institution of slavery or the ideology of racism as peculiarly southern phenomena. Rather, she held that the nation had a racist illness, of which southern segregation was merely a symptom. Hurston remained adamant that race was a "loose classification of physical characteristics [which] tells nothing about the *insides* of people," believing not in desegregation, but in ensuring that black schools and teachers received the same resources as their white counterparts. As such, she supported the separate-but-equal ideology propounded by the Supreme Court's *Plessy v Ferguson* decision of 1896, and was at odds with *Brown*.[57] Although common to

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[56] M.L. Young, President, "Mutual Association of Colored People, South; Bulwark Against Communism," letter to "Dear Sir," 4 August 1956, Cox Papers, Box 10.

[57] For a general overview of Hurston's life, See Tiffany Patterson, "Zora Neale Hurston" in D.C. Hine [ed.], Black Women in America: An Historical Encyclopedia (Brooklyn: Carlson, 1993). More specifically on her racial politics, see Annette Trefzer, "'Let us all be Kissing-Friends?': Zora Neale

many accommodationists before the Second World War, by the 1950s the vast majority of African American protest organisations were actively seeking equality and integration. Hurston's continued adherence to the premise of separate-but-equal throughout the Massive Resistance years left her increasingly isolated.

She added to her defence of separation of the races by re-emphasising that integration was the official Communist Party line. "It is most astonishing that this [integration] should be tried just when the nation is itself to shake off the evils of Communist penetration," she wrote in the Asheville Times in August 1955. "It is to be recalled that Moscow," she continued, "being made aware of this folk belief [of integration], made it the main plank in their campaign to win the American Negro from the 1920s on."[58] The implication in Hurston's statement was that, if integration was taken as the communist line, segregation must by definition have been anti-communist. A month later, Hurston was more vindictive in an appraisal of the NAACP. The Association, she believed, "has not now, nor ever has had any substantial Negro following." Instead, she believed, it was headed, financed and master-minded by those "who cunningly seek to give the South a pistol-whipping with a black hand. They hotly and bitterly resent certain rejections of themselves," she continued, and "are more socialistic-minded than any other group on earth."[59]

Davis Lee, publisher of The Herald, the self-proclaimed "Leading Negro Newspaper" of South Carolina, held similar views to Hurston, albeit ones that were put across in a less vituperative manner. In a front page article published on 31 May

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Hurston and Race Politics in Dixie," Journal of American Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1 (1997). Hurston quotation from p. 77.

[58] Zora Neale Hurston, "'White Mare' Doctrine False," Asheville Times, 30 August 1955, clipping in Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 119.

[59] Zora Neale Hurston letter to Virginius Dabney, 29 September 1955, Dabney Papers, Box 7.

1959, Lee stated that he was a "full fledged, full blooded American." He did not believe, he stated in a reference to subversive forces, "that we will ever achieve our full potentiality by pressure, agitation and force." Lee followed a third way between forced integration and forced segregation, preferring instead a system of voluntary segregation. He believed that "the race issue has gotten out of hand to the extent that our race has been set back from 15 to 25 years...Those of us who have gone along with these agitators have become willing tools of the Communists. They have," he concluded, "set out to divide us, and then conquer us..."[60] Lee's vocal pro-segregation stance ensured him a relatively high profile. Billy James Hargis, leader of the far-right Christian Crusade, wrote that the "views of such Negro leaders as Davis Lee are deserving of much more prominence in the American press" than had, he believed, hitherto been the case.[61]

The Reverend O.B. Brown, pastor of the Negro Belmont Heights Church of God in Tampa, Florida, shared Lee's position in many respects. Brown was troubled by what he had witnessed at a 1956 conference held at Booker T. Washington College in Tuskegee, Alabama. The Tampa Tribune reported that "Brown said there were white speakers at the conference and they were 'cramming' integration down the throats of Negroes. He accused Communists of agitating on the segregation question and added, 'For God's sake, let us, the Negro race, alone." Brown was in no doubt that the instigators were not only communists, but also that other traditional enemy of

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[60] Davis Lee, "Pressure Groups Have Aroused Prejudice, Bitterness and Hatred Never Heard of Before in This Nation," The Herald, 31 May 1959, clipping in B. Everett Jordan Papers, Box 257, Special Collections Library, Duke University.

[61] Billy James Hargis, Communist America...Must It Be So? [3rd Edition] (Tulsa, Oklahoma: Christian Crusade Publishing, 1960), p. 97. Hargis also identified the Southern Negro Improvement Association of Alabama as a black segregationist group, stating that they had "sent a 350-word telegram to President Eisenhower indicating that most Southern Negroes don't want forced integration. The group asked for a government-sponsored poll of Southern Negroes to prove the point," p. 96.

the white South, outsiders. "You should have heard the messages that came from white peoples lips. These people were not from the Southern states. They spoke on segregation. They want to cram some things down our throats whether we can swallow them or not."[62]

[62] "Article from The Tampa Tribune, Tampa Florida of June 21, 1956: Tampa Negro Pastor Hits Integration," clipping in Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 108.

Chapter Three

Virginia

It was in many ways fitting that Virginia Senator Harry Flood Byrd, Sr, was credited with coining the term "massive resistance."[1] From the mid-1920s onwards, he was the commanding figure of Virginia politics, constructing an "organisation" from a rural, agrarian power base which came to dominate the Old Dominion for forty years. Byrd's controlling interest in Virginia was sustained by the limited size of the electorate, and by the unrepresentative concentration of voting wards in the segregationist, Black Belt stronghold of the "Southside."[2] The senator's continued political pre-eminence was taken for granted by almost all Virginians, and the organisation faced few challengers before mid-century. In keeping with other southern states, the vast majority of Virginia's African Americans were excluded from mainstream political processes. It is an indication of the stifling political atmosphere of the Byrd-era Old Dominion that, whereas blacks had no control over their exclusion, much of Virginia's white population chose to shun politics at the state-level. They preferred instead to devote their energy to "traditional nonpolitical" and "localized" interest groups.[3]

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[1] James Latimer, who first reported Byrd's use of the term "Massive Resistance" in the Times-Dispatch, ironically wondered afterwards whether he had misheard Byrd, and that what the Senator had really called for was "passive" resistance. See Earle Dunford, Richmond Times-Dispatch: The Story of a Newspaper (Richmond, Va.: Cadmus, 1995), p.362.

[2] One of the ways in which Virginia's white elites ensured this small, controllable electorate was via the poll tax, which was reintroduced in 1902. It was a traditional mechanism for disfranchising southern blacks and, when it suited, poor whites.

[3] Matthew D. Lassiter and Andrew B. Lewis, "Massive Resistance Revisited: Virginia's White Moderates and the Byrd Organization," in Lassiter and Lewis [eds], The Moderates' Dilemma: Massive Resistance to School Desegregation in Virginia (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1998), p. 15.

After the Second World War, however, Byrd's rural-oriented machine was increasingly found wanting: it responded slowly to the development of cities and suburbs, and was not prepared for the resultant state-wide shortfall in public services. Suddenly Byrd and his political allies began to face significant opposition in elections. Francis Pickens Miller, a retired colonel with a heroic war record and progressive credentials, ran the machine-stalwart John Stuart Battle close in the 1949 gubernatorial contest, and, in 1953, Republican Theodore "Ted" Dalton garnered almost 45% of the vote in an ultimately unsuccessful gubernatorial campaign.

With his power looking somewhat precarious, Massive Resistance came as a revitalising tonic for Byrd and his organisation. From an early, surprisingly mild response to *Brown*, under Byrd's influence Virginia first drifted and then galloped towards increasingly robust defiance. Crucial to the unfolding of this story was the way in which the organisation pounced on a referendum ratifying relatively moderate pupil placement plans and a local option solution to the desegregation crisis, and used it as a mandate to follow a more mutinous course. As part of a strategy that was always underpinned by an expressly legal-minded approach, the state constitution was altered to allow the governor to close schools that were directly threatened by desegregation. By 1958, Massive Resistance in Virginia was as intemperate as anywhere in the Deep South, and Governor J. Lindsay Almond, Jr, actually closed schools in three localities.

Ironically, as we shall see, the school closures actually hastened an end to all-out defiance in two ways. First, white resistance sentiment increased until the schools were actually shut; at that point, the majority of Virginia's white citizens decided that they placed a higher value on the continuation of public education than on the

continuation of segregated schooling.[4] Second, federal and local courts found the closures to be in breach of both US and Virginia Constitutions. For a state that placed so much emphasis on due process and legal argument, open resistance to *Brown* was no longer tenable.[5] From late 1959 until federal civil and voter rights legislation in 1964 and 1965, and finally the Supreme Court's *Green v. County School Board of Kent* decision in 1968, Virginia returned to a local option scheme of token, voluntary segregation.[6] The state's two commissions set up to formulate a response to *Brown*, one under Garland Gray and the other under Moseby Perrow, therefore bookended a far more obdurate spell of fierce resistance with a more measured, moderate approach.

This chapter plots the evolving politics of Virginia's legislative Massive Resistance programme, and the development of related arguments and counter-arguments designed to bolster opposition to federally mandated desegregation. It thus provides a detailed, local context within which to evaluate the use of anti-communism and red-baiting not only by those opposing desegregation, but also by those supporting the aims and goals of the civil rights movement.

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[4] As Lassiter and Lewis have suggested, "When it meant not just accepting the status quo but also standing by while politicians tampered with the future of public education, popular support for de jure segregation outside Virginia's Black Belt turned out to be less rigid than scholars have often recognized." ibid., p. 15.

[5] Richmond Times-Dispatch reporter Charles McDowell provided a glimpse of that atmosphere of strict adherence to process and ceremony. He wrote that the post-World War II legislature was "a place where the members tended to be the leading citizens of their towns and counties. They came there as a great honor...Their observance of parliamentary procedure was the most devoted and precise that I have ever seen in any legislative body. Everybody was forever in his seat. Nobody was reading a newspaper in his seat. They were as attentive as school children." Charles McDowell quoted in Jack Bass and Walter DeVries, The Transformation of Southern Politics: Social Change and Political Consequence Since 1945 (New York: Meridian, 1976), p. 343.

[6] The *Green* decision ruled that the "freedom-of-choice" concept of local option desegregation was unconstitutional, where dual black and white school systems persisted. The exception to the return to local option controls and public education was Prince Edward County, which, as will be discussed, persisted with private education until after the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

II

One of those to whom Byrd entrusted responsibility for formulating a legally based response to *Brown* was David J. Mays, widely perceived to be one of the finest legal minds of the South. Mays kept a personal and very frank diary of the internal machinations of the Virginia legislature during the period of Massive Resistance.[7] From those diaries, it is clear that Mays thought Byrd to be a man without any new ideas for the maintenance of segregation, in what was an increasingly hostile federal climate for the senator. To compound his problems, as veteran Virginia political correspondent James Latimer recalled, "Just before [*Brown*], the Young Turks had done something that nobody else had done for an awful long time, that was take control of the House of Delegates at least temporarily away from the Byrd organisation leadership."[8] It was this downturn in the Byrd machine's electoral fortunes, remembered Latimer, that started rumours that *Brown*, and more specifically Massive Resistance, might serve to revitalise the Byrd camp. Bereft of fresh ideas before the decision, and in the face of the onslaught from a younger generation of thrusting politicos, Byrd and his cohorts adopted the school desegregation problem as a political panacea.

Although there are interpretative problems in judging mass public opinion simply by the content of letters sent by constituents to politicians, such

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[7] Since his diaries were left sealed until 1996, even the most recent histories of Virginia have been unable to take them into account. Ronald L. Heinemann, Harry Byrd of Virginia (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1996), makes no mention of them, whilst Lassiter and Lewis [eds] The Moderates' Dilemma: Massive Resistance to School Desegregation in Virginia (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1997) note that the Diaries are open, but make no use of them. James Latimer, therefore, remains the only journalist or historian to have written on the Mays Diaries. See "The Rise and Fall of Massive Resistance", Times-Dispatch, 22 September 1996, pp. A1, A9, A10-12.

[8] The "Young Turks" saw themselves as the progressive arm of the Byrd machine, and had all entered the legislature after World War II. James Latimer Interviews with Former Governors Darden and Tuck; Program 6, Manuscripts Division, Special Collections Department, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville.

correspondence offers at least an indication of Virginia's mood.[9] In the month following the Supreme Court's decision, the correspondence received by Governor Thomas Bahnsen "Bahnse" Stanley revealed a strong current of pro-segregation opinion. On 1 June 1954 alone, Stanley received 46 letters on the subject of *Brown*: 41 were for continued segregation, two were against, while three suggested names of possible members for a proposed commission designed to respond to the decision. Of a total of 191 letters received between 2 and 8 June, 183 were for continued segregation with only three against, and a further three suggesting commission members.[10] Clearly, of those who were moved to write, the overwhelming majority were against the desegregation of Virginia's schools.

In keeping with other southern states, there was a period of relative calm in the immediate aftermath of *Brown* in Virginia. The Old Dominion's first legislative response to the decision, the Gray Plan, was the result of a consultation commission set up in late August 1954, under the tutelage of state senator Garland "Peck" Gray, a Byrd machine stalwart. The reason behind Gray's appointment was quite clear. He had written to Byrd only twelve days after *Brown*, expressing views similar to Byrd's own. "I have been racking my brain to see if there is not some way that we, here in Eastern Virginia, can circumvent the effect of the Supreme Court Decision," wrote Gray, who, like most of Byrd's acolytes, held power in Virginia's Black Belt. "The

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[9] Historians should not assume, for example, that all members of the public, whether taking an active interest in contemporary politics or not, deem it necessary to write to their political representatives. On a different level, Sarah Patton Boyle admitted in a letter to Lillian Smith that, as of September 1951, she had been the author of fourteen of the eighteen pro-integration letters published by the Richmond Times-Dispatch, many under assumed names. Boyle letter to Lillian Smith, 9 September 1951, Sarah Patton Boyle Papers [8003-b], Microfilm, Manuscripts Division, Special Collections Department, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville.

[10] "Segregation Jan -- June 1955", Thomas Bahnsen Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 104, Archives and Research Services, Library of Virginia, Richmond.

territory I represent has approximately two-thirds negro children and I do not believe that many of our white people would accept the situation where their children will be subjected to such overwhelming numbers of negroes without exhausting every effort to prevent this situation."[11] Stanley, as a machine-backed Governor, was expected to rubber stamp the appointments that his patron wished to make. In short order, Gray was entrusted with chairing a commission to decide upon Virginia's response to *Brown*.

The diaries of David Mays provide a unique insight into the internal wrangling of that decision making process. They confirm what veteran Virginia political correspondent James Latimer has referred to as political manoeuvres of the Massive Resistance era which have "long been largely rumour."[12] According to Mays, "Peck" Gray was enmeshed in a private battle for the next governorship with the then attorney general, J. Lindsay Almond, Jr. The situation seriously affected their judgement and respective political stances. A diary entry on 19 November 1954, for example, stated that, "involved in the whole segregation affair [is] a backstage fight for the next governorship. Peck and his friends...are busily trying to undermine the Atty-Genl. [sic] who has gained considerable ground in the past four months. This I am keeping out of..."[13] So much was he keeping out of it, in fact, that Mays turned down a position on the Gray Commission itself, although, along with Henry T. Wickham, he served as the Commission's counsel.[14] In the emerging behind the scenes battle for

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[11] Garland Gray letter to Harry Byrd, Sr, 29 May 1954, Mills E. Godwin, Jr, Personal Papers, Box 1, Manuscript and Rare Books Department, Earl Gregg Swem Library, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg.
[12] Latimer, "The Rise and Fall of Massive Resistance."
[13] David J. Mays Diaries, 19 November 1954, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia.
[14] Mays had met Gray on 6 January 1955, and was given four days to consider whether or not he wished to join the Commission. "I know this to be a fearfully difficult assignment", wrote Mays, "and if I accept I must have some definite conditions agreed to in advance. A very supplicating factor is the

the governorship, Gray remained the organisation's choice to succeed Stanley, and thus had the backing of many of Byrd's key players. Even Stanley himself was caught up in the feuding, and it began to affect his choice of counsel. "Stanley is passing up Almond frequently, and bad blood between [them] can easily lead to major disaster in State problems."[15]

The principal clash between Almond -- supported by Mays -- and Stanley -- supported by Gray and Byrd -- appears to have come over the strength of Virginia's resistance formula. Almond and Mays both favoured a more legally tenable "local option" or "assignment plan" approach, which would put school placement criteria in the hands of local school boards. As was the case across the South, the majority of those boards were comprised of the very white, pro-segregation forces that wanted to halt school desegregation. The assignment plan would, therefore, show a willingness to comply with *Brown* in the broadest of terms, whilst simultaneously ensuring that the minimum amount of desegregation would take place.

The Byrd camp refused to endorse anything that could be taken as even tacit acceptance of the Supreme Court's desegregation edicts, and was loathe to accept the possibility of even token desegregation. The intensely legalistic approach both Mays and Almond brought to their work, however, made it highly unlikely that they would follow Byrd's line of total exclusion, knowing that it was sure to be rebuffed in time by both state and federal courts. As a result, both Almond and Mays were gradually excluded from the decision-making progress. "While Peck's treatment of Lindsay [and] me has been shabby," wrote Mays, " I realise that the gubernatorial bug has

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battle for the governorship, Lindsay Almond and Peck Gray trying to use the school issue to win the high office." ibid., 6 January 1955.

[15] ibid., 16 June 1955.

bitten him very badly and that he is but trying in his clumsy way to carry out the wishes of Harry Byrd, Bill Tuck, Watt Abbitt, and other extremists who want the assignment plan killed."[16] If the local option assignment plan was indeed shelved, the only available options were to desegregate or close public schools. Byrd, Tuck and Abbitt would not have endured desegregated schooling.

On 11 November 1955, the Gray Commission presented its report to Stanley. It represented the first comprehensive, systematic examination of the scope for legal defiance of the Supreme Court and *Brown*. The plan did, after all, endorse the local option, assignment plan route to compliance. The commission also proposed an amendment that would allow state-funded tuition grants for white students who wished to attend private schools rather than endure desegregated public education. In order to enact those provisions, a public referendum was needed to clear the way for a special legislative session. More than two-thirds of Virginia's enfranchised population voted in favour of the constitutional change necessary to enact the commission's proposals.

Surprisingly in the circumstances, Byrd publicly supported Gray and his commission's relatively moderate findings. The senator was determined to portray his organisation as united in its resistance to *Brown*, especially in the wake of Miller and Dalton's anti-organisation campaigns in 1949 and 1954 respectively. He was also determined that, having already compromised his hard line stance, passage of the tuition grant amendment would not be blocked by organisation factionalism. On 21 December 1955, Virginius Dabney wrote to Byrd, stating that he was "glad you have thrown the weight of your great influence behind the Gray Commission's report. I am

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[16] ibid., 26 June 1956.

sure that will go far to put it over, but we will still have a lot of work to do."[17] Perhaps less surprisingly, moderates and the Young Turks who threatened Byrd's political hegemony also supported Gray: by formulating a plan which stopped short of actually closing the schools, the commission had ploughed a relatively moderate furrow. In the light of these developments, the state referendum was advertised as a vote not on the continued opening or imminent closure of schools -- which had been Stanley and Byrd's personal choice -- but on whether or not integration should be forced. One advertising flyer, for example, besought Virginians "On January 9th [to] Vote X For the Convention. A Vote For the Convention is a Vote Against Enforced Mixed Schools."[18] Although it is a subtle difference, nonetheless a vote against forcing desegregation in schools appealed far more to moderate, liberal-minded Virginians than a stronger, more reactionary-sounding vote for school closures.

Virginia's response to *Brown* did not, however, remain hidebound by the relatively moderate approach of the Gray Plan for long. The more extreme arm of the organisation, including Stanley and Byrd, took the public's overwhelming ratification of the Gray Plan as a mandate for a more hard line response. At the same time as the state's segregationist leadership began to retreat from moderation, Byrd confidant and Richmond News-Leader editor James Jackson "Kilpo" Kilpatrick sought other means of defiance. Starting in November 1955, he used a series of editorials to revamp the confederate doctrine of interposition as a means of bolstering resistance legislation.

Short of secession, a resolution of interposition was the ultimate manifestation of the

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[17] Virginius Dabney letter to Harry Byrd, Sr, 21 December 1955, Byrd Papers, Box 3, Manuscripts Division, Special Collections Department, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville.
[18] Advertisement by the "State Referendum Information Center. Room 370 Hotel Richmond, Richmond, Va., Dabney S. Lancaster Director. Henry T. Wickham, Counsel," Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 91.

States' Rights doctrine. As Kilpatrick's work showed, however traditional or even predictable calls for States' Rights had become in southern politics, the weapon offered a more flexible form of resistance than has often been acknowledged, and serves as an example of the malleability of resistance weapons in general. Kilpatrick's interposition campaign culminated with the introduction of a Virginia Senate resolution "Interposing the Sovereignty of Virginia against Encroachment upon the Reserved Powers of this State, and appealing to Sister States to Resolve a Question of Contested Power." As Bass and DeVries have succinctly commented, however, "once examined calmly, interposition was legal nonsense."[19]

In this atmosphere of increasing extremism, Stanley and the assembly passed a package of bills in late August 1956 that represented the pinnacle of legislative resistance in Virginia. The assembly established a State Pupil Placement Board, removing authority for pupil assignment away from local school boards to the governor himself. Stanley now had the authority to close any schools under direct court order to desegregate, and to cut off state funds to any school threatening to integrate upon reopening. Although often obscured by *Brown*'s specific focus on school desegregation, this period of hard line Massive Resistance also saw legislative moves aimed at ensuring the continued restriction of the black voting franchise. As a result, the National Association of Colored People [NAACP] was widely vilified by resisters, not only for bringing the *Brown* case to court, but also for its wider attempts to increase African American voter registration numbers. To complement school closing measures, therefore, Virginia legislators established committees that were

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[19] The matter of interposition, they continued, "had clearly been resolved by the Civil War." Bass and DeVries, The Transformation of Southern Politics p. 347. Kilpatrick's interposition plan was struck down by the courts on 19 January 1956.

intended to destroy the state's NAACP chapters. The Thomson Committee, established in 1957 under Alexandria's Congressman James M. Thomson, and the Boatwright Committee, under Buckingham County's John B. Boatwright, were eventually merged by Act of the General Assembly into one Committee under Boatwright.[20] They were empowered by two "anti-NAACP" Acts passed in 1956, the most potentially useful of which ordered the names of all members of, and donors to, the NAACP to be made public.[21]

In November 1957, Almond won the gubernatorial elections, although he did not replace Stanley until inauguration day on 11 January 1958. Just before Almond's inauguration, Byrd wrote to Virginia Congressman William Munford Tuck, urging Almond to "prepare a great States Rights speech for his inauguration and not suggest, at that time, any changes in our existing laws to prevent integration."[22] Almond would, therefore, be signalling his intention to continue defiance of the federal government without having to go into explicit detail. The new governor initially announced that he would follow existing resistance legislation, reporting that his concern was to "maintain and preserve an efficient and well functioning system of public free schools."[23] The manner in which Almond chose to preserve the state's

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[20] The official names of these two committees were, respectively, the Committee on Law Reform and Racial Activities, and the Committee on Offenses Against the Administration of Justice. Boatwright had previously served as Chairman of the Division of Statutory Research and Drafting, in the State Capitol, Richmond. Passed over by many historians, a brief discussion of the activities of both the Thomson and Boatwright Committees can be found in James W. Ely, Jr, The Crisis of Conservative Virginia: The Byrd Organization and the Politics of Massive Resistance (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1976), pp. 46-50.

[21] Along with this demand, "the new statutes make it illegal for any person, firm, or corporation to stir up litigation by offering, promising, or donating anything of real value as an inducement to another person to commence or continue a suit before a court or administrative body." Walter F. Murphy, "The South Counterattacks: The Anti-NAACP Laws," Western Political Quarterly, 12 (June 1959), p. 374.

[22] Harry Byrd, Sr, letter to William Munford Tuck, 10 December 1957, Byrd Papers, Box 262.

[23] J. Lindsay Almond to Reverend Charles L. Lady, 27 February 1958, J. Lindsay Almond Personal Papers, Box 6, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia.

public schools, however, evolved dramatically during his tenure as Governor: in his 1957 gubernatorial campaign, he had proposed cutting off one of his arms before allowing any integration in education; on 28 January 1959, he publicly announced that school closures were to be consigned to Virginia's political past.[24]

Again, Mays' diaries encapsulated not only some of the reasons behind Almond's apparent *volte face*, but also crucially delineated between resistance as a heartfelt matter of principle and resistance as political pragmatism. According to Mays, Almond acceded to the governorship on a segregationist ticket in 1957 not on ideological grounds, but because Republican candidate Ted Dalton had out-manoeuvred him and claimed the moderate ground for himself. "This," as Mays succinctly noted, "puts Lindsay [Almond] in a deep hole since he must now go for 'massive resistance' without stint, backing Governor Stanley's statute that would cut off school funds in any county or city where any integration took place."[25] What Mays' clandestine writings demonstrate, therefore, is that during the era of Virginia's Massive Resistance, politicians were frequently driven into taking stands and outlining positions that they not only disagreed with, but to which they were fundamentally opposed. He clearly establishes that politicians were fully prepared to

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[24] "It was three years ago that Ex-governor Almond, in a spectacular performance, reversed his frequently announced opposition to federally enforced integration of public schools in Virginia. Opposition to integration had been the main plank in the platform on which he was elected governor. Reversal of his position was made more conspicious [sic] by his speech of just 10 days before in which he urged the people of Virginia, to stand firm and never surrender in their opposition to enforced integration. It was in that speech that he said he, as governor, would cut off his right arm before submitting to the iniquitous and unconstitutional school decision by the Warren Court..." Statement by Sen. Harry F Byrd (D.Va.) January 19 1962, Byrd Papers, Box 264.

[25] Mays Diaries, 5 July 1957. This sly manoeuvring was not unique: future Governor Albertis S. Harrison, Jr, was, according to Mays, "driven into running for Atty-Genl [sic] against his will, he has denounced the local school assignment recommended by the Gray commission, when he has to admit privately that no other method of resistance will work." ibid., 10 September 1957.

expound hard line policies and indulge in extremist rhetoric in the name of short term, pragmatic political expediency.[26]

But there is also a more subtle explanation for Almond's turn around. As a lawyer and former attorney general, he realised that closing public schools was legally untenable in the long term. Perhaps with the benefit of hindsight, Almond claimed in an interview conducted in 1964 that he felt Virginia's move away from the Gray Plan had "broken faith with the people." By actually closing schools, Almond alleged that he knew full well that the courts would strike down the state's 1956 Massive Resistance legislation, and that Virginia would once again steer a more moderate, legally defensible course.[27] Indeed, at the start of January 1959, Stanley's hard line resistance measures began to be dismantled by both federal and state courts. By January 19, the Virginia Supreme Court had effectively wiped out what remained of the Old Dominion's Massive Resistance laws. The NAACP, too, proved that it had been on firmer legal ground than the Virginia legislature. The Old Dominion's anti-NAACP statutes were declared void in *NAACP v. Patty*, which held that the publication of the names of those supporting or associated with the NAACP was a violation of the rights of free speech and assembly, and interpreted the attempts to curtail the Association's access to the courts as a denial of due process of the law.[28]

On 5th February 1959, the state legislature authorised the establishment of a committee under state senator Moseby Perrow to provide new direction in the

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[26] Almond was also pressurised by Virginia's business community. As J. Douglas Smith notes, for example, Almond's U-turn came "after a group of statewide business leaders apparently convinced him that further defiance would destroy the commonwealth's reputation..." J. Douglas Smith, "'When Reason Collides With Prejudice': Armistead Lloyd Boothe and the Politics of Moderation," in Lassiter and Lewis [eds], The Moderates' Dilemma, p. 46.

[27] J. Lindsay Almond, Jr, quoted in Lassiter and Lewis, "Massive Resistance Revisited," p. 11.

[28] Murphy, "The South Counterattacks", pp. 374-375.

desegregation struggle. Staffed, in contrast to the Gray Commission, by a majority of moderate legislators from around the state and not just from the more reactionary Black Belt, the Perrow Commission not only accepted the premise of *Brown* as law, but was also infused with a real sense of the danger posed to public education by school closures.[29] The development of the commission's views strengthens the argument that resistance in Virginia hardened steadily until schools were actually closed. From that point, only committed, die-hard segregationists continued to fight for total resistance rather than some form of token integration. As, among others, James Herschman, Jr, has suggested, the closing of public schools also saw the emergence of a large-scale, white political backlash against school closures. Forced to chose between no schools in their own localities or token desegregation, the number of whites who joined the Virginia Committee for Public Schools [VCPS] proved that continued public education was a priority.[30] The VCPS brought together a number of federated, local committees for continued public education. After only one year in operation, it boasted a membership of 25,000.[31] In an attempt not only to forge a white consensus, but also to offset any claims of excess radicalism, these committees steadfastly refused to support integration. Instead, they couched their moderation in terms of keeping public schools open.[32]

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[29] There were, according to James Herschman, only nine pro-Massive Resisters on the Perrow Commission. James H. Herschman, Jr, "Massive Resistance Meets Its Match: The Emergence of a Pro-Public School Majority," in Lassiter and Lewis [eds], The Moderates' Dilemma, p.130.

[30] ibid.

[31] J.L. Blair Buck Papers, Box 1, Manuscript Division, Special Collections Department, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville.

[32] J. Albert Rolston, for example, wrote to Almond outlining the purpose of the Charlottesville CPE as follows: "1. We are determined to pursue every legal means to keep public schools open. 2. We are concerned with neither encouraging integration nor perpetuating segregation. 3. We oppose any permanent arrangement with [sic] entrusts public education to private hands having no responsibility or accountability to the general public. 4. We have faith in Charlottesville's ability to meet its public education needs." J. Albert Rolston letter to J. Lindsay Almond, Jr, 16 September 1958, Charlottesville

The case of Prince Edward County is deserving of special mention, for it was the one area in Virginia where public schools were closed until the end of the 1964 school year, and where white moderate opinion had not rejected total resistance to desegregation once schools were actually closed. Even after Almond had performed his U-turn on resistance strategy, the Prince Edward County Board of Supervisors continued with a private school system. That was in part due to the nature of the county itself; a central part of the Southside Black Belt, Prince Edward's African Americans made up 45% of the population. The completion of the modern, all-black Moton High School in September 1953 publicly demonstrated that -- in some areas at least -- the county was committed to separate and equal facilities. As a result, Massive Resisters were able to label desegregation in the county as a specifically social problem, to be dealt with by the black and white communities.

That, in turn, allowed the county's political elites to unite their white community behind the decision to close schools and operate a private alternative for white students. As Amy Murrell has demonstrated, leaders of the resistance campaign effectively eliminated any white moderate opposition to school closures by couching their arguments in terms of community consciousness. Die-hard segregationists dominated public meetings, and succeeded in convincing "average white citizens that theirs was a pro-education, civic-minded mission, and they applied social pressure to those [whites] who doubted them."[33] As Harry Boyte, who volunteered to teach black children after the school closures noted, "no one dares speak out. It is a strange thing

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Committee For Public Education Papers, Box 1, Manuscripts Division, Special Collections Department, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville.

[33] Amy E. Murrell, "The 'Impossible' Prince Edward County Case: The Endurance of Resistance in a Southwide County, 1959-64," in Lassiter and Lewis [eds], The Moderates' Dilemma, p. 135.

to see such control over public utterances."[34] Indeed, so pervasive was the consensus among the white population that rabid Massive Resistance rhetoric was not necessary.

Prince Edward's white leadership was helped by two other issues in its attempts to constrict public debate about the efficacy of closed schools. The county had been named in the original *Brown* decision, which helped the white community to focus on resisting desegregation. Furthermore, the private school system that was set up -- for the county's white children -- was hugely effective, in part because white teachers were guaranteed the same pension schemes and social security benefits that they had received when in the state system. The unity of the white community also contributed to the establishment of that successful school system, as desks, filing cabinets and books were donated by local businessmen. One third of the $212,830 needed to support private schools was pledged at the private school fund's inaugural meeting.[35] In the end, it was the constant yet painfully slow legal process instigated by the NAACP and the county's black population that led to the Supreme Court declaring, on 25 May 1964, that the Prince Edward County Board of Supervisors had violated the 14th Amendment by ending public education in the County.

Beyond the borders of Prince Edward County, Virginia's Massive Resisters were guided by the Perrow Plan, the main tenets of which echoed the earlier focus of the Gray Plan. It heralded a return to "local option" pupil assignment, although provision was made to facilitate the establishment and operation of private schools, in a move to appease the Southside legislators still persevering with closed schools in Prince Edward County. The Plan passed by only one vote. A circular letter from the

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[34] Harry Boyte quoted in ibid., p. 162.
[35] ibid., p. 141.

VCPS, dated 2 May 1959, exemplified the impact that the adoption of the Perrow Plan made. "The special session of the General Assembly is over," it proclaimed. "What is its significance?...The adoption of the Perrow Commission's 'freedom-of-choice' program represents the first step away from Massive Resistance. The psychological impact is probably much more significant than the actual measures."[36]

Sarah Patton Boyle, too, sensed that the indefatigable campaign against desegregation was, at last, tiring. The notable and outspoken white moderate, who lived in Charlottesville for much of the 1950s, wrote to her New York City-based friend and fund-raiser, Flora "Florsch" Morrison, in February 1959. In the letter, she stated that she was "feeling more hopeful on the integration front. All quiet still. So people know it can be, even if there's trouble latter [sic]. Massive resistance is broken. New laws are being hastened through it's true. But I know of no way to repair broken ice."[37]

III

Virginia's complicated and varied legislative response to *Brown* did not occur in domestic isolation. Like the United States as a whole, from the late 1940s onwards Virginia was plunged into the chilling milieu of the Cold War.[38] The views of those on all sides of Virginia's Massive Resistance debate were affected by the global situation. Those in favour of hard line resistance legislation continually supplemented their arguments with rhetoric concerning the links between communism and integration, just as racial progressives appealed to the state's ruling elites to end

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36 "Correspondence of Committee, 1959, May", Buck Papers, Box 1.
37 Sarah Patton Boyle letter to Flora Morrison, 10 February 1959, Boyle Papers, Box 5,
38 Ely's assessment here is surely wide of the mark. "Cold War themes," he writes, "so misplaced in this bitter domestic controversy, primarily serve to emphasize the anticommunist mood of the 1950s." On the contrary, Massive Resistance and the schools issue were inextricably bound up in the Cold War. Ely, The Crisis of Conservative Virginia, p. 121.

segregation because of its detrimental effect on the United States' global image. Although an undercurrent of Cold War rhetoric continued unabated, its tenor and vigour was dependent upon the urgency of the situation: a softening of legislative resistance strategies, for example, brought forth more intemperate rhetoric from hard line segregationists who feared that their battle was in danger of being lost.

While Gray's commission was still hearing arguments over Virginia's proposed response to *Brown*, the organisation's moderate and hard line factions reacted very differently to the pressures that the Cold War placed on the race issue. Mays, who, along with Almond, supported a more moderate line than Stanley and Byrd, was aware of the need to soften Virginia's racial image. In August 1955, when a visiting Ambassador from India was forced into segregated restaurant facilities on a visit to Houston, Texas, Mays seized the opportunity for the Old Dominion's own propaganda purposes: by 10 September 1955, Mr Melita, the Ambassador, had accepted Mays' invitation to address the Richmond Bar Association on 3 November. "I intend," wrote Mays, "to make quite an affair of it."[39] Stanley's camp, on the other hand, was not so conciliatory. Lucas D. Philips, a pro-Byrd member of the Virginia House of Delegates, wrote to tell Stanley of his outright opposition to *Brown*. The decision was, he believed, "wrong." As a result, he continued, "it is a time for action, and I for one am not willing to remain silent in order to please all the Socialists and do-gooders who have fallen for false doctrine under the lash of Communist propaganda."[40]

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[39] Mays Diaries, 24 August 1955 and 10 September 1955.
[40] Hon. Lucas D. Philips letter to Governor Tom Stanley, 26 June 1954, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 100.

Once the state's hard line Massive Resistance laws had been passed in the Summer of 1956, segregationist anti-communism became gradually less shrill. In contrast, moderate forces in the state began to use Cold War issues to support their opposition to school closures. As the "Peninsula Council for Community Co-operation," a self-styled non-profit, non-political, Newport News-based organisation suggested to Almond during his gubernatorial campaign, "the Sputniks are continually warning us that the battle for the minds of the people of the world is not for keeps. Thus, it is our duty to tell our citizens no matter how repugnant it may be emotionally, that it is no longer a question of preserving the southern way of life but rather the pressing question of preserving the national life itself. It is within such a context of meaning that the preservation of our public school system must be considered." Otherwise, the Council continued, any victory for Massive Resistance in such circumstances could "well be a pyrrhic one."[41]

In February 1958, a month after school closures had been authorised, Konnarock's Lutheran Reverend Charles L. Lady wrote to Almond. Lady was "greatly concerned to know whether my governor is more interested in 'cross burning' than he is in 'cross bearing,' I believe that we need to remember that the white race is the minority race in this world. The great mass of yellow, red, brown, and black-skinned people of this world are not going to accept Christ proclaimed by American Christians as long as we continue to promote segregation and forbid integration in this country. Have you ever stopped to consider what would happen to the teaching of the Bible in Africa or India if the governments of those lands would have taken the same

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41 "Peninsula Council for Community Co-operation; a Non-Profit, Non-Political Organization," Newsletter, Vol. II, No. 2, November 1957, Byrd Papers, Box 241.

attitude as your policy [of segregation] has proclaimed?" Almond sought to deflect the Reverend's criticisms by counter-attacking. "You express great concern over what peoples of other colors throughout the world may think relative to our position in this matter," he wrote. "You cite Africa and India. You are apparently not familiar with the caste system of India, the terrible discriminations on racial lines enforced throughout the Soviet world, nor with racial conditions which prevail in Africa..."[42]

While still advocating the hard line of school closures, Almond did his utmost to make States' Rights, such an intrinsic part of any Massive Resistance campaign, a part of Cold War concerns, too. "Advocates of centralized power," he said in 1958, referring to those who would support federal rights over those of individual states, along with "misguided theorists" and jurists "either ignorant or indifferent to provisions of the fundamental law," were firmly linked to "subversives eager to take advantage of every opportunity." Together they had succeeded, thought Almond, in bringing a state of inertia and confusion to Virginia.[43] The Old Dominion's constituents, too, joined Almond in rebranding States' Rights as a Cold War issue. Phoebus' Dana Wier, for example, wrote that "I believe the proper state officials should find out who the clique may be that is being financed to overthrow State and individual rights that we have enjoyed since the birth of our nation...If Communist people are behind the revolution to overthrow state policies they should be given a fast trial plus a cheap funeral."[44]

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[42] Reverend Charles L. Lady Letter to J. Lindsay Almond, Jr, 24 February 1958, and Almond letter to Lady, 27 February 1958, Almond Personal Papers, Box 6.
[43] "Address of J. Lindsay Almond, Jr, Governor of Virginia, American Legion Convention, Department of Virginia, Roanoke, Saturday August 2, 1958, 11 a.m." Almond Gubernatorial Papers, Box 143, Archives and Map Research Room, Library of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia.
[44] Dana Wier letter to Governor Tom Stanley, 29 October 1954, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 103.

At the start of 1959, when Almond's decision to reopen public schools once again reinvigorated desegregation debates, supporters of both sides of the argument were still trying to use the Cold War climate to their own advantage. The moderate Waynesboro News-Virginian, for example, noted in January that "the world is torn by a gigantic struggle between opposing ideologies...Communism and Christianity. The United States, of which Virginia is an integral part, is a Christian nation. We believe in the dignity of the individual, the freedom of the person and in equal opportunity for all citizens. The free public school is the bulwark of our democratic philosophy." Damningly, the editorial ended with the admonition that "we cannot shipwreck anything as fundamental as our school system on the shoals of prejudice and hate."[45]

In the same month, the CBS network broadcast a television programme entitled "The Lost Class of 1959," in reference to those affected by Virginia's school closures. It featured the forthright views of Colonel James G. Martin on the issue, who still saw school integration as a communist inspired plot. "As a device in implementation of this scheme of subversion of American institutions," broadcast the Colonel, "the Soviet [sic] has adopted this technique called integration -- integration of the races for use in the United States...to so amalgamate the races in America that there will ensue a mongrel race so debilitated and so diffused that it has little or no principle left with which to withstand the avalanche of Communism, which then plans to take over."[46]

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[45] Editorial, News-Virginian, Waynesboro Va., Saturday, January 24 1959, clipping in "Correspondence of Committee, 1959, May", Buck Papers, Box 1.

[46] "'The Lost Class of 1959' Edited and Produced by Edward R. Murrow, Fred W. Friendly, as Broadcast Over the CBS Television Network, January 21, 1959 ---- 8:00 to 9:00 p.m. EST," Byrd Papers, Box 242.

By the Summer of 1959, when Virginia had returned once again to a more moderate, local option approach with the Perrow Plan, the vituperative nature of correspondence on the subject of race and the Cold War increased. In July, for example, many of Virginia's segregationists reacted angrily to reports that a US fashion show in Moscow was to feature interracial barbecue and wedding scenes. "I cannot imagine a more shameful and outrageous waste of the tax payers money," wrote Virginia Beach's Richard Tucker to Byrd, "than to include this false and disgraceful picture of the American way of life in an exhibition in Moscow." According to a report in the Virginia-Pilot, the scenes were eventually abandoned because of objections from US fashion editors.[47]

Given the pervasive influence of the Cold War, it was hardly surprising that Virginia's politicians, and, indeed, much of the Old Dominion's population, harboured anti-communist views. In Virginia, as throughout the nation, however, anti-communism was not the monolithic ideology which many historians have described.[48] Any discussion of anti-communism and red-baiting must take into account the genuine communist presence in the state. Anti-communism was, to a certain extent, predicated upon a realistic, if much exaggerated, threat. There had been signs of local

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[47] Virginia-Pilot article, 15 July 1959, enclosed with Richard B Tucker letter to Harry F Byrd, Sr, Byrd Papers, Box 262.

[48] Much of the historiography seriously underplays the role of anti-communism in Virginia, or, at the very least, its fluidity. Ely, for example, has characterised Massive Resistance as resting "upon the twin pillars of state rights [sic] philosophy and a belief in white supremacy." He oversimplifies anti-communism as an argument made by segregationists that "racial integration was promoted by the communists." Ely, The Crisis of Conservative Virginia, p. 100 and p. 121. Similarly, Ann Elizabeth Burnette, in a communication studies PhD dissertation examining the language of Massive Resistance, looked at the effect of "two arguments of different stases" for resistance to *Brown*, namely white supremacy and States' Rights. Ann Elizabeth Burnette, "A Lost Cause Revisited: Virginia's Massive Resistance, 1954-1962," Dissertation, Evanston Illinois 1996, p.11. Robbins S. Gates makes no mention of anti-communism as a weapon of Massive Resistance. Robbins S. Gates, The Making of Massive Resistance: Virginia's Politics of Public School Desegregation, 1954-56 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1962).

Communist Party activity in Virginia since the CPUSA's Popular Front period. In July 1944, the Virginia State Democratic Platform stated that "we have observed with apprehension the public announcement by the Communist Party of its purpose to infiltrate our party. We resent and deplore any action that encourages these subversive elements to feel that they and their policies are welcome in the National Democratic Party."[49] By the Federal Bureau of Investigation's 1949 estimate, there were 150 members of the CPUSA in Virginia.[50]

The most active chapter in the state was the Communist Party of Norfolk. In the minds of Virginians, its activities would have done little to disassociate the fears of integration from the fears of communism. The Norfolk branch produced flyers in the wake of *Brown*, for example, praising the Supreme Court for finally stating that "segregated schools are illegal." Furthermore, it urged citizens to write to representatives of the State political machine to demand desegregation. Byrd and his cohorts, it believed, would "try to find ways to evade the decision -- to delay its enforcement." Indeed, the Norfolk Communist Party worded its missive in what appears to be a deliberately provocative, even triumphalist way, so eager was it to celebrate the victory over segregation. "The militant and united demands of 15 million Negro Americans," it wrote, in language sending shivers down the spine of the white South, "supported by millions of white Americans -- among them, of course, every American Communist -- could no longer be denied."[51]

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[49] "Virginia State Democratic Platform adopted at Roanoke, Virginia, July 8, 1944, Presented by Colgate Darden, Jr, Resolution Committee Chairman," Byrd Papers, Box 5.
[50] FBI file on HUAC, Roll 3 -- 573, Roosevelt Study Center [RSC], Middleburg, The Netherlands. As has been noted, though, membership numbers did not provide an accurate reflection of overall strength or influence.
[51] "END SCHOOL DESEGREGATION -- NOW Issued as a public service by: The Communist Party of Norfolk", J.B. Matthews Papers, Box 154, Special Collections Library, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina.

The way in which the state's Communists reacted to *Brown*, coupled to the increasing permeation of Cold War fears in Virginian domestic life, convinced many segregationists that *Brown* was a communist inspired plot. Thomas D. Hewitt, for example, told Governor Stanley that, having lived in Alexandria all his life, and having talked with "thousands" of people since May 17, he found each and every one of them to be "bitterly opposed" to integration. It was, he indicated, "a known fact that this is a Communist conspiracy to overthrow the government of the United States." Drifting into McCarthyite territory, Hewitt attempted to undermine racial moderation and its advocates with red-baiting smears. "This applies to Armisted Boothe [sic], state Senator for the 10th District who definately [sic] is not speaking for the people when he says that we should comply with the Supreme Courts [sic] desegregation order."[52]

In order to justify this belief that *Brown* was part of a Soviet plot, many of Virginia's segregationists followed a South-wide pattern: they looked for, and more often than not found, signs of communism in the Supreme Court, which had promulgated the decree, the NAACP, who had brought the original school desegregation cases to court, and Gunnar Myrdal, whose work had underpinned the sociological arguments of the case. Representative Burr P. Harrison, for example, hinted at the Supreme Court's sympathies in an address to none other than the Virginia Association of Chiefs of Police. He told them to "remember in passing that these nine men are the same who have decreed that a public school board may not

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[52] Thomas D. Hewitt letter to Governor Tom Stanley, 29 July 1956, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 108. Hewitt lived in Alexandria, one of Washington, DC,'s Virginia suburbs. Boothe entered the Virginia legislature at the start of 1948, and realised almost immediately that Virginia's continued segregation statutes would eventually be struck down by the courts. See J. Douglas Smith, "When Reason Collides With Prejudice," in Lassiter and Lewis [eds], The Moderates' Dilemma, pp. 22-50.

dismiss a teacher who refuses to say whether he is a communist; that a state may not convict a person actively engaged in a plot to overthrow its government..."[53] The inference was clear: the nine Supreme Court justices could not be trusted, such was their pandering to communist causes. A little over a year later, Harrison omitted the last vestiges of subtlety displayed in his earlier address. In October 1958, he identified the drive for school integration as "part of a world-wide movement to create tension and strife between races," races which had, he claimed, previously lived together peacefully. It was the decision of the Supreme Court which had "been seized upon as a vehicle for use by those who are masterminding the move." More than most segregationists, however, Harrison had a vested interest in presenting the Court as tyrannical. Along with Stanley and fellow congressman and organisation stalwart Howard W. Smith, Harrison had been responsible for formulating Virginia's hard line resistance legislation in the Summer of 1956. By the time of his outbursts against the Court, therefore, that legislation had led to school closures.[54]

The state's senior senator, who shared Harrison's interest in undermining the court, agreed with him. "In my judgement," proclaimed Byrd, "the Warren Court is irresponsible to public interest, and subversive to our form of government. If you think I base this conclusion solely on the school integration decision," he continued, attempting to head off such criticism, "you are wrong. That is only one irresponsible decision of many which...form a pattern which can be described only as subversive to

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[53] "Address of Representative Burr P. Harrison of Virginia at banquet of Virginia Association of Chiefs of Police, Richmond, Virginia, Thursday, September 19, 1957," Byrd Papers, Box 356.
[54] "Address Delivered by A.S. Harrison, Jr, before Henrico County Democratic Annual Celebration, John Marshall Hotel, Richmond, Virginia, October 3, 1958, 8:00 p.m." Byrd Papers, Box 244. Perhaps also taking a lead from the weighty correspondence received by governors Stanley and Almond on the issue, Harrison stated categorically that the "majority of Virginians are opposed to voluntary submission to court rulings which they regard as unconstitutional and tyrannical."

our form of government and all that it stands for."[55] The Court had passed a list of deplorable decisions, "usually protecting communism or exalting special social and political minorities," stated Byrd. Whilst noting the implications of each of these "communist exalting" decisions, Byrd fell back on some of the other standard themes of Massive Resistance: the Court had, for example, attempted to "destroy the sovereignty of States guaranteed by the Constitution," and had disregarded "the clearly stated intent of laws enacted by Congress." Above all, however, "the United States Supreme Court has decided 15 cases which directly affect the right of the United States of America to protect itself from Communist subversion."[56]

White segregationists outside Virginia's political decision making processes were also drawn towards the belief that, with *Brown*, the Supreme Court had aided the communist cause. Myrtis J. Baber, for example, complained to Stanley that "the Supreme Court decision[,] instead of taking 'a formidable weapon out of the Communists [sic] hands as so many poor dumb, benighted white souls profess to believe has done just the opposite. They played right into the Communists' hands for that is exactly what they planned, so that internal friction and turmoil could keep our minds off what they are doing."[57] It was a double-edged sword: pre-*Brown*, southerners were castigated by the Soviets for being openly racist; post-*Brown*, the Soviets benefited from the United States' internal turmoil, amidst which, it was commonly believed, the CPUSA could make greater headway.

There were subtle variations on this theme. Delegate Lucas D. Philips, for example, told Stanley that "if carried to its logical conclusion, [*Brown*] embraces the

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55 "1944-1959 Virginia, Schools, Integration," Byrd Papers, Box 5.
56 ibid.
57 Myrtis J. Baber letter to Governor Tom Stanley, 7 June 1954, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 100.

Communist Doctrine by placing all children on a basis of being treated exactly alike without regard to ability."[58] Philips' stance does not, therefore, suggest sweeping anti-communism or red baiting, but rather the reasoned -- albeit imprecise -- belief that the decision represented the communist ideology. Furthermore, reinforcing his white supremacist standpoint, Philips castigated the Supreme Court for not taking into account what he saw as the innate inferiority of African American children. Philips also implied that it was not Virginia's blacks who were the communists: they, like the Old Dominion's white citizens, were merely pawns in a wider game orchestrated by a left-wing court in Washington.

Virginians also sought to discredit and disable the NAACP by linking it to communism. The legal training of many of the Old Dominion's political elites enlivened them to the dangers posed by a legal approach to dismantling segregation. Furthermore, as has been noted, the Byrd machine's continued political success rested in no small way upon the preservation of a compact, predominately segregationist white electorate. Organisations which strove to expand the African American franchise therefore posed a considerable threat to Virginia's elites. As a result, both the NAACP and other organisations with similarly legalistic approaches to fighting segregation had been red-baited before the *Brown* decision had been promulgated.

The extent of that pre-*Brown* red-baiting is exemplified by the celebrated case of the Martinsville Seven. Seven African Americans were accused of rape by a 32 year-old white woman in Martinsville, on Virginia's southern border, in January 1949. Two organisations vied to represent the Seven: the NAACP and the Civil

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[58] Hon. Lucas D. Philips letter to Governor Tom Stanley, 26 June 1954, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 100.

Rights Congress [CRC], which had been established to offer an alternative to the NAACP in 1946.[59] Neither organisation was able to avoid being red-baited during the case. Indeed, Martin A. Martin, of Hill, Martin, and Robinson, who finally took the case for the NAACP, told a clemency hearing for the Seven on 7 July 1949, that, although "some quasi-liberal and quasi-Communist groups have tried to get into this, to make it another Scottsboro case, we have made every effort to keep them out. We feel that justice will be granted in Virginia."[60]

It is testament to the strength of Virginia's anti-communist fervour that, as early as 1951, Governor Battle was swayed away from clemency for at least some of the Seven because of the connotations of acceding to the demands of the radical protest organised by both the CRC and the NAACP. A CRC delegation visiting the Governor to petition for clemency, for example, prompted the Danville Register to question "just how many of the scum who have changed their loyalty from Uncle Sam to Uncle Joe the CRC can bring into Virginia's capital..."[61] What is, perhaps, most remarkable, and indicative of the global stakes now involved in southern race relations, is the coverage that the trial and execution of the Seven received from abroad. Just as southern segregationists were alive to the possibilities of undermining the CRC by red-baiting, so the CRC were alive to the opportunities that this global coverage afforded it. On 26 August 1950, for example, a CRC press release stated that

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[59] The CRC replaced the communist-tainted International Labor Defense.
[60] Martin quoted in Eric W. Rise, "Race, Rape, and Radicalism: The Case of the Martinsville Seven, 1949-1951," Journal of Southern History, Vol. LVIII, No. 3 (August 1992), p. 480. For a fuller account of the case and its wider implications, see Eric W. Rise, The Martinsville Seven: Race, Rape, and Capital Punishment (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1995).
[61] Quoted in Rise, "Race, Rape, and Radicalism," p. 484. Importantly, Rise also noted that, "Although Battle denied at the time that CRC involvement had affected his decision to deny clemency, he admitted years later that at least two of the men probably deserved commutations to life imprisonment." p. 486.

"1,044 Polish Groups Have Sent Protests on Martinsville Seven Frameup," whilst a similar release of 15 January 1951 claimed that "West German, French Youth, East Africans, Protest Martinsville Seven Death Sentences."[62] Even with the knowledge that the case had become a world-wide examination of southern racial mores, Virginia's judiciary and executive were not prepared to be seen either siding with a black attorney from an allegedly radical organisation, or to allow due process to contradict the testimony of one white woman against seven African American men. It was, as Eric Rise has shown, the first case in which statistical evidence was used to point out the systematic discrimination against blacks in capital punishment cases.[63] Regardless, the last of the Seven was executed on 5 February 1951.

After *Brown*, the vilification of the NAACP intensified. Segregationist lawyer Henry J. Lankford wrote to Stanley that he was "confident that your position is the right one, namely, that integration must be resisted by Virginia on a state-wide basis. If the matter is left to the localities, the NAACP and their fellow travelers will divide and conquer us."[64] Lankford had chosen his words very carefully. Staying away from any potentially libellous claims of direct communist links, he chose the suggestive term "fellow travelers" to insinuate that the NAACP was inextricably bound up in the seedy, ill-defined underworld of communist conspiracy.

Thurgood Marshall, of course, as Legal Defence for the NAACP, was an open target. A week after the signing of the Southern Manifesto in March 1956, James Thomson wrote a letter urging ex-Governor John Battle to seek higher office. "It

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[62] ibid., p. 481.
[63] For a fuller, more detailed exposition of this novel legal strategy, see Rise, The Martinsville Seven, pp. 99-132.
[64] Henry J. Lankford letter to Governor Tom Stanley, 25 August 1956, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 106.

would make me happy to see you vice president of the United States," he wrote to Byrd's former lieutenant, "on a ticket which would not have to be passed on and approved by Thurgood Marshall and his Northern Socialist, Communist fellow travelers in the National Democratic Party."[65] Thomson went on to accuse Communists of trying to take over Virginia's "Governor, our Legislature, our schools and our public affairs," and, again, provides an example of the interwoven concerns within Massive Resistance. "You possibly know the work which these Communists, Socialists, radical and meaner elements have attempted to do among our public schools, our colleges, our labor unions and political organisations. According to Thomson, "the paramount problem," not just in Virginia but across the South and throughout the United States, was ensuring a return to States' Rights. Interestingly, Battle replied that "you and I think alike on many fundamental issues but I am afraid we are very much in the minority in this country."[66]

The actions of NAACP members in Virginia give an indication of the widespread extent of this red-baiting. At the local level, branches mirrored the Association's national purges of suspected radicals and distanced themselves from leftist polemic.[67] As part of a wider voter registration drive in 1952, for example, E.B. Henderson, the vice-president of the Virginia State Conference of NAACP branches, wrote to all the chapters under his control. "Uniting around a theme of resisting

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[65] James M. Thomson letter to John Battle, 19 March 1956, John Stuart Battle Gubernatorial Papers, Box 6, Archives and Map Research Room, Library of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia.
[66] ibid.
[67] As early as June 1950, for example, at the 41st Annual Convention of the NAACP, a resolution was passed instructing the Association's Board of Directors to "take the necessary action to eradicate [communist] infiltration, and if necessary to suspend and reorganize, or lift the charter and expel any unit, which...comes under Communist or other political control or action." Quoted in Mary L. Dudziak, "Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative," Stanford Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 1. (November 1988), p. 76.

godless communism and improving democracy," he suggested that "organized groups should make suffrage a leading item on their agenda."[68]

Henderson had made a common contemporary link between "godlessness" and communism. For many Virginia whites opposition to integration was every bit as holy a crusade as the battle of western democracies against communism. It was a conflict often portrayed as one of religion against atheism. With no official state religion, Soviets and other communists were assumed to be godless. It was commonly thought that Americans, on the other hand, necessarily had God on their side because they were involved in an absolute contest with an atheist foe.[69] A 16-year-old white Virginian, Tuck Waller, added another link to the chain connecting "godliness" and anti-communism, namely segregation. He wrote to former governor Stanley to tell him that his "stand concerning integration is to be commended...God will lead us in our fight against Communism, you are our leader and He is yours. We can't go wrong! We are praying for you."[70]

Virginians also accused Gunnar Myrdal of communist links: not only was Myrdal a sociologist, he was also a foreigner and a socialist, facts which provided grist to the southern red-baiter's mill. In a letter to the Richmond News Leader copied to Governor Stanley, for example, Norfolk citizen Randolph McPherson expressed outrage that even a colleague of Myrdal's, and a co-author of An American Dilemma,

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[68] E.B. Henderson "To Negro Groups", 14 November 1952, Boyle Papers, Box 3.
[69] As part of their drive for a pure America, for example, the Daughters of the American Revolution [DAR] passed a resolution praising the President of the Richmond Academy of General Practice for organising youth clubs in Virginia. In particular, they praised his "high Christian standards," which, by implication, prepared Virginia's boys and girls to meet "the menace of *atheistic* Communism." "Resolutions," Virginia Commission on Constitutional Government Papers, Box 1, Archives and Maps Research Rooms, Library of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia.
[70] Tuck Waller letter to Governor Tom Stanley, 19 February 1959, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 106.

had been invited to speak at the installation of the new Chancellor at St Mary Washington College, Virginia. The invitation to this "gentleman of decidedly 'Pink' Communist leanings," as McPherson referred to him, was made by Colgate Darden and the Board of Visitors of the University of Virginia. "This gentleman who was invited to address the young ladies at Mary Washington College, is known all over the world as an [sic] mongrelizer of the races, and his 'scientific' books are widely quoted by integrationists."[71]

J.R. Orgain, a sometime member of the Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Liberties and serial writer of letters, thought the Swede's intellectual outlook to be of central importance to the Supreme Court's infringement of what he took to be inalienable southern rights. "When a political group of un-Americans took over the Supreme Court bench and substituted sociology and philosophy for the law of Constitutional government," he wrote to Stanley, "the negro has become [sic] 'top dog.'" According to Orgain, Virginia was fortunate only because the Old Dominion had the "State government" standing between the people of the state and the federal incursions of the Supreme Court. States Rights could yet save the South from this unwanted foray by the Supreme Court, under Myrdal's influence, into southern racial affairs.[72]

The red-baiting of Myrdal was in no way confined to the pro-Massive Resistance masses in Virginia, but extended to political leaders, too. Almond also indulged. Tellingly, he did so three months before he set Virginia back onto a more moderate resistance path. Still maintaining a hard line stance against *Brown*, he had an

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[71] Randolph McPherson letter to Governor Tom Stanley, 5 August 1957, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 107.

[72] "Brunswick County Race Relations Past and Present" by J.R. Orgain, [n.d.], J.R. Orgain Papers, Folder 687, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia.

interest in undermining those who were perceived to be behind the desegregation decision. Claiming in October 1958 that he would "never" become party to the destruction of the races by mixing them in schools only nine months before he did just that, Almond proclaimed that "the children of Virginia will be educated. I shall do everything within my power to prevent them from being victimized by this experimentation of sociological hallucination, Communist inspired."[73]

Within this ideological milieu, Virginia's politicians, civic leaders and segregationists all began to attach their anti-communist concerns to the burgeoning African American civil rights movement. The Byrd machine's stultifying grip on Virginia politics, and the dominance of Southside leaders in positions of power, limited the scope of an indigenous movement in Virginia. Nevertheless, as claims of communist plots and rumours of internal subversion became more common, the charge of communist involvement increasingly became a weapon with which to tar anyone suspected of undermining any aspect of segregation, not just in schools or via civil rights legislation. In such a charged atmosphere, moves by blacks to buy property in non-black areas made them part of this insurgency. As one Norfolk attorney stated in September 1954, "there is a vile gang of communists here engaged in the practice of contributing money for the purposes of purchasing a piece of valuable white property." By so doing, the attorney argued that they would lower the price of real estate in the area, which would cause "depreciation of property values, causing depreciation of moral values, causing depreciation of liberty of white people."

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[73] "Address of Governor J. Lindsay Almond, Jr, Virginia Education Association, Richmond, Va., October 30 1958," Almond Gubernatorial Papers, Box 13.

These "negroes", he went on, were clearly "communists despoiling property as well as white men's rights."[74]

As integrationist, civil rights activity blossomed in the decade following *Brown*, so anti-communism and red-baiting were modified to confront each new form of black protest as it developed. Beginning on 1 February 1960, four African Americans breathed new life into the traditional "sit-in" method of protesting against segregated facilities, when they occupied the Woolworth lunch counter in Greensboro, North Carolina.[75] Sit-in protesters became a favoured target of red-baiters. As has been noted, communism was inextricably linked to the destruction of cherished property rights in the American psyche. Sit-ins, labelled as "trespasses" against private property by their detractors, could thus readily be linked to a communist plot. An editorial in the Richmond News Leader shows how this connection was made. "These actions of trespass," it seethed, "in brazen violation of private property rights, obviously have served to inflame race relations all over again. The Communists live on friction and thrive on divisiveness," it continued. "This sort of thing is their meat."[76] The CPUSA's response to the sit-ins did little to deter such accusations. As the editorial went on to say, "Last week's Communist Worker devoted two full pages to a report from Richmond, in which correspondents exulted in heightened tensions and gleefully exhorted the Negroes to further provocations."[77]

As ever, Harry Byrd was at the vanguard of the Virginia segregationists who attempted to undermine civil rights activity as the work of subversive agitators.

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[74] Garrett Baxter letter to Governor Tom Stanley, 9 September 1954, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 102.
[75] The four were Franklin McCain, Ezell Blair, Jr, Dave Richmond and Joseph McNeil.
[76] Richmond News Leader, 9 March 1960, Editorial, clipping in Kathryn H. Stone Papers, Box 2, Manuscripts Division, Special Collections Department, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville.
[77] ibid.

Furthermore, he was equally aware of the military danger that the Cold War represented. In 1957, he merged these two concerns together. At a time when the national guard had been called out to restore order during the Little Rock school crisis, Byrd was appalled to learn that US troops were being trained specifically in the art of riot suppression. To Byrd, it was diabolical that there was no better employ for US troops at a time of threatened global war than to train them to put down internal disturbances, specifically those caused by the question of desegregation. "When the international crisis is what it is," he thundered, "and Russia has shown a superiority in missile development, to train troops to stop rioting appears so ridiculous that I can hardly believe what I see and hear. We can be certain," he continued, "that troops so trained can accomplish little against the brutality of those who may threaten us."[78]

Discussing the racial crisis accompanying the Freedom Rides in Alabama nearly four years later in May 1961, Byrd hinted that the situation "was deliberately provoked by a mixed group of outsiders who went to Alabama to influence the people for propaganda purposes." Although not explicitly labelling these "outside agitators" as communist, implicitly Byrd made it very clear; "provocation" and "propaganda" were terms that went hand in hand with the language of communist insurgency.[79] His stance was echoed in the letters that he received from his constituents. He was, according to Ruth Galloway, a "conservative" and a "real democratic statesman" at a time when others were abrogating their responsibility to the South. "Politics are not

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[78] Learning from an article in the Times-Dispatch that Byrd was pursuing an investigation into the matter, a woman wrote to Byrd that her "husband is now in the Army. I received a letter from him dated September 22, in which he said: 'This afternoon I was on a raiding party (aggressor). We had to harass them and see if they could repel us. Our only weapons were rocks, yes rocks...'" "Byrd-Speeches-Drafts-Civil Rights, etc., for reference 1956-1960," Byrd Papers, Box 1.

[79] "Statement -- May 23, 1961 on the situation in Alabama," Byrd Papers, Box 413.

the crisis at hand," she continued. "Communism is the great issue. You know and I know it is infiltrating our great country in a most diabolical way."[80]

For many white Virginians, Martin Luther King, Jr, was, if not a willing agent, then at least a vehicle for that infiltration. His visit to Richmond in late 1963 provoked a hostile reaction from some segregationists. On her weekly Saturday radio broadcast on Station WINC WRFL-FM, for example, Mrs Betsy Osth stated that "big bold black headlines in the Communist paper, The Worker, appeared in their October 1st issue reporting on Martin Luther King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference recently held at the John Marshall Hotel in Richmond. That The Worker lent valuable space to this shindig shows how important it was to the Communists." Before the end of her broadcast, other civil rights activists -- black and white -- had also been tainted by allegations of communist involvement, notably Jim Dombrowski, Andrew Young, Carl Braden, and the Highlander Folk School.[81]

But, as elsewhere in the South, any attempt to stamp a single blueprint on segregationists' deployment of anti-communism in Virginia must be tempered by the knowledge that, in both real and in oratorical terms, it was a weapon with many permutations and nuances, and its application often eluded tight definition. At times, for example, the decision *not* to use anti-communism was as revealing as the decision *to* use it. Byrd himself did not always take the easy opportunity of discrediting *Brown* as communist inspired until after the 1956 referendum on Gray's resistance proposals, when he was certain that a majority of Virginians supported circumventing the

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[80] Ruth M. Galloway letter to Byrd, "Monday 18th," Byrd Papers, Box 268. No year was listed for the letter, which was filed in the folder "1961-1965 Misc Political Corresp 'G.'"

[81] "12 October, 1963 MINUTE WOMEN USA, Va. Branch WINC WRFL-FM RADIO" enclosed with Mrs R.E. "Betsy" Osth letter to William Munford Tuck, 6 October 1963, Tuck Papers, Folder 4247, Manuscript and Rare Books Department, Earl Gregg Swem Library, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg.

decision. Indeed, on the eve of the referendum, Byrd was exceedingly cautious in his use of language. There was no hint of reds anywhere, not even a subversive: "The conditions confronting us are such that we will succeed better," claimed Byrd, "by going forward on a flexible basis or on a basis of stand-by legislation than by attempting at this time to enact complete and final legislation to begin with the school term of next September." In the light of this, as Mays' diaries strongly suggested, it would appear that Byrd was so unsure about the course of events unfolding before him, and of the options available to him, that he was almost timid in the early defence of his position.[82]

As one of Byrd's leading lieutenants, Kilpatrick shared the Senator's early restraint, at least publicly, and avoided any reliance on red-baiting. As Joseph J. Thorndike has clearly shown, Kilpatrick did not embrace radical resistance methods openly until Virginia's official opposition to *Brown* had been firmly established.[83] Even then, he was not offering any glib answers. "Lord knows I have no pat solution to propose. I don't think there is one," he wrote.[84] Famous throughout the nation for calls for interposition, Kilpatrick was not a red-baiter. In a whole range of speeches given by the Richmond News-Leader editor between December 1957 and November 1964 on the issues pertinent to Massive Resistance, from civil rights and States' Rights to integration, there are simply no examples of red-baiting.[85]

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[82] See "Statement -- December 18, 1955, on the Referendum"; "Statement -- Feb 26, 1956 on Interposition," both Byrd Papers, Box 409.
[83] See Joseph J. Thorndike, "'The Sometimes Sordid Level of Race and Segregation': James J. Kilpatrick and the Virginia Campaign against *Brown*," in Lassiter and Lewis [eds] The Moderates' Dilemma, pp. 51-71.
[84] Kilpatrick quoted in ibid., p. 55.
[85] Those speeches without any hint of red-baiting include: "Speeches 1957: Sharon, Connecticut, Race Issue"; "Speeches 1958: Rotary Club, Richmond, On School Integration"; both Kilpatrick Papers, Box 1; "Speeches 1959: City Club, Cleveland, On School Integration"; "Speeches 1960: Camden High School, Camden, S.C. On the Constitution," both Kilpatrick Papers, Box 2; "Speeches 1962: Hampden-Sydney College on School Integration"; "Speeches 1963: Hampden-Sydney College on

Although Kilpatrick himself did not red-bait, he did, however, seem to acknowledge the necessity of anti-communist purges. Referring to a book on Senator Joseph McCarthy in an editorial, he noted that, "Gradually, ever so slowly, the McCarthy years are coming into perspective so that rational men may distinguish who was persecuting whom. The evidence is mounting that a courageous American was driven to an early grave as a sacrifice to 'liberal' self-esteem; that a myth was made by the small-souled men who could not accept even the possibility that they may be wrong."[86] McCarthyism, however, was never directly linked to the southern race problem and, therefore, it must be assumed that Kilpatrick did not feel that red-baiting was an appropriate weapon for specifically southern resistance. He had, after all, so many other strategies to chose from, having consistently championed interposition and States' Rights.

IV

If committed segregationists like Kilpatrick, Mays and even, on occasions, Byrd, could avoid red-baiting the Movement and its allies, there were those in Virginia's resistance lobby who could scarcely speak without fastening onto the communist threat. One such figure was William Munford Tuck, one of the most important and influential members of Byrd's political organisation, and one of the Old Dominion's foremost exponents of red-baiting. A former Governor of Virginia, he settled into a role of Southside congressman during the Massive Resistance years, and

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Civil Rights," both Kilpatrick Papers, Box 3, Manuscripts Division, Special Collections Department, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville.
[86] Earle Dunford, Richmond Times-Dispatch, p.321.

held views on civil rights that were typical of the area.[87] On the 1957 Civil Rights Bill, for example, he informed the press that "the reported compromise on the Civil Rights bill is more than a compromise on principle -- it is a complete surrender to iniquity."[88] In fact, Tuck was so zealous in his advocacy of Massive Resistance that he occasionally managed to offend fellow segregationists in his own State. Remarks that he made in the winter of 1958, suggesting that even if the people of Norfolk and Arlington did not want Massive Resistance they would be forced to accept it regardless, caused some controversy. Harrison Mann, for example, told Tuck that "the vast majority of our people don't want to integrate any more than you do. When you speak of forcing Arlington and Norfolk you sound as arrogant and as arbitrary as the Supreme Court. I suggest you run your district and quit minding the business of the people in the 10th district."[89]

Tuck's vehement anti-communism had crystallised during his 1945-1949 term as Governor. Notably, as a direct rebuttal of Truman's Fair Employment Practices Commission [FEPC] and the President's support for the Committee on Civil Rights, Tuck proposed a change to Virginia's ballot system for presidential elections which became known as the "Anti-Truman Bill."[90] More moderate Virginians, such as Ted Dalton and Howard Carwile, were fervent in their opposition to Tuck's proposals.

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[87] Tuck's biographer, William Crawley, has written that, "from the beginning of the Byrd hegemony until the end, it is likely that no political figure in the Commonwealth better personified the essence of organization politics than did William Munford Tuck." William Bryan Crawley, Bill Tuck: A Political Life in Byrd's Virginia (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1978), p.16.

[88] "85th Congress, 1st Session 1957 -- Civil Rights Part II", Tuck Papers, Folder 3974.

[89] Harrison Mann telegram to Tuck, 14 November 1958, Tuck Papers, Folder 4029.

[90] The proposed "Anti-Truman Bill" was not universally popular, intending as it did to keep the names of presidential candidates off the ballot entirely, as well as limiting the parties on the ballot paper to those listed at the last election. Effectively, it headed off any third party challenge for the Presidency. As Heinemann has shown, Tuck objected to the President's Committee on Civil Rights' report, To Secure These Rights, because it "called for passage of a federal antilynching law, abolition of the poll tax, creation of a permanent fair employment practices commission, and stronger enforcement of civil rights." Heinemann, Harry Byrd of Virginia, p. 255.

Tuck's erstwhile riposte was that "the papers, the Communists, Jews, Negroes, and so-called liberal Democrats, as well as the Republicans, are giving us a hard fight, but I hope that we will succeed in passing it through the General Assembly...We are in this fight to the end."[91]

Elected to the US Congress in the wake of *Brown*, Tuck made his views on integration clear. "On this subject, I am not a 'gradualist,' I am a 'neverist.'"[92] He certainly believed the Supreme Court and most civil rights groups were part of a communist conspiracy, which, to his satisfaction at least, explained *Brown*. In 1956, for example, he told Governor Stanley that "only by a firm and determined resistance on the part of the people of the State and their officials we can succeed in thwarting the efforts of the left wing groups and the Supreme Court to foist upon us an unholy and intolerable situation..."[93] In January 1959, he urged Almond to use the gubernatorial power handed to him by the 1956 Massive Resistance laws to close schools faced with desegregation. Tuck, with typical racial paternalism, claimed that "We have not had any trouble between the races in Virginia since the War Between the States. A breaking out of trouble of this sort would be tragic and would mar the good name of Virginia and of her present leadership. The left-wingers and communists would wish nothing more than to create such a situation and thus bring disfavor upon us and demean the high standing of our great commonwealth."[94] By 1965, Tuck had become even more belligerent, sensing the impending failure of his

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[91] Tuck quoted in Crawley, Bill Tuck, p. 149.
[92] ibid., p. 219.
[93] William Tuck telegram to Governor Tom Stanley, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 157.
[94] William Tuck letter to J. Lindsay Almond, Jr, 14 January 1959, Almond Gubernatorial Papers, Box 185. Those gubernatorial powers Tuck referred to included, "the Governor's power to suppress public mischief...power to prevent bloodshed," and finally, "power to enhance the peace and tranquillity of any community in the State."

cause, and desperate to rally support for one last stand. He told Albert Tatum in no uncertain manner that "any and all of these menacing so-called Civil Rights groups which are lawless and un-American" should be investigated by HUAC. The reasons were clear. Those groups harboured members and leaders whose names, according to Tuck, "are thoroughly familiar as persons who have engaged in communistic activities." Furthermore, it was those groups who were responsible for the recent "national turmoil and strife, and for much of the bloodshed which has gone on in America in the last months and years."[95]

Tuck's involvement in a rare incident of indigenous civil rights activity in Virginia, occurring in Danville, in Pittsylvania County on Virginia's southern border, acts almost as a case study of red-baiting resistance. Coming as he did from Halifax, the county to the east of Pittsylvania, Tuck immersed himself in the city's racial controversies. At the same time that George Wallace was grabbing the national headlines with another "set piece" of Massive Resistance at the University of Alabama in June 1963, widespread civil rights protests against segregation were underway in Danville. Police wielding night-sticks and deploying high-pressure fire hoses caused 48 of 65 black protesters to seek hospital attention in one night. Martin Luther King, Jr, sent a telegram to the Kennedys, imploring them to intervene in order to stop the "beastly conduct of law enforcement officers."[96] The Southern Christian Leadership Conference [SCLC], in the words of its leaders, began to try to "work up" a large movement in the city.[97]

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[95] William Tuck letter to Albert Tatum, 28 September 1965, Tuck Papers, Folder 4343.
[96] Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: Martin Luther King and the Civil Rights Movement 1954-63 (London: Macmillan, 1988), p. 822.
[97] Andrew Young quoted in ibid., p. 916.

Having previously attacked such organisations as the SCLC, and such individuals as King, from afar, the escalating Danville protests gave Virginian red-baiters a chance to get to grips with their foes at close quarters. The protesters were immediately labelled outside agitators, both by political leaders and Danville citizens. Most of the vitriol, however, revolved around Tuck, who had secured a reputation as one of the state's leading defenders of white supremacy. On 5 July 1963, W.O. Collins, a white Danville resident, wrote to Tuck that "we really are in need of legislation to curb the invasion of our communities by paid professional race agitators that travel city to city bent on creating ill will between our citizens, wrecking our economy and placing our lives in jeopardy."[98] This was a theme taken up by J.C. Owen, "a white voting citizen of the State of Virginia," who wrote to Tuck on 26 June. "We have had very little trouble with our Negro Population of about 12,000 until recently," he stated, "at which time a group of agitators from other states converged upon our city and managed to arouse approximately 250 to 300 of our negro population..." Tuck, in his reply to Owen, agreed that "our troubles have been stirred up largely by the outsiders." To remedy both Owen and Collins' complaints, Tuck stated that "today I have introduced a bill that will stop them. The law I have proposed would prevent such trouble as they have inflicted on Danville and in other communities."[99]

By the time of Danville's racial disturbances, Tuck had taken up a position on HUAC, an appointment that did not go unnoticed by his constituents.[100] A committee calling itself the "Capitol Hill Committee on the Danville Story" was set up by

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[98] W.O. Collins letter to William Munford Tuck, 5 July 1963, Tuck Papers, Folder 4205.
[99] J.C. Owen letter to William Munford Tuck, 26 June 1963; Tuck letter to Owen, 27 June 1963, Tuck Papers, Folder 4204.
[100] Tuck's two committee assignments as a US Senator were Un-American Activities and Judiciary.

protesters in Danville, and became an immediate target of concern for those suspecting subversive activities. The city manager, T. Edward Temple, wrote to Tuck to air his fears over the planned speech to the Capitol Hill Committee by Mrs Jacob Karro. "You will note," wrote Temple, "that Mrs Jacob Karro is the same character who has been constantly in demand as a speaker before almost every liberal group from Maine to Georgia. You will note on the back of the [enclosed] sheet the names of the so-called Capitol Hill Committee on the Danville Story. If you would kindly have these individuals checked I shall appreciate it. I strongly suspect that the majority of them will be found as members of front organizations of the Communist Party."[101]

In an exchange of letters with J.R. Orgain, Tuck revealed the complicated network which linked the national red-baiters and anti-communists of HUAC to like-minded individuals and groups at the state level. On 14 June 1963, Orgain wrote to Tuck asking whether HUAC's records "indicate any Communist activity or associations" by a Mr and Mrs Stern, Robert Zellner and Samuel Pearson, Jr. Only four days later, Tuck wrote to HUAC's Francis J. McNamara. He enclosed a copy of Orgain's letter, informing him that "you will note in his [Orgain's] letter that he inquires about the Communist activity of certain individuals and organizations. I will be grateful if you will supply me with any information which you may have concerning them." Two days later, on 20 June, McNamara replied to Tuck that "a check of the public records, files and publications of this committee has disclosed no record on John Robert Zellner or Samuel J. Pearson, Jr." Tuck relayed this information to Orgain on 21 June: just one week after he had made his original

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[101] T. Edward Temple letter to William Munford Tuck, 29 January 1964, Tuck Papers, Folder 4299.

enquiry to Congressman Tuck on subversive activities, Orgain knew the contents of selected HUAC files.[102]

Clearly, when seeking to link civil rights activity to communism, some of Virginia's segregationists felt that they could rely on Tuck to furnish them with privileged HUAC information. One of Tuck's closest personal friends, John W. Carter, of Carter & Carter Law Offices in Danville, corresponded with him at the time of the disturbances. "As you may have heard," wrote Carter, "CORE has opened headquarters here in Danville, and we are sure to have more trouble as soon as they get cranked up." As an example of the usefulness of communist-tainting materials in such circumstances, Carter continued that "Armstead Sapp was very successful in Greensboro when he was able to expose a white woman affiliated with CORE as a known communist. I am wondering whether the [sic] HUAC or the Senate Committee may have anything on CORE."[103]

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[102] J.R. Orgain letter to William Munford Tuck, 14 June 1963; Tuck letter to Orgain, 18 June 1963, copied to McNamara; Tuck letter to McNamara, 18 June 1963; McNamara letter to Tuck, 20 June 1963; Tuck letter to Orgain, 21 June 1963; Tuck Papers, Folder 4246. Although there is no supporting evidence for this, Orgain claimed in a letter to Hamilton Crockford of the Richmond Times-Dispatch that Danville was the "first major city targeted" because the "Communist Front" Southern Conference Education Fund [SCEF] thought it would bring all the more embarrassment to Tuck to have communist-led civil rights demonstrations in his constituency, especially, "with him on the HUAC." Orgain letter to Hamilton Crockford, 9 September 1963, Tuck Papers, Folder 5107.

[103] John W. Carter letter to William Munford Tuck, 17 April 1963, Tuck Papers, Folder 4300. Armistead Sapp was the lawyer employed by Greensboro's S&W and Mayfair cafeterias for the case against the sit-in demonstrators. He successfully managed to undermine two protesters, Alice and Victor Jerome, with accusations of communism. See William H. Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North Carolina, and the Black Struggle For Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 112-3. Tuck's role as go-between for local red-baiters and their national HUAC equivalents was not confined to the Danville disturbances. A citizen from Roanoke, for example, sought to use Tuck's position on HUAC to investigate the NAACP. Having received extra appropriations to undertake, paradoxically, an investigation of the un-American activities of such right wing groups as the Ku Klux Klan and the Minutemen, Horace Walker wrote to Tuck that he was "of the opinion that such organizations as the NAACP and others in the civil rights movement should also be investigated to determine if they are in any way connected to Communistic backing or support." Horace E. Walker letter to William Munford Tuck, 29 April 1965, Tuck Papers, Folder 4343.

Ultimately, Tuck's use of red-baiting against the civil rights movement was more of a pragmatic response than an expression of genuine anti-communism. Although it was clearly his favoured weapon, red-baiting was not, however, the only part of the Massive Resistance armoury that Tuck utilised. He did, for example, back legislative shows of southern strength, and was a signatory of the Southern Manifesto. Moreover, in July 1956 Tuck initiated a second manifesto along with William M. Colmer of Mississippi and Edwin E. Willis of Louisiana. Entitled the "Warning of Grave Dangers," Tuck, Colmer and Willis railed against the civil rights measures under debate in Congress. Their manifesto was signed by 83 members of Congress, just 18 less than had signed the Southern Manifesto.[104]

V

No single group posed more of a potential threat to a solid, white wall of resistance to desegregation in Virginia than the state's racial progressives. Comprised of local, predominately white Virginians, such interracial groups as the Virginia Council on Human Relations [VCHR] and its affiliates in Charlottesville and Richmond spoke, in the words of Benjamin Muse, for the "silent" and "submerged" majority of Virginians.[105] Segregationists sought to undermine the Council and its affiliates with the minimum of delay. Spawned from the by then firmly integrationist Southern Regional Council [SRC], the VCHR fought for full compliance with the spirit of *Brown*. To the majority of white segregationists, the only whites who

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[104] Numan Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South During the 1950's (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969), p. 148. Bartley noted that the "Warning" "found 'grave' dangers to liberty inherent in national legislative protection for civil rights."

[105] For more on Benjamin Muse's views, see Matthew D. Lassiter, "A 'Fighting Moderate': Benjamin Muse's Search for the Submerged South," in Lassiter and Lewis [eds], The Moderates' Dilemma.

habitually stood against continued segregation were by definition either communist, northern, or both.

Established in February 1955, the VCHR fully expected to be red-baited, possibly due to the bitter experiences of its parent organisation, the SRC. Virginia's segregationists did not disappoint. The first draft of an anonymous document entitled "Introducing the Virginia Council on Human Relations," for example, stated that the organisation believed "that free speech, free discussion, and freedom of association must at all costs be preserved, unhampered by any personal action or public policy that tends to intimidate individuals or deprive lawful organizations of their civil and Constitutional liberties."[106]

In July 1956, while Stanley was formulating his hard line resistance legislation, he had been warned by H.P. Moore to be "most watchful of the Virginia Council on Human Relations for they can infiltrate into many phases of the public, warping their minds on this subject."[107] Again, the language is revealing: "infiltration" certainly had overtones of popular perceptions of communist subversion. Battle himself went on to say of the Charlottesville Council on Human Relations that "they do not in any sense of the word represent the feeling of the vast majority of citizens of this section who resent their activities as being those of a small group of extreme left-wingers, many of whom have recently moved to the community."[108] Two months later, Mrs Morris Brown, vice-president of the Charlottesville-Albemarle branch of the VCHR, felt sufficiently worried about such accusations of communist

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106 "Introducing the Virginia Council on Human Relations" Virginia Council on Human Relations [VCHR] Papers, Box 1, Manuscripts Division, Special Collections Department, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville.
107 H.P. Moore letter to Tom Stanley, 29 July 1956, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 108.
108 Battle quoted in Ely, Crisis of Conservative Virginia, p. 34.

leanings to write to the SRC's executive director, George S. Mitchell, asking, "Where can we get concrete information with regard to the Ford Foundation, the Southern Regional Council, etc. which would help us to lay at rest the charge of 'communist'?"[109]

Anderson M. Renick, commander of Roanoke's American Legion, waded in to the schools debate with red-baiting rhetoric. With the full extent of white support for desegregation still unknown, Renick released a statement reported by the Times-Dispatch. In it, he named "six persons exercising guiding influence in this Southern Regional Council who," continued the Times-Dispatch, Renick claimed were affiliated with "subversive organisations." In the same article, somewhat surprisingly, the paper gave the VCHR's then executive director, John H. Marion, the right of reply. "Mr Renick may be sincere in what he says," he stated, "but he has certainly been grossly misinformed. Actually, the Southern Regional Council is a strongly anti-Communist organization. The twelve State councils affiliated with it, including the Virginia Council on Human Relations, are also anti-Communist organizations."[110]

Minutes from VCHR meetings show that, in a recurring theme of Massive Resistance era anti-communism, the ignominy of being red-baited did not entirely die out as resistance fever waned in Virginia. In June 1962, five months before Heslip M. "Happy" Lee gave up the VCHR presidency to Aubrey Brown, and three years after Almond had endorsed minimal desegregation, the Board of Directors met in the Monticello Hotel in Charlottesville. The minutes of the meeting recorded that "the Christian Anti-Communist group has been in Roanoke since the Board last met,"

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[109] Mrs Morris Brown letter to George S. Mitchell, 9 September 1956, VCHR Papers, Box 1.
[110] Richmond Times-Dispatch clipping, "Legion Raps Group's Affiliation," 1954-1964 Misc Papers re: VCHR", Boyle Papers, Box 27.

while noting that "the minister, however, was not very successful."[111] On a more worrying level, the meeting heard how Robert Welch, head of the extreme-right -- and extremely anti-communist -- John Birch Society, had contrasted communism with the Birchers on national television, implying "that it was an either or proposition." The Birchers, it was noted with some trepidation, had moved into some of Richmond's high schools.[112] By 1963, the irrepressible correspondent J.R. Orgain, who from his language and style of prose appeared to believe he was still a member of the secret intelligence unit he claimed to have served in during the Second World War, sent copies of his "Confidential Report to the Governor of Virginia on the Virginia Council on Human Relations 12-23-63 (After 3 Months of Preliminary Study)" to Byrd, Abbitt and Tuck. Showing the lack of terminological precision common to so many red-baiters, Orgain blustered that the VCHR had developed into "a vehicle of Liberalism" which used communist front affiliations to obtain its objectives. "The national politicians are using the communists and the communists are using them," he claimed.[113]

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[111] "VCHR Board of Directors Meeting, Monticello Hotel, Charlottesville, Va. 15 June, 1962 'Report from the Executive Director, Heslip M. Lee,'" Aubrey Brown Papers, Box 2, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia.

[112] ibid. Formed in February 1959, and led by Robert Welch, the John Birch Society was based in Indianapolis. An indication of the extremism of the Birchers can be gleaned from their labelling of President Eisenhower himself as a willing participant in the communist conspiracy, of the State Department as riddled with Soviets, and the communist connections of such apparently random international figures as India's Nehru. For a more detailed look at the Birch Society's truly paranoid red-baiting polemic, see The Blue Book of the Birch Society [Ninth Edition] ([n.p.]: Robert Welch, 1961); Robert Welch, The Politician (Massachusetts: Robert Welch, 1963); and Robert Welch, The Neutralizers (Massachusetts: The John Birch Society, 1963). In his foreword to a report on the society issued in 1966, Dore Schary, National Chairman of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, noted that, "In the period since November, 1964, the John Birch Society has emerged as the strongest of all Radical Right Organizations." Schary, "Foreword" in Benjamin R. Epstein and Arnold Forster, Report on the John Birch Society 1966 (New York: Vintage, 1966), p. xi.

[113] J.R. Orgain, "Confidential Report to the Governor of Virginia on the Virginia Council on Human Relations 12-23-63 (After 3 Months of Preliminary Study)," Tuck Papers, Folder 5107.

One of the leading lights of the VCHR, and the woman primarily responsible for setting up its Charlottesville chapter, Sarah Patton Boyle was all too aware of the short- and long-term problems caused by segregationists' red-baiting. Showing obvious concern about the proposed southern visit of a HUAC sub-committee, she wrote to the Greenville, South Carolina attorney, John Bolt Culbertson. "If only we don't get Senator Eastland, I shan't complain," she stated. "He does the most damage in one's community, I'm told, because his accusations that one is a communist are difficult to disprove to public satisfaction." Then she précised one of the main reasons for red-baiting's ongoing popularity in white supremacist circles: "How the heck can you prove you're not a communist? Yet his [Eastland's] failure to establish you are is not enough to clear you in the minds of many."[114]

Boyle was no stranger to the many forms of abuse and slander racial moderates had to endure. In the wake of *Brown*, she had published an infamous article in the Saturday Evening Post that claimed "Southerners Will Like Integration."[115] It caused a storm of protest, for here was a white woman, living in the South, openly supportive of the Supreme Court decision. As a result, she admitted she was "accused of being a traitor to the South, of having Negro blood, of being paid by the NAACP to tell lies, of wanting integration because I had a yen [sic] for black flesh (this usually complete with four letter words and general concepts which made me realize what extraordinarily pure minds I and all the people I'd ever known had) and finally of looking exactly like Mrs Roosevelt." Sharing many of the racially progressive views

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[114] Sarah Patton Boyle letter to John Bolt Culbertson, 20 November 1956, Boyle Papers, Box 1.
[115] Boyle claims that the original title was set to be the less sensationalist and inflammatory "We Are Readier Than We Think," but this was changed against her wishes by Post editors who said that it "lacked reader appeal." See Sarah Patton Boyle, The Desegregated Heart: a Virginian's Stand in Time of Transition (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1962), pp. 201-202.

of the ex-First Lady as she did, it was the physical similarities to her to which Boyle humorously claimed to take offence. "The latter of course was the most unkindest out of all, and not one, but several hit upon this form of mental torture."[116]

In her autobiography, Boyle pondered the list of those progressive and humanitarian organisations standing for integration which had been labelled subversive, communist or communist fronts. The implication, she noted, "was that Communists were the chief people in our nation who were seriously concerned with other people's welfare."[117] There was a real danger that the red-baiting of integrationist organisations would forge a positive link in the minds of blacks between those groups who were most willing to help them, and communists -- not what Virginia's red-baiting segregationists had intended.

VI

The 1958 senatorial campaign of Dr Louise Oftedal Wensel offers perhaps the best example, in Virginia, of the ways in which the rhetoric of the Cold War could actually be used by those opposed to both red-baiting and Massive Resistance.[118] A thirty-nine year old practising physician native to Fargo, North Dakota, Wensel had moved to Virginia in 1954. She and her family had been living in Washington, DC, but ironically chose to move south for the education of her children: "I didn't know,"

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[116] Sarah Patton Boyle letter to John H. Marion, 1 October 1955, Boyle Papers, Box 4.
[117] Those moderate organisations included the National Council of Churches, the United Church Women, the YWCA, the YMCA, the Catholic Committee of the South, the Community Chest, the Red Cross, the United Nations, the AFL-CIO, the Anti-Defamation League, the National Urban League, the NAACP, and, finally, the Supreme Court. Boyle, The Desegregated Heart, pp. 233-234.
[118] For a fuller account of this campaign, see George Lewis, "'Any Old Joe Named Zilch'? The Senatorial Campaign of Dr Louise Oftedal Wensel," The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography Vol. 107, No. 3 (Summer 1999).

she recalls, "that I was going from the frying pan into the fire."[119] A reluctant political candidate, she proved to be Senator Byrd's primary source of opposition in a campaign that was steeped in the often vitriolic rhetoric of school desegregation and Massive Resistance.[120]

Although ultimately unsuccessful, Wensel's campaign is worthy of further investigation, not so much for the final outcome as for the manner in which it was conducted. Campaigning against the incumbent Senator two years after Massive Resistance's initial proclamation, Wensel joined a procession of candidates, including Martin A. Hutchinson and Francis Pickens Miller, who had attempted to harness and increase that anti-Byrd protest vote, none of whom had received more than 38% of the total votes cast.[121] Her campaign began simply, with a letter to the Times-Dispatch. It was in response to a breakfast-table discussion in her family home near Fishersville, Virginia, on 13 July, following the delivery of the morning newspaper. Angered by the Republican Party's decision not to proffer a candidate to run against Byrd, and spurred on by her family, Wensel wrote to the paper's editor.[122] On Monday 21 July,

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[119]Dr Louise Oftedal Wensel Fernbach interviewed by George Lewis, 18 April, 1998, Charlottesville, Virginia, University of Newcastle upon Tyne Oral History Collection [UNOHC].

[120] Her campaign, however, has been largely dismissed or ignored by historians, and by biographers of Byrd. Ronald Heinemann's stately 1996 biography of Harry Flood Byrd, Sr, for example, simply states that he was opposed by Dr Wensel who had, "labor support". Heinemann, Harry Byrd of Virginia, p.344. Dr Wensel does not receive mention in J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Harry Byrd and the Changing Face of Virginia Politics, 1945-1966 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1968). In a recent collection of essays on the subject of Virginia's Massive Resistance, Dr. Wensel is referred to in only one of those essays, as one offering a "quixotic challenge" to Byrd. Lassiter, "A 'Fighting Moderate,' p.184.

[121] Byrd's campaigns had traditionally encountered a minority protest vote, both against him personally and his political organisation in general. A Richmond News Leader editorial, written on the day after the 1958 election, makes this point emphatically. "In any election in which Mr Byrd is a candidate...roughly 30 percent of the vote automatically will be cast against him. This is the 'anti-Byrd vote.' It is instinctively anti-Byrd," the editorial continued, "as cats are instinctively anti-dog, and it [is] as easily predictable as the rising of the sun." Editorial, Richmond News Leader, 5 November 1958.

[122] The Wensel Family comprised of Louise, husband Henry T. Wensel, a psychologist at the Woodrow Wilson Rehabilitation Center near Fishersville, seventeen-year-old Bert, fifteen-year-old Linda, nine-year-old David, six-year-old Pamela, and five-year-old Teddy.

her letter was printed. The response was not what Wensel had expected. Indeed, she did not realise that the letter had been printed until she received a telephone call from the President of the AFL-CIO in Virginia, Harold Boyd.

Boyd had called Wensel because he, and the organised labour concerns that he represented, wanted her to run in the senate race against Byrd.[123] An afternoon meeting that same Monday with Boyd and his AFL-CIO vice-president, Julian Carper, saw Wensel begin her initiation into the politics of running for public office. She was handed a copy of V.O. Key's seminal Southern Politics, received a telephone call of support from defeated but respected gubernatorial candidate Theodore "Ted" Dalton, was offered fund-raising promises from Major Reynolds of the Reynolds Aluminum Company and, perhaps most importantly, was swept along by the confident enthusiasm of Boyd himself. Boyd and Carper, Wensel recalls, treated her throughout that day's meeting as if she had already agreed to run.[124]

Although a working mother of five, Wensel decided to take up the challenge, egged on by the energetic enthusiasm of her eldest son, seventeen-year-old Bert. "Mother," he said, "will make a good senator."[125] Boyd instructed Wensel to prepare a press release, and it was decided to delay the announcement that she would join the race until 25 July, the final day for nominations. This was a shrewd move on two counts. First, it suggested that Wensel had waited until the last moment in the hope that someone more qualified to run against the incumbent senator would come forward; she was, therefore, a reluctant candidate. Second, this reluctance added to the

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[123] The editor of the Times-Dispatch also encouraged her to run. Wensel Fernbach interview, UNOHC.
[124] Bound Memoir, Louise Oftedal Wensel Papers, 1 Box only, Manuscript Division, Special Collections Department, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville.
[125] ibid.

impression that it was only because the issues at stake were so vitally important that a woman doctor responsible for patients across a wide geographical area, and with a family comprised of a working husband and five lively children, felt obliged to take a political stand; it was to be a campaign centred on heartfelt matters of principle.

Picking up on the themes espoused by such contemporary political theorists as Hannah Arendt, the letter that had initially attracted Harold Boyd's attention in the Times-Dispatch contained what were to become the main pillars of Wensel's campaign, startling in their clarity.[126] "Is Virginia to become a dictatorship? How can we parents face our children if we sit back and accept the one-party rule of the Byrd machine with its plan for closing our public schools?" "Can we persuade our children," she continued, "that democracy is better than communism if we succumb to the dictatorship of a man who proposes to destroy the very foundation of democracy -- our public schools?"[127] It was the most effective and sustained use of Cold War rhetoric in an election contest against the Byrd Machine.[128] More usually, it was racial moderates and the more extreme integrationists who were the targets of such rhetoric. Indeed, it would not have been a surprise had Byrd himself red-baited his opponent in the 1958 campaign.

Instead, Wensel seized the initiative. She even injected a new dimension into the anti-communist rhetoric that was increasingly common in Virginia politics, by

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[126] Hannah Arendt's writings on totalitarianism pressed for the castigation of all oppressive totalitarian regimes, regardless of their "left-" or "right-" wing political polarity. See Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism [Third Edition] (London: Allen and Unwin, 1967).

[127] Bound Memoir, Wensel Papers, 1 Box only.

[128] Indeed, towards the end of Byrd's campaign against Francis Pickens Miller in 1952, billboards started appearing across the state emblazoned with the words, "Vote American -- Return Harry F. Byrd to the United States Senate -- Maintain your Democratic form of Government." Francis Pickens Miller, Man From the Valley: Memoirs of a 20th-Century Virginian (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971), pp. 199-200.

drawing parallels between the totalitarian aspects of Soviet Russia and Byrd's machine. Byrd, she maintained, had been working feverishly for the establishment of a dictatorship within the state for years. It was an indication of the organisation's success that the Republican Party had decided not to pit a candidate against the senator: to all intents and purposes, it was to be a one party election, Soviet-style. "Unless someone comes forward to be Republican candidate for the United States Senate," Wensel wrote, "Virginians like Russians will have only one choice in the next election."[129] Thus, she exposed the contradiction common to so many southern leaders, who were deeply suspicious of centralised government on a national level, but were nevertheless keen to centralise government under their own power at a state level. Not only had Wensel established an effective line of attack, but taking up the anti-communist stance herself also worked as a pre-emptive strike, denying Byrd the opportunity of using red-baiting as a tactic against her.

Wensel's anti-totalitarian strategy received broad coverage in the Winchester Evening Star. It published two articles on her appearance before the Winchester, AFL-CIO chapter, in which she was quoted as stating that "Virginia's program of Massive Resistance to integration is un-American," and that it constituted "massive sabotage against our US Government. He [Byrd] wants Governor Almond to declare himself superior to the Supreme Court. But Governor Almond is a lawyer. He knows the consequences of sedition." This was a forthright exposition of Wensel's views for any Virginian paper to print, but the Evening Star was not just any Virginian paper: it was owned by Harry Byrd, Sr, and edited at the time by his son, Harry Byrd, Jr.[130]

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[129] ibid.

[130] Dr Wensel quoted in Winchester Evening Star, 11 October 1958, p.1. The reasons for this apparent filial disloyalty are unclear, although Harry Byrd, Jr, had clashed with his father before in Evening Star editorials. After the 1952 Democratic Convention, for example, Harry Byrd, Jr, had endorsed the

The actual content of Wensel's campaign remained remarkably true to the spirit of her original letter to the Times-Dispatch. The schools, she believed, had to be kept open at any cost. Initially, in common with so many other racial moderates of the time, the Richmond News Leader reported that "she did not believe in enforced integration," a policy which then had the hallmarks of racial radicalism, not moderation. The Times-Dispatch noted that, as an alternative to closing schools, "she proposed local option controls that would permit each city and county to deal with its own problems," in line with Gray's original proposals.[131] By October, she had set out a more detailed plan. This included the proposed discontinuation of school social functions, and the establishment of integrated, dual vocational and academic schools. Then, she told Washington's Evening Star, "parents would have to assume their rightful responsibility for their children's social life. School would be a place for serious learning instead of a place to play at taxpayers' expense." In a further attempt not to appear too radical for the moderate voters to whom she was trying to appeal, Wensel was quoted as saying that her suggestions "enable us to meet the Supreme Court requirements for desegregation without encouraging racially mixed marriages or offspring and without lowering the academic standards of our schools."[132] Such subtleties, however, were soon hammered flat by the press, who seemed determined to portray the contest as a Manichean struggle between open and closed schools.

Stevenson-Sparkman ticket, whilst his father was considerably more circumspect. See Heinemann, Harry Byrd of Virginia, p.314.

[131] Richmond News Leader, 26 July 1958, p.9.; Times-Dispatch 26 July 1958, p.2.

[132] The Evening Star, Washington, DC, 24 October 1958, clipping in Bound Memoir, Wensel Papers, 1 Box only. An similar story, run by the Associated Press appeared in the Washington Post and Times Herald, 24 October 1958, stating that Dr Wensel favoured desegregation, "without encouraging racially mixed marriages or offspring and without lowering the academic standards of our schools."

Continuing her Cold War and totalitarian themes, Wensel argued that, by closing public schools, Byrd was displaying far greater subversive intent than any of Khrushchev's agents, since they had never succeeded in disrupting the country's education system. "Khrushchev really should give [Senator] Byrd a medal," she was reported as saying in the Evening Star, "for accomplishing what none of his workers had been able to do -- close American public schools and persuade many Americans to defy the laws of their country."[133] It was a popular campaign proposition. The Times-Dispatch, for example, reported on a speech given to about one hundred members of the Richmond League of Women Voters in the tea room of the Richmond YWCA. The League turned out to be staunch supporters of Wensel throughout her campaign, and, when she rebuked Byrd for his "dictatorial control" of Virginian politics, the Times-Dispatch reported that they "applauded heartily and warmly."[134]

That Cold War theme was extended into a plea for more US backing for the United Nations, and, in direct opposition to Byrd's own professed admiration for the policy of "mass retaliation" in the light of a Soviet attack, a plea to "do everything possible to keep American soldiers out of foreign countries and Russian hydrogen bombs out of the United States."[135]

With such concerns as a stronger United Nations and an end to a policy of "massive retaliation," Wensel's campaign exemplifies a major trend in women's post-war political activism identified by Susan Lynn. Many liberal women's organisations, noted Lynn, "expressed serious reservations about the increasing militarism of US foreign policy in the postwar world and played a critical role in educating the public

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133 Winchester Evening Star, 11 October 1958, clipping in Bound Memoir, Wensel Papers, 1 Box only.
134 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 28 October 1958, p. 2.
135 ibid.

about international concerns."[136] Wensel had attempted to do just that, until Virginia's press decided to concentrate so stubbornly on the single issue of the fate of the public schools. "What I didn't mention in my letter," remembered Wensel, referring to her initial letter to the Times-Dispatch, but which was nevertheless "one of the things that I stressed in my campaign, was that we should be more interested in strengthening the United Nations...we had the nuclear weapons pointed at us at the time." Asked about her contemporaries' reaction to her discussions of such internationalist concerns, she stated simply that she was "sorry to say I think it was essentially indifference."[137] However much the Cold War infused domestic politics in 1950s America, the electorate in 1958 Virginia was clearly most concerned with the central issues surrounding segregated schooling. In part that was a result of the successful press campaign to concentrate on the schools issue, but it was also because the school crisis was more immediate than the distant and somewhat intangible threat of nuclear missiles, over which Virginians felt that they had little or no immediate control.

When the polls closed on 4 November 1958, Wensel had accumulated over 120,000 votes, but still only managed just over 27% of the total votes cast.[138] Commenting on her campaign's place in the history of post-war Virginia, Wensel believed that it was "important as a demonstration of what a person with political, social and financial handicaps can do to prevent evil, entrenched politicians from

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[136] Susan Lynn, Progressive Women In Conservative Times: Racial Justice, Peace, and Feminism, 1945 to the 1960s (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1992), p. 96. Lynn concentrates primarily on the work of the Young Woman's Christian Association [YWCA] and the American Friends Service Committee [AFSC]. In a statement released by their National Board in the year of Dr Wensel's campaign, for example, the YWCA deplored "the primary emphasis which is placed frequently in foreign policy on defense and military preparedness...We plead for a foreign policy in which the creative and constructive genius of the United States is directed toward affecting conditions in the world which will make peace possible." Quoted in Lynn, Progressive Women in Conservative Times, p. 107.

[137] Wensel Fernbach interview, UNOHC.

[138] Her final total was 120,224 to Byrd's 317,221. See Ely, The Crisis of Conservative Virginia, p. 81.

destroying the democratic process in American communities."[139] Wensel's campaign contributed to the growing awareness that an increasing number of white Virginians would not tolerate closed public schools. It also offers an incisive look at the ways in which both the language and tensions of the Cold War permeated politics at the state level at mid-century.

VII

It was, perhaps, fitting that the Byrd Organisation chose David Mays to head the Virginia Commission on Constitutional Government [VaCCG], set up by an Act of Assembly on 7 March 1958. In essence, the Commission was a States' Rights organisation, created "to develop and promulgate information concerning the dual system of government, federal and state, established under the Constitution of the United States and those of several states."[140] The Commission became the official propaganda arm of Virginia's Massive Resistance programme, producing and publishing reams of rhetoric intended to bolster the Old Dominion's stance against integration. Somewhat surprisingly, rather like Louise Wensel's campaign, it has been virtually ignored by historians of the era; surprising not only because of the central role it played in the battle for southern hearts and minds, but also for its particular take on anti-communism. [141]

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[139] Bound Memoir, Wensel Papers, 1 Box only.
[140] "Report to Governor, December, Yearly," VaCCG Papers, Box 1.
[141] There is no mention of the Committee in Ely, Crisis of Conservative Virginia, Lassiter and Lewis [eds], The Moderates' Dilemma, or Francis M. Wilhoit, The Politics of Massive Resistance (New York: George Braziller, 1973). Numan Bartley simply states that, "Among latecomers to the public propaganda field, the Virginia Commission on Constitutional Government, with *News Leader* [sic] editor James Jackson Kilpatrick as Publications Committee chairman, was most consistently energetic in propaganda and lobbying activity during the massive resistance phase of southern race politics." Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, p.183. The lack of literature on the VaCCG does, it should be noted, place a heavy emphasis on Mays' own accounts of its activities.

At different times during its existence, the Commission was comprised of between fifteen and seventeen people, many of them leading lights of Virginian politics. They included Mays as chairman, Kilpatrick as head of the publications division, Albertis S. Harrison, Burr P. Harrison, and the Byrd confidant and member of the Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Liberties, Judge J. Segar Gravatt.[142] In most of its output, the Commission mirrored the views of its chairman. A keen legal mind, just as Mays had attempted to modify Stanley's early response to *Brown*, so he steered what he consistently referred to in his candid diaries as "*my* VaCCG" away from the more hard line, extremist polemic of many of his peers.[143] In Virginia, the VaCCG came closest to fulfilling the role of an investigative committee, one of the state governments' three favoured approaches to anti-communism noted by Michael Heale. However, unlike the Johns Committee in Florida and, for example, the Sovereignty Commission in Mississippi, the VaCCG did not indulge in the kind of witch-hunting anti-communism practised by many of Virginia's southern neighbours.[144]

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[142] Other members of the VaCCG during its existence include William T. Muse, the Hon. E. Almer Ames, Jr, the Hon. Hale Collins, the Hon. Frederick T. Gray, the Hon. Garnett S. Moore, the Hon. W. Carrington Thompson, the Hon. William L. Winston, the Hon. W.C. Daniel, Edgar R. Lafferty, the Hon. Roy Smith, Leslie D. Campbell, Jr, the novelist John Dos Passos, Garnett S. Moore, Hugh V. White, Jr, William L. Winston, Sam Crutchfield, Jr, Charles Cross, Jr, John A.K. Donovan, and the secretary, May Gee.

[143] Emphasis added. In a perfect example of his shying away from the more lurid excesses of some of his segregationist colleagues, Mays noted that, having been contacted by the Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Liberties and sent a plaque by them to hang on his wall, "The Defenders are a rapid crowd who until now have given me as wide a birth as I am to give them, and to hang this would indicate a relationship foreign to my Commission and tend to reduce greatly its effectiveness." Mays Diaries, 26 June 1964.

[144] The other two favoured approaches were loyalty oaths and communist-control laws. The VaCCG justifies Heale's emphasis on the importance of looking at such committees on a state by state basis. Michael J. Heale, McCarthy's Americans: Red Scare Politics in State and Nation, 1935-1965 [American History in Depth] (London: MacMillan, 1998), p. xvi. For more on the work of investigative committees, see pp. 7-27.

Mays' own calming influence continued in spite of the feelings of some of his fellow members. In a clear example of just how much it was *his* Commission, in August 1962 Mays made his excuses from a meeting of the League of Conservative Voters. "I can't involve the CCG [sic]," he wrote, "in a meeting at which such wild people as Judge Billy Old will be on the program."[145] It had been Judge William "Billy" Old and his belief in the ultimate primacy of States' Rights who had, in November 1955, first urged Kilpatrick to take his well-publicised stance on interposition. Regardless of the fact that Kilpatrick was a high ranking member of the VaCCG in 1962, Mays could not countenance such links. Under his tutelage, the VaCCG strove to be realistic, accurate, workmanlike and even plodding in its legal strictures.

Indeed, it was this style of reasoned, often legalistic advocacy which characterised much of the Commission's work, giving its resistance a distinctive cast. While the sit-ins were a target for red-baiting smears in many quarters, for example, Mays' Commission preferred to emphasise the illegality of the protests. On April 20 1960, the VaCCG released "Race and the Restaurant: Two Opinion Pieces," containing reprints of both Judge Soper's opinion in *Williams v Howard Johnson's Restaurant*, and of the Delaware Supreme Court's ruling in *Washington Parking Authority v Burton*. Mays recorded in his diary simply that "these point out clearly the illegality of the current trespasses by Negroes in white restaurants and may give a few people something to think about."[146] Likewise, rather than launching into demagogic,

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[145] Mays Diaries, 17 August 1962.

[146] ibid., 20 April 1960. In his entry for 8 April 1960, concerning the distribution of Calhoun's Fort Hill address, which espoused a strong States' Rights doctrine, Mays noted that "we shall hold up its release until we can get out our folder dealing with the obvious illegality of the Negro lunchcounter sit downs. This effort of the Negroes is self-defeating since they have now turned from the federal courts to extra -- and illegal -- actions."

racist rhetoric in his quest to convince Virginians that continued segregation was fundamental to their well-being, he noted that "Carter Pittman's article in the ABA [American Bar Association] Journal demonstrating the obvious -- that all men aren't created equal -- will fit nicely into our CCG [sic] reprints."[147] Even Almond, eschewing his occasional lapses into red-baiting, calmly told the Commission that "we have nothing to fear from communism if the young minds of the state can be impressed with the facts of history and the arguments pro and con on this great issue."[148] And that is exactly what the Commission set out to achieve. Through judicious reprintings of effective speeches, and through the widespread dissemination of original, educative works, it sought to add structure to the existing, genuine anti-communist fears of Virginians, and strove to support them with hard evidence. Furthermore, if there was a legal means to attain the desired result, however mundane it may have appeared, Mays drove his Commission towards it.

The sheer scale of the Commission's publication activities was staggering. The Biennial Report to the Commission by the Executive Director, covering the period from 1 December 1963 to 1 December 1965, claimed that the total number of publications distributed by the VaCCG since its inception in 1958 stood at 1,262,621.[149] By December 1969, that figure had grown to 2,176,498 booklets and

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[147] Mays Diaries, 26 August 1960.
[148] "Remarks of Governor J. Lindsay Almond before the Commission on Constitutional Government 21 July, 1958," VaCCG Papers, Box 2.
[149] "Report to General Assembly 1 December 1963 - 1 December 1965," VaCCG Papers, Box 1. The distribution lists included state legislators, Governors, and Chief Justices of every state; US Congressmen, and Federal (including Supreme Court) Judges; members of the Virginia Bar Association and all Virginia department heads; college and junior college libraries "throughout the nation"; all high school libraries in Virginia; city public libraries "throughout the nation"; state public libraries, law school libraries and state law libraries; chambers of commerce in any US city with a population over 100,000; daily newspapers in the US; "Magazines of national circulation"; all college deans; instructors in government and economics in all Virginia high schools; and "the various editors, news commentators, and columnists."

pamphlets, and 16,425 books, including 37,600 copies of "Democracy and Despotism", and 39,055 of "Did the Court Interpret or Amend?" attacking the Supreme Court's decision-making process in the school desegregation cases.[150] What is more, they were distributed right at the core of government, both at state and federal level. "Where I could get them to do [so], I have used senators and congressmen as my 'newsboys' to distribute my pamphlets on Civil Rights," noted Mays, "because people in Washington are far [more] likely to read them when asked by a legislator."[151]

Mays resolutely refused to red-bait, but still remained stoically anti-communist. "I believe that positive teaching is necessary," he explained. "Prove the virtues of the American system and give communism some good kicks in the pants in passing. Nothing is done by mere negation," he said. Then, coming to the crux of his position, he wrote that "the trouble is that we have thousands of orators denouncing communism without telling the people what it is and what to do about it."[152] He had also learnt from two earlier mistakes on the dissemination of anti-communist material. The Commission had once ordered a report on communism for Virginia's schools from a highly recommended Massachusetts researcher, referred to in VaCCG correspondence as "Dr Gannon." Mays had, however, by his own admission, been so keen to get the programme underway that he gave Gannon insufficient time to prepare, and the report had to be shelved. It was not a mistake he would make again.[153]

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150 "Report to Governor, December, Yearly", VaCCG Papers, Box 1.
151 Mays Diaries, 19 February 1964.
152 ibid., 26 April 1961.
153 Mays first met Gannon on 7 February 1961, at the recommendation of Dean Manion, and had to shelve his 120-page report on 21 March of the same year.

Likewise, in 1961, great umbrage was caused by the linking of a VaCCG pamphlet on communism with the name of the John Birch Society. As William T. Muse felt compelled to tell the assembled members of the Virginia Bar Association, "it was unfortunate that the name of the John Birch Society was on the front page of the proof. That society had no connection with the preparation of the material." The VaCCG, continued Muse, had simply employed a "highly recommended person" to compile the pamphlet, who had taken it upon himself to add the name of the Birch Society, for whom he also wrote.[154] Even Kilpatrick, perhaps the greatest firebrand of the VaCCG Board, referred to the John Birch Society as "a bunch of nuts."[155] Accusations of involvement with the Birchers -- and, therefore, with extremes of racism, red-baiting and McCarthyism -- would have compromised the legalistic, respectable and moderate reputation that Mays and the Commission were so desperate to foster, especially among groups like the Bar Association. Here, then, was a segregationist, a Massive Resister, a States' Righter and an anti-communist clearly deploring irresponsible red-baiting.[156]

Mays' personal standpoint was wholeheartedly adopted by the Commission, most clearly in a joint campaign with the Farm Bureau Federation to portray communism accurately in school textbooks. This formed part of a wider mission to

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[154] William Muse letter to Members of the Executive Committee, Virginia Bar Association, 24 March 1961, VaCCG Papers, Box 1.

[155] James Kilpatrick quoted in Hugh V. White, Jr, letter to Mills E. Godwin, Jr, 13 March 1961, Godwin Personal Papers, Box 1.

[156] Mays' fear of a genuine subversive threat, and, therefore, his anti-communism, is exemplified by his donations to both the Crusade for Freedom and Radio Free Europe. The only hint of red-baiting in Mays' expansive and very personal diaries, in which he was not shy of voicing his true opinions, concerned public hearings in front of the Senate and House Committees on both Privileges and Elections, held on 30 November 1955. "Many spoke, black and white," reported Mays, "some wisely, some foolishly, and one nigger lawyer was unbelievably arrogant. Meantime, some of the proceeding was broadcast by television nationwide although I was unconscious of it at the time. *We certainly had some Commies with us*." Mays Diaries, 30 November 1955, emphasis added.

warn high school students of the dangers of the communist threat. Again, this whole episode was carried out in a highly systematic manner. On 12 April 1961, Mays personally accepted the request of the Farm Bureau's Maury Hubbard to serve as chairman on the agricultural agency's committee to instruct its members on the dangers of communism. Hubbard's credentials were strengthened by his recent visit to the Soviet Union, to see a communist system of government at first hand. The Farm Bureau's request reflects the impact Mays' stance on anti-communism had made in the three years since the VaCCG had been established, and offered him the opportunity to blend the VaCCG's programme with that of the bureau.[157]

Mays had dinner meetings with Farm Bureau representatives in June and October 1961 to finalise plans.[158] Meanwhile, the VaCCG strode onwards in its education drive. Woodrow Wilkerson began a scheme in September to review all encyclopaedias used in the state school system, evaluating their observations on capitalism, socialism, communism and "related matters," and Mays attended hearings of the Advisory Committee of the State Department of Education on "teaching Democracy v. Communism in Senior Class of Va. public schools."[159] In his diary entry of 21 March 1960, Mays revealed the thoroughness with which proposed school

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[157] Very little evidence of the Farm Bureau's anti-communist activity remains. The only reference to the Committee in the Virginia Farm Bureau's files is a Report to the Board of Directors, Virginia Fram Bureau Federation - 23 August 1961. "Mr Johnson reported that the Committee on Communism had recommended as one of its projects, getting business organizations in the state to use good books (i.e. 'YOU CAN TRUST THE COMMUNIST to do what they say') on the subject of Communism[,] as Christmas gifts. On motion by Mr. Metz, seconded by Mr. Johnson and carried, the Board approved the employing of a person on a temporary basis to contact business organization, probably in the Richmond area, in an effort to get such organizations to use books of this type as Christmas gifts." My thanks to Jonathan S. Shouse, Corporate Secretary, Virginia Farm Bureau Federation, for this information. Correspondence between Jonathan S. Shouse and George Lewis, 9 November 1999.

[158] Mays eventually became frustrated by the slow pace of the Farm Bureau's machinations. "Attended dinner meeting," he wrote in June 1962, "which lasted more than three hours of the 'Paul Revere Committee' of the Va. Fed. Farm bureau at John Marshall Hotel. They are fine people and are devoted in war on communism but they do talk so long." Mays Diaries, 27 June 1962.

[159] ibid., 6 September 1961 and 28 November 1961.

textbooks warning about the dangers of communism were vetted. Of three books submitted, he wrote, "the first was generally approved, the second was criticized mainly due to the relative space given communism, and the third was almost thrown out on the grounds that it had obvious errors and was not well written. As it was, the books were approved for [teachers'] use only."[160]

The VaCCG's role was also crucial in attempting the co-ordination and preparation of a south-wide, non-extremist but still resolutely defiant response to *Brown*. In 1958, only two months after the Commission had been established, Governor Almond told the South Carolina Bar Association that, "in brief, the whole purpose and conception of the Commission is to work in co-operation with our sister states to the end that several states may be restored to their proper dignity and defended in the exercise of their non-delegated and reserved powers under the Constitution." In this undertaking, he was "earnestly inviting" the co-operation of South Carolina.[161] Again, tellingly, the VaCCG's chosen audience was a Bar Association. The approach was no different, but the aim this time was to unite the South in what Mays -- and, amongst others, Almond -- believed to be a formidable, region-wide, process of dignified resistance.

It is an unfortunate result of both the omission of the VaCCG from the historiography of Massive Resistance, and of the preoccupation with the minutiae of meetings and committees in the Commission's own papers, that the efforts of Mays and his Commission to help other southern states with similar resistance bodies have

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[160] ibid., 21 March 1960. According to his diary entry, the books in question were "American Capitalism (Case Series), Capitalism and other economic Systems (Case Series), and Heckman's The Economics of American Living (Rand McNally)."

[161] "The Achilles Heel of America: Address by Governor J. Lindsay Almond, Jr, Governor of Virginia, South Carolina Bar Association, Columbia SC, May 2 1958," Almond Personal Papers, Box 13.

gone unnoticed. Although corroborating evidence is scarce, Mays' personal papers and diary suggest that the influence of "his" VaCCG was not confined to Virginia, but spread across the South and beyond in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It took a long time for Mays' plans for an inter-state meeting of southern legislators, which were to discuss the work of Commissions such as Virginia's, to come to fruition: he wrote to his opposite numbers in Arkansas, Mississippi, Louisiana and Florida on 12 August 1959, but had to admit on the last day of August that he was "getting nowhere."[162] These intended links, however, were not pursued without some misgivings. Again, stressing the legalistic, educational nature of the VaCCG, Mays confided that he was a little apprehensive in his attempts to forge links with the main segregationist protagonists of the Little Rock crisis two years earlier. "Both the Governor and I," admitted Mays, "are charry [sic] about getting tangled up with rabid segregationists, and I wrote Faubus, of Arkansas, with some misgivings."[163]

In September 1960, he was at last introduced to the other southern governors at the Hot Springs Southern Governors Conference, chaired by Virginia's J. Lindsay Almond, Jr. "I was careful to begin by pointing out," reported Mays, "that my Commission was not set up to deal with school litigation, but was to put on an educational program concerning basic constitutional concepts, and that I had had that understanding before accepting the chairmanship." The talk was applauded, and, according to Mays, "received vocal approval by Faubus, Hollings, Barnett, Hodges, and Patterson." Somewhat bizarrely, however, John Patterson went on to announce that he did not want a similar Commission in Alabama, as it would, he claimed,

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[162] Mays Diaries, 12 August 1959, and 31 August 1959.
[163] ibid., 12 August 1960. "Charry" is a misspelling of "chary," meaning "careful" or "wary." I am indebted to Janet B. Schwarz, Associate Reference Librarian of the Virginia Historical Society, for this interpretation.

remove power from the governor to the legislature and "enable aspirants for the governorship and attorney-generalship [sic] to use the commission as political stepping stones."[164] By September 1961, the VaCCG's Ed Welley told Virginia legislators that, in travelling around the country, he had been "congratulated universally" on the work that the VaCCG was doing.[165]

It would, initially, appear surprising that the best response Mays received from another state was from the legislature of Pennsylvania. He was delighted by its enthusiasm, and, on closer inspection, the reason for this becomes quite clear. Mays realised that Virginia specifically, and the South generally, needed an element of northern support in order to make Massive Resistance successful. It was a view shared by Kilpatrick. "We can never win this thing on votes from Southern representatives alone," the Richmond News Leader editor had said. "If we are to win, and I am confident that in the end we will win, it must be with help from other areas of the country."[166] Mays' logic was that, were Pennsylvania or any other northern state to establish a committee along the lines of the VaCCG, Massive Resistance could be explained as opposition not to racial integration, but simply as opposition to overbearing federal intervention into the affairs of individual states. On 29 May 1961, when Mays was first contacted by the Pennsylvania General Assembly about sending a delegation South to discuss constitutional government committees, he remarked that "this is the first real break we have had in the North."[167] A meeting was set up in

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[164] ibid., 28 September 1960.
[165] ibid., 13 September 1961. Welley was, however, speaking at the same time as other Virginia Board heads to explain their budget requests for the next fiscal year, so his observations may have been prone to over-exaggeration.
[166]Kilpatrick quoted in Thorndike, "James. J. Kilpatrick and the Virginia Campaign against *Brown*," p. 64.
[167] Mays Diaries, 29 May 1961.

Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, in February of 1962. Indeed, so keen was Mays to make it a success that, when poor weather grounded his party's plans to fly North, they drove all the way in limousines.[168] It was a qualified success, both parties agreeing to meet again in Williamsburg, Virginia, in the summer, and the Pennsylvanians agreeing to set up a commission if they could take control of the legislature in their upcoming state elections. By January 1963, Philadelphia planned a constitutional commission, and Guy Kestler, one of its representatives, telephoned Mays for advice and for material in support of the promotion of States' Rights.[169]

In other states, the VaCCG's stock kept rising. In the Summer of 1963, Mays was asked by the University of Georgia to make a television recording espousing the Commission's views. In his home state, too, he was asked to make a "canned film" by the Central Virginia Educational Television Corporation on the subject of teaching anti-communism in schools. It was for use "where desired in different parts of the country." Jack Kilpatrick went to Arizona, to "spread a bit of Gospel" in February 1962, and then went on to try "his hand with the hapless 'liberals' of Antioch College in Ohio" in May. The VaCCG was asked to send speakers all over the country, from Mobile, in the Summer of 1962, to the Student Congress of Young Americans For Freedom Convention at the University of Indiana, in the Summer of 1963. By March 1964, Mays noted that the Governor-elect of Louisiana was planning to realign Louisiana's Sovereignty Commission along the lines of the VaCCG, a move which Alabama looked set to follow in April with a large order for VaCCG materials. "The word certainly gets around," wrote Mays.[170] As Massive Resistance laws were being

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[168] ibid., 26 February 1962.
[169] ibid., 17 January 1963.
[170] ibid., 7 August 1963; 29 April 1965; 28 February 1962; 7 May 1962; 27 August 1962; 9 August 1963; 25 March 1964; 6 April 1964.

dismantled, and the force of white, northern public opinion was swinging inexorably towards support of southern civil rights agitators, there was concrete, widespread support for the line promulgated by the VaCCG: for its distancing of resistance from the more rabid displays of racist segregationists; for its espousal of legal arguments; for its educational approach to anti-communism, especially in schools; and for its heavy emphasis on the primacy of States' Rights. Moreover, what both the work of the commission and the diaries of its chairman establish beyond doubt is that there was a widespread exchange of ideas, information and resistance-minded argument between not only the states of the South, but also across the whole country.

Mays' influence was also discernible in a very low key yet highly influential gathering of leading Virginians known as the Forum Club. Meeting on a regular social basis at Richmond's Commonwealth Club, usually on the second Monday of each month, the Forum Club included among its 112 members Mays, Kilpatrick, Coleman Andrews, Virginius Dabney, Admiral Alvin Duke Chandler, Albertis Harrison and countless members of Virginia's commercial elites.[171] Like the VaCCG, although probably due to its informal, almost secretive nature, The Forum Club is missing from the historiography of Virginia in the mid-twentieth century.[172] Granted, the overall influence of the club is unclear, but it is almost unthinkable that so many influential Virginians would meet at such crucial times in the Old Dominion's political development without exchanging and polishing their own views on relevant subjects.

Indeed, even the club's moniker suggests an arena for discussion and debate.

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[171] "Forum Club Notice of Meeting," 15 September 1958, David J. Mays Papers, Box 1, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia.

[172] One of the few references to the Forum Club is as a place where Kilpatrick heard Mays' arguing for local option and tokenism as the most effective way to side-step desegregation. Thorndike, "Kilpatrick and the Campaign Against *Brown*," in Lassiter and Lewis [eds], The Moderates' Dilemma, p. 70.

Furthermore, a "Notice of Meeting" sent to all members for Tuesday 21 September 1954 reveals that Forum Club members were immersed in both Cold War and desegregation issues. "At our last meeting held 17 May 1954, the Supreme Court and its non-segregation decision crowded McCarthy off the program (that is, off our program)," the letter began, "but maybe before integration is settled we will feel that we would rather have McCarthy. We had a fine talk by Robert A. Wilson on the part played by the Richmond Citizens Association in civic affairs and we remained a few minutes overtime to hear a learned address by John C. Wyllie on communism. At 9:00 p.m. opinions were developing that almost turned our meeting into an all-night session. I believe we are going to hear from Mr Wyllie again!"[173] The very fact that the club had a discernible "program" strongly suggests that it was more than simply a chance to chatter and dine.[174]

VIII

In ideology and in method, half-way between the Commission on Constitutional Government and the White Citizens' Councils lay the Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Liberty.[175] Virginia's Defenders groups had much in common with the state's overall Massive Resistance strategies, mainly because of the overlap in personnel: the Defenders counted among their members three state

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[173] "Forum Club Notice of Meeting," 15 September 1954, Mays Papers, Box 1.
[174] A "Notice of Meeting" sent out on 15 September 1958, for example, stated that the meeting was to feature not only Kilpatrick speaking on the schools issue, but also Colgate Darden, President of the University of Virginia and a former US Delegate to the General Assembly of the United Nations, speaking on the role of the U.N. "Forum Club Notice of Meeting," 15 September 1958, Mays Papers, Box 1.
[175] As McMillen has noted, neither Virginia, North Carolina nor Tennessee had actual Citizens' Councils groups. The Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Liberty were, therefore, the closest to a Council group that Virginia's resistance movement produced.

senators, two state delegates, several county supervisors and clerks, and numerous members of the state's business elites.[176] Like the moderate Virginia Committee for Public Schools, the Defenders were originally made up of smaller, federated groups such as the Crusaders for Constitutional Government.[177] The thirty-seven chapters that were eventually federated may have had a membership as high as 12,000, but, unlike the VaCCG and its state-sponsored finances, many of the less successful enclaves were highly compromised by their lack of adequate funding. On 17 July 1961, for example, R.B. Crawford, the state-wide President of the Defenders, felt compelled to write to fellow Defender Bill Tuck that "it will be up to this Board to determine whether this organisation will continue -- If the larger chapters that have been delinquent in dues for the past two years do not pledge co-operation, we will," he continued, "have to fold our tents."[178]

Like similar groups across the South, the Defenders were white supremacists with a deeply entrenched interest in Massive Resistance. Thus, the themes and means of opposition they espoused followed the pattern of Massive Resistance at the state level, although, unencumbered by any official designation or state position, such groups often used more vitriolic and vituperative rhetoric than their legislative peers. However, in many respects the Defenders' tactics represent a microcosm of those used by the state's legislators and segregationist leaders. Once again, anti-communism was widespread and multi-faceted. In 1960, for example, Crawford readily enjoined Defenders groups in the debate over internal infiltration of civil rights groups by

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[176] Neil R. McMillen, The Citizens' Council: Organized Resistance to the Second Reconstruction, 1954-64 [2nd Edition] (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), p.106.
[177] On 18 November 1959, for example, John W. Carter delivered a speech entitled, "The Saga of the Commonwealth of Virginia: Governor J. Lindsay Almond and his Pals," in his capacity as vice-chairman of the Crusaders for Constitutional Government. Byrd Papers, Box 242.
[178] R.B. Crawford letter to William Tuck, 17 July 1961, Tuck Papers, Folder 5288.

communists. "Because you are on our side," he wrote to all members, "we are now going to ask you to accept responsibility in your community -- the responsibility of helping to stop the Communist drive in our communities."[179] The Arlington chapter of the Defenders reinforced this same point, but rather more colourfully. "We know not the spirit in which Tennis Champion Laura Lou Kunnen wore the Rebel flag on the seat of her pants," it wrote in late February 1959, "whether in defiance of judicial tyranny or in contempt for a South that prostrates itself before the first onslaught of communism's mailed fist. If it was worn in defiance, we salute her; if in disdain, we grant her justification."[180]

Again, that claim of communist involvement in general civil rights activity was bolstered by more specific attacks on individual incidents of civil rights agitation. The sit-ins, the NAACP and, for example, the involvement of racial moderates in civil rights, were all on the receiving end of the Defenders' red-baiting assaults. The sit-ins were labelled as having been "exposed" as being "planned and led by Communists, their secret agents and their dupes" by HUAC and the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.[181]

Referring to the failure of continued segregation in Arlington schools, and a court ordered shift towards a pupil assignment programme, the Arlington Defenders' "corresponding secretary," Mrs Marian Gatterman, wrote to Almond that its members felt "that the contamination of the NAACP, through its vast associations with the

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[179] R.B. Crawford letter to "Members," Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Liberties, 20 September 1960, Byrd Papers, Box 243.
[180] "Arlington Chapter: Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Liberties. Sic Temper Tyrannis. Defenders Views From Here and There," News sheet, 20 February 1959, Almond Gubernatorial Papers, Box 87.
[181] "Students, White Negro, Red Dupes; J. Edgar Hoover Exposes Youth as Target of Communists," Byrd Papers, Box 243.

Communist Party should have been brought out [in court], and this would have certainly...strengthened our stand publicly and legally."[182] Almond's reply concluded that there was no "available evidence" for such claims: he was not questioning the use of red-baiting on moral grounds, simply, as a trained lawyer, on legal grounds.[183] Rather self-effacingly, J.C. Hoge, President of the Blacksburg Chapter of the Defenders, told Almond that "I doubt if you have heard of our chapter as we have done nothing. I am rather disappointed with the whole affair. I have nothing against the negro," he continued, "but I fear very much what I feel is behind the NAACP."[184] Once again, the implication was that, if the NAACP were communist infiltrated and motivated, so was another villain of *Brown*, the Supreme Court. "Broadcast Number 22," one of a series of Defenders radio propaganda programs, entitled "The Truth About the Civil Rights Fight," was unequivocal in its condemnation of the "left-wing" court. "The South is the only strong bastion of states rights and individual liberty," it proclaimed, picking up on the wider themes of resistance. "As such," the broadcast continued, "it is the number one target of these budding federal tyrants. For only over the prostrate body politic of the South can they reach their goal of the superstate. And what better way is there to neutralize Southern opposition than to besiege the South with a tyrannical Supreme Court?"[185]

Justifying the VCHR's attempts to ensure that it was well prepared against attacks on the alleged communist connections of its parent organisation, the Southern

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[182] Mrs Marian Gatterman letter to J. Lindsay Almond, Jr, [copied to Tom Stanley], 3 August 1956, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 108.
[183] J. Lindsay Almond, Jr, letter to Mrs Marian Gattermann [copied to Tom Stanley], 6 August 1956, Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 106.
[184] J.C. Hoge letter to J. Lindsay Almond, Jr, 4 December 1959, Almond Gubernatorial Papers, Box 87.
[185] "Broadcast #22: The Truth About the Civil Rights Fight," Boyle Papers, Box 21.

Regional Council, the Arlington Defenders released a one-page news sheet in March 1961, entitled, "Human Relations Committee Commie Connected?" This news sheet found it "highly significant" that, as part of a membership deal to join the Fairfax County Council on Human Relations, $5 per calendar year would also guarantee a subscription to New South, the official publication of the SRC. Quoting the ubiquitous communist informant Paul Couch, the Defenders made it clear that, as an ex-CPUSA agent, one of the positions Couch had been given was "Tennessee editor of the Communist Magazine, The New South."[186] The inference was clear. If the Fairfax committee was giving away what an ex-communist, and now anti-communist informant, claimed was a paper connected to the CPUSA, then that committee was surely red.

It is, of course, important to remember that the Defenders fell back on all the established weapons of resistance at their disposal, not just anti-communism. Various Defenders' groups, for example, drew attention to such issues as the miscegenation that would, they felt, be inevitable once schools were desegregated. Nativist arguments were also redeployed, some of which claimed that it was inherently "American" to segregate and discriminate. The United States, it was claimed, had been founded upon principles of racial separation, in stark contrast to the South American colonies of the Spanish and Portuguese which encouraged miscegenation.[187] An advocacy of the primacy of States' Rights, though, was the most

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[186] "The Arlington Defender: Human Relations Commie Connected?" 13 March 1961, William Tuck Papers, Folder 5288.

[187] Defenders "Broadcast #17," for example, includes a very ponderous nativist argument: "The white men and women, chiefly of British, German, Dutch, and Scandinavian stocks, who colonized and occupied what is now the United States, were strongly imbued with race preference. They did not follow the example of the Spanish and Portuguese (in whom, for historical reasons this instinct of race preference was much weaker) who, in colonizing South and Central America, amalgamated with the Indians found in possession of the land, and in some cases with the Negroes brought over as slaves.

frequently used argument. A 1959 speech given by Danville's John W. Carter to the Lunenburg Chapter of the Defenders, made this wider intent very clear. "In January of this year," he began, "we lost the first great battle in our fight to preserve the sovereignty of the Commonwealth of Virginia." Token integration was, therefore, interpreted without reference to race; what was at issue first and foremost was States' Rights and the sovereignty of Virginia.[188]

Instead, the founders of the future United States maintained their practice of non-amalgamation rigorously, with only slight racial blendings along the fringes of each group. Hence, it is nonsense to say that racial discrimination, the necessary consequence of race preference, is 'Un-American.'" Boyle Papers, Box 21.

[188] "The Saga of the Commonwealth of Virginia: Governor J. Lindsay Almond and his Pals," 18 November 1959, Byrd Papers, Box 242.

Chapter Four

North Carolina

A predominately rural state, North Carolina's reputation at mid-century rested upon its comparative liberalism in a region characterised by reactionary politics. In contrast to Virginia's conservative, agrarian powerbase and white supremacist oligarchy, North Carolina was dominated by elites whose power rested not only on the land, but on the industrial muscle of tobacco, textile and furniture manufacturing. Much of the Tar Heel State's economic success was based upon the widespread belief that, although a southern state, it was nonetheless industrially, commercially, and, indeed, culturally progressive.[1] William Chafe has hinted at the somewhat illusory quality of the state's progressivism by dubbing it a "progressive mystique." Other southern commentators have been even blunter. Jack Bass and Walter DeVries, for example, have termed it a "progressive myth."[2] To a certain extent, Chafe suggests, the image of economic progressivism was used to shield an intransigent political culture, and to forestall meaningful racial and social change. As notoriously vitriolic

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[1] North Carolina, for example, was second in a list of states drawn up to show the percentage of in-state communities that had an Industrial Development Organisation to co-ordinate and solicit industrial development: the Tar Heel state boasted 211 communities with at least one Development Organisation, second only to Florida with 227. Similarly, a list based on the advertising money devoted to State Redevelopment Programs, as at 15 August 1964, saw North Carolina ranked 5th out of all 50 states, with a budget of $140,000. See James C. Cobb, The Selling of the South: the Southern Crusade for Industrial Redevelopment, 1936-1990 (2nd Edition) (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993) p. 83 and p. 91 respectively.

[2] William H. Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North Carolina, and the Black Struggle For Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 6, and Jack Bass and Walter De Vries, The Transformation of Southern Politics: Social Change and Political Consequence Since 1945 (New York: Meridian, 1976), pp. 218-222. "The progressive image of the state projected in the late 1940s has evolved into a progressive myth that remains accepted as fact by much of the state's native leadership," wrote Bass and De Vries, "despite ample evidence to the contrary." p. 219.

political campaigns in 1950 and 1954 suggested, there were deep pockets of reactionary conservatism and racism in the state.

As will be seen in this chapter, North Carolina's political leaders had to tread carefully throughout the Massive Resistance era. To appease the state's segregationists, they strove to avoid compliance with *Brown*; to appease the state's powerful business elites, they sought to avoid social and racial conflict. There was a shrewd realisation that continued external investment, especially from the North, relied upon political and social stability, both of which would be compromised by either civil rights agitation or violent responses to such activity. Regardless of the real extent of the state's progressivism, as long as continued segregation and an image of moderation could be reconciled, North Carolina's segregationist elites remained satisfied.

Thus, North Carolina's legislature decided upon a course of what Jonathan Houghton has convincingly described as "sly resistance" to the *Brown* decision.[3] Although continually striving to maintain segregation in the state, the legislature -- and Governor Luther Hodges in particular -- took great care to couch resistance rhetoric in moderate terms, avoiding the twin extremes of wholesale desegregation on the one hand, and public school closures on the other. Local option plans were formulated to provide token desegregation, which not only ensured minimum compliance with *Brown*, but also allowed Hodges to refer to "safety valves" and "the middle way." North Carolina's resistance strategies often had a temperate appearance, but they nevertheless postponed meaningful school desegregation for more than a

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[3] Jonathan T.Y. Houghton, "The North Carolina Republican Party: From Reconstruction to the Radical Right," Dissertation, Chapel Hill, 1993.

decade. That facade of moderate resistance was occasionally punctured by virulent anti-communism, however, and served to reveal the true intensity of white supremacist feeling in areas of the Tar Heel State.

II

North Carolinians were well aware of a Communist Party presence within their state from shortly after the Bolshevik Revolution. "While in Burlington in 1925," wrote Erwin A. Holt to various North Carolina newspaper editors in 1952, a preacher known as "Evangelist Ham (who is still going strong), warned against communist propaganda from Moscow headquarters -- a warning which was and still continues largely ignored."[4] Evangelist Ham's suspicions were confirmed by official reports on Communist activity, both from the Party itself and from the Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI]. Unfortunately, the CPUSA merged membership figures for both North and South Carolina together; nonetheless, a tally of members on New Year's Day 1936 revealed that 176 Carolinians were officially registered as Communists.[5] At the time of the first All-Southern Communist Party Conference, held in Chattanooga in September 1937, that number had risen to 274.[6]

According to the FBI report on state-by-state Communist membership completed in 1949, North Carolina alone had 138 Party members, just twelve less than Virginia.[7] With that in mind, Director J. Edgar Hoover's insistence that the real

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[4] Erwin A. Holt letter to "Editors," Frank Porter Graham Papers, Box 34, Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
[5] Harvey Klehr, The Heyday of American Communism: The Depression Decade (New York: Basic Books, 1984), p. 380.
[6] ibid., p. 275.
[7] FBI file on HUAC, Roll 3 - 573, Roosevelt Study Center [RSC], Middelburg, The Netherlands.

menace of internal communism lay not with the official members of the Party but with their unseen, underground cadres provoked fear in the minds of North Carolina's citizens, and especially the state's powerful industrial magnates and business elites. Moreover, in North Carolina there was less of a possibility that segregationists could write off Communist Party activity as that of recently settled, first generation immigrants. Party membership in the Carolinas had traditionally been drawn from native-born Americans, rather than the foreign-born membership that characterised the Party nationally. In the 1930s, for example, District 16, which encompassed the Carolinas and Virginia, had a foreign-born membership of only 4%. In contrast, District 1 (New England) boasted a 90% foreign-born membership.[8]

Tim Minchin's detailed work on the Textile Union Workers of America [TWUA] has suggested that the "only location in the textile South where the Communists had any influence was at Erwin Mills" in Durham, North Carolina. As his study has shown, the mill workers' main concerns were economic, and were structured around the privileges and disadvantages of race: their main priority was increased pay, whether it came from union pressure or from companies aping union pay structures to ward off further labour organising. Furthermore, the ideological concerns of communism were often less significant than the Party's organisational skill.[9] "There were workers in Erwin Mills," Minchin quotes Erwin Mills shop steward and Communist Party member Bill Evans as saying, "who didn't know the difference between Communism and rheumatism...All they had to do was raise the

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[8] Klehr, Heyday of American Communism, p. 162.

[9] Timothy J. Minchin, 'What Do We Need a Union For?' The TWUA in the South, 1945-1955 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997). Minchin's work on the TWUA, therefore, dovetails neatly with the work of Gerald Zahavi. Gerald Zahavi, "Passionate Commitments: Race, Sex, and Communism at Schenectady General Electric, 1932-1954," Journal of American History, Vol. 83, No. 2 (1996).

race issue; it would create much more interest and excitement among workers than the Communist issue."[10]

The recollections of Junius Scales support Minchin's view that, although not widespread, there was nonetheless an active communist presence at work in North Carolina industry. Scales was a CPUSA member and an integral part of Local 22 of the United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing, and Allied Workers of America [UCAPAWA] Union in Winston-Salem, a non-textile union.[11] He worked for better conditions at the town's major industrial employer, the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. Scales provided an example of the very communist menace that segregationist leaders continually warned their constituents about after the Second World War. "As cold war attitudes pervaded the domestic political atmosphere and as the Communist and leftist forces became more and more isolated," remembered Scales, "the Reynolds company added a second major weapon to its arsenal: Red-baiting."[12] Sam Hall, Chairman of CPUSA's North Carolina district, felt that "an effort has been made to create a red 'bogey.'"[13] Scales' memoirs suggest that there was a genuine communist presence in North Carolina, which, in the deteriorating global climate, justified a measure of anti-communism at both grass-roots and legislative levels. "I never identified anyone as a Communist to another unless he or she was publicly known as such or had expressly asked for the designation," Scales wrote, suggesting that he was fully conscious of a larger Communist Party presence than was officially registered.[14]

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[10] Bill Evans quoted in Minchin, What Do we Need a Union For, p. 45.
[11] ibid., p. 44.
[12] Junius Scales and Richard Nickson, Cause at Heart: A Former Communist Remembers (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1987), p. 204.
[13] Sam Hall letter to Frank Porter Graham, 19 March 1947, Box 31, Graham Papers.
[14] Scales and Nickson, Cause at Heart, p. 297.

While still working for Reynolds tobacco, Scales concluded that the company saw itself as threatened by two distinct enemies. "The Reynolds version of the situation in Winston-Salem seems to be that black hordes were advancing on it in one direction while the Red Army was closing in from another," he wrote.[15] By suggesting that the Reynolds Company's two greatest fears were communist infiltration and increasing black protest, Scales showed that, however "progressive" it claimed to be, North Carolina nevertheless adhered to South-wide trends: Tar Heel business elites saw civil rights agitation as a vehicle for red insurgency.

In 1949, events in the sleepy town of Albemarle, just East of Charlotte, gave an indication of the ways in which one individual could exploit the residual feelings of anti-communism that North Carolina's communist presence engendered. Coming five years before *Brown* and seven years before the solidification of a truly massive resistance effort, Albemarle's anti-communist crusade serves to show just how receptive southerners were to red-baiting at a local level, and the effect that such a drive could have on politics at the state level.

In October 1949, Major Paul Cyr, an army officer previously unknown in Albemarle, started what appeared to be a solo drive to awaken the town to the threat of communism as he perceived it. His patriotic credentials were perfect: a war hero trained by the Office of Strategic Services [OSS] and the British Secret Service in World War II, he had twice parachuted behind enemy lines. He began his crusade with a speech in front of 185 members of the Albemarle Executives Club in the town's First Street Methodist Church, on Tuesday 11 October. According to the local press, "his listeners were stirred by his appeal for them to do something about the

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[15] ibid., p. 204.

threat of communism that hangs over this country today." The paper went on to report that the Major "warned that men who openly opposed communism are often communists, seeking to gain the confidence of the American people."[16] Identifying a communist was, therefore, going to be somewhat difficult.

In short order, Major Cyr's initiative incited a community-wide crusade against communism. Enthusiastic local citizens took up the gauntlet, and spread the Major's message to specially convened meetings of Albemarle's clubs and associations.[17] A Stanly News and Press editorial urged citizens to swamp politicians at all levels with letters, "not a batch of form letters, but individually written letters expressing personal opinion," outlining the dangers that the United States faced from this ill-defined communist menace. The first week of November was declared "Stamp Out Communism in America Week" by Albemarle's Mayor W.H. Morrow. By 11 November, an estimated 1,000 homes had been canvassed.[18]

There is much about the Albemarle crusade that remains unexplained, not least the apparently random choice of the town as the focus of Major Cyr's campaign. What the crusade does show, however, is that many of the concerns voiced by North Carolinians during Massive Resistance's pomp were in evidence before the 1950s. As whites did across the South, for example, so Oron Rogers of the town's Chamber of Commerce explicitly linked the anti-communism generated by Major Cyr to wider

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[16] Stanly News and Press, 14 October 1949, p. 1. Newspapers covering Cyr's crusade, such as the Stanly News and Press and the weekly Albemarle Enterprise can be found in the North Carolina Collection, Wilson Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

[17] Edward L. Gehring, for example, addressed the members of the Albemarle Women's Club on the communist threat on 24 October. Having received the unanimous support of the women, he called a meeting of "representatives from civic clubs, fraternal orders and churches" to be held at the City Hall six days later. Stanly News and Press, 25 October 1949, p. 1. The Stanly News and Press reported that the clubs canvassed included the Albemarle Women's Club, the "P.O.S. of A." [sic], the American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Lions Club, the Rotary Club, the JC's, and the Civitan Club.

[18] Figures quoted in Stanly News and Press, 11 November 1949, p. 1.

appeals for States' Rights. In one of the letters to Tar Heel senators that Cyr had urged Albemarle citizens to write, Rogers wrote to Frank Porter Graham to ask him to "use your personal and official influence against infiltration in the government of anything that leans in a Communist direction. I personally consider," he continued, "much pending legislation to have the taint of socialism, or Communism, or whatever else one may call 'excessive government.'"[19] The term "excessive government" foreshadowed Massive Resistance rhetoric on the subject of States' Rights.

Even in the midst of Albemarle's anti-communist crusade, however, there were voices of dissent. Local resident Harvey Cox, Jr, for example, wrote to Senator Graham to voice his concern over Major Cyr's operations. "This cry of 'communism' is a smokescreen in my opinion," he wrote, "a smoke screen to divert our attention from the real issues that face the Congress and the American people," namely the "growing crisis in our free enterprise economy, one that cannot be blamed on Communism, and that is of course the growing period of overproduction."[20] As all consuming as the Cold War may have been, not everyone was totally enveloped by its concerns. Cox went on to decry Governor William B. Umstead's attacks on those who had "coddled" communism, which, Cox told Graham, "means you I suppose. He gave a particularly nasty speech slanted at you recently at Lexington." Cox's next line is critical to understanding the inconsistencies in uses of anti-communism. "Mr Umstead," he wrote, "apparently isn't at all interested in the real needs of the people and wants to make his whole campaign one of hysterical red-smearing." Evidently, by

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[19] Oron J. Rogers letter to Frank Porter Graham, 10 November 1949, Graham Papers, Box 78. Graham was fulfilling the term of Senator J. Melville Broughton, who died in office.
[20] Harvey A. Cox, Jr, letter to Frank Porter Graham, 25 November 1949, Graham Papers, Box 78.

the end of the 1940s there were vocal individuals unimpressed by the cynical deployment of red-baiting.[21]

On the whole, however, Albemarle's crusade against communism was at least a partial success, influencing politicians at both local and state levels. The papers of Senator Clyde Hoey reveal that, of all the letters received by him on the subject of communism between 1949 and 1950, nearly 86% were from Albemarle residents.[22] Frank Porter Graham, too, was inundated: 27 of the 34 letters Graham received on the subject of communism throughout 1949 were from Albemarle residents, just under 80%.[23] The support and campaigning zeal created by one man's crusade, in one particular locality, shows how one community could distort a specific politician's understanding of public opinion. Without the Albemarle crusade, the combined mailbags of Hoey and Graham would in all probability have contained only twelve letters on communism.

III

One of the most controversial and written about figures of mid-twentieth century North Carolinian politics was the doyen of the state's liberal left, Frank Porter Graham.[24] President of the University of North Carolina from 1931 to 1949, unsuccessful Senate candidate, Governor-appointed Senator, active participant in the

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[21] ibid.
[22] 30 of the 35 letters in Hoey's "Communism 1949-1950" folder were from Albemarle residents, Clyde Roark Hoey Papers, Box 143, Special Collections Library, Duke University.
[23] See "Communism 1949" folder, Graham Papers, Box 78.
[24] Secondary texts on Frank Porter Graham include John Ehle, 'Dr Frank': Life With Frank Porter Graham (Chapel Hill: Franklin Street Books, 1993); Warren Ashby, Frank Porter Graham: A Southern Liberal (Winston-Salem, N.C.: John F. Blair, 1980); and Julian M. Pleasants and Augustus M. Burns III, Frank Porter Graham and the 1950 Senate Race in North Carolina (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990).

Southern Conference for Human Welfare [SCHW], appointee to Truman's Committee on Civil Rights, and member of the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies, each phase of Graham's career drew the full wrath of red-baiters and anti-communists. What was perhaps most remarkable about Graham, however, was his good-natured rebuttal of all such claims, and their negligible impact on his popularity. Indeed, on occasion, Graham worked for organisations not despite, but because of segregationists' red-baiting attacks on them. His work for SCHW, for example, is well chronicled elsewhere, but the circumstances behind his accession to the chairmanship of the Conference are worth revisiting.[25] In the wake of the controversy surrounding SCHW's inaugural meeting in Birmingham in 1938, the organisation was ravaged by red-baiting. Graham, in the words of Thomas Kreuger, agreed to take the post of Chairman -- a post that he had previously turned down -- only when "he heard of the attacks on the organization." It was because of the red-baiting and, to a lesser extent, race-baiting of SCHW that Graham thought he should take over, to add stability and direction.[26]

Two incidents revealed the "hit and miss" efficacy of red-baiting, the enduring appeal of "Dr Frank" in North Carolina's more progressive circles, and the man's own dignified, good humoured strategy of dealing with repeated accusations of communist links. In October 1946, Graham was elected the first chairman of the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies, which aimed to make nuclear facilities available to university researchers. Two years later, a right-wing radio broadcaster, Fulton Lewis,

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[25] See in addition to the above mentioned books on Graham himself, Thomas A. Kreuger, And Promises to Keep: The Southern Conference For Human Welfare, 1938-1948 (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1967); Anthony P. Dunbar, Against the Grain: Southern Radicals and Prophets 1929-1959 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981); and Patricia Sullivan, Days of Hope: Race and Democracy in the New Deal Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996).

[26] Kreuger, And Promises to Keep, pp. 38-39.

Jr, who objected to Graham's appointment, used his weekday radio show to pursue a personal vendetta against Graham.[27] Starting on 28 December 1948, Lewis began to trawl through Graham's past association with left wing causes.[28]

Not all North Carolinians, though, were convinced that Lewis' claims justified Graham's suspension from his Oak Ridge duties. L.K. Jackson protested directly to Lewis, stating that "very few men in America have done as much as he [Graham] has done...to break down the most flagrant types of nazism in the South, which," he felt, "is a disgrace to America and a reflection upon all people who claim they believe in the democratic way of life."[29] In issuing its report on Graham, the Atomic Energy Commission [AEC] itself appreciated that much of the controversy surrounding Dr Frank was due to his "active role in championing freedom of speech and other basic civil or economic rights," and, therefore, condoned his behaviour. "The specific purposes for which he had these associations," the committee concluded, "were in keeping with *American* traditions and principles."[30] There was no doubt that the choice of language was very deliberate: Graham, the commission was suggesting, was in no ways "un-American."

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[27] According to Oliver Pilat, biographer of Drew Pearson, another of Lewis' targets, "Fulton Lewis, Jr, was a nuisance because he had a five-day-a-week radio program on top of a syndicated Washington newspaper column and a Washington newsletter called *Exclusive*." Oliver Pilat, Drew Pearson: An Unauthorized Biography (New York: Harper's Magazine Press, 1973), p.29.

[28] Lewis rhetorically asked Graham if he was "willing to resign publicly from all organizations which are listed as subversive, Communist or Communist-front in view of your present access to Atomic Energy information?" "Broadcast of Fulton Lewis, Jr, December 28, 1948," Graham Papers, Box 36.

[29] L.K. Jackson letter to Fulton Lewis, Jr, 14 January 1949, Graham Papers, Box 36. Jackson went on to place Graham in the pantheon of domestic social reformers who were regular targets of red-baiting. "It is a dark day in the history of America when such men and women as Mrs Eleanor Roosevelt, Henry A. Wallace, Dr Frank Porter Graham, A. Phillip Randolph and Mrs Katherine Hyndman are smeared with the black ink of disloyalty and branded with the hot iron of communism," Jackson thought, "simply because they have come from under the blanket of hypocrisy and are fighting, bleeding and dying to make the pronouncements of America on democracy a practice of our every day life."

[30] Atomic Energy Commission Report quoted in Ashby, Frank Porter Graham, p. 237.

As was the case throughout his career, Graham did not go out of his way to exonerate himself. In the wake of Lewis' attacks, he relied simply on repeated factual declarations of his beliefs, and remained unfazed by red-baiting. It was typical of the man that his statement to the Joint Congressional Committee investigating his appointment to Oak Ridge included an appeal to "Let the facts tell the story of (1) my connection with the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies; (2) my connection with several organizations on the Attorney General's list as Communist or Communist fronts; and (3) my economic and political views expressed in representative excerpts from talks and statements made by me over the last twenty years."[31]

Many of the themes of the Oak Ridge controversy recurred during Graham's time at UNC, a University which was condemned by many contemporary right-wingers as a viper's nest of left-leaning subversives. Much of that condemnation stemmed from the 1949 "Freistadt Affair," which strongly polarised anti-communist opinion both at, and about, the University. The robustly segregationist senator, Clyde Hoey, maintained that a soldier studying at UNC had tipped him off that a fellow student with an AEC Fellowship, Hans Freistadt, was a member of the CPUSA. Hoey doggedly preserved the anonymity of his source, and received widespread praise for his "outing" of the Communist. "I want to congratulate you," a Raleigh physician wrote to Hoey in late May 1949. "If communists dont [sic] like our form of government let them get out," he continued, "and if they insist in putting in their communistic views and way of life, then lets [sic] run them out."[32]

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[31] "Frank Porter Graham Statement to Joint Congressional Committee," Graham Papers, Box 36.
[32] Robert P. Noble, MD, letter to Clyde Roark Hoey, 27 May 1949, Hoey Papers, Box 143.

Once again, though, Hoey and his fellow red-baiters did not receive universal support. It emerged that Freistadt was already well known as a communist on the campus, suggesting that it was his links to the AEC and its nuclear secrets that caused such panic.[33] Jonathan Marshall, a fellow student, was outraged at the witch-hunt. "The Freistadt case represents far more than a question of whether one insignificant little communist should receive a government scholarship or not," he wrote in a Tar Heel article enclosed with a letter to Hoey. Rather, he felt that it "hits at the very foundation of our American concept of Democracy. By the very fact that we are afraid of Freistadt and his kind," he continued, "we admit a fear that democracy is not strong enough. This columnist feels that our democracy is strong enough," he concluded, "to withstand thousands of communists if we do not become hysterical and make martyrs of them."[34] Graham himself had given a speech only recently beforehand, in which he had acknowledged that "everyone who knows me knows that I am and have always been opposed to Communism, Fascism and every other form of totalitarian tyranny. I have never been," he had reiterated, "am not now and will never be a Communist a pro-Communist or fellow-traveler."[35]

In 1950, during Graham's infamous senatorial race against Willis Smith, the red-baiting that characterised so many campaigns against Graham was closely linked to questions of race. As a result, the campaign has often been seen as the zenith of

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[33] An editorial in the campus newspaper, the Tar Heel, for example, registered the fact that "readers of this page are thoroughly familiar with Freistadt's philosophy, for the Stubbering, Austria, native is the most prolific 'Letters to the Editor' writer at Carolina..." Clipping, Tar Heel editorial, [n.d.], Hoey Papers, Box 143.

[34] Tar Heel article by Jonathan Marshall, enclosed with Jonathan Marshall to Clyde Roark Hoey, 21 May 1949, Hoey Papers, Box 143.

[35] "Speech, 1948," Graham Papers, Box 34.

southern reaction.[36] As with most southern elections, the race for the vacant Senate seat boiled down to a race for the Democratic party nomination. In 1950, the candidates were Graham, incumbent since Governor Kerr Scott had appointed him to fulfil the last year of the late Senator J. Melville Broughton's unexpired term, A. Willis Smith and Robert Rice Reynolds, who, in the words of Graham's contemporary and close associate John Ehle, "was not going to win, but he would muddy the waters a little bit."[37] When the results were in, Graham had received 303,605 votes, with Smith, his nearest challenger, polling 250,222. With 48.9%, Graham was just short of the majority that would give him outright victory in the first May primary.[38] On 25 June 1950, election night for the resultant run-off, Smith polled 281,114 to Graham's 261,789.[39]

The Smith camp had changed tactics between the first primary and the run-off, and it reaped heavy reward. Although the delineation between the two was not always clear cut, in the first campaign Smith had concentrated more on red-baiting Graham; in the second, he concentrated more on race-baiting. Both methods played to popular contemporary concerns, with the escalating Korean crisis heightening Cold War anti-communism, and the impending Supreme Court decision in the *Sweatt v. Painter* case heightening racial tensions.[40] Ultimately, however, it appeared that playing on

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[36] The tactics and rhetoric used in the 1950 election were even more scathing than those used by George Smathers against Claude Pepper of Florida in the same year. For a personalised account of that campaign, see Claude Denson Pepper with Hays Gorey, Pepper: Eyewitness to a Century (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Janovich, 1987), esp. pp. 189-214.

[37] Ehle, Dr Frank, p. 162. Smith, a corporate lawyer, had recently been elected President of the American Bar Association, and was Chairman of Duke University's Board of Trustees.

[38] Figures quoted in Pleasants & Burns, Frank Porter Graham, p. 186.

[39] Figures quoted in ibid., p. 244.

[40] North Carolina had filed an *amicus curiae* brief with the Court in *Sweatt v. Painter*, which on 5 June ruled that a separate black law school in Texas was not equal to its white counterpart. Although the Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiff on appeal, it did not overturn *Plessy v. Ferguson*, arguing that the decision in *Sweatt v. Painter* applied only to graduate schools. NAACP attorneys, however, saw it as a launching pad for an all-out attack on the separate-but-equal premise. A retrospective article on the

Graham's alleged links with communist-fronted organisations was a marginally less successful tactic than preying on his acceptance of increased civil rights for the state's black population.[41]

That red- and race-baiting has been well chronicled.[42] Once again Graham refused to take a strong stand against such charges, much to the chagrin of his support staff. Indeed, it had long been part of Graham's psychological make-up to steer away from direct attacks on his political position, especially if those attacks were based only in rumour. Alexander Heard, who joined Graham at the UNC faculty, remembered that in the late 1930s Norman Thomas warned Howard Kester of communist involvement in the SCHW. Heard reminisced that Graham "wrote back to Howard Kester and said in effect, 'Now Howard, I have a lot of respect for you and I admire you in many ways, but I just can't go along with all this innuendo and these unsupported charges. These people may well be Communist, but I don't have any proof of it yet and until I have some proof I'm just going to have to tell you that I can't go with you on this.'"[43] Looking back on Graham's ultimate defeat in 1950, one

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campaign in the Baltimore Evening Sun published on 3 July 1950, titled "North Carolina Takes Second Look At Primary," stated that the timing "of the North Korean explosion adds an interesting postscript by way of a question to North Carolina's senatorial primary runoff last Saturday: would Frank Graham have been defeated had the communists invaded South Korea sooner?" Article in, "Campaign Scrapbook," Allard K. Lowenstein Papers, Box 28, Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

[41] Perhaps the best example of the truly wretched, insidious nature of the race-baiting in the run-off was a picture that appeared as a variant to an often-used photograph of black GIs dancing with white women in London during World War II. The picture was released with Graham's wife's head superimposed onto one of the white women in the photograph. See Graham Papers, Box 39, or Pleasants and Burns [eds], Frank Porter Graham, p. 221.

[42] The writings on the campaign are voluminous. Pleasants and Burns Frank Porter Graham concentrates almost solely on the campaign, which is described as "taking on the trappings of a factional brawl," p. 2. Ashby denotes considerable time to the campaign, as does Ehle. See Ashby, Frank Porter Graham, pp. 243-285, and Ehle, Dr Frank, pp. 161-187. See also Julian M. Pleasants, "The Last Hurrah: Bob Reynolds and the U.S. Senate Race in 1950," The North Carolina Historical Review 65 (January 1988), pp. 52-75.

[43] Alexander Heard, Southern Oral History Program [A-344], Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

of his closest lieutenants during the campaign, Allard Lowenstein, felt that it was that continued failure to reply to scurrilous rumours that cost Graham his election, not the red-baiting or race-baiting *per se*. In a letter to Michael Straight, editor of The New Republic, Lowenstein noted that it "has been fashionable for Northern liberal publications to blame Senator Graham's defeat on what is described variously as his 'timidity' or as 'backsliding on his principles.'"[44] It was one of Graham's abiding principles that he should not stoop to the level of red-baiters, believing that he could shrug off the effects of their attacks by reiterating his own stance on relevant issues and ignoring their claims.

IV

Race- and red-baiting were clearly well established in North Carolina when, on 17 May 1954, the Supreme Court promulgated the first *Brown* decision. Paralleling Virginia's Gray and Perrow Plans, North Carolina's legislative response to *Brown* was also marked by the reports of two commissions, both chaired by Thomas Jenkins Pearsall. However, in two vital respects at least, Massive Resistance in North Carolina differed dramatically from that in Virginia. Unlike the Old Dominion, North Carolina was not named in the original *Brown* case. As a result, Tar Heel legislators had more time to formulate a response. More importantly, perhaps, whereas most members of the Byrd Machine prioritised the preservation of segregation, North Carolina's elites wished to preserve both segregation and their progressive image.

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[44] Allard Lowenstein letter to Michael Straight, 3 August 1950, Graham Papers, Box 39. For an account of Lowenstein's role in the campaign, see William H. Chafe, Never Stop Running: Allard Lowenstein and the Struggle to Save American Liberalism (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), pp. 87-92.

Almost as well known as North Carolina's reputation for being moderate is its governor's reaction to *Brown*. Umstead was "terribly disappointed," but was nonetheless adamant that the Supreme Court had spoken and should be obeyed.[45] Irving Carlyle, a well-respected Winston-Salem political leader, summed up the state's initial response when he publicly stated that, as good citizens, "we have no other course except to obey the law laid down by the United States Supreme Court."[46] One of Umstead's last political acts before his untimely death in the autumn of 1954 was the establishment of the Special Advisory Committee on Education, under Pearsall, then a state senator. In a letter written to National Association for the Advancement of Colored People [NAACP] state president Kelly Alexander, however, Umstead made it quite clear that he was "in thorough agreement with the announcement made by the State Board of Education some time ago that the schools in North Carolina will open in September on the same basis upon which they have been operating."[47] In the absence of a court timetable for desegregating the schools, North Carolina was in no immediate rush to desegregate.

Beyond the initial platitudes of Umstead and Carlysle, however, there was caution in North Carolina just as there was in Virginia. No politician or legislator wanted to take the first step towards defining the state's long-term strategy. Furthermore, the early establishment of Pearsall's committee gave the impression that the state was actively pursuing a response to *Brown*, even though, in reality, the committee was bereft of ideas. "It is a tremendous responsibility and I feel terribly

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[45] Umstead quoted in Raleigh News and Observer, 18 May 1954, p.1.
[46] Carlysle quoted in Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights, p. 48.
[47] William Umstead letter to Kelly Alexander, 24 June 1954, William B. Umstead Gubernatorial Papers, Box 58, State of North Carolina Department of Cultural Resources, Division of Archives and History, Raleigh, North Carolina.

inadequate," Pearsall wrote to M.P. "Mickie" Dawson, of Rocky Mount, in August 1954, the month in which his committee was established. "The distressing part," he continued, "is [that] everyone on the Committee, as well as the Governor, seems almost lost as to where to turn. We are almost forced entirely to depend upon time and Providence to provide the answer."[48]

It fell to Luther Hartwell Hodges, a former vice-president of the Marshall Field and Company Mills, and consultant for the State Department on the International Management Conference, to try to give the state some direction.[49] Steeped in the progressive business culture of North Carolina, he had become Umstead's Lieutenant Governor in January 1953. When Umstead died in November 1954, Hodges fulfilled his term until the gubernatorial election of 1956. His business and management experience fitted perfectly with North Carolina's image, and when he ran for the governorship in his own right in 1956 he carried every county. In recognition of the needs of the state's business elites, Hodges realised a middle ground had to be found between the extremes of integration and interposition. Full-scale resistance and racial extremism would surely frighten off prospective northern investors; actual desegregation was anathema to the vast majority of white North Carolinians.[50] Swinging away from Umstead's initial compliant platitudes, Hodges

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[48] Thomas Pearsall letter to M.P. "Mickie" Dawson, 16 August 1954, Thomas Jenkins Pearsall Papers, Box 1, Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

[49] The International Management Conference was set up to offer technical assistance to European businesses.

[50] A good example of the dilemma that concurrent drives for continued segregation and economic advancement presented North Carolina's leaders with is provided by the presence of military towns in the state. Military towns, mindful of federal law and of the presence of black GIs, often pushed for quicker desegregation than their civilian equivalents. As David Cecelski has noted, in Havelock, adjacent to the Cherry Point Marine Corps Air Station in Craven County, on North Carolina's eastern seaboard, public elementary schools "had been integrated since 1959." Whilst keen to forestall desegregation, Hodges was nevertheless also aware of the important economic role that federal military bases played. They had, for example, been central to pulling eastern areas of North Carolina out of the pre-war depression. David Cecelski, Along Freedom Road: Hyde County, North Carolina, and the Fate

propagated what Houghton usefully termed North Carolina's "sly" resistance.[51] Underlying the surface veneer of North Carolina's respectable, measured response to *Brown* was Hodges' steadfast determination to defy federal attempts to force desegregation upon the state. That veneer also tempered indigenous civil rights activity in North Carolina, leading the state's African Americans to believe that more was being done to ameliorate their position than was, in fact, the case.

The report of the first Pearsall committee was delivered as part of Hodges' Budget and Biennial message on 6 January 1955; the second, which became known as the Pearsall Plan, was delivered eighteen months later in June 1956. The initial committee's report, anticipating the second *Brown* decision, recommended that the task of pupil assignment be delegated to local school boards. It was a stultifying delay tactic: if the NAACP was to attempt to bring suit to secure desegregation, it would have to do so in each locality separately. Even if the NAACP did decide to stretch its resources in such suits, the provisions of the Pupil Assignment Act allowed segregationists to claim that they had assigned students to particular schools according to a litany of non-racial criteria. Adhering strictly to a legal framework, therefore, North Carolina's resisters sought to do as little as possible to implement *Brown*.

By the Summer of 1955, in line with the second *Brown* decision, Hodges proposed the voluntary school attendance plan often referred to by contemporaries as "voluntary segregation." At the end of September, the governor authorised Attorney General William B. Rodman, Jr, to give a statement to the press that exemplified the state's twin needs of moderation and continued segregation. The plan for voluntary

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of Black schools in the South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), p. 18 and p. 181 ftn. 40.

[51] Houghton, "The North Carolina Republican Party."

segregation, said Rodman, "is designed primarily to permit communities that, sometime in the future, may be faced with an integration problem as a result of a court order or otherwise, to close their public schools if they wish and try other methods of educating their children."[52] Rodman thus couched the ultimate hard line sanction of school closures in conciliatory tones. The time frame of "sometime in the future" was even more vague than the Supreme Court's "all deliberate speed."

Ever mindful of the progressive image North Carolina was trying to preserve, Hodges lambasted as "extremist" anyone who opposed the plan, whether they did so because they felt that it was not sufficiently progressive, or because it did not ensure total segregation. "Those who would force this State to choose between integrated schools and abandonment of the public school system," he pronounced, "will be responsible if, in the choice, we lose the public school system...and find, to our eternal sorrow, the personal racial bitterness which North Carolinians of both races have avoided so successfully."[53] When it appeared in June 1956, the Pearsall Plan incorporated Hodges' new stance. The formidable maze of litigation facing potential desegregation suits was preserved from the first Pearsall report, but, more radically, it also allowed for school boards to close public schools faced by the direct threat of imminent desegregation, if countenanced by a public referendum. In the event of school closures, the Plan would also provide state tuition grants for white students wanting to attend private schools.

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[52] "The Segregation Problem in the Public Schools of North Carolina: Summary of Statements and Actions by Governor Luther H. Hodges, October 3, 1957," p. 5, Basil Lee Whitener Papers, Box 82, Special Collections Library, Duke University.

[53] ibid., p.4. Chafe is correct in his assertion that, "By the time he had finished the speech, Hodges had succeeded in creating a situation where anything he proposed -- short of an outright endorsement of the Ku Klux Klan -- could be portrayed as 'moderate.'" Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights, p. 52.

Because of the provisions for actually closing public schools, the 1956 Pearsall Plan was far more hard line than its 1955 predecessor. As Davison Douglas has perceptively noted, though, it was less extreme than the plans of Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi and South Carolina, all of which dropped any constitutional provision for public education.[54] No doubt because of its provisions for more hard line resistance, Hodges strove to sell the Pearsall Plan as a moderate response to *Brown*. In a September speech, broadcast on both radio and television, he used a paternalistic tone in hoping that, with the provisions of the Plan, "the traditional good relationship between our races in North Carolina will take care of us." It was as part of an effort "to be sure [that] we don't have trouble" that Hodges insisted that North Carolina needed "the 'safety valves' of school attendance grants and local option such as are provided by our constitutional amendment [to allow the implementation of the Pearsall Plan]."[55] Following a major publicity campaign, the North Carolina electorate ratified the Plan in a referendum by a ratio of four to one, a greater margin than that which had ratified the Gray Commission in Virginia.[56]

The initial appeals to moderation encapsulated by the Pearsall and Gray Plans were not, however, the only link between the Tar Heel State and the Old Dominion. North Carolina's response was more closely entwined with Virginia's than has

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[54] See Davison M. Douglas, Reading, Writing, & Race: The Desegregation of Charlotte Schools (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), p. 33. The Pearsall Plan was devised as a "safety valve" against integration. As Chafe has succinctly described it, it was "a local-option clause permitting a school district, or any portion thereof, to close its schools by public referendum if desegregation occurred, and a constitutional amendment granting state tuition aid for white students in those districts to attend private schools." Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights p. 53.

[55] "The Segregation Problem in the Public Schools of North Carolina: Summary of Statements and Actions by Governor Luther H. Hodges, October 3, 1957," Whitener Papers, Box 82, p. 11.

[56] Douglas, Reading, Writing, & Race, p. 33. Virginia's Gray Plan had received support in a ratio of three to one in an equivalent referendum. See Matthew D. Lassiter, "A 'Fighting Moderate': Benjamin Muse's Search for the Submerged South," in Matthew D. Lassiter and Andrew B. Lewis [eds], The Moderates' Dilemma: Massive Resistance to School Desegregation in Virginia (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1998), p.175.

hitherto been acknowledged. In January 1955, for example, Judge A.M. Aiken of the Corporation Court in Danville, Virginia, wrote to Hodges in simple terms. "For all your recent public statements," he said, "my admiration and congratulations."[57] Of greater importance to the direction of both Virginia's and North Carolina's Massive Resistance, however, was a meeting on 3 May 1955. Hodges, his administrative assistant Paul A. Johnstone, Attorney General McMullan, Pearsall, various members of the Assembly, and other members of the first Advisory Committee on Education, met David Mays, sometime counsel for Virginia's Gray Commission. Mays' conclusions from the meeting were that both states saw their legislation on pupil assignment merely as "a stop gap, not an ultimate solution," and, damningly, that "the leaders know of no solution which will retain both the public school system and segregation."[58] If total segregation was to be maintained, it would have to be through private schooling. As Pearsall had himself admitted to Curtis Briggs eight months earlier in September 1954, however, "the problem of our Committee is to find a way to preserve our schools *within* the Court's decision."[59]

Token integration was the logical solution. A two-hour meeting between Mays and Johnstone, in October 1956, reinforced this feeling. Johnstone, according to Mays, stated that the North Carolina legislature was "grateful" to its Virginian counterparts for recognising that some integration was unavoidable. The Virginia

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[57] Judge A.M. Aiken letter to Luther Hodges, 14 January 1955, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 39, State of North Carolina Department of Cultural Resources, Division of Archives and History, Raleigh, North Carolina.

[58] David Mays Diaries, 3 May 1955, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Va. In his diaries, Mays also stressed the point that North Carolina had more time to manoeuvre, given that no federal suit was pending there. In July 1955, he commented that, "Meantime NC has followed our lead in declaring the policy of segregation for the 1955-56 school year. Of course, they have a better chance of getting away with it since no federal suit is pending against any NC locality." Mays Diaries, 11 July 1955.

[59] Thomas Pearsall letter to Curtis Briggs, 13 September 1954, Pearsall Papers, Box 1.

Public Education Commission's report had, after all, recommended that tuition grants should be provided "in localities where integration occurred." Because of this, Mays reported that Johnstone believed Virginia had "rendered a great service to the leaders of other southern states by being the first responsible people to recognize this, and that all leaders in his own state are in agreement on the point, but not yet able, for political reasons, to recognize it publicly."[60]

When Hodges' governorship ended in 1960, it was no surprise that North Carolina's voters embraced Terry Sanford of Laurinburg as his successor. Having served as the president of the Young Democratic Clubs of North Carolina from 1949-1950, and been assistant director of the Institute of Government at UNC-Chapel Hill, he had the relevant political experience for the post. More importantly perhaps, he had practised law from 1948 until his gubernatorial election in 1960, which helped him bring a rational approach to the governorship that sought to avoid legally untenable positions of resistance. Indeed, he seamlessly extended Hodges' much vaunted moderation, continuing to defer any desegregation decisions to local school boards. By 1961, Sanford's office had formulated a stock reply to constituents' complaints and concerns over desegregation, describing how "students have been assigned to these schools by action of the local school boards. Under our North Carolina system of public education," the letter continued, "the local board has complete authority over the assignment of students and, therefore, there is nothing that this office or any agency of state government can do to either encourage or prevent such assignment."[61]

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[60] Mays Diaries, 2 October 1956.

[61] Form letter of Governor Sanford, as at August 1961, Terry Sanford Gubernatorial Papers, Box 111, State of North Carolina Department of Cultural Resources, Division of Archives and History, Raleigh, North Carolina.

V

As across the South, North Carolinians fleshed out legislative measures designed to forestall school desegregation with an advocacy of the primacy of States' Rights. Although North Carolina was lacking a central figure with the urgency and zeal of Virginia's James Kilpatrick and his appeals to interposition, Governor Hodges often hinted at a deep resentment of what he saw as the Supreme Court's infringement of North Carolina's sovereign status. Apart from Hodges, however, and a few other notable exceptions, North Carolinians did not appeal to States' Rights with the same regularity as their Virginian counterparts. Such diversity in the tenacity of segregationists' adherence to States' Rights, not only between two states, but also between individuals within the same state, is testament to the complexity of segregationist responses to questions of resistance strategy. Rather than examining the elaborate nature of that response, however, historians have been drawn to studies of the self-declared "moderate" nature of those whites who looked to sustain North Carolina's progressive reputation.[62]

On 5 January 1955, Hodges issued a statement commenting on the interposition movement that Kilpatrick had precipitated, announcing that he himself "was in accord with the opinion in many parts of the South that the Supreme Court of the United States, in its segregation decisions, had assumed the authority to change the Constitution of the United States at the will of the members of the Court and without legal precedent."[63] Having consulted Pearsall, Hodges released another

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[62] Douglas, in particular, and to a certain extent Cecelski, favour detailed discussions of white attitudes to segregation, rather than the myriad ways in which different segregationists utilised different arguments to promote, sustain, and propagate their beliefs in white supremacy. Douglas, Reading, Writing, and Race; Cecelski, Along Freedom Road.

[63] "The Segregation Problem in the Public Schools of North Carolina: Summary of Statements and Actions by Governor Luther H. Hodges, October 3, 1957," Whitener Papers, Box 82, p. 6.

statement a month later. They had agreed that Pearsall's advisory committee should consider a resolution to "reaffirm North Carolina's position with the other Southern States in emphasizing the strong resentment our people feel toward the unjustified usurpation of power by the Supreme Court of the United States."[64] Belying wider attempts to appear moderate, Hodges became one of only two southern governors in the peripheral South to endorse interposition, albeit, as Numan Bartley has noted, as "a protest, not a statement of policy."[65] The other Governor to do so was that icon of immoderate southern resistance, Orval Faubus.

As if his position on federal intervention was in any way ambiguous, Hodges took the opportunity to reiterate it when he announced his candidacy for the 1956 gubernatorial primary to an audience in Leaksville. "I do not agree with the Supreme Court decision," he said, "and I think it usurped the rights of the States and the Congress in its decision."[66] Hodges gave his full support to the Southern Manifesto, sponsored and co-drafted as it was by his North Carolina colleague, Sam Ervin.[67] His support for the Manifesto allowed him to appeal to the state's more intransigent segregationists, but in a relatively moderate manner. The document did, after all, only advocate all *legal* means for defying the Supreme Court's desegregation edicts.

The North Carolina Patriots, the state's foremost White Citizens Council body, supported the same strong line of States' Rights as Hodges, and in particular rejected the validity of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the established social and racial mores of individual southern states. They wrote to UNC faculty member and fellow

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[64] ibid., p. 7.
[65] Numan Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South During the 1950's (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969), p. 144.
[66] "The Segregation Problem in the Public Schools of North Carolina: Summary of Statements and Actions by Governor Luther H. Hodges, October 3, 1957," Whitener Papers, Box 82, p. 8.
[67] The other two main authors of the Manifesto were Richard Russell and John Stennis.

Patriot Wesley Critz George in February 1956, enclosing a copy of The Civil Rights Revolution, by Aldrich Blake. "As Mr Blake so well puts it," wrote the Patriots, "'The real issue over civil rights is not race, color, creed or national origin, but a FREE SOCIETY vs. STATISM.'"[68] This drew a parallel to what many southerners in the 1950s understood to be the mechanics of a socialist state, or, in its most extreme form, a Soviet-style, centralised system of government. Put in the most simple terms possible, as Walter J. Alston of Henderson did in a letter to Hodges in January 1956, "if States do not have any rights, then we are drifting to a Socialist or Communist State."[69]

In much the same way, C. Dana Malpass linked an infringement of States' Rights to a socialist central government in his campaign for a seat in the House of Representatives in 1960. Clearly, in some quarters, such rhetoric had not lost its potency in North Carolina as the 1950s drew to a close. The pamphlet produced to publicise Malpass's campaign stated that a "return to [a] constitutional position on States' Rights is long overdue." Tellingly, he wove his concern for States' Rights tightly into a wider desire to eradicate socialism. "The choice of the voter on November 8," concluded his pamphlet, "is between the Republican party of performance and the U.S. Socialist (Democratic) party of promises."[70]

More often than not, as Malpass and Alston exemplified, what States' Rights sentiment there was in North Carolina was inexorably linked to discussions of the global situation. Moreover, some citizens chose to define the segregation issue as an

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[68] North Carolina Patriots letter to Wesley Critz George, 11 February 1956, Wesley Critz George Papers, Box 2, Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Capitals in original.
[69] Walter J. Alston letter to Luther Hodges, 14 January 1956, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 117.
[70] "C. Dana Malpass, Republican Candidate for the House of Representatives from Hanover County, Wilmington, N.C.: For Progress Vote Republican," George Papers, Box 8.

integral part of that Cold War struggle. An editorial in the N.C. Christian Advocate in January 1955, for example, discussed the speech given by State Senator O. Arthur Kirkman to the "Brotherhood Class" of West Market Street Church, in Greensboro. Kirkman supported the theory that, if southerners were either "thoroughly Communist" or "thoroughly Christian," the segregation problem could be successfully addressed: in communist Russia, blacks would be dispatched to Siberia, he claimed, or subjected to some other method of disappearance, "then there would be no race issue"; conversely, he believed that if Americans chose a path of genuine Christianity "closer to home," again there would be no race problem. "Mr Kirkman's incisive analysis cuts to the quick," the Advocate summarised. "We are too good to apply the Communist treatment to this problem; we are not good enough to apply the Gospel..."[71]

In both arenas -- Cold War abroad and segregation at home -- the stakes were high. It would, however, be a mistake to suggest that all North Carolinians gave equal weight to both issues: many did attempt to differentiate between the two concerns, often imbuing one with more importance than the other. Lloyd B Owens, for example, Senior Vice Commander of an Asheville-based veterans' association, wrote to Hodges in the winter of 1959. "It surely is a very definite fact that our negro situation in America could very easily *become* much worse than our Russian communist one is at the present time since our negro question is a more internal affair," he wrote.[72] For

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[71] "Is This Subsidized Propaganda? Editorial From the N.C. Christian Advocate, Greensboro N.C." 20 January 1955, clipping in Stanley Gubernatorial Papers, Box 104, Archives and Research Services, Library of Virginia, Richmond. Kirkman implied, therefore, that the Christian line was integrationist, in stark contrast to some of his segregationist-minded fellow churchmen. For more on the arguments underpinning religious segregation, see David L. Chappell, "Religious Ideas of the Segregationists," Journal of American Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2 (1998) pp. 237-261.

[72] Lloyd B. Owens letter to Luther Hodges, 16 February 1959, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 421. Emphasis my own.

Owens, there was no mention of any of the other possible points of conflict of the 1950s, be they over gender roles, or teenage rebellion and perceived delinquency. In his mind, at least, the most pervasive problem of the late 1950s was that of communist insurgency; he noted, however, that the one source of unrest that could eclipse the threat of external communism was the racial situation.

North Carolinians became increasingly aware that the United States' racial dilemmas were being played out on a world stage. In May 1961, for example, Charlotte was selected to host North Carolina's first state-sponsored International Trade Fair, to run from 12 to 21 October of the same year. The organisers showed an understandable paranoia about how the city's residual patterns of racial segregation and discrimination would impact on such an international forum. Two African Americans, Dr R.A. Hawkins, Chairman of the Mecklenburg Organization on Political Affairs, and Joseph Charles Jones, Chairman of the Student Protest Movement, outlined their concerns in a joint letter to Terry Sanford.[73] The success of such a trade fair should have boosted the image of North Carolina's progressive culture, especially in the wake of the sit-in movement.[74] "In your considerations of the potential site," wrote Hawkins and Jones, "we wonder if it occurred to your board that public accommodations such as the leading hotels, motels, restaurants and theaters of this city...refuse to honor colored citizens of this community in the use of their accommodations." The use of such facilities, they noted, would be integral to the

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[73] Dr R.A. Hawkins and Joseph Charles Jones letter to Terry Sanford, 4 May 1961, Sanford Gubernatorial Papers, Box 111. The letter was copied to, among others, the President, former-Governor Hodges and President Kennedy's Special Assistant, Attorney Frank D. Reeves.

[74] Indeed, Charles Jones was himself active in the sit-in movement. In the words of Davison Douglas, he "led several hundred other students in a sit-in protest at several downtown Charlotte lunch counters that refused service to black customers," on 9 February 1960. Douglas, Reading, Writing, & Race, p. 85.

success or failure of the fair. What Hawkins and Jones were essentially highlighting was that, "with colored peoples being invited from other parts of the world, we assure you that this humiliation will be quite an embarrassment to our community, state and nation." Fleshing those concerns out onto the world stage, the two authors reasoned that, unless action was taken to deconstruct Charlotte's racist systems, more aid and comfort would be given "to the Communists in their attempt to embarrass our nation in the eyes of the colored peoples of the world, by our refusal to treat all peoples as equal."[75] Segregated conditions could all too easily undo all that the trade fair sought to achieve.

By mid-century, furthermore, technological advances had made possible the speedy dissemination of information, not just around the nation, but around the globe. "Modern communication methods have made it possible for Russia to flash the news of any segration [sic] incident around the world in a few hours," commented Mrs Glenn A. Bassett to Governor Terry Sanford, in early 1961. A self-described "former North Carolinian," Mrs Bassett had moved to Leadville, Colorado, but by those very same communication methods kept in touch with the situation in her home state. "We cannot afford to wash our dirty linen in public," she continued. "We have to settle integration (or desegration [sic]) before we will be able to convince the dark races of the rest of the world that DEMOCRACY does mean FREEDOM."[76]

Southerners in general were increasingly aware of the valuable propaganda that the Soviet Union was able to generate from the region's racial situation. Some North Carolinians, therefore, interpreted Hodges' attempts to label the state's

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[75] Dr R.A. Hawkins and Joseph Charles Jones letter to Terry Sanford, 4 May 1961, Sanford Gubernatorial Papers, Box 111.
[76] Mrs Glenn A. Bassett letter to Terry Sanford, 12 January 1961, Sanford Gubernatorial Papers, Box 111.

resistance "moderate" as an active attempt to negate this Soviet source of propaganda. W.W. Finlator, for example, of the First Baptist Church in the eastern seaboard's Elizabeth City, sought to inform Hodges of the perspective on *Brown* and Massive Resistance that he had gleaned whilst travelling to Europe in the early summer of 1955. "To the traveler returning to these shores," he wrote, "nothing seems to have raised the stock of the United States in the eyes of the world or given the communist racist propaganda against us such a jolt as these rulings of the Court [*Brown I* and *II*]. Finlator confidently told Hodges that "You were aware of this when you acted with such courage and statesmanship during the General Assembly at the time this issue was raised."[77] Finlator's letter strongly suggested that Hodges was deemed to be giving much needed direction to North Carolina's resistance campaign. Clearly, as Hodges and the North Carolinian legislature had hoped that their constituents might, the Reverend believed that the Pearsall Plan was taking the prudent middle ground in order to deflate Soviet propaganda based on the United States' internal racial turmoil. Finlator did not countenance the idea of the Plan as an attempt to perpetuate segregated schooling in North Carolina for as long as possible.

Some citizens of the Tar Heel State were also aware, however, that, regardless of their own stated racial progressivism, other, less moderate approaches to segregation amongst their southern neighbours could impact negatively on the nation as a whole. Katie Pridgen, of Lincolnton, for example, wrote to Senator Hoey in 1948 to denounce the recent behaviour of the wife of South Carolina's Governor, Olin Johnson. She noted how "happy the Communists and the Ku Klux Klan will be to spread abroad the statement that Mrs Olin Johnson...is reported to have made -- that

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[77] W.W. Finlator letter to Luther Hodges, 4 August 1955, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 40.

she refused to attend the democratic dinner lest she have to sit beside a negro! How can we expect to lead anyone into the world of tomorrow with such nullifications in the saddle?"[78]

On the domestic front, if the likes of Junius Scales and Frank Porter Graham had confirmed a connection between civil rights activity and communist insurgency in the minds of the majority of North Carolina's segregationists, then the *Brown* decision cemented that link. Professor C.E. Branscomb of Laurel Fork was one keen to advise Governor Umstead on a plan to thwart the Supreme Court's proposals for desegregation. The Professor would start "colored schools" a month early, so that states with compulsory education attendance laws could assign black students to schools whilst white children were still on vacation. "The teacher can dismiss the school upon approval of the administration," continued Branscomb, "should Federal Communists assert the authority that they are to force the students into the school where they do not belong." Then, tying those concerns tightly to a broader Massive Resistance rhetoric, Branscomb linked his plans to an avowedly States' Rights standpoint. "Any interruption of the schools under any plan by Federal agents," he concluded, "constitutes a destruction of education by the states."[79] Gastonia's Elva Harrison felt that compulsory desegregation, against the will of either parent or pupil, was "a restriction of force equal to anything sponsored by Soviet Russia."[80] Four years later, in 1958, C.A. Rea was somewhat starker in his terms. "Don't be deceived," he wrote to Hodges. "Segregation (separation of Races, Purity) is not unchristian. Integration, (mixing of the races, mongrelization) is anti-Christ,

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[78] Katie B. Pridgen letter to Clyde Hoey, 22 February 1948, Hoey Papers, Box 142.
[79] Professor C.E. Branscomb letter to William Umstead, 29 May 1954, Box 58.1, Umstead Gubernatorial Papers.
[80] Elva Harrison letter to William Umstead, 28 May 1954, Box 58.1, Umstead Gubernatorial Papers.

Communism. Read the Bible (King James Version) Know the Truth, Be Led by the Truth."[81]

The Cold War had introduced Americans to the rhetoric of the Soviet technique of "divide and conquer," and, to southern eyes at least, attempts to integrate met all the criteria for such a campaign. Many believed that the South would be split over such questions as whether or not to desegregate, how to go about desegregation, or to what extent desegregation should be pursued. Under such pressures, it followed that internal violence could ensue, providing conditions perfect for a communist uprising.[82] There is some evidence to suggest that a minority of the state's segregationists rescinded on calls for the continuation of total segregation simply to ensure that there was less division. In the Summer of 1954, Dr J. Symington warned Governor Umstead that maintaining "segregation regardless of consequences... might mean war. Some feel so strongly about it that they would go to war," he continued. Symington, however, was unwilling to countenance such actions. Such headstrong adherence to segregation, he thought, "would be playing into the hands of the communists." When confronted by the two evils of forced integration and war with the Soviet Union, the doctor made it quite clear that he would give in to the former in order to prevent the latter.[83]

In the main, North Carolinians did not feel that the state's African Americans were themselves communist; they were merely unwitting dupes in a wider communist plot. In the minds of such a paternalistic society, especially one which liked to dwell

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[81] C.A. Rea letter to Hodges, 20 October 1958, Box 313, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers.
[82] Beatrice Loeb, for example, wrote that, "I wish to say that I would help a Negro as readily as I would help one of my own race. I wish them every good thing, and I believe they are being made a political foot-ball, and I also see the fine hand of Communism, with its 'divide and conquer' techniques." Mrs George H. Loeb letter to Wesley Critz George, 12 January 1956, George Papers, Box 3.
[83] Dr J. Symington letter to William B Umstead, 1 July 1954, Umstead Gubernatorial Papers, Box 58.2.

upon its support for improving black conditions within a segregated system, there was a genuine belief that blacks were content with their lot. "Many of our best and most thoughtful colored citizens," wrote E.S. Askew, "those who are not under the influence or pressure of outside paid professional agitators -- some of them Communists -- recognise the realities of the problem, and are opposed to mixing the schools."[84] The subtext of the message was clear: in the minds of segregationists, North Carolina's African American population would not have agitated for greater civil rights in general, or mixed schooling in particular, if they had been left to their own devices without communists "stirring up" trouble.

"I am no expert," Norfolk's John Fallin wrote to Wesley Critz George in 1955, "but I have tried to find the original motivating source of these militant Negro moves to mix with white people." Again, believing that blacks were too content to agitate for racial change without the stimuli of external radical forces, Fallin concluded that, "I believe the answer is International Communism."[85] This feeling was closely coupled to the belief that Soviet interest in the whole situation stemmed from a wish to ferment internal turmoil in the Unites States. "Are the thinking people too blind to see Communism behind this anti-segregation subject?" wondered Mrs Joseph Graham, of Lincoln County. "They are using negroes to start all this disturbance and cause a split among the American people."[86] As the letters of Fallin and Graham both suggested, North Carolinians at grass-roots level were undeniably gripped by a genuine fear of communism. However cynically red-baiting was deployed as a weapon by

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[84] "A Physical Not a Spiritual Separation: Race Suicide -- Ecclesiastical Edict," by E.S. Askew [n.d.], Box 16, George Papers.
[85] John H. Fallin letter to Wesley Critz George, 6 October 1955, George Papers, Box 2.
[86] Mrs Joseph Graham letter to Wesley Critz George, "Undated 1954," George Papers, Box 2.

segregationists, North Carolina citizens still harboured real fears of communist insurgency.

Two of the most pressing matters for southern segregationists were, therefore, the growing threat of desegregation and the possibility of communist infiltration. One organisation in particular was held to represent both of those concerns: the NAACP. It was because of the intrusion into southern affairs by such national organisations as the NAACP, thought North Carolina's segregationists, that school desegregation was threatened. There was little argument as to the motivating force behind the Association. The Deputy Sheriff of Rowan County, for example, felt simply that it was "a Communist inspired organization," whilst Greensboro's John Lambert had "a good many colored friends who tell me they prefer it [the segregated school system] as it is. [The] NAACP may be causing most of the trouble," he wrote to Hodges in January 1956. "They may be more of a racket than sincere. Communists may have a hand in this, hoping to create another Civil War, then moving in for the kill."[87] Allison James, a pharmacist from Winston-Salem who showed his true segregationist colours as one of the most energetic members of the Board of Directors of the Patriots of North Carolina, Inc., was more certain. He wrote to every Tar Heel School Superintendent in 1956 that, "The Communists, Fellow Travelers, and the NAACP are trying to force early integration. Their propaganda," he continued, "has blinded a few school officials who proceeded to integrate before their false theories were investigated."[88] For Mrs O.W. Hines of McCleansville, the NAACP's subversive

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[87] Woodrow W. Wilson, Deputy Sheriff of Rowan County, letter to Luther Hodges, 19 July 1955, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 40; John W. Lambert letter to Luther Hodges, 2 January 1956, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 119.

[88] Allison James letter to "All Superintendents of Schools in North Carolina; re: Data on White and Negro Testing Programs, Status of Teachers, and other items related to the non-segregation problems facing the South," [1956 Undated] George Papers, Box 4.

menace had not dissipated six years after *Brown*. "Russia is [at the] back of all of it," she wrote in March 1960, and the Soviets were "financing the Communist [sic] and the NAACP." The Soviet Union wanted to "weaken or divide us[,] she knows this negro subject is a sore spot with America."[89] A year later, a new governor faced the same old accusations. "How do you get away with it?" Marguerite Hale asked Terry Sanford. "How can you allow this spread of Communism without lifting your finger to try to stop it, or perhaps you are a member of the NAACP also."[90]

The North Carolina branch of the NAACP was involved in two specific incidents which showed how vulnerable the Association was to red-baiting attacks: one revolved around Assistant Attorney General I. Beverly Lake, the other around the notorious "Kissing Case." The NAACP's standing amongst segregationist white North Carolinians was never exactly high, but in the Summer of 1955 it plummeted further when the Association demanded the dismissal of Hodges' Assistant Attorney General, the rabidly segregationist I. Beverly Lake, because of remarks he had made suggesting that North Carolina should prepare private funding to finance private schools in an attempt to circumvent *Brown*. Lake, therefore, was undoing much of the hard work that Hodges had put in to cast the Pearsall Plan as a moderate response to *Brown*. Not wishing to be seen to give in to black demands, however, Hodges decided to stand by Lake. Exemplifying the governor's need to appeal not only to the state's moderates, but also to its staunch segregationists, Hodges was deluged by correspondence praising both Lake and his own continued support for the assistant attorney general.

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[89] Mrs O.W. Hines letter to Luther Hodges, 11 March 1960, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 523.
[90] Marguerite S. Hale letter to Terry Sanford, 20 July 1961, Sanford Gubernatorial Papers, Box 111.

According to Hodges' private secretary, E.L. Rankin, in the days after the furore the Governor received "considerable mail about the segregation problem in the public schools," the vast majority of which supported Lake's position.[91] Frank L. Austin, the Principal of Hartwell School in Concord, told Hodges that it was "reassuring to read your reply to the NAACP," before going on to equate the NAACP's extremism with that of the Ku Klux Klan. "Both are extremists!" he wrote. "They incite apprehension, fear, hatred, and violence. The Klan's deeds were through physical force: the NAACP accomplishes theirs through influence, pressure and legislation."[92] More common than the equation with the Klan's extremism was the repetition of charges of communist leadership and direction. "Every Communist organization in America is behind this integration fuss to destroy the White race and to raise up a nation of Mongrells [sic]," proclaimed Charlotte's Parks A. Yandle. "The NAACP Organization is...evil and should not be allowed to exist."[93] H.V. Carver was "proud" of his governor who would, he felt, "not sell out the white race to a few paid negro adgatators [sic] and comminist [sic] Pressure groups."[94]

Even such an apparently localised event as the remarks of one state's assistant attorney general provoked a response from across the entire South. "The time has come," thought Hubert Bickley, of Marion, South Carolina, "...where the white man must arise, or forever be lost to a communist inspired NAACP rule." Bickley asked Hodges when and where he thought that the NAACP insurgency would stop. That would be, he felt, "when your chair as governor will be filled with a negro, it is when

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[91] E.L. Rankin reply to D.B. Martin's letter of 15 July 1955, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 41.
[92] Frank L. Austin letter to Luther Hodges, 18 July 1955, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 39.
[93] Parks A. Yandle letter to Luther Hodges, 18 July 1955, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 40.
[94] H.V. Carver letter to Luther Hodges, 20 July 1955, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 40.

your daughter or grand daughter will have a negro husband, it is when you and I will be ruled by a communist inspired NAACP government."[95]

D.B. Martin, on the other hand, the Associate Agency Director of the Durham-based, black-owned North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Company, aimed to embarrass Hodges by exposing North Carolina's pretensions to moderation, and its considerably more hard line, segregationist reality. He claimed that the actions of Hodges and Lake had compromised North Carolina's reputation as "one of the better southern states." The Assistant Attorney General -- after all, a legal appointment -- should not, thought Martin, condone such "unwarranted" and "undemocratic" attacks on the NAACP and the Supreme Court. To do so "automatically classifies the State of North Carolina among other southern states, formerly of less prestige," concluded Martin, "such as Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana," precisely the position that the State's well planned resistance strategies strove to avoid.[96] Hodges, although outraging Martin, did not totally lose sight of his own carefully crafted position. In response to one constituent's suggested revocation of the NAACP's charter, for example, Hodges reverted to type. "I have had my office investigate the possibility," he replied, "and find that the NAACP is an unincorporated association which does not require a charter under State law." It was, therefore, only within a strictly legal framework that the Governor would "make every effort to combat the disturbing activities of this organization."[97]

A testament to the extent and success of red-baiting attempts on North Carolina's NAACP was the Association's attitude to what became known as the

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[95] J. Hubert Bickley letter to Luther Hodges, 30 July 1955, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 39.
[96] D.B. Martin letter to Luther Hodges, 15 July 1955, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 41.
[97] Luther Hodges letter to Louis F. Lawler, 3 August 1955, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 40.

"Kissing Case" in Monroe, N.C. The case held many parallels to that of Virginia's Martinsville Seven: both, for a short time, became world-wide *cause célèbres*; both were the type of cases in which the NAACP could have been expected to mount a defence, yet was reluctant to do so. Reports stated that Dave "Fuzzy" Simpson and Hanover Thompson, two black boys aged eight and nine respectively, were arrested for allegedly kissing a seven-year-old white girl on 28 October 1958. It was claimed by the Committee to Combat Racial Injustice [CCRI] that, although juveniles, the two boys were held in Monroe Jail for six days where they were kept *incommunicado*. Again according to the CCRI, when they were brought to trial they were not allowed representation by counsel.

News of the case was carried by various newspapers and national magazines, including The Nation which published a report sympathetic to the two black boys. Chester M. Davis was sufficiently moved by what he -- and many other segregationists -- felt was The Nation's one-sided view of the case to write a rebuttal. He set out his version of events in the Winston-Salem Journal Sentinel, published on 8 February 1959. At best, it was a paternalistic view of the boys' treatment; at its most insidious, it was a reiteration of white supremacist assumptions and ideals. Those press reports and the CCRI's stance, claimed Davis, had failed to mention that keeping juveniles in an adult penitentiary was standard procedure in Union County, which at that time had no separate juvenile facilities. Furthermore, it was claimed that Judge Price of the Juvenile Court had applied to obtain places for the boys in Morrison Training School, in Hoffman in Richmond County. The institution, according to Price, was full. To counter the claims of the boys being held *incommunicado*, Davis claimed that Hanover Thompson's mother made no attempt to

see her son in jail. More unlikely, however, was the explanation that David Simpson's mother "came daily to the jail and was admitted to see David the one time she asked to do so."[98] Bizarrely, no explanation was given for the motive behind Mrs Simpson's visits to the jail when she had not asked to see her son. Finally, Judge Price was quoted by Davis as saying that no request for counsel was ever filed by the boys' defence.[99]

Taken in its entirety, the case highlights the obvious paranoia that members of the NAACP harboured with regard to being labelled communist, especially in the wake of the wide purges of suspected radicals in the Association at the national level.[100] In one of his two Journal-Sentinel articles, tellingly entitled, "Propaganda Campaign Is On: Communist Front Shouts 'Kissing Case' to World," Davis reported that the Association's leaders "are deeply concerned about the possibility that the [CCRI] is a Communist directed 'front.' They are frightened," he continued, "at being identified with the Communist movement. As Kelly Alexander of Charlotte, president of the Carolina NAACP Board of Directors, told this reporter, 'If we ever get identified with communism, the Ku Klux Klan and the White Councils will pick up the charge that we are 'reds' and use it like a club to beat us to death.'"[101] Hodges, mindful that the state's more intransigent segregationists viewed the NAACP itself as

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[98] Clipping, "'Kissing Case' is Distorted in the Northern Press," Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 423.
[99] ibid.
[100] For more on the NAACP's stance on anti-communism, see Kenneth R. Janken, "From Colonial Liberation to Cold War Liberalism: Walter White, the NAACP, and Foreign Affairs, 1941-1955," Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 21, No. 6 (1998) pp. 1074-1095; and Wilson Record, Race and Radicalism: the NAACP and the Communist Party in Conflict [Communism in American Life Series] (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1964).
[101] Clipping "Propaganda Campaign Is On: Communist Front Shouts 'Kissing Case' to World," in Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 423.

communist tainted, noted that "even the NAACP organization in North Carolina is disturbed over the way in which this case is being exploited."[102]

The sexual nature of the case, too, alarmed the NAACP hierarchy. Robert F. Williams, the maverick leader of the Monroe chapter of the NAACP and advocate of armed self-defence, was unequivocal as to why the Association's national leadership shunned representation in the case. "The national office of the NAACP wouldn't have anything to do with the case," he wrote, "because it was a 'sex case.'"[103] As an integral part of Massive Resistance rhetoric, segregationists played on fears of miscegenation. To many whites, any dismantling of the South's racial barriers would unleash a torrent of inter-racial sex. In order to heighten those fears, segregationists played upon the traditional supremacist belief that African Americans harboured an innate, bestial sexuality, which they were waiting to unleash on southern white womanhood. As Tim Tyson has commented, "For many white citizens, the case seemed to confirm the sexual fears that accompanied their vision of where school desegregation would lead."[104] Once more, the case provoked fears of juvenile delinquency, warnings of which also formed an intrinsic part of resistance rhetoric. According to a firsthand account written by Robert Williams' close associate Julian Mayfield, "Monroe officials cast doubt on the legitimacy of the boys' births. Moreover, they had asserted that James and Fuzzy were delinquents who had been in trouble with the police before..."[105]

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[102] Luther Hodges Statement, 12 February 1959, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 423.
[103] Robert F. Williams, Negroes With Guns (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1998), p. 22.
[104] Tim Tyson introduction to ibid., p. xx.
[105] Julian Mayfield's account reproduced in James Forman, The Making of Black Revolutionaries (Washington, DC: Open Hand Publishing, Inc.,1985), pp. 172-174. Quotation from p. 173.

Miss Barbara Easton, of New York City, wrote a letter to Governor Hodges which gave a further explanation of the NAACP's concerns. She claimed that both of Davis' articles in the Journal and Sentinel were "pure propaganda, filled with emotion rather than fact." Incisively hitting upon the NAACP's very fears, she continued that this "most obvious propaganda device is that of calling the CCRI a 'Communist Front.' This is a common trick; when you dislike a person or a group or a cause you yell 'red!' and hope to obscure the real reason thereby."[106] The NAACP, it would appear, had learned this lesson the hard way, and had learned it well. They avoided any representation in the case until 31 December, 65 days after the arrests.

It was, eventually, the pressure of international press coverage that forced the NAACP to make representations in the case, and which pressurised North Carolina's ruling elites into a resolution of the affair. As Mayfield's account attests, a journalist on the London News Chronicle, Joyce Egginton, published stories of the case which were soon disseminated across Europe. As a result, there were "massive demonstrations in Paris, Rome and Vienna. The hugest," Mayfield maintained, "was in Rotterdam, where the United States Embassy was stoned," and an international committee was formed to pressurise for the boys' release. A petition was sent from Europe to the States, where it eventually passed from Eleanor Roosevelt, via President Eisenhower to Hodges. On 13 February 1959, four months after the boys were first arrested, Hodges ordered the children's' release.[107]

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[106] Barbara Easton letter to Luther Hodges, 24 February 1959, Hodges Gubernatorial Papers, Box 421.
[107] Perhaps unsurprisingly given the NAACP's reluctance to take part in the defence of the boys, the Association's Kelly Alexander refuted the accusation that international pressure had had a hand in their release. "According to Mr. Alexander," wrote Mayfield, "he and journalist Harry Golden, through consultations with Governor Hodges, had effected Hanover and Fuzzy's release." Mayfield quoted in Forman, Making of Black Revolutionaries, p. 173 and p. 174.

The NAACP, however, was far from being the only target of segregationist red-baiting in North Carolina. As the drive for integration spread from specific school desegregation to southern society in general, Massive Resisters became adept at using red-baiting to undermine an expanding range of enemies. When Greensboro students began a new wave of sit-in demonstrations in Woolworth's in February 1960, for example, segregationists immediately sought to redeploy red-baiting tactics against those sitting-in. The task was made a little easier by the fact that the Communist Party had indeed attempted to give aid to the four originators of the Greensboro sit-ins, Franklin McCain, Ezell Blair, Jr, Dave Richmond and Joseph McNeil. As Franklin McCain remembered in an interview with Howell Raines, "We got a lot of attention from the Communist party [sic]. The Communist party sent representatives down to Greensboro to assist us in any way that we deemed appropriate. If it meant actual participation, they offered to sit-in with us. If it meant you needed x number of dollars to do this, they made it known that money was available, assistance was available. Just don't sit down here in Greensboro and want for things you need." Party aid was rejected, however, because "we didn't need it, there was no reason to affiliate with the Communist Party. We were in the driver's seat..."[108] McCain also exemplified the shared language that emerged between segregationists and civil rights agitators in the Cold War. One of the reasons for declining Communist aid, remembered McCain, was that "it was a Christian movement, and Christians and Communists just don't mix."[109] Just as segregationists attacked "godless" communism, therefore, so many

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[108] Franklin McCain quoted in Howell Raines, [ed.] My Soul Is Rested: Movement Days in the Deep South Remembered (New York: Penguin Books, 1983), p. 81.
[109] Franklin McCain quoted in ibid., p.81.

civil rights activists, themselves patriotic and God-fearing, felt that communism was un-American and un-Christian.

Three years after those sit-ins began, the Director of the North Carolina State Bureau of Justice [SBI] filed a report after a group of about 4,000 marching black protesters had clashed with about 3,000 white resisters. On 29 May 1963, SBI Director W.F. Anderson reported that the American Patriot News Sheet was distributed by white resisters at the march, "and this tells how the communists are using these demonstrations to further their own cause of communism." Even though Anderson did criticise the white mob whose leadership, he reported, "secretly issued pocket knives to a large number of white persons who were participating in the demonstrations," his report contained no analysis of the charges that communists led the black march, and certainly no refutation. Indeed, it reads very much as though the SBI was endorsing the view that such agitation was the work of communist infiltrators.[110]

A minority of North Carolinian segregationists were still attempting to link external subversive threats to internal racial turbulence when Congress passed the Civil Rights Bill of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965. In 1963, for example, Agnew H. Bahnsen wrote to Grady Allred, of K&W cafeterias in Winston-Salem, defining "two of the biggest, if not the biggest problems which will face our generation." These were, he continued, "communism on the international front and the race issue on the domestic front. Both," he believed, "can easily become fraught with emotionalism and cause both sides to make serious mistakes."[111]

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[110] "Bureau of Investigation, N.C. Department of Justice, Raleigh," report of 29 May 1963, Sanford Gubernatorial Papers, Box 346.

[111] Agnew H. Bahnsen letter to Grady Allred, 19 September 1963, Box 346, Sanford Gubernatorial Papers.

VI

As Frank Porter Graham's travails proved, North Carolina's segregationist leaders traditionally targeted the campus and faculty of the University at Chapel Hill as a haven of left-wing subversion. The university did not help its position in the eyes of those segregationists by insisting on the rights of free speech and academic freedom for all-comers. Regardless of the political climate in the 1950s, Ralph Bunche, Benjamin Mays, Roy Wilkins, Linus Pauling and Langston Hughes were all invited by the institution to give formal addresses. As Paul Hastings, a member of the Patriots, explained in a letter to his governor, "Many citizens of our state are disturbed and distressed over the many radicals that are brought to the University of North Carolina and allowed to poison the minds of the students with their views. Some of them," he continued, "are outright Communist [sic], and others have belonged to many Communist front organizations that promote the Communist line and programs."[112] Langston Hughes' involvement caused perhaps the greatest consternation; he was, after all, an outspoken black activist and paid-up Communist Party member. Moreover, he appeared to have gone out of his way to offend the Christian principles upon which many segregationists claimed to lay their racial views. Hastings quoted Hughes' poem, "'Goodbye Christ' which is the most blasphemous thing I have ever read about the Lord Jesus Christ:

> Put one more S in the USA
>
> To Make it Soviet.
>
> The USA when we take control

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[112] Paul D. Hastings letter to Luther Hodges, 26 April 1960, George Papers, Box 7.

Will be the USSA then."[113]

His appearance at UNC produced a predictable protest from even more predictable sources.

In 1960, W.N. Jefferies suggested to Dr L.J. Herring, of Wilson's Herring Implement Co., that support should be gathered for a man he believed deserved the governorship, and who would, "if elected, see to it that the state schools are investigated and cleared of any subversives, Communists or subversive teachings within. The man who is out-spoken," continued Jefferies, "capable, and able, is Dr I. Beverly Lake."[114] Greensboro's Eugene Hood exclaimed that "North Carolinians have become so accustomed to hearing practically nothing from [UNC at] Chapel Hill except racist propaganda until many have come to believe that most of our so-called intellectuals at college level are concerned primarily with preaching and teaching the one-world philosophy of communism."[115] R.N. White simply pointed out that Chapel Hill was "known to so many as, 'The Little Moscow of the South.'"[116]

Hastings, Jefferies, Hood and White were all members of North Carolina's White Citizens' Councils, which, as historian Neil McMillen has clearly shown -- and as the Southern Regional Council's contemporary research suggested -- were not as successful as those of other southern states.[117] In the direct wake of *Brown*, a cluster of small organisations jockeyed for segregationist support in North Carolina. In November 1954, for example, a Durham-based group known as the North Carolina

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[113] ibid.
[114] W.N. Jefferies letter to Dr L.J. Herring, 30 March 1960, George Papers, Box 7.
[115] Eugene Hood letter to The Editor, Greensboro Daily News, 22 November 1954, George Papers, Box 2.
[116] R.N. White letter to Wesley Critz George, 23 November 1954, George Papers, Box 2.
[117] See Neil McMillen, The Citizens' Council: Organised Resistance to the Second Reconstruction, 1954-1964 [2nd Edition] (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), esp. pp. 112-115.

Association for the Preservation of the White Race, Inc., [NCAPWR], approached Gene Hood to head their operations.[118] The NCAPWR's stance was not a subtle one, relying on coarse expositions of anti-communism and a belief in the inferior bloodline of African Americans. One broadsheet produced by the NCAPWR, for example, was headlined, "Negro Blood Destroyed the Civilization of Egypt, India, Phoenicia, Carthage, Greece and Rome: He Will Destroy America!" The organisation believed America to be weakening, as she looked "frantically around for Russian spies, believing that Russia will attack us with armies...In the meantime," the broadsheet continued, "Russia is laughing. She has a more deadly weapon than the atomic bomb. She knows our strength is in our white stock, and that when she has mixed our blood with Negro that we are licked forever."[119]

Upton Blevis presided over a similar group called the Constitution of White Men Incorporated [CWMI]. The preamble to their incorporation notice made their intentions quite clear: they wished to "examine carefully, very carefully," all prospective federal and state employees "to prevent the election or appointment of any person who is inclined toward internationalism, interracialism, atheism, or communism"; to teach the State and nation's children to protect them from "the evils of excessive liberalism and excessive tolerance and how they lead to internationalism, inter-racialism, and atheism, which are the three absolutely necessary steps leading to communism, treason, degradation, total ruin and destruction of individuals and

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[118] Eugene Hood letter to Wesley George, 22 November 1954, George Papers, Box 2.
[119] North Carolina Association for the Preservation of the White Race, Inc., "Negro Blood Destroyed the Civilization of Egypt, India, Phoenicia, Carthage, Greece and Rome: He Will Destroy America!" George Papers, Box 1.

nations"; and, finally, to identify, discredit, and expose every source of "propaganda against the southern people and segregation."[120]

The fractious world of North Carolina's organised white resistance was transformed by Wesley Critz George, a geneticist and eugenicist.[121] Under his tutelage, the Patriots of North Carolina, Inc., provided more direction for Tar Heel segregationists than at any other stage of Massive Resistance. George strove to bring an element of scientific certainty to racial arguments, even though, in the wake of the holocaust, some southern segregationists felt that eugenics had sinister overtones. In May 1951, for example, George was elected to the Presidency of the North Carolina Academy of Science, based in Raleigh, and, more insidiously, to the membership of the nascent American Eugenics Society, Inc., [AES] in April 1954.[122] Like George himself, the AES sought respectability, boasting a Park Avenue, New York City, postal address. The Professor came to prominence not because of his work for the various North Carolina White Citizens' Council groups to which he gave direction, but predominately for his published scientific works which purported to show a genetic basis for black inferiority. Indeed, he received literally thousands of requests

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[120] "Constitution of White Men Incorporated: Preamble," [n.d.] George Papers, Box 2.

[121] It was indicative of George's vast influence among the state's active white supremacists that the letters of Hastings, Jefferies, Hood and White -- and many more -- were copied to him, regardless of their original, intended recipient. The doctrine of eugenics was created by Francis Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin, who defined it as "the science which deals with all the influences that improve the inborn qualities of a race; also with those that develop them to the utmost advantage." Quoted in Marek Kohn, The Race Gallery: The Return of Racial Science (London: Random House, 1995), p. 114.

[122] George was Professor of Histology and Embryology at UNC from 1924 to 1949, and was Chairman of the Department of Anatomy from 1939 to 1949, before becoming Professor Emeritus in the 1950s and 1960s.

for copies of, "Race, Heredity, and Civilization," "Human Progress and the Race Problem," and, "Genes, Brains, and Social Policies."[123]

Throughout his life, George remained deeply convinced that African Americans were inferior to white Americans, a difference which he attempted to justify on mainly scientific grounds. As early as July 1944, for example, he had publicly proclaimed that "the race problem is not a religious one; it is socio-biological."[124] More caustically, he wrote to sociologist Howard Odum to remind him that he was "a breeder of fine cattle, and know[s] something about genetics. And yet," he continued, referring to recently published newspaper reports of Odum's relatively moderate stance on the desegregation question, "you are promoting public policies the ultimate results of which would be to do to the white race in America the sort of thing that would be done to your Jersey herd if the state were to require you to incorporate into your herd the sorriest scrub bull in North Carolina." Quite simply, George wrote, "I do not understand."[125]

George's scientific stance proved to be a popular proposition. Eugene Cook, Georgia's attorney general and author of "The Ugly Truth About the NAACP," had a reputation as a red-baiter. Even Cook, though, admitted to George that he had only concentrated on the legal defence of segregation and of repulsing "subversive plots" in his home state because "of my lack of knowledge of the premise on which you have based your observations and conclusions."[126] It is unlikely that Cook would have eschewed red-baiting had he had more of a grasp of George's brand of scientific

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[123] The three essays were eventually published in one complete volume in 1967: Wesley Critz George, Race Problems and Human Progress: Three Timely Essays (West Sayville, N.Y.: Research, Inc., 1967).
[124] "A Statement to the Statement of Four Ministers," 25 July 1944, George Papers, Box 1.
[125] Wesley Critz George letter to Howard Odum, 24 May 1944, George Papers, Box 1.
[126] Eugene Cook letter to Wesley George, 27 March 1957, George Papers, Box 6.

racism, but the Georgia attorney general was certainly impressed. Alabama's governor John Patterson was equally affected; he ordered a manuscript from George for a book tentatively titled, "The Biology of the Race Problem," and paid him $3,000 for its due completion.[127]

George's reaction to *Brown*, ten years after his cattle-breeding letter to Odum, found him restating his original position with ever more urgency. Furthermore, he authored a petition and submitted it to Hodges and the North Carolina Senate and House of Representatives. It concluded that the undersigned deplored "the efforts of some people to identify a program of integration of the races with Christianity." Once again, he stated that it was "rather a biological-social problem," although he consistently downplayed the latter in favour of the former, scientific approach. "It is unbelievable," he continued, "that we should passively accept such an outcome by edict."[128] The petition, and George's position on race, illuminate two crucial aspects of anti-communism, both vital to a full understanding of its multi-faceted applications. In praising George's stance, many correspondents warned George that he could only expect to be the victim of intimidation and vitriol himself. "Anyone who takes a position favoring segregation," wrote L.A. Crowell, Jr, a physician at Lincolnton's Gordon Cromwell Memorial Hospital, "...is sure to receive a lot of nasty letters from the so-called left wing element. Their main weapon," he continued, "is the

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[127] George liaised with the Governor, John Patterson, but more often it was with one of Patterson's aide's, a certain "Mr Smith." The Alabamians, however, inexplicably shelved the book, and George resorted to having it published privately by his "East Coast Friends," whom he adamantly refused to name. Eugene Cook letter to Wesley George, 25 March 1957, George Papers, Box 6; Wesley Critz George Oral History, T-3822/1, Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

[128] "Petition to Governor Luther Hodges, the Senate, and the House of Representatives," "undated 1954," George Papers, Box 2. So successful was the petition that there were calls for copies of it from around the state. "Would it be possible to start the petition on its rounds in Mecklenburg?" wrote Albert Boyle, Jr, for example, in early 1954. Albert Boyle, Jr, letter to Wesley George, George Papers, Box 2.

attempt to cow and intimidate all who differ from their views. Don't give up the fight," he concluded, "stick to your own guns."[129] An editorial in the News and Courier supporting George's position warned that "Dr George may find himself being 'investigated' by eggheads and assailed as 'un-American.'"[130]

The other crucial aspect of anti-communism revealed by George was that, under his guidance, the Patriots refrained from red-baiting civil rights agitators. It was not that members -- even Board members -- did not want to use anti-communism or red-baiting to undermine their opponents' positions; often they did propose to, but George refused to countenance such attacks, and vetoed their use. In 1955, Allison James sent George the text of an advertisement that he proposed as part of a recruitment drive for the Citizens' Council group. Entitled "The Eight Ifs and Your Answer," the advert was devised to solicit a response of eight "yes" answers in agreement with the eight statements James had proposed: eight agreements from the reader meant that "you should immediately join the Patriots of North Carolina, Incorporated."[131] These included saying "yes" if "...you believe there can be NO compromise on the matter of segregation," and if "you believe the rights of the Sovereign States to handle their own internal affairs." Question four on the list was another staple of Massive Resistance. Say "yes," the advert continued, "If you realize that either Communistic influences or economic pressure groups stand behind every effort made to invade States' Rights and force integration and miscegenation on the peoples of the South." George returned the proposed advertisement to James with his

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[129] L.A. Crowell, Jr, MD, letter to Wesley George, 20 November 1954, George Papers, Box 2.
[130] Editorial, News and Courier, 20 November 1954, clipping in George Papers, Box 2.
[131] "Ad. proposed by Mr James, "The Eight Ifs and Your Answer," [n.d.]1955, George Papers, Box 3.

comments. He had ticked statements one to eight with the exception of "four," besides which was written, "Correct! But desirable?"[132]

There is, however, no doubt that George was himself an anti-communist. An article in the New York Times Magazine in early 1956, for example, quoted George as believing that school integration was a "Communist-clerical conspiracy to promote miscegenation and thereby the ultimate downfall of America's civilization."[133] In an oral history interview given towards the end of his life, George acknowledged that, when he began to popularise racial science, "we had been through many years of agitation on the race problem by what we may speak of as the left wing, by the NAACP," and by what he termed "that element in society and the nation who were trying to bring about a forced integration of the white and the nigra [sic] races."[134]

Rather than denying the pernicious nature of communism, George simply did not believe in the efficacy of red-baiting. This was partly because of the enduring popularity of his writings on race science, and partly because he realised that red-baiting had become an overused tool of the rabid demagogue. By red-baiting, furthermore, he believed that he would detract from what he saw as the stark correctness of his scientific line.[135] When Paul Hastings wrote to George in March

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[132] ibid.

[133] George quoted in Steven Niven, "Wesley Critz George: Scientist and Segregationist," North Carolina Literary Review, No. 7 (1998) pp. 39-41. Niven's erudite, short piece is one of the very few secondary sources on Wesley Critz George.

[134] Oral History, T-3822/1. Furthermore, in a speech examining the decision of South Africa's African National Congress [ANC] to reject non-violence and take up arms to end apartheid, George stated that "the timing and co-ordination of events throughout the world suggest and give strong support to the inference that our racial problems and social conflicts spring from the dark shadows of world intrigue and from Communism." "Communism and World Wide Violence," by WC George [n.d.], George Papers, Box 14. Although the speech is not dated, it must have been late on in George's career, as it refers to an article in the Charlotte Observer of September 1963.

[135] The evidence in George's personal papers suggests that he was continuously praised by a wealth of correspondents for his three race science essays up until the Spring of 1961, when they were compiled in one volume, titled, Race, Heredity, and Civilization, which was itself equally praised and sought after. It is, perhaps, strange that George did not attempt to make more of Soviet involvement in the South's civil rights agitation, especially considering the blossoming branch of Soviet eugenics.

1956 to suggest the release of a Patriot statement elucidating the link between communists and the NAACP, George said that he thought the idea "seems a good one."[136] However, the Professor was adamant that it was "not the area in which my talents lie or my special knowledge." That area was clearly racial science, and with limited knowledge of the relevant facts, George told Hastings that he "should not want to make charges of Communist connection on the basis of newspaper stories." Press accounts, he believed, were "too unreliable."[137]

Although George ensured that the organisation was not a red-baiting outfit, it nonetheless implicitly attacked all things un-American: the name of the organisation itself, as opposed to, for example, the Citizens' Councils of South Carolina, suggested patriotic American-ness; the organisation's headed notepaper stated simply, "National Integrity, Constitutional Government, Racial Integrity, States' Rights, Individual Liberties, Private Property."[138] There could be no doubting the inference that private property was an integral part of Americanism, and, conversely, anathema to communism.

George's stature as President of the Patriots was unrivalled by any other individual member within the cantankerous world of North Carolina's organised white resistance.[139] Indeed, he remained aloof from much of the infighting and inner

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Variously referred to as, "Michurinism," "Lamarckism," or "Lysenko's Genetics," Soviet scientists had begun to pioneer socio-biological work which suggested that "apparent differences in races are only the result of differing environment." This, therefore, directly contradicted George's own stance of genetic inferiority of races. Quotes from John H. Falin letter to The Editor, Norfolk Ledger Dispatch, copied to George, 26 September 1955, George Papers, Box 3.

[136] Paul Hastings letter to Wesley George, 28 March 1956, George Papers, Box 4. Hastings worked for Reidsville's Hastings Furniture Company and was a member of the Patriots.

[137] Wesley George letter to Paul Hastings, 2 April 1956, George Papers, Box 4.

[138] Headed notepaper as at 12 March 1959, George Papers, Box 7.

[139] One indication of that stature is that almost all correspondence between members of the Patriots and the Governor or General Assembly, or simply between Patriot members, can be found copied to George in his personal files.

turmoil that has led Neil McMillen to award the Patriots "the dubious distinction of being the most short-lived of the major resistance groups in the eleven state area."[140] Finally imploding in the Summer of 1958, its replacement, the North Carolina Defenders of States' Rights [NC Defenders], was "even less effective at recruiting a mass following than had been the Patriots."[141] McMillen has ascribed this to problems "encountered by organized segregationists in states where the atmosphere was one of comparative racial moderation."[142] No doubt true, he does not, however, consider the precise nature of the in-fighting that so disrupted the organisation. In 1956, it was the Patriot's Eugene "Gene" Hood causing the most internal dissent. Hastings wrote to Allison James, who had by that time been appointed full-time executive secretary, that Dallas E. Gwynn, a Patriot member from Leaksville, "went to Gene Hood's home last week and said that Gene raved and ranted like a mad man, stating that he and Paul Hastings had wrecked the Patriots organisation."[143] Furthermore, Gwynn felt that fellow-Patriot C.L. Shuping was the man to make a success of the organisation. A year later, though, Shuping was lambasted by Erwin A. Holt, who told the then-President S.H. McCall, Jr, that it was Shuping who was "responsible for our being in the bad shape that we are in now." Holt very much regretted to add that, "so long as Mr C.L. Shuping is our general consul[,] we will never get anywhere."[144] Clearly, with such personality clashes and differences of personal opinion, all was not well.

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[140] Neil McMillen, Citizens' Councils, p. 114.
[141] ibid.
[142] ibid., p. 115.
[143] Paul Hastings letter to Allison James, 19 July 1956, George Papers, Box 4. Only six days earlier, Gwynn had himself written a substantial letter to George about the ills of the Patriots, especially the feud between Allison James and C.L. Shuping. Dallas E. Gwynn letter to Wesley George, 13 July 1956, George Papers, Box 4.
[144] Erwin A. Holt letter to S.H. McCall, Jr, 18 March 1957, Erwin Allen Holt Papers, Box 1, Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

With George at the helm, much of that internal friction was glossed over, but by the Spring of 1957, his patience had run out and he tendered his resignation on 22 March.[145] The reasons behind his departure appear twofold: he was winding down his public activities in general because of his wife's ill-health; and, in reference to the Patriot's lack of success, he stated that he could not "afford to waste my strength in spinning wheels that do nothing."[146] Once released from his grip, first the Patriots and then their successor, the NC Defenders, began to countenance the red-baiting that George had previously forced them to shun. They used red-baiting in general terms, and they used it specifically. In early 1959, for example, Earl LeBaron wrote to fellow NC Defender Sterling R. Booth, Jr, that "we have the biggest made-to-order weapon for our cause if we only use it! This does not involve us in attacking any race or religion, only defending the American and Southern way of life against Communism and race-mixing."[147] As LeBaron no doubt realised, North Carolinians harboured genuine anti-communist views as a direct consequence of the Cold War. All that segregationists had to do, therefore, was remind their fellow citizens of the link between civil rights activism and communism to tap into those fears.

LeBaron's next letter to Booth, four days later, throws up an interesting anomaly in the use of red-baiting and anti-communism. LeBaron had written a television programme purporting to show links between communists and the NAACP, entitled "History Behind the News." It was to be broadcast on Hartwell Campbell's

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[145] George wrote to Robert Porter of the Patriots, "I hereby tender my resignation as a member of the Board of Directors of the Patriots of North Carolina, Incorporated." Wesley George letter to Robert Porter, 22 March 1957, George Papers, Box 6.

[146] Wesley George letter to Robert Porter, 8 April 1957, George Papers, Box 6. On the subject of his wife's health, George turned down an invitation to speak in front of Patriots in Burlington on 13 July 1957 because he felt his wife's health would suffer if he were to become involved again. George Papers, Box 6.

[147] Earl LeBaron letter to Sterling R. Booth, Jr, 14 January 1959, Holt Papers, Box 1.

WNCT station, but LeBaron found Campbell strangely recalcitrant in his attitude to screening the programme. Mr Campbell, wrote LeBaron, refused to air the programme unless he himself could "seek out and offer equal time to the Communists and the NAACP."[148] Much to the annoyance of the NC Defenders, and in stark opposition to many episodes of public red-baiting, Campbell would not show the programme without giving the NAACP the chance to reply to LeBaron's accusations of red infiltration.[149]

In general terms, though, the Board and membership of the NC Defenders recognised that they needed to "combat the menace to our society posed by the Socialists, Integrationists, Communists, and their fellow-travelers," who were, it was felt, "working night and day with millions of dollars at their disposal to destroy America."[150] By July 1960, new NC Defenders President, the Reverend James P. "Jimmy" Dees, was adamant that unless communist-inspired integration was defeated, "we can be sure that our Southern way of life will be lost to a mulatto culture and a Communist-Socialist system."[151] Specifically, red-baiting was used by the NC Defenders in attempts to discredit the very real dangers posed to continued segregation by the nascent sit-in movement. A radio broadcast by the Alamance County division of the NC Defenders over Radio WFNS AM and FM in February 1960, for example, specifically targeted the Greensboro sit-in protesters. "This is the new negro," the report stated, not only a "protégé of the NAACP," but also a "product

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[148] Earl LeBaron letter to Sterling R. Booth, Jr, 18 January 1959, Holt Papers, Box 1.
[149] It was actually a stipulation of the Federal Communications Commission to offer equal time to both sides of an argument on matters of public controversy. It was, however, usually ignored.
[150] Letter to All Members, 20 June 1959, Holt Papers, Box 1.
[151] James P. Dees letter to "All Members," 23 July 1960, Holt Papers, Box 1.

of communist cunning."[152] By 22 July, the escalating situation required a statement to the press "for immediate release." It was to register a "protest against efforts to racially integrate the lunch counters," as well as wider integration moves. It concluded that the sit-ins violated private property rights, and were established to foment "violence and race hatred and social anarchy, which serve the goals of the Communist offensive."[153]

After George's departure, the NC Defenders' belief in the strong grass-roots support for anti-communism also led them to use it as a device for fund-raising. Dees wrote a letter to potential fund-raisers to donate money for the employment of two full-time secretaries, who should both be sufficiently aware of the situation to attempt to "change the direction in which the State has been, not drifting, but resolutely led by men fronting for the Communist program and Communist-Socialist party and ideology." Dees asked for a total of $50,000, but added that, if donors so wished, "your pledge or contribution will be kept confidential, although every patriotic citizen should be proud to be identified with this battle for survival, and battle for survival it is."[154]

But it was not just the NC Defenders themselves who moved on to red-baiting after George's departure. In the most blatant example of the ties between segregation, red-baiting and States' Rights in North Carolina, W.C. Brown formed the Southern Association for the Restoration of States' Rights, based in Raleigh. Writing to inform Governor Sanford of the group's formation in the Summer of 1963, Brown clarified his nascent group's intended position. "I am proud enough of my State," he began, "to

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[152] "North Carolina Defenders of States' Rights, Inc., Alamance County Division: Radio Broadcast of Sunday, February 28, 1960 over radio WFNS AM & FM 12:45 pm," George Papers, Box 7.
[153] "For Immediate Release," 22 July 1960, Holt Papers, Box 1.
[154] James P. Dees Form Letter, 30 January 1961, Holt Papers, Box 1.

want to protect it from the threat of Segregation, Communism, and Atheism." He did, in fact, "pray for my State each night."[155] Furthermore, as Brown informed Sanford, he believed that "the backbone of North Carolina is initialled JFK on one side and NAACP on the other." There was, therefore, a common theme running through all North Carolina's White Citizens' Councils and organised resistance bodies: unless George was in charge, when red-baiting was unceremoniously avoided, all referred constantly to the primacy of States' Rights, the dangers of integration, the subversion of the NAACP, and the insidious nature of the all-pervasive internal communist threat.

VII

Two high-profile politicians in North Carolina embodied the diverse but equally committed approaches brought by individuals to sustaining segregation in the state. One was Senator Samuel James Ervin, Jr, the other I. Beverly Lake, who had first come to white supremacists' attention for his anti-NAACP remarks whilst Assistant Attorney General in the Summer of 1955. Lake had kept a relatively low profile for the rest of the 1950s, but re-emerged in 1960 as the segregationists' candidate for the upcoming gubernatorial election, and received the NC Defenders' full and enduring support. George himself came out of his self-imposed exile from Citizens' Council activity to write to all former Patriot members. "You will be interested in supporting a candidate," he wrote, "who stands for, and one who will act to preserve segregation of the races in our schools and through our State."[156]

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[155] W.C. Brown letter to Terry Sanford, 30 August 1963, Sanford Gubernatorial Papers, Box 346.
[156] Wesley George letter to "Former Members of the Patriots of North Carolina, Inc.," 5 February 1960, George Papers, Box 7.

By March, Hastings had written to the NC Defenders' President, Jimmy Dees. Using the organisation's own estimate of its membership numbers, Hastings urged Dees to write to each and every one of the Patriots' 20,000 former members. Each one, he felt, should be sent "a well considered letters [sic] setting forth the fact that there is no other man in public life in North Carolina today outside of Dr Lake who would stand a chance of being elected Governor that has stood for segregation of the races like he has."[157] Ever since the two *Brown* decisions, Lake had publicly equated the NAACP with desegregation and communists, or, at the very least, "fellow travelers." To a meeting of the Association of County Accountants in Asheville in the Summer of 1955, for example, he claimed that it was "cruel and dishonourable for the NAACP and its fellow travelers to lead our Negro friends to believe that they have a choice between sending their children to mixed schools or to Negro public schools. In truth," he harshly concluded, "we have no intention of supporting mixed schools."[158] He was still vehemently against the Pearsall Plan and any integration of North Carolina's public schools when the 1960 campaign was under way.

It is difficult to tell whether or not Lake's campaign was specifically aimed at North Carolina's poor white population, traditionally the most welcoming constituency for demagogic appeals to red- and race-baiting, but in replying to his overtures for funding, over a third of the correspondents from whom he received letters claimed that they would be more than willing to send money, but that they could not afford to.[159] Regardless, there were certainly overtones of demagoguery in

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[157] Paul D. Hastings letter to Jimmy P. Dees, 9 March 1960, George Papers, Box 7.
[158] "'Separate Schools For the Races' Address by I Beverly Lake at Meeting of Association of County Accountants, Asheville, N.C., 22 August 1955," Reed Sarratt Papers, Box 3, Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
[159] For a collection of those letters, see George Papers, Box 7.

his campaign, and he red-baited with vigour. "I sincerely trust that the people of North Carolina will elect Dr I. Beverly Lake," wrote former-Patriot and NC Defender W.N. Jefferies in April, as that would ensure a governor "who would investigate our Schools for Communist [sic] and Subversives." Referring to a speech recently given by Lake in Danbury, Jefferies reported that Lake "told the negroes to their teeth and the audience that such matters would be investigated if he is elected." Echoing his controversial 1955 stance, Lake had concluded by promising "that there will be no NAACP in the State of North Carolina if he is Governor."[160] According to George Hodges, North Carolina representative for Virginia's Shenandoah Life Insurance Company, "It will be a disgrace to have our state called southern if we fail in the campaign."[161]

Lake's campaign did not manage to defeat Sanford, but, as Earl Black has pointed out, the second primary provided the sole example of a post-*Brown* runoff in which a more militant segregationist -- in this case Lake -- failed to defeat a more racially moderate opponent -- in this case Sanford.[162] Sanford by no means ran on an integrationist ticket, but was far more in keeping with North Carolina's smooth, sly resistance strategies than his overtly racist opponent.[163] Guy Benton Johnson's daughter, Nancy, witnessed the campaign first-hand. She wrote to her parents shortly after Sanford's victory, explaining that she "became very worried as the Lake and Sanford campaign neared completion." Lake's campaigners, she recalled, showed more zeal and energy than Sanford's, and "the campaign got rather nasty and bitter

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[160] W.N. Jefferies letter to Charles A. Cannon, 14 April 1960, George Papers, Box 7.
[161] George Hodges letter to Wesley George, 26 May 1960, George Papers, Box 7.
[162] Earl Black, Southern Governors and Civil Rights: Racial Segregation as a campaign Issue in the Second Reconstruction (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 217.
[163] Sanford, for example, stated that, "I am and have been on the solid ground of being in favor of the North Carolina approach." Sanford quoted in ibid., p. 217.

toward the end. The Lake supporters...began digging up every tiny detail they could that might smear Sanford's character and make him seem a pawn of the labor unions, the NAACP, or some other influence group. It was," she concluded, "really very messy."[164]

A lawyer and a quintessential, gallus-wearing southern patriarchal gentleman, Samuel James Ervin, Jr, was another of North Carolina's influential resistance leaders.[165] A co-author of the Southern Manifesto, the Senator was a symbol of the segregated South. Like Lake, Ervin was not a formal member of the Patriots or NC Defenders, but often supported the White Citizens' Councils' various approaches to the maintenance of segregation. Like Wesley Critz George, Ervin was an anti-communist, but did not regularly or overtly red-bait. Like Virginia's David Mays, Ervin's response to the two Supreme Court *Brown* decisions were firmly rooted in United States law and legal manoeuvring.

Indeed, in many respects Ervin epitomised the legalistic approach to Massive Resistance. His main argument against *Brown* was not that it allowed communist-dominated outside agitators to destroy the South's racial mores, but rather that it was, simply, the product of incorrect legal procedure: in deciding the case, "The members of the United States Supreme Court as it is now constituted ignored the judicial

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[164] Nancy Johnson letter to her parents ("Dear Folks"), 1 July 1960, Guy Benton Johnson Papers, Box 1, Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
[165] The Samuel J. Ervin, Jr, Papers are at the Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. For an upcoming, all-encompassing biography of Ervin, see Karl E. Campbell, The Last of the Founding Fathers: Senator Sam Ervin and the Road to Watergate (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, forthcoming). A colourful portrait of Ervin is painted by Alistair Cook. "He is seventy-six years old," wrote Cook in 1973, "an old-time -- almost a professional -- Southerner, who is a one-man anthology of Biblical tags and Southern folk wisdom and has a face as homely as a turnip...he is of the earth earthy and yet retains the instinctive courtesy of an old-fashioned Southerner. But, for all his air of being a country lawyer...he is a graduate of the Harvard Law School and the Senate's expert on constitutional law." Alistair Cook, The Americans: Letters From America, 1969-1979 (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1980), pp. 117-118.

process and usurped power to amend the Constitution when they handed down the school segregation decision," he explained to Dr Isaac Taylor of the UNC School of Medicine. "This would never have happened, he thought, had there been "qualified men on the Court."[166] His replies to the only two extant letters he received in the wake of *Brown* that were in favour of integration were suitably brief. "It is obvious that our views diverge," he wrote, "because you think that the Constitution of the United States ought to be interpreted to conform to the precepts of religion while I think it ought to be interpreted to conform with the principles of Constitutional law."[167]

Emphasising a legalistic response to *Brown*, Ervin appeared in a series of heavily pre-scripted television interviews, carefully -- though badly -- choreographed by Dick Morphew, anchorman of the "Program of the Citizens' Council Forum Series."[168] Morphew looked perpetually uncomfortable throughout the series, but Ervin appeared a little more at ease. The Senator talked about proposed federal civil rights legislation in 1959, followed by a programme devoted to a "Discussion of Constitutional Rights and Civil Rights." Despite his hosts' rather more bellicose position, Ervin remained true to his principles. In discussing Constitutional and Civil Rights, for example, Ervin would say no more than that there was "nothing in the school desegregation decision that requires desegregation, it merely prohibits what it called discrimination on racial grounds..."[169]

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[166] Samuel Ervin letter to Dr Isaac Taylor, 2 June 1954, Ervin Papers, Folder 279. Ervin often railed against the appointment to the Supreme Court of only one member who had previous experience as a Judge, and claimed that "only two or three of them ever practised law in a serious manner."
[167] Samuel Ervin letter to Lewis E. Eveline, 12 March 1956, Ervin Papers, Folder 1120.
[168] Copies of these television interviews appear on videotape in "Motion Picture Films" section, Ervin Papers.
[169] "Program of the Citizens' Council Forum series, Discussion of Constitutional Rights and Civil Rights," Tape 1, Film 1, Ervin Papers.

When pushed on matters of anti-communism and the subversive, "red" infiltration of civil rights groups, Ervin did not take the bait. H.L. Coble, of the H.L. Coble Construction Company and a forthright member of the Patriots, told the Senator that he had "long believed that the NAACP was Communist inspired and Communist dominated. That belief is now borne out by the testimony in the Federal Court trial of Junius Scales for violation of the Smith Act."[170] Ervin noted Coble's suggestion that the FBI should be called upon to investigate the NAACP, but rejected it "in view of the fact that the present Administration is 'kowtowing' to this organization..."[171] It would, he felt, "be utterly futile to request that the FBI investigate it. As you know," he concluded, somewhat mischievously, "the FBI is subject to the directions of the Attorney General." That was as close as Ervin got to red-baiting: a knowingly roguish stirring of the waters, but no more.

In a similar manner to George's desire to preserve the impact of his eugenic approach to segregation, Ervin did not want to employ methods that might compromise the strength of his legal stance. He was anti-communist, and freely admitted it. In 1962, for example, Ervin wrote to the First Union Bank's Alan B. Orr that, "I share the views expressed by you in respect to the threat which communism poses to the United States and the free world." He believed it necessary not only to have greater and more numerous weapons than the Soviets, but also to "have the willingness to fight and the will to win if we are to preserve our freedom."[172] Ervin, though, perhaps more than any other Massive Resister in the South, personified the

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[170] H.L. Coble letter to Samuel Ervin, Jr, 26 February 1958, Ervin Papers, Folder 1649.
[171] Samuel Ervin, Jr, letter to H.L. Coble, 5 March 1958, Ervin Papers, Folder 1649.
[172] Samuel Ervin letter to Alan B. Orr, 9 February 1962, Ervin Papers, Folder 2981.

need to differentiate between genuine sentiments of anti-communism and the cynical deployment of red-baiting in the battle to preserve segregation.[173]

Instead of red-baiting, Ervin busied himself with legal obstruction to civil rights legislation of all kinds. When, for example, the Kennedy Administration finally submitted legislation to ban the poll tax in federal elections in February 1962, Ervin was in charge of the Senate subcommittee holding hearings on the proposed legislation. Unsurprisingly, the bill was immediately stalled in the committee stage.[174] More importantly, perhaps, Ervin attempted to derail the landmark 1964 Civil Rights Bill with an amendment which, according to Hubert Humphrey's aide John Sewart, "would have gutted the bill" if it had been adopted.[175] In the wake of cloture in June 1964, time was precious for the southern Democratic caucuses trying to retard the proposed bill's progress. On 10 June, therefore, Ervin proposed a "double jeopardy" amendment, which would prohibit persons being tried in a federal court if they had already been acquitted of the same crime by a state court. The amendment was defeated 47-48, but a later recalculation showed that it should have passed 48-47. Complicated Senate rules, however, forbade its adoption once the mistake had been recognised.[176] The next day, a watered down version of Ervin's amendment,

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[173] By September 1963, Ervin's moderate stance led him to clearly and publicly condemn his more extreme peers, in an attempt to rally southern senatorial support against impending federal civil rights legislation. He refrained, for example, from endorsing George Wallace's use of State Troopers to prevent the opening of the State University at Tuscaloosa. His reasoning was that "such conduct seriously handicaps Southern Senators in their fight against civil rights bills, and aids and abets those who advocate the passage of such bills." Ervin "Form Letter" on George Wallace, as at September 1963, Ervin Papers, Folder 3889.

[174] Mark Stern, Calculating Visions: Kennedy, Johnson and Civil Rights (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1992) pp. 73-4.

[175] John Stewart quoted in Charles and Barbara Whalen, The Longest Debate: A Legislative History of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Cabin John, Md.: Seven Locks Press, 1985), p. 204.

[176] Ervin's amendment should have followed a proposal by Russell Long and Herman Talmadge on jury trial. Once cloture had been invoked, however, Talmadge chose to withdraw his amendment. Ervin's "double jeopardy" amendment had technically been attached to the Talmadge amendment, and thus should also have been passed over in the order of business. ibid., p. 204.

proposing only that a person could not be tried twice under United States law, passed 80-16.[177] Ervin and the South's Democratic caucuses had come within a whisker of undermining the 1964 Civil Rights Act, not by red-baiting, mob-violence or the more extreme forms of Massive Resistance, but by carefully conceived legal manoeuvring.

[177] For more on the debate over Ervin's "double jeopardy" amendment, see ibid. pp. 203-207.

Conclusion

Assessing the importance of anti-communism as a weapon of Massive Resistance is, ultimately, a somewhat difficult affair. Segregationists' success in convincing those on both sides of the Mason-Dixon line that Moscow's hand lay behind the civil rights movement, for instance, cannot readily be measured by empirical data. That task is further complicated by the problems of trying to measure the success of Massive Resistance as a whole. Overall, any evaluation of Massive Resistance's effectiveness must take into account the differences between its long and short term achievements.

In the short term, Massive Resistance was by no means unsuccessful. By using a wide range of tactics to delay the implementation of *Brown*, segregationists certainly succeeded in postponing the inevitable where school desegregation was concerned. A dynamic blend of States' Rights arguments, red-baiting, demagogic rhetoric, white supremacist dogma, specific legislation, pragmatism and occasional mob violence had ensured minimum compliance: there were, for example, no African Americans in white schools or colleges in Mississippi, Alabama or South Carolina by 1962. By 1964, a decade after the first *Brown* decision, only 2.3% of southern blacks attended desegregated schools.[1] Those schools often provided the focal point of segregationist ire in the Massive Resistance era, but it is important to note, as does Steven Lawson, that African American attention in the civil rights movement was equally focused upon obtaining the vote as a means of political advancement. Yet here, too, Massive Resistance enjoyed some palpable short term successes. Southern intransigence had

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[1] Figures quoted in J. Harvie Wilkinson III, From *Brown* to *Bakke*: the Supreme Court and School Integration: 1954-1978 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 65.

also managed to restrict the numbers of southern blacks registering to vote across the South: between 1957 and 1960, for example, black voter registration increased by only 3%. As David Goldfield has pointed out, even that figure was misleading since almost all the gains occurred in the cities.[2] In 1960, only 29.1% of the region's African Americans were registered voters.[3]

By the end of the 1950s, however, southern resistance was already losing much of its intensity, cohesion and potency. Once Eisenhower had, however belatedly, sent federal troops to Little Rock to desegregate Central High in 1957, it was clear that there would be no total victory for proponents of continued southern segregation. In the final analysis, executive power would be used to enforce desegregation, which, after all, was the law of the land. When Virginia's own Massive Resistance laws were struck down by both state and federal courts in 1959, it became clearer still that resisters would not be able to prohibit desegregation by legal manoeuvring any more than they would by mob action. By the early 1960s, moreover, the white South's resistance campaign was faced with an increasingly hostile American public: the civil rights movement had largely succeeded in convincing that public, and northern white liberals in particular, that it was a legitimate movement seeking genuinely American, democratic goals. In contrast, it was segregationists who were now perceived as un-American.[4]

It is testament to the complexities of Massive Resistance, however, that, even in the short-term, victory and defeat were never clear cut. Where, on the one hand, the

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[2] David Goldfield, Black, White, and Southern: Race Relations and Southern Culture 1940 to the Present (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), p. 151.
[3] Figures quoted in Steven F. Lawson, Running For Freedom: Civil Rights and Black Politics in America Since 1941 (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1991), p. 85.
[4] As an indication of the waning of resistance, the number of voting age African Americans registered to vote in the South had risen by 1964 to 43.1%. ibid.

Little Rock crisis forced the federal government into action to ensure compliance with *Brown*, on the other it caused deep fissures in local black civil rights leadership and spurred a tremendous white backlash which further retarded racial progress.[5] When sit-in demonstrations took place in Little Rock in 1960, for example, city authorities took a hard line approach. On one occasion, an Arkansas judge presiding over the trial of a sit-in demonstrator exceeded the maximum sentencing limits set out in the Act under which the protester had been charged.[6] Furthermore, whilst the vitriolic nature of so much of the rhetoric of Massive Resistance -- and the more extreme, violent manifestations of resistance -- united die-hard followers of southern segregation, such aggression could also backfire on the white South. The often belligerent stance of the staunchest segregationists ensured a strong response from both federal government and civil rights activists, and sometimes alienated the region's less dogmatic opponents of desegregation. In the context of widespread and often vituperative white resistance, the civil rights movement ultimately succeeded in precipitating an avalanche of federal intervention and federal legislation, culminating in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965.

The story of Virginia's resistance highlights many of the difficulties inherent in judging the extent of Massive Resistance's success. The Old Dominion's white elites were impressive in their early displays of obduracy. By actually closing some of its public schools, however, Virginia invited fierce and determined opposition from

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[5] John Kirk has noted in the wake of the Little Rock school crisis that Arkansas' "white business leadership looked to return to the state of race relations that predated 1957, with the token integration of the city's schools as the only concession to change. Indeed, they recoiled from any suggestion of using their influence to cultivate a more racially enlightened attitude in the city." John A. Kirk, "Black Activism in Arkansas, 1940-1970," PhD Dissertation, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, 1997, p. 213.

[6] ibid., p. 227.

the federal government and judiciary. Senator Harry Byrd, Sr, did not heed the advice of those such as David Mays who advocated a softer line of resistance, similar to that in North Carolina. Again in the short term, Virginia was successful: with the notable exception of Prince Edward County, where schools were actually closed, segregationists were able to maintain segregated schools until 1959. African American voting registration in the Old Dominion was limited to just 22.8% in 1960, compared to a South-wide total of 29.1%. By 1964, however, once the full effect of the dismantling of Virginia's Massive Resistance laws had been felt, the state's African Americans made impressive gains: in that year, 45.7% of the Old Dominion's voting age blacks were registered to vote, a figure over 2% higher than the South-wide figure for blacks of 43.1%.[7]

North Carolina's "sly resistance" was, if anything, more successful than Virginia's school closures and all-out defiance. The Tar Heel state had largely succeeded in projecting an image that racial change was already underway, and that progressive forces were running the state. In reality, though, there was a minimum of compliance masked by limited, tokenistic desegregation. As a result of this strategy, North Carolina initially faced less acute federal pressure to desegregate thoroughly than her more conspicuously intransigent neighbours. Not only did this allow for slower rates of desegregation, but it also facilitated the continuation of resistance after the Voting Rights Act of 1965.[8]

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[7] Figures quoted in Lawson, Running For Freedom, p. 85.

[8] Jack Bass and Walter De Vries, for example, have demonstrated that, from 1965 to 1974, North Carolina ranked behind only South Carolina and Mississippi in conservative voting records in Congress. Jack Bass and Walter De Vries, The Transformation of Southern Politics: Social Change and Political Consequence Since 1945 (New York: Meridian, 1976), pp. 221-2.

If Massive Resistance's long-term goal is taken -- as it surely must be -- as an attempt to prohibit the desegregation of southern society and exclude the vast majority of southern blacks from the political process, then it clearly failed. After federal legislation addressed civil and voting rights in 1964 and 1965 respectively, the South was forced to scale down what had been a truly extensive, diverse resistance operation. Segregationists, however, were by no means willing to embrace *de facto* racial equality. Instead, the South transformed its strategies, and post-1965 resistance was maintained in more measured, focused and perhaps ultimately more effective ways than it had been in Massive Resistance's heyday. Certainly, continued resistance drew more heavily from the approach of North Carolina's resisters than from Virginia's.

So obdurate did resisters prove to be after the Civil and Voting Rights Acts that it took three further Supreme Court decisions to overcome continued prevarication by local school boards, and to encourage further desegregation in public schools. In 1968, *Green v New Kent County* held that freedom of choice, "local option" plans were no longer an appropriate means of complying with *Brown*; one year later, *Alexander v Holmes County* finally laid to rest the "all deliberate speed" provision of *Brown II*, and ordered school boards "to terminate dual school systems at once"; the 1971 decision in *Swann v Charlotte-Mecklenburg* upheld the 1970 edict of North Carolina Judge James McMillan, who had ordered cross-town busing for black and white school children to ensure a racial mix in public schools.[9] *Swann* may have been brought against a North Carolina school board, but, nonetheless, the decision

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[9] Goldfield, Black, White, and Southern, pp. 257-8.

was greeted with white violence and threats of boycotts.[10] Pickets outside McMillan's house included his neighbours, and he received threatening telephone calls. Indeed, the judge felt so threatened by the response of many of Charlotte's white citizens that he resorted to carrying a gun. Once white North Carolinians were threatened with the probability or real desegregation, the state's carefully constructed moderate facade dissolved.[11]

Seventeen years after the first *Brown* decision, the combined impact of *Green*, *Alexander* and *Swann* succeeded in convincing some -- but by no means all -- southern white parents that school desegregation was inevitable. Whereas 60% of white respondents to a poll had objected to integrated public schools in 1963, that number had dropped to only 16% by 1970.[12] By the mid-1970s, southern schools surpassed their northern counterparts as the least segregated in the US: the South had 47.1% of its school age black population in schools with a white majority, compared to 42.5% in the North.[13]

As the upheavals in Charlotte dramatised, however, not all white southerners were convinced to embrace integration, and resistance to school desegregation lived on. An increasing number of whites fled to the suburbs, for example, and pressed for "neighborhood schools" which would reflect the racial make-up of the new, exclusive white suburbs. Where they could afford it, many concerned white parents sent their children to private schools which became popularly known as "seg academies." As

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[10] One antibusing protester, addressing the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School Board, made his intentions clear by saying, "I served in Korea, I served in Vietnam. I'll serve in Charlotte if I have to." Quoted in Davison M. Douglas, Reading, Writing & Race: The Desegregation of the Charlotte Schools (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), p. 162.

[11] For the mobilisation of antibusing sentiment in North Carolina, see ibid., pp. 160-189.

[12] Goldfield, Black, White, and Southern, p. 262.

[13] Lawson, Running For Freedom, p. 138.

Francis Wilhoit has pointed out, many segregationists attempted to transform their arguments against school desegregation into arguments against busing. In the wake of *Swann*, segregationists attempted to use the issue as a screen for their ongoing racism.[14] Even though a considerable number of US school children -- North and South -- had been bused to school before the *Swann* decision, it was only once busing became a tool for furthering school desegregation that it provided a focus for opposition and outrage.[15]

Even in the wake of the 1965 Civil Rights Act, resistance continued to operate against full and equitable black political participation. In the aftermath of full-scale Massive Resistance, southern segregationists still did their utmost to limit the effectiveness of the black vote. The vote dilution schemes upon which segregationists attached their hopes of maintaining white supremacy were manifold: anti-singleshot or "full-slate" voting systems were introduced, requiring each voter to mark his or her ballot paper for the same number of candidates as there were officers to be elected, thus prohibiting "single-shot" voting; the "majority-vote" rule, stipulating that a run-off election must be held if no candidate received a majority of votes, was widely implemented; and voter wards were gerrymandered to ensure ongoing white political success.

By the mid- to late-1960s, moreover, segregationists had learned many of the harsher lessons of the mid- to late-1950s. They were careful to couch these restrictive

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[14] Wilhoit notes that "The slogan 'No Busing!' is being used today by unreconstructed Massive Resisters in the same way that they used the slogans "states' rights" and "freedom of choice" in the fifties and sixties -- namely, to rationalise their white supremacy racism and make it more palatable to the courts and the nation at large." Francis M. Wilhoit, The Politics of Massive Resistance (New York: George Braziller, 1973), p. 276.

[15] In Charlotte-Mecklenburg, for example, 23,600 pupils were bused to school with the minimum of fuss before *Swann* turned it into an expressly racial issue. Goldfield, Black, White, and Southern, p. 258.

voting practices in sophisticated and opaque terms. In January 1966, a planned racial gerrymander of the Mississippi Delta area, which engineered a white majority in each of five newly created districts, was rejected by Mississippi legislators. They chose instead a plan which created three new districts, one of which preserved a slight black majority. Whereas the first plan would have fallen foul of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the second plan was sufficiently subtle to pass. There was indeed a theoretical majority of blacks in one district, but segregationists had continued to restrict the voting franchise to such an extent that, in practice, a white majority was maintained.[16]

Although manifestations of anti-communism in the United States had preceded the emergence and consolidation of Massive Resistance, the two became inextricably linked. This was in part because the global concerns of the Cold War permeated all facets of southern life; the multiple strands of Massive Resistance became saturated with Cold War anxieties and rhetoric. In such a climate, anti-communism acquired added purchase in the public imagination. It was also partly due to the fact that anti-communism, perhaps more so than any other weapon in the resisters' arsenal, proved to be multi-faceted and highly flexible. As this thesis has suggested, it was utilised by a wide range of pressure groups and individuals in an equally wide variety of ways. More often than not, segregationists employed anti-communism to respond to specific threats to their racial codes and practices. When *Brown* posed a legal threat to continued segregation, for example, all those who were perceived to be behind the decision were targeted: the Supreme Court for deciding in favour of desegregation;

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[16] The first plan was devised by Representative Kenneth Williams. The second, submitted by W.B. Alexander, passed by 25 votes to 21. Frank R. Parker, Black Votes Count: Political Empowerment in Mississippi After 1965 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), p. 17.

the NAACP for bringing the case to court; and Gunnar Myrdal, for co-authoring An American Dilemma. Likewise, when civil rights groups "invaded" a southern town or city, they were singled out by segregationists in concerted campaigns designed to highlight the role of communists in the financing, planning and leadership of that civil rights activity.

It was also hugely important for the segregationist cause to find a means of undermining any internal threat from a small, but potentially troublesome, group of pro-desegregation southern whites. Almost all of the weapons in the resistance arsenal were geared towards stopping northern, federal aggression or discrediting black activism. States' Rights, in particular, offered no defence against southern white racial dissenters. Anti-communism, however, provided segregationists with an extremely effective weapon against those heretical white southerners who actively opposed continued segregation and discrimination in the region. Conversely, it also offered an opportunity to present civil rights agitators as part of a national problem; segregationists attempted to use the ubiquitous anti-communist atmosphere of the 1950s to unite the whole country against the "un-American" forces "invading" the South. Attempts to impose general patterns on segregationists' uses of anti-communism can, however, be misleading. As the case studies of Virginia and North Carolina revealed, committed individuals such as Major Cyr in Albemarle could have a huge impact on the use of anti-communism and red-baiting at the local level, while individuals such as Virginia's Bill Tuck provided links between national and state-wide anti-communist campaigns.

Perhaps every bit as important as stressing the diverse application of anti-communist and red-baiting tactics by segregationists, this thesis also serves as a

reminder that these weapons were by no means guaranteed success. Moreover, it explains that white segregationists did not have a monopoly on anti-communism and red-baiting in the South. On occasion, anti-communism was used as a weapon against them; at others, it was not white but black separatists who took up red-baiting.

Examining the ways in which segregationists used and abused anti-communism helps us to appreciate the often subtle variations in segregationist thought and action in the two decades following the Second World War. For too long, those segregationists have been treated in the historical record as monolithic, inflexible, and often ignorant reactionaries. Rather, many were intelligent, resourceful, pragmatic and rational, even if they geared those talents towards the preservation of racial segregation, white power and, on many occasions, their own personal political advancement. Above all, anti-communism highlights how independent leading segregationists could be in both thought and deed. Some of the region's most influential policy makers and segregationist polemicists took up diametrically opposed positions on the use of red-baiting. Likewise, some tempered their racist outbursts in the knowledge that their actions were being played out on the world stage, where blatant racism would be detrimental to diplomatic attempts to woo newly independent, post-colonial nations into America's sphere of influence. Others, however, simply continued regardless, refusing to let such concerns impinge on what they saw as their right to live in a segregated society.

It was, perhaps, no coincidence that Massive Resistance began to wilt as the effectiveness of anti-communism diminished. As Michael Heale has explained, nation-wide domestic anti-communism had in large part been the domain of the Republican Party. In 1954 and 1958, though, it was the Democrats who controlled

both Houses, and a liberal anti-communist consensus emerged to replace the Republican-led anti-communist one. The end of the Korean War and the death of Josef Stalin somewhat tempered public perception of the USSR as a relentlessly aggressive and recklessly expansionist power; both events paved the way for a long drawn out, tense and expensive stand-off between the two nations, where many had previously feared open warfare. Domestically, a series of Supreme Court decisions in 1956 and 1957 undermined red-baiting and the more injudicious uses of anti-communism.[17] Anti-communism was not dead as a domestic political weapon, but it was certainly moribund.[18]

In the South, however, it took a little longer to dismantle anti-communism and red-baiting as political weapons. This stemmed in part from the animosity that the region's segregationists directed towards the Supreme Court, but also from anti-communism's effectiveness as a weapon of Massive Resistance. In many respects, however, southern anti-communism was a victim of its own success, for it was overused by segregationists and began to face mounting opposition. That overuse was increasingly exposed as hysterical, paranoid, or, indeed, un-American in its frequent disregard for the Constitution and for due process. National opinion swung in support

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[17] See Michael Heale, American Anticommunism: Combating the Enemy Within, 1830-1970 [The American Moment] (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), pp. 191-202. Those Supreme Court decisions included *Pennsylvania v Nelson*, which held that state sedition laws had no validity; and *Jencks v US*, which stated that the defence must have access to confidential information supplied by government informants and the FBI. The Court handed down three decrees in one day on 17 June 1957: two decisions striking down contempt charges against witnesses refusing to answer questions, *Watkins v US* and *Sweezy v New Hampshire*; and *Yates v US*, in which the Supreme Court reversed 14 Smith Act convictions and greatly reduced the scope of the Act.

[18] Communist accusations were, for example, levelled at student radicals in the late 1960s, and against revolutionary groups such as the Black Panthers, but with little success. The Panthers openly supported the Communist regime in North Korea, and often printed letters of support from, and excerpts from speeches of, Kim Il-Sung in their newspaper. See, for example, Kim Il-Sung, "On Intensifying Anti-Imperialists Anti-US Struggle to Crush US Imperialism, Unify and Defend World Peace," The Black Panther: Black Community News Service Vol. IV, No. 3 (20 December 1967) p. 16; Kim Il-Sung, "Left Opportunism and Modern Revisionism," The Black Panther: Black Community News Service Vol. III, No. 32 (29 November 1969) p. 10-11.

of many of those civil rights groups and activists who had previously been targeted as "red." Furthermore, as many of the legal and, indeed, extra-legal weapons of Massive Resistance were removed from the segregationists' armoury by a succession of court decisions and forceful federal interventions, many segregationists became less and less discerning in their attempts to label civil rights activists as communist. They were caught up in a vicious circle: red-baiting was one of the few weapons left with which segregationists could discredit the Movement; the general public was increasingly aware of segregationists' cynical use of red-baiting against the Movement.

By the early 1960s, and certainly by the Voting Rights Act of 1965, anti-communism no longer had a central place in southern resistance strategy. Resistance methods had been transformed, and now offered subtler, often masked forms of opposition to desegregation. After over a decade as one of the white South's most effective and flexible tools of resistance, anti-communism no longer suited the needs of the white South. After the ravages of McCarthyism and the injudicious use of red-baiting by countless demagogic southerners, the one thing that anti-communism could not lend the new era of southern resistance was respectability.

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